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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role and impact of the committee staff 
of the South Korean National Assembly in the scrutiny of government bills. It also 
explores the factors affecting their role and impact focusing on the scrutiny of 
government bills. Parliamentary staff globally have not drawn much academic 
attention with the exception of those in the U.S., and it is difficult to apply the 
theories and concepts in American studies to staff in the legislatures of other 
countries due to the peculiarity of legislatures in the U.S. Moreover, previous 
literature on parliamentary staff has not given much attention to the roles of staff 
in mediation and negotiation between policy actors. 
This research sets out the framework consisting of macro-level institutions, 
network, actors and the interaction between actors, and uses the perspectives of 
policy network theory and new institutionalism to derive key concepts, in the 
context of the South Korean National Assembly, on the features of network; the 
capabilities and orientations of MPs and committee staff members; and historical 
contexts affecting the evolution of institutions. In order to collect and analyse 
empirical data, this research conducted qualitative interviews with 38 committee 
staff members; amendment analysis on 787 amendment opinions in the scrutiny 
of law bills; and legislative case studies on four cases of the legislative process. 
The thesis argues that the committee staff provide information and guide the 
scrutiny; consult with and mediate between policy actors; and play a limited role 
in setting the items of the subcommittee meetings. Generally speaking, the 
impact of them is found to be strong, as evidenced through the interview data and 
amendment analysis. This is because the orientation structures and capabilities 
of MPs and committee staff members are conducive to MPs’ delegation of 
detailed scrutiny to committee staff members; staff members’ participation; and 
MPs’ agreement with them according to the interview data. In addition, political 
controversy affects the role and impact negatively, but technical complexity 
affects positively according to the interview data and amendment analysis. These 
findings are also supported by the legislative case study. The committee staff 
conducted substantive roles in the scrutiny of uncontroversial bills, but their roles 
in amending bills were limited to the translation of the agreement between parties 
in the scrutiny of controversial bills although they specified detailed amendments 
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and conducted scrutiny in the aspects of legal structure and wording in technically 
complex matters. 
The contributions of this research are as follows: First of all, it sheds lights on 
the network managing function of parliamentary staff generally and in Korea in 
particular in their roles such as consultation and mediation. In addition, it also 
sheds light on the nature of issue as the factors affecting the role and impact of 
parliamentary staff differently. Last, but not least, it can be a base of comparative 
research on the legislative staff through studying non-partisan committee staff. 
The major limitation of this research is that it does not address whether the 
findings can be applied to the legislatures of other countries. This limitation is due 
to the peculiarity of South Korean National Assembly, although it shares some 
features of the legislative process with those in the U.K. and U.S. But then, this 
is a major problem with all kinds of comparative social science research and 
ought not to be an excuse not to engage with these important issues. Thus, the 
conduct of a comparative research about parliamentary staff of different countries 
with a consistent framework is suggested as the direction of future studies. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research Question and the Importance of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the role and impact of the committee 
staff of the legislature through examining those of the committee staff in the South 
Korean National Assembly focused on the legislative process of government law 
bills. The research question is summarised as ‘What are the roles and impact of 
the committee staff of the South Korean National Assembly in the legislative 
process of government law bills?; and which factors affect them?’ This study 
exploits the perspectives of policy network theory and new institutionalism which 
emphasise the interdependence of the policy process and the resources, 
capabilities and orientations of policy actors in the policy process. 
The legislative staff organisation has become an important ingredient in the 
establishment of a robust legislature. Members of the legislative branch who are 
politicians are likely to have lower policy expertise than the executive officials 
(Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981, pp.5-6), and the executive branch are 
likely to dominate the policy information channel in the legislative process 
(Whiteman, 1995, p.2). This is an important disadvantage for the legislature in 
facing complex policy problems as an institution dealing with policies. One of the 
efforts to overcome this difficulty is the establishment of the legislative staff and 
support organisation. In the literature about the institutionalisation and 
professionalism of legislatures, the institutionalisation of a quality staff 
organisation has been conceived to be important for the establishment of a robust 
legislature (e.g. Hibbing, 1988; Polsby, 1968; Rush, 2001, ch.5).  
Research on the legislative staff is conducted vigorously in the U.S. According 
to Hammond’s (1984; 1996) two comprehensive reviews, studies in the U.S. 
include those describing the institutional features of staff organisation; those 
focused on individual staff members (background, recruitment and career 
patterns); those about staff role and functions; those about the relationship 
between staff and legislative performance; and those about staff impact.  
Needless to say, those studies have dealt with staff who work for the most 
influential legislatures in the world – the U.S. Congress or state legislatures in the 
U.S. 
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Research about the legislative staff also has been conducted outside the U.S., 
but the research is almost all descriptive, institutional and prescriptive. The 
number of studies about the real role and impact of legislative staff has been 
small compared with that in the U.S. Moreover, theories, concepts and research 
hypotheses developed in the U.S. are rarely used in studies about the legislative 
staff in other countries as Hammond (1984, p.306) states. If we are to understand 
the legislature as a whole, however, it is necessary to study the legislative staff. 
This is not just because they are the institutional basis of the legislature, but also 
because they are actors in the policy process who have their own capabilities and 
orientations, and occupy a position where they could exercise an impact on public 
policy basically by providing legislators with information. 
 
  1.2. Contributions of the Study 
Several contributions are expected from this study. First of all, exploiting the 
policy network perspective, this study gives its attention to the network managing 
function of the legislative committee staff, for example, the consultation with and 
mediation between policy actors, as well as the information and intelligence 
function which has been focused on in the previous literature. The importance of 
the network managing function in the policy network has been recognised in 
governance literature (e.g. Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997a; Rhodes, 1997a). 
Because of the interdependence of the modern policy process and the feature of 
the legislative process as the policy process, the network managing function 
would be required during the legislative process, and the committee staff could 
be a candidate for the network manager. Although the mediation function of the 
committee staff has been recognised in American literature as the integration 
function (DeGregorio, 1995; Patterson, 1970; Sidlow and Henschen, 1985), the 
focus of American literature about the role of the legislative committee staff has 
been on the information and intelligence function as discussed in chapter 4 (also 
see Hammond, 1996). 
On top of that, exploiting the policy network perspective and new institutionalism 
which emphasise the resources, capabilities and orientations of policy actors, this 
study gives its attention to the nature of the issue under scrutiny as a factor 
affecting the role and impact of the committee staff. As discussed in chapter 4, 
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the literature in the U.S. has recognised human factors (chair’s character or 
leadership style and partisanship or expertise of staff members) and 
administrative factors (the structure of staff organisation, committee’s terms of 
reference, chair’s tenure and official power of staff) as important factors. However, 
those factors would not be important in legislatures which were in different 
institutional contexts from the U.S., for example, the South Korean National 
Assembly where the committee staff are non-partisan staff and the committee 
chair has no practical power in the appointment and operation of the committee 
staff is different from the U.S. Congress. This study focuses on the nature of the 
issue – the political controversy and technical complexity of the issue under 
scrutiny – because it affects the value of resources, capabilities and orientations 
of important policy actors – committee staff members and MPs in this study – in 
the legislative process. 
 Thirdly, examining the role and impact of the legislative staff outside the U.S., 
this research could be a base on which staff in the legislatures of diverse 
countries are compared. The need for comparative research on the legislative 
staff has been stressed as Hammond (1996) stated 20 years ago, but most 
studies in this field are on the U.S. congressional staff who have a different status 
– partisan staff – from those in many legislatures of other countries, and do not 
have leverage to give implications to the studies of legislative staff in other 
countries. The committee staff in the South Korean National Assembly are non-
partisan staff and permanent employees of the institution. The legal status of the 
staff gives the opportunity to compare them with those of the legislatures in other 
countries who have similar legal status.  
Last but not least, this research could present implications for the legislatures of 
newly-democratised countries in the aspect of the institutionalisation of the 
legislative branch. South Korea is the 24th with France – the second highest in 
Asian countries after Japan – in the democracy index 2016 (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2017), and the 13th economy in the world according to GNI (PPP) 
in 2015 (The World Bank Group, 2016). It is a country that has achieved both 
democratisation and industrialisation and could be a good model for newly-
democratised countries. When it comes to the institutionalisation of the legislature, 
the case of the South Korean legislative staff could give insights for them if the 
competitive staff organisation is found to be helpful for a robust legislature. 
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  1.3. The Context 
This research analyses the role and impact of the committee staff of the 
legislature through examining those of the committee staff in the South Korean 
National Assembly focused on the legislative process of government law bills. 
Firstly, this research pays attention to the legislative process of government law 
bills. A government law bill is a manifestation of a policy of the executive and the 
executive tries to pass the bill in the legislature to achieve its own policy 
preference, so the legislative process of government law bills reveals the 
relationship between the legislature and the executive well and is a policy process 
in which the legislative staff function as a resource of expertise of the legislature 
to overcome the discrepancies of policy information and expertise between the 
legislature and executive. Thus, it is possible to see whether the legislative staff 
contribute to the policy capacity of the legislature and alleviate the asymmetry of 
information and expertise by investigating the role of legislative staff in the 
scrutiny of government law bills. 
Secondly, this research focuses on the committee staff. This is because the 
committee stage is the core of the legislative process in committee-centred 
legislatures such as that of South Korea and it has been demonstrated that the 
committee staff play a more significant role in the legislative process than other 
staff studied in previous literature – especially those about the U.S. congress. 
Moreover, the reinforcement of committees has been emphasised for the 
improvement of the legislative process even in plenary-centred legislatures (e.g. 
the British House of Commons) due to the expertise and non-partisan 
atmosphere of committees (Brazier, 2004) and the consolidation of the committee 
staff system can be a measure of the reinforcement. 
Finally, there are several reasons for selecting the National Assembly of South 
Korea as the context of this research. First of all, the committee staff in the South 
Korean National Assembly are non-partisan staff and are immune to political 
appointments as are those in many countries except the U.S. where the 
committee staff are appointed and dismissed by committee chairs or ranking 
minority members usually on a partisan basis. Therefore, this research could 
provide different implications about the relationship between MPs and staff 
members from those of research in the U.S. which are difficult to apply to other 
legislatures where staff are non-partisan. On top of that, the committee staff in 
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the South Korean legislature can present their reviews on bills and suggest their 
opinions at the committee and subcommittee meetings. This unique procedure 
enables investigation of the impact of the committee staff, and the study of the 
committee staff, who can advise MPs on the policy aspect at official committee 
meetings, could provide implications for discussions about the improvement of 
the legislature’s policy expertise in the legislative process by the reinforcement of 
the legislative staff system. Finally, the researcher has been a legislative staff 
member in South Korea, which gives an insight for this research and enables 
easier collection of data and conducting of research about the legislature. 
 
1.4. Theoretical Perspectives and the Basic Arguments of the Thesis 
The role and impact of a policy actor in the policy process derive from the 
interactions that the actor has with other policy actors. Therefore, if the role and 
impact of a policy actor are to be investigated, the interactions and relationships 
among actors have to be examined. The interactions and relationships are 
affected by the features of actors, the policy network and macro-level institutions 
in which the actors and network are embedded (Marsh, 1998a, pp.192-197; 
Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.4-10; Scharpf, 1997, ch.2). Actors are direct agents 
of interaction (Dowding, 1991, p.10). Networks provide the locus in which the 
actors behave, and actors are bearers of their positions in the network (Marsh, 
1998a, p.194; Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.6-7). Networks also affect the setting 
of issues and solutions and the way they are dealt with (Marsh, 1998a, p.195; 
Marsh and Smith, 2000, p.6). Macro-level institutions exert influences on the 
change of networks (Marsh, 1998a, p.195; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, pp.257-
258; Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.7-8; Smith, 1993, pp.93-97) and affect actors’ 
capabilities and orientations (Goodin, 1996, p.17; Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.6-
7; Pierson, 2004, p.169; Shaprf, 1997, pp.12, 40). One more important point to 
be mentioned is that the formation of macro-level institutions is affected by 
historical contexts (Thelen, 1999, pp.382, 384). 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the features of those elements (interaction 
among actors, actor, network, macro-level institutions and historical contexts) 
and the relationships between those elements. For the purpose of this study, it is 
necessary to analyse the features of actors and networks relevant to the 
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legislative process and macro-level institutions surrounding the legislature and 
the mechanism through which their features affect the interaction between 
committee staff members and MPs in the legislative process. In this study, policy 
network perspectives and new institutionalism are adopted for the work. The 
policy network perspective is useful for the analysis of the features of a network 
and the relationship between network and actor (especially the capabilities of 
actors) and between the network and interactions among actors. New 
institutionalism is useful for the analysis of features of actors and the relationships 
between: actors and interaction among actors, actor and macro-level institutions, 
and the network and macro-level institutions. It (in particular, historical 
institutionalism) is also helpful for the analysis of the origins and formation of 
macro-level institutions affected by historical contexts. 
When it comes to the policy network perspective, the focus is on the 
interdependence due to resource dependency and on network management. 
First of all, a resource dependency approach is useful for the explanation of how 
the interdependence in a network affects the capabilities of policy actors and 
interactions among them. According to the approach, policy resources are 
dispersed among policy actors and they need to interact with each other to 
exchange or transact resources that they want (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.36; 
Klijn, 1997, p.22; Rhodes, 1986a, p.17; 1999, pp.78-79; Van Waarden, 1992, 
p.31). The capabilities (power) of policy actors are based on the resources they 
have and the way resources are transacted (Klijn, 1997, p.22; Rhodes, 1986a, 
p.17; 1999, pp.78-79; Smith, 1993, p.59). 
On top of that, the focus on the network management emphasises that the 
feature of the network as a mechanism of collective action requires the function 
of network management in the interaction among actors in the policy network. 
The aims of network management are coordinating actors with different interests 
and orientations to a policy issue and enhancing the joint problem solving ability 
of a policy network (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997b, p.10; Kickert and 
Koopenjan, 1997, p.45). Thus, facilitating negotiation and consultation between 
actors is one of the foci of network management (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, 
p.44). The abilities and skills required a network manager include those of 
negotiation or mediation, a certain amount of expertise, impartiality and 
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independence, and other actors’ acknowledgement of the network manager’s 
legitimacy (Kickert and Koopenjan, 1997, p.58). 
Among the diverse approaches of the new institutionalism, this study pays 
attention to rational choice, normative and historical institutionalism. First of all, 
rational choice institutionalism pays attention to individual actors’ intentional 
behaviour to maximise their own utility (Peters, 2012, p.51). It is useful for the 
explanation of strategic interaction among actors that is affected by their 
capabilities and orientations (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.945, 951; Scharpf, 1997, 
pp.5-6) and for the examination of social actors’ self-interested orientations. 
Normative institutionalism suggested by March and Olsen (1989; 1995; 1996; 
2006) emphasised the logic of appropriateness that enforces actors to oblige with 
their socially expected role in a given circumstance (March and Olsen, 1989, 
p.160). It is helpful for the examination of the influence of macro-level institutions 
on the orientations of actors. Historical institutionalism focuses on the influence 
of decision making in the past and derives key concepts, such as path 
dependence (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.941-942; Levi, 1997; Peters, Pierre and 
King, 2005; Pierson, 2000; 2004; Thelen, 1999), critical juncture (Collier and 
Collier, 1991) and punctuated equilibrium (Krasner, 1984) to explain the influence. 
It is good at tracing the origins and formation of macro-level institutions affected 
by historical contexts. 
In particular, when it comes to the orientations of MPs and committee staff 
members, this study refers to specific theories in the tradition of rational choice 
and normative institutionalism. For the orientations of MPs, Fenno’s (1973) triads 
(re-election, influence within the House and good public policy); the orientations 
to re-election (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1989); Searing’s (1994) four preference 
roles (policy advocate, parliament men, ministerial aspirants and constituency 
members); and Rush’s (2001) three roles (a partisan role, a constituency role and 
a scrutiny role) are referred to. For those of committee staff members, the career-
concern model (Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999a; 1999b; Dixit, 2002, 
pp.703-704; Holstrőm, 1982) that focuses on the civil servants’ orientations to 
promotion and growth in their career and public service motivation theory (e.g. 
Perry and Wise, 1990; Perry, 1996; Perry and Hondaghem, 2008a; Perry and 
Vandenabeele, 2008) that emphasises altruistic and community-oriented 
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features of civil servants’ motivations are referred to. The theoretical framework 
and perspectives discussed so far is summarised in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1. Theoretical framework and perspectives 
Policy network 
perspective 
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Historical 
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* Those terms – capabilities and orientations – are borrowed from Scharpf (1997). 
 
The basic arguments of this thesis are derived from the application of those 
theoretical perspectives to the scrutiny of government law bills in the legislature 
of South Korea. When the discussion about the interdependence and network 
management is applied to the legislative process, the legislative arena is 
perceived as a network of interdependent actors in which each individual actor 
cannot monopolise all resources necessary in the legislative process. The 
capabilities of each actor in the network is based on the resources that they have. 
The legislative process is perceived as collective action among relevant policy 
actors. This interdependence requires the network management function in the 
legislative process. Therefore, the basic role of the committee staff may be to 
provide information during the legislative process due to their knowledge about 
the legislative process, technical knowledge in legislation and a certain level of 
policy expertise (from the resource dependence approach), and they also could 
be network managers who mediate and arbitrate among other policy actors (from 
the network management perspective) because the committee staff in the 
legislature of South Korea are non-partisan staff; do not have any direct stake in 
an individual policy; occupy the centre of the information channel among other 
actors; and conduct working level legislation. 
The committee staff can exert a substantive impact through the roles of 
information provider and network manager due to the orientation structure of MPs 
and themselves. The orientation structure of MPs, who give their attention to their 
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diverse roles, may inhibit them from focusing on the scrutiny of government law 
bills. For MPs who have orientations to their own constituencies, parties and 
policies, the scrutiny of government law bills can have the feature of production 
of public goods in which there is no exclusive reward, but there is  a cost of time 
and attention. Thus, they may delegate detailed scrutiny of government law bills 
to the committee staff. Conversely, for committee staff members, who are 
permanent employees of the legislature; have orientations to promotion and 
growth in their career; are in need of demonstrating their competency in the 
scrutiny; and have orientations to participate in the policy process and the public 
interest, the scrutiny of government law bills can have the feature of production 
of private goods from which they take exclusive rewards. Therefore, they may 
actively intervene in the scrutiny of government law bills. 
For the factors to affect the role and impact of the committee staff, this thesis 
pays attention to the features of the issues under scrutiny – the political 
controversy and technical complexity in policy and legislation. This is because 
the two features affect the network and actors’ capabilities and orientations. 
Firstly, political controversy increases the degree of conflict among actors and 
makes network management difficult. The committee staff who have no official 
authority have difficulty in conducting the network managing function. It also 
increases the values of resources that MPs have – official authority and political 
knowledge and skills – and draws the attention of them because of the high 
political stakes and opportunities to raise their profile. Conversely, due to the 
norms of impartiality and anonymity, committee staff members have low 
motivation for active engagement in the scrutiny. Secondly, technical complexity 
increases the values of resources that committee staff members have – technical 
knowledge in legislation and a certain level of policy expertise. In addition, 
committee staff members have high motivation because they can demonstrate 
their competency. Conversely, due to the bigger costs of time and attention, MPs 
may have low motivation. To sum up, political controversy has negative effects 
on the role and impact of the committee staff, but technical complexity has 
positive effects. 
 
1.5. The Overview of the Thesis 
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The next chapter introduces the contexts surrounding the subject of this thesis. 
The chapter presents an overview of the South Korean National Assembly. First 
of all, the historical change of the role and function of the legislature is introduced. 
Secondly, the election, nomination and roles of MPs are explained. Thirdly, the 
organisation of the legislature – important posts, committees, party and legislative 
support system – is described. Finally, the operation of the legislature – the 
legislative process and parliamentary politics – is explained. In the introduction of 
contexts, the features of institutions affecting the features of the network and 
actors are explained through tracing the historical origin and change. 
Chapter 3 is the introduction of the committee staff system in the South Korean 
National Assembly with a comparison to those in other countries’ legislatures at 
a descriptive level. The legislatures compared are those of the U.K., the U.S, 
Australia and Germany. The selection is to explore the influence of formal 
institutions – the government system (parliamentary system and presidential 
system), the status of the upper chamber (strong and weak) and the status of 
committees in the legislative process (committee-centred legislative process and 
plenary-centred legislative process) – on the roles of the committee staff in the 
legislature. The organisation, role and function, legal status and norms of the 
committee staff in those legislatures are described and the differences in the roles 
of committee staff are highlighted. The committee staff system in the legislatures 
of those four countries are not referred to again in this thesis, not only because 
the focus of this study is on that in the legislature of South Korea, but because 
the aim of the description of those legislatures is to expedite the understanding 
of that in the legislature of South Korea through the comparison. 
Chapter 4 reviews previous literature about the legislative staff. The review 
basically aims to give a comprehensive review of the studies about the legislative 
staff. When it comes to the studies in the U.S., however, the review focuses on 
those about the role, function and impact of the legislative staff. In addition, the 
literature in South Korea and Western Europe is reviewed. Through the review, 
the implications and limitations of studies about the committee staff are identified, 
and research needs and directions are derived. 
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with theory and methodology. Chapter 5 discusses the 
theoretical framework and perspectives of this thesis. The framework consisting 
of actors, the network, macro-level institutions and historical contexts is 
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introduced. The policy network perspective and new institutionalism to examine 
the features of these elements in the framework and the relationship between 
them are discussed. In addition, from the application of the framework and 
perspectives, key concepts of this thesis are derived 
Chapter 6 discusses methodological issues and explains data collection and 
analysis in this thesis. This study conducts interviews with the former and current 
committee staff members in the South Korean National Assembly; amendment 
analysis which investigates the initiator(s), significance and acceptance of 
amendment opinions in the scrutiny of government law bills; and legislative case 
studies which compare the role and impact of the committee staff during the 
scrutiny of bills that show different degrees of political controversy and technical 
complexity – the factors affecting the role and impact of the staff. Starting with 
the discussion of the challenges in studying the legislative staff, the reasons for 
the use of diverse methods are explained. Then, the methods of data collection 
and analysis are described as transparently as possible. 
From chapter 7 to chapter 9, findings from the analysis of empirical data are 
reported. Chapter 7 examines the roles and impact of the committee staff. 
According to the interview data, in addition to the role as information provider, 
they guide the scrutiny of bills and conduct the consultation and mediation 
function among policy actors during the legislative process. The reasons they 
perform those functions are explained through the application of the policy 
network perspective. In addition, the impact of the committee staff is analysed 
through the interview data and amendment analysis.  
Chapter 8 explains the factors affecting the role and impact. The sources of staff 
members’ impact are identified from the interview data. Based on the sources of 
the impact, the mechanism through which the committee staff exert impact in the 
legislative process is traced. From the mechanism, the factors affecting the role 
and impact of the committee staff are examined. The effects of the two key factors 
of this thesis – political controversy and technical complexity – are investigated 
more by amendment analysis. In addition, the nature of staff members’ impact is 
addressed based on the analyses in the chapter and chapter 7. 
Chapter 9 is about the legislative case study that examines four cases of 
legislative process. The argument in chapter 8 that the impact of the committee 
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staff depends on the features (political controversy and technical complexity) of 
issues under scrutiny is examined by the in-depth case study. The cases are 
selected according to the logic of most similar systems design (Przeworski and 
Teune, 1982, pp.32-34). Through the case study, the concrete examples in which 
the role and impact of the committee staff vary according to the two key factors 
in this thesis are presented.  
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2. The Legislature of South Korea 
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the context of this thesis – the National 
Assembly of South Korea – and trace the relationship between the historical 
contexts and parliamentary institutions in South Korea. The Provisional 
Legislative Council convened in Shanghai in April 1919 (Japanese colonial era) 
could be identified as the first legislature of Korea as the legislative branch of 
modern democratic policy and the precursor of the National Assembly (National 
Assembly, 2012). After the liberation from Japan, the Constituent Assembly was 
convened in 1948 as the legislature of a new independent nation. 
The legislature was conceived as weak in the era of the authoritarian regime. 
The legislature was dominated by the influence of the executive and the imperial 
presidency of South Korea (Kim, 2004, pp.30-32; Park, 2004a, p.45). Governing 
parties which were subordinated by the executive dominated the legislature (Lee, 
2004, pp.95-96). The concentration of power in the President strengthened the 
party discipline of the governing party and exacerbated the subordination of the 
legislature to the executive (Park, 2004, p.277). The President saw the legislature 
as his subordinate or excluded it from the policy process (Chong, 2004, p.113). 
The legislature of South Korea was disregarded by the authoritarian dictatorship 
(Chong, 2004, pp.115-116). The National Assembly of South Korea played the 
role of rubber stamping to pass bills which the executive preferred (Kim, 2006, 
p.17). 
The need for the construction of a political and administrative system 
appropriate for rapid economic development weakened the status of the 
legislature. The efficient mobilisation of limited resources and a focus on 
promising industries were considered as the way for economic development 
(Park, 2003, p.28). The executive was centred in the policy making process to 
implement development policy preferring economic rationality (Park, 2003, p.28). 
The executive monopolised information and human resources to achieve the 
goals of economic development (Kang, 2005, p.322). Elites in the authoritarian 
regimes considered the legislature as an inefficient decision-making body 
representing special interests or regional interests (Park, 2003, p.29). The 
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function of the legislature was shrunk under the authoritarian regimes 
emphasising efficiency (Kang, 2004, p.165; Park, 2004a, p.23). 
After the democratisation in 1987, the National Assembly of South Korea began 
to gain autonomy and power. The power of the inspection and investigation of 
state administration was resurrected in 1987. Pre-appointment hearings on 
ministerial and other important posts were introduced in early 2000s. The number 
of private members’ bills has skyrocketed since 1988 and the percentage of 
government bills rejected by the legislature has also increased (see section 2.4). 
The law-making activities of MPs have been invigorated and the influence of the 
executive in the legislative process has been weakened (Lim, 2010, p.33). The 
legislature has been gaining autonomy from the executive (Kim, 2009a, p.241). 
The National Assembly of South Korea can be conceived as a policy-influencing 
legislature in the typology of Norton (1990) (Kim, 2006, p.20). 
Legacies from the past, however, also remain in parliamentary politics. The 
National Assembly of South Korea still focuses on the function of being a safety 
valve or tension release, rather than on law-making or administrative oversight 
(Park, 2003, p.100). The conception of the legislature as the arena of political 
strife still exists, which had the feature of democratic resistance to the 
authoritarian regimes in the past. Policy capabilities of parties, which were 
organisations for election campaigns (governing parties) or those for democratic 
movement (opposition parties), is still weak (see section 2.3). The strengthened 
power of the legislature has become the weapon of political strife in the legislature 
and exacerbated conflicts between parties rather than increased the policy 
capacity of the legislature (Park, 2001, p.72). The National Assembly of South 
Korea can be conceived as exerting ‘strong political control and weak policy 
control’ (Park, 2001, p.72). 
This mixed status of the legislature is influenced by the historical contexts of 
South Korea. The following sections introduce institutions surrounding policy 
actors in the legislative process of South Korea and provide linkage between the 
institutions and historical contexts influencing them. The next section is about 
election, nomination and MPs. Along with the introduction of the election and 
nomination system and official power, privileges and duties of MPs, the features 
of electoral cleavages and MPs’ roles are explained. The section is followed by 
the introduction of organisations in the National Assembly of South Korea. After 
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the explanation of the historical cause of the unicameral composition of the 
legislature and introduction of important posts (the Speaker, deputy speakers and 
committee chairs), the features of committees and parties are discussed. Finally, 
the operation of the legislature is explained. The introduction of official process 
and features of the legislative process is followed by a discussion about the 
realities of parliamentary politics. The discussion recalls the mixed status of the 
legislature of South Korea. 
 
2.2. Election, Nomination and MPs 
  2.2.1. Election 
The official system and its history 
The 20th National Assembly in South Korea has 300 MPs. MPs can be classified 
into two categories by the way they are elected: One is local constituency 
members, and the other is proportional representatives. The number of local 
constituency members is 253 and that of proportional representatives is 47. The 
election of local constituency members is through the first-past-the-post system 
(Public Official Election Act 2005, art. 188(1)). One MP is elected in a 
constituency. If there is a vacancy in the local constituency, a by-election would 
be held in the constituency where the vacancy happened (Public Official Election 
Act 2005, art. 200(1)). The constituency of proportional representatives is the 
whole country (Public Official Election Act 2005, art. 20(1)). Candidates for 
proportional representatives are nominated by parties which decide the rankings 
of candidates to be elected before the election. The seats are allocated to parties 
in proportion to the votes obtained (Public Official Election Act 2005, art. 189). If 
there is a vacancy among the proportional representatives, the next candidate 
according to rankings of candidates succeeds to the seat (Public Official Election 
Act 2005, art. 200(2)). Candidates for MPs should be over 25 years old (Public 
Official Election Act 2005, art. 16(2)). The term of MPs is four years (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987, art. 42) and the National Assembly is 
not dissolved in this term. 
The history of the general election system is summarised in table 2.1. One 
important feature is the distorted allocation of proportional representatives under 
the authoritarian regimes supporting the interests of the President and governing 
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parties. The system of proportional representatives was introduced in the 6th 
general election (in 1963) after the military coup in 1961. The majority party which 
won the most seats in the local constituency election was guaranteed to secure 
half (from 6th to 8th) or two-thirds (11th and 12th) of seats allocated to the 
proportional representation system. The President appointed proportional 
representatives in the 9th and 10th National Assemblies. The proportional 
representative system along with multimember districts (2 MPs per local 
constituency) in the 1970s and 1980s exacerbated the unrepresentativeness of 
parliamentary elections. For example, the governing party occupied 62.8 per cent 
of total seats (135 / 231) in the 10th assembly although they obtained only 31.7 
per cent of votes (Ho, 2005, pp.231, 239). The electoral legitimacy of the 
governing party was not secured (Park, 2004a, p.219). 
Table 2.1. The history of the general election system in South Korea 
General 
Election 
1st – 5th 
(Until 1960)* 
6th – 8th 
(1963, 1967 
and 1971) 
9th and 10th 
(1973 and 
1978) 
11th and 12th 
(1981 and 
1985) 
After 13th 
(After 1988) 
Electoral 
formula 
First-past-
the-post 
First-past-
the-post 
Plurality Plurality 
First-past-
the-post 
The number of 
local 
constituency 
members per 
constituency 
1 1 2 2 1 
Ballot structure 
Single non- 
transferable 
vote 
Single non- 
transferable 
vote 
Single non- 
transferable 
Vote 
Single non- 
transferable 
vote 
Single non- 
transferable 
vote 
Proportional 
Representatives 
No 
A quarter of 
all MPs 
One-third of 
all MPs 
One-third of 
all MPs 
Variable 
(being 
decreased) 
Allocation of 
proportional 
representatives 
- 
Majority 
party are 
guaranteed 
half of 
them** 
Appointment 
by the 
President 
 
 
Majority 
party are 
guaranteed 
two-thirds of 
them*** 
According to 
the number 
of seats or 
votes**** 
 
* When it comes to the 5th Assembly composed of two chambers, the electoral system for the 
lower chamber is described. 
** Remaining seats were allocated according to the votes from local constituency elections 
*** Remaining seats were allocated according to the number of seats from local constituency 
elections 
**** According to the number of seats from local constituencies (13th and 14th, 1988 and 1992, but 
majority party are guaranteed half of them in the 13th); the votes from local constituency elections 
(15th and 16th, 1996 and 2000); and the votes to parties for proportional representatives elections 
(after 17th, after 2004) 
Sources: Kim (1998, p.57) and electoral laws from 1948 to 2016 
 
Moreover, the proportional representation system did not contribute to 
enhancing the expertise of the legislature through recruitment of professionals 
17 
 
from diverse fields. The system was introduced in order that politicians from the 
military who have no base in a local constituency take seats in the legislature 
(You and Moon, 2007, p.123). Opposition parties exploited the system to finance 
parties themselves rather than to secure expertise and representativeness of 
MPs (Chung, 1995, p.68; You and Moon, 2007, p.123). The committee activities 
of proportional representatives were not based on their expertise (Chung, 1995, 
p.73). 
The low rates of incumbents’ re-election 
One of the important features of the general election in South Korea is the low 
rates of re-election of incumbents as demonstrated in table 2.2. This is because 
of public distrust of and disappointment in the legislature (Cho, 2000, p.117; Seo, 
2010, p.65; Ka, 2013, p.75) due to political strife, fierce conflict and frequent 
stalemates in the legislature (The public distrust and its causes are discussed in 
section 2.4). Because of the public distrust, parties recruit candidates from 
outside and replace incumbents (Seo, 2010, p.65). The replacement of 
incumbent MPs in nomination is indirectly examined through the number of 
candidates as incumbent MPs in table 2.3. The real replacement figures in the 
nomination stage would be bigger because incumbent MPs who do not get the 
nomination of their own party could run for the election as independent 
candidates or candidates of other parties. These high rates of replacement of 
incumbents make professionalization of MPs and securing their policy expertise 
difficult, which becomes more explicit in the distribution of the numbers of MPs’ 
terms (table 2.4). 
Table 2.2. Re-election rates of incumbents in local constituency elections 
General Election 
The number of 
local 
constituency 
The number of 
incumbents re-
elected 
Re-election 
rates of 
incumbents 
Turnover rates 
of incumbents 
13th (1988) 224 66 29.5% 70.5% 
14th (1992) 237 118 49.8% 50.2% 
15th (1996) 253 102 40.3% 59.7% 
16th (2000) 227 118 52.0% 48.0% 
17th (2004) 243 88 36.2% 63.8% 
18th (2008) 245 129 52.7% 47.3% 
19th (2012) 246 108 43.9% 56.1% 
20th (2016) 253 138 53.5% 46.5% 
Sources: Seo (2010, p.64) and National Election Commission (2016) 
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Table 2.3. Candidates as incumbent MPs 
General Election Incumbent MPs 
Candidates as 
incumbent MPs 
Replacement rates of 
incumbents 
17th 
(2004) 
268 167 37.7% 
18th 
(2008) 
291 198 32.0% 
19th 
(2012) 
291 170 41.6% 
20th 
(2016) 
292 192 34.2% 
Sources: The report of the proceedings of the National Assembly (various issues) and National 
Election Commission (2016) 
 
Table 2.4. The numbers of MPs’ terms 
Number of 
terms 
Assembly 
1st 2nd 3rd 
4th or 
more than 4th 
13th 
(1988-1992) 
174 
(56.5%) 
60 
(19.5%) 
43 
(14.0%) 
31 
(10.0%) 
14th 
(1992-1996) 
156 
(45.6%) 
90 
(26.3%) 
46 
(13.5%) 
50 
(14.6%) 
15th 
(1996-2000) 
159 
(47.5%) 
72 
(21.5%) 
52 
(15.5%) 
52 
(15.5%) 
16th 
(2000-2004) 
139 
(44.4%) 
89 
(28.4%) 
35 
(11.2%) 
50 
(16.0%) 
17th 
(2004-2008) 
206 
(63.6%) 
57 
(17.6%) 
43 
(13.3%) 
18 
(5.5%) 
18th 
(2008-2012) 
158 
(47.7%) 
91 
(27.5%) 
48 
(14.5%) 
34 
(10.3%) 
19th 
(2008-2012) 
171 
(51.5%) 
73 
(22.0%) 
53 
(16.0%) 
35 
(10.5%) 
20th 
(2016-) 
132 
(44.0%) 
70 
(23.3%) 
47 
(15.7%) 
51 
(17.0%) 
Sources: National Assembly Secretariat (2012) and personal correspondence with Proceedings 
Bureau in the National Assembly Secretariat (2017) 
 
Electoral regionalism 
The second important feature of the general election in South Korea is the 
regional cleavage. Each major party has a regional base where it has dominant 
status. The regional cleavage is basically divided between south-eastern and 
south-western areas as demonstrated in table 2.5. This regional cleavage 
appeared in the 13th general election in 1988. As the founding election after 
democratisation in 1987, this general election bears the responsibility for the four-
party system in which the major four parties had regional bases (Cho, 2000, p.40; 
Kang, 2005, p.50). The current regional cleavage basically originated in this 
election. For this reason, the 13th general election was the critical election of Key 
(1955) that established electoral regionalism (Jung, 2008a, pp.29, 89; Kang, 
2005, p.259). 
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Table 2.5. The rates of regional dominant parties’ seats 
Regions 
 
 
General Election 
South-western area South-eastern area 
North Jeolla 
Gwangju and 
South Jeolla 
Daegu and 
North 
Gyeongsang 
Busan, Ulsan 
and South 
Gyeongsang 
13th 
(1988) 
100% (14/14) 
PPD 
95.7% (22/23) 
PPD 
86.2% (25/29) 
DJP 
62.2% (23/37) 
PRD 
14th 
(1992) 
85.7% (12/14) 
DP 
100% (25) 
DP 
68.8% (22/32) 
DLP 
79.5% (31/39) 
DLP 
15th 
(1996) 
92.9% (13/14) 
NCNP 
100% (23) 
NCNP 
40.6% (13/32) 
NKP 
86.4% (38/44) 
NKP 
16th 
(2000) 
90% (9/10) 
MDP 
84.2% (16/19) 
MDP 
100% (27/27) 
GNP 
97.4% (37/38) 
GNP 
17th 
(2004) 
100% (11/11) 
UP 
70% (14/20) 
UP 
96.3% (26/27) 
GNP 
82.9% (34/41) 
GNP 
18th 
(2008) 
81.8% (9/11) 
UDP 
80% (16/20) 
UDP 
68% (17/25) 
GNP 
70.7% (29/41) 
GNP 
19th 
(2012) 
81.8% (9/11) 
DUP 
 84.2% (16/19) 
DUP 
100% (27/27) 
SNP 
90% (36/40) 
SNP 
20th 
(2016) 
70% (7/10) 
PP 
88.8% (16/18) 
PP 
84% (21/25) 
SNP 
67.5% (27/40) 
SNP 
Source: National Election Commission (2016) 
PPD: Party for Peace and Democracy, DJP: Democratic Justice Party, PRD: Party for the 
Reunification and Democracy, DP: Democratic Party, DLP: Democratic Liberal Party, NCNP: 
National Congress for New Politics, NKP: New Korea Party, MDP: Millennium Democratic Party, 
GNP: Grand National Party, UP: Uri Party, UDP: United Democratic Party, DUP: Democratic 
United Party, SNP: Saenuri Party, PP: People’s Party 
 
Before democratisation, the main political cleavage was whether to support 
authoritarian regimes or not. The voting pattern is succinctly stated in the phrase 
of ‘governing party in the countryside and opposition parties in the cities’ (Cho, 
1993, p.53). This cleavage was weakened along with the growth of 
democratisation. Under this situation, electoral regionalism is attributed to several 
historical contexts. Firstly, the ideological spectrum among mainstream parties 
was narrow and the difference in their policies was not big because the 
confrontation with North Korea and the experience of war kept progressive parties 
from entering mainstream politics (Cho, 2000, p.48; Choi and Park, 2010, pp.33, 
253). Secondly, authoritarian regimes discriminated against south-western areas 
in allocation of resources and programmes in implementing economic 
development policies by focusing on south-eastern areas (Cho, 2000, p.48; Kang, 
2008, p.473). The discrimination alienated south-western area and brought about 
regional sentiments (Kang, 2008, p.473).  
Thirdly, politicians mobilised regionalism. The democratisation in 1987 was a 
compromise between the authoritarian regime and pro-democracy forces, and 
surviving authoritarian forces exploited regional antagonism in their leader’s 
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home region (North Gyeongsang) for electoral interests in the presidential 
election and general election (Kang, 2008, p.473). Two prominent leaders (two 
Kims) in opposition parties under the authoritarian regimes – one was from Jeolla 
and the other from South Gyeongsang – constructed a charismatic status during 
the democratisation movements and also provoked regional sentiments to 
mobilise support in the elections (Kang, 2008, p.473). Fourthly, the electorate in 
those regions had the perception that the electoral victory of politicians from their 
region would be favourable for them from their experience of the implementation 
of development policies under the authoritarian regimes (Cho, 2000, p.89, 150). 
Even in Seoul metropolitan area outside the regions, electoral regionalism 
dominated the people who came from the regions. Finally, centralisation of power 
to the national government and hyper concentration to Seoul metropolitan area 
for economic development made the stake of national politics, which allocates 
resources and benefits, much bigger (Choi and Park, 2010, pp.33, 189). 
Mainstream politicians depended on electoral regionalism to secure their status 
in national politics (Choi and Park, 2010, pp.33, 189), and electorates reinforced 
electoral regionalism to secure their stake in allocation of national resources (Cho, 
2000, p.89). 
This electoral regionalism has had negative effects on South Korean politics as 
demonstrated in the following parts of this chapter. A couple of these are worth 
mentioning here. First of all, elections become zero-sum games between regions, 
which damages elected leadership and the political system’s capabilities for 
conflict resolution (Park, 2004a, p.116). Parliamentary parties cannot help acting 
under the consideration of regional interests, which makes cooperation between 
parties difficult (Park, 2003, pp.80-81). On top of this, public policy does not 
become important in electoral campaigns (Kang, 2005, p.267); candidates of 
regions where electoral regionalism dominates depend not on manifestos or their 
performance in the legislature, but on nomination from the dominant party in the 
region, which damages the policy function of the legislature (Kim, 2006, p.21). 
Generational and ideological cleavages 
The third feature of the general election in South Korea is generational and 
ideological cleavages outside the southern area that electoral regionalism still 
dominates (Park, 2014). The cleavages appeared in the 2002 presidential 
election (Kang, 2008, pp.463-466, 473; 2010, pp.131, 138, 206; Kim, 2006, p.91; 
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Kim, 2009, p.200; Sheen, 2003, p.1). The appearance of the cleavages concurred 
with the retirement of the two Kims and the emergence of the so-called 386 
generation who participated in the democratisation movement in 1980s and had 
relatively progressive ideology (Kang, 2008, pp.473, 475). Overall, younger 
voters are likely to be more progressive (Jung, 2008a, p.56; Kang, 2008, p.465) 
and richer voters are likely to be more conservative (Lee, Lee and Kim, 2013). 
Candidates from more conservative parties are likely to be elected from wealthier 
constituencies in Seoul (Park, 2014). This ideological difference has become 
important for mainstream parties (Kang, 2010, p.233). 
The different historical experiences of generations affected the ideological 
difference between the generations. Older generations, who were poor and had 
experienced war, became conservative prioritising economic growth and a strong 
position against North Korea, but younger generations who had grown up in the 
period of economic prosperity and had no experience of war became relatively 
progressive prioritising environment and a soft position against North Korea (Auh, 
1999; 2004; Jung, 2008a, p.56). South Korea had experienced rapid socio-
economic changes after 1960s due to rapid economic growth, so each generation 
had a different experience in forming their own values (Jung, 2008a, p.60). 
A couple of qualifications in interpreting the impact of the generational and 
ideological cleavages are worth mentioning. One of them is that, as discussed in 
section 2.3, the major parties in South Korea do not represent the progressive 
ideology that is important in Western European democracy. The right wing is 
close to the far right in its position to communism, and the relative progressive 
parties are not left wing, but close to centrists by the standards of Western 
European democracy. The link between parties and social classes are weaker 
than that in Western Europe (Kang, 2010, p.203). The other consideration is that 
regional cleavage still exerts an important impact. Major parties still have regional 
bases where they have a dominant status.  The southern area dominated by 
electoral regionalism occupied 36.8% of seats for local constituency members 
(93 out of 253) and 35.9% of electorates in the 20th general election (2016) 
(National Election Commission, 2016). Electoral regionalism has even 
subordinated ideological cleavage in the southern area (Cho, 2004; Choi, 2001, 
pp.159-163; Kang, 2010, p.134; Moon, 2009). Relatively progressive policies 
promoted by parties based in the south-western area were opposed by parties 
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based in the south-eastern area, and the south-eastern area was mobilised to 
bear conservative ideology. When it comes to the south-western area, the 
mechanism is operated in the opposite direction. Support for parties and 
candidates is affected not by occupation or income, but by region and generation 
(Lee, Lee and Kim, 2013, pp.15-16). 
  2.2.2. Nomination of candidates 
Candidate selection by parties for general elections in South Korea has not been 
democratic. Under the authoritarian regimes, nominations of governing parties 
had been at the whim of the President, and those of opposition parties had been 
as a result of a power struggle between internal factions (Kim, 2003, pp.8-14, 21). 
The proportional representation system exacerbated the top-down nomination 
(Kim, 2003, p.13). After democratisation in 1987, electoral regionalism made 
nomination by the dominant party in the region essential for electoral victory, and 
the regional support for the party came from that for the leader of the party. 
Therefore, party leaders monopolised the power of nomination (Cho, 2000, p.41; 
Kim, 1998, p.73; 2003, pp.14, 19, 20; Lee, 2003, p.42; Lee, 2003, p.102). Even 
outside the regions dominated by electoral regionalism, voters preferred 
candidates nominated by mainstream parties and party labels were important (Ho, 
2005, p.324; Kim, 2006, pp.241-242). The proportional representation system still 
concentrated the nomination power in party leaders (Kim, 2003, p.23). 
The top-down nomination system has remained dominant even after the 
retirement of charismatic party leaders (two Kims). The official nomination system 
for local constituency elections in general elections is based on primaries in 
constituencies, but the nomination committee in the central party decides 
candidates for the primaries and whether to hold the primaries. The committee 
even directly nominates the candidate for the general election when the 
committee decides not to hold a primary in a constituency. The rates of primaries 
in the nomination of candidates have been low as demonstrated in table 2.6. 
Therefore, the nomination system is conceived as top-down and undemocratic 
(Gill, 2011, p.299; Jeon, 2005, pp.222-224; Jung, 2008a, p.152; Kim, 2004, p.119; 
Park, 2008, p.49; Yoon, 2012, p.6, 30). 
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Table 2.6. Major two parties’ nominations of candidates for local constituency 
elections in general elections 
Parties 
 
 
General Election 
Liberty Korea Party and its 
antecedents 
The Minjoo Party and its 
antecedents 
Committee’s 
decision 
Primary 
Committee’s 
decision 
Primary 
17th 
(2004) 
213 
(93.7%) 
15 
(6.6%) 
159 
(64.4%) 
84 
(35.6%) 
18th 
(2008) 
245 
(100%) 
-* 
197 
(100%) 
-* 
19th 
(2012) 
183 
(79.6%) 
47 
(20.4%) 
128 
(61.2%) 
81 
(38.8%) 
20th 
(2016) 
109 
(43.6%) 
141 
(56.4%) 
179 
(76.2%) 
56 
(23.8%) 
* Primaries are not applied in the 18th general election. 
Sources: Gill (2011), Jung (2004, p.7), Park (2008), Yoon (2012, pp.21-22), The Minjoo party of 
Korea (2016) and News articles (Cha and Yang, 2016; Kim, 2016; Kim and Jeon, 2016; Lee, 
Hong, and Hyeon, 2016; Song, 2016; Yonhap news agency, 2016a; 2016b) 
 
There are several factors in the maintenance of the top-down nomination system. 
First of all, party organisation has depended on personal leadership and has not 
been institutionalised (Gill, 2011, p.299). Party organisation had been the 
electoral organisation of politicians in South Korea (Ho, 2005, p.58; Kim, 2003, 
p.20; Park, 2003, p.72). The public had been mobilised as party members for the 
electoral needs of politicians. The percentage of party members who pay party 
fees is very low (Gill, 2011, p.300). Party members’ rights in candidate selection 
are not a matter of course in South Korea. On top of this, the nomination of 
candidates has been the result of internal power struggles between factions. The 
faction holding power in a party wants to nominate more candidates to maintain 
their power and top-down nomination is appropriate for that goal (Park, 2008, 
p.58; Gill, 2011, p.306). For example, the then governing party’s candidate 
selection for the 18th and 20th general election was called a ‘nomination massacre’ 
and ‘stamp row’ respectively by the media.1 Lastly, parties have had a need for 
the top-down nomination system in order to secure their electoral prospects. Due 
to the public distrust of the legislature discussed in section 2.4, each party has to 
show a considerable degree of replacement of incumbent MPs in a general 
election. The top-down nomination system is helpful for the replacement and the 
recruitment of freshmen (Kim, 2003, p.15). A bottom-up system based on 
                                                          
1 The minority faction of the governing party was largely excluded in the party’s nomination for the 18th 
general election. In the 20th general election, the party’s leader from the minority faction rejected to 
approve six critical nominations by nomination committee which are largely affected by the majority 
faction. 
24 
 
primaries by party members in constituencies is likely to be favourable for 
incumbent MPs, and incumbent MPs would not give way without top-down 
nomination from the central party.  
  2.2.3. MPs 
Official power, privileges and duties 
MPs have the right to participate in the work of the National Assembly. Firstly, 
they have the right to speak, debate and vote in committees and on the floor 
during the scrutiny of bills (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 58, 60; ch.6, ss. 4, 
5). Secondly, they can introduce bills. Any National Assembly member can 
propose a bill with the concurrence of 10 or more National Assembly members 
(National Assembly Act 1988, art. 79(1)). There is no official favour to government 
bills compared with private members’ bills in the proceedings of the National 
Assembly in South Korea. Finally, they have the right to question and demand 
testimony or submission of documents. They can question to the Prime Minister 
or ministers on the floor during government interpellation sessions (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 122–2). They can hear testimonies from ministers and 
senior officials of the executive during committee meetings or receive documents 
from the executive especially during the inspection of state administration or 
investigation of state administration (Act on the Inspection and Investigation of 
State Administration 1988, art. 10). 
MPs have privileges and benefits for undertaking their work. The Constitution of 
South Korea specifies two legal privileges of MPs. The one is the privilege of 
exemption from apprehension. During the sessions of the National Assembly, no 
MP shall be arrested or detained without the consent of the National Assembly 
except in the case of flagrante delicto (The Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
1987, art. 44). The other is the privilege of exemption from liability for one’s 
speech in the National Assembly. No MP shall be held responsible outside the 
National Assembly for opinions officially expressed or votes cast in the Assembly 
(The Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987, art. 45). According to the Act on 
allowances, etc. for National Assembly members 1981, each MP receives 
allowances and can employ seven staff members who support his/her work. 
However, MPs also have other duties. The Constitution states that MPs should 
not concurrently hold any other office prescribed by Acts; that MPs have the duty 
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to maintain high standards of integrity; that MPs should give preference to 
national interests and should perform their duties in accordance with conscience; 
and that MPs should not acquire, through abuse of their positions, rights and 
interests in property or positions, or assist other persons to acquire the same, by 
means of contracts with or dispositions by the State, public organizations or 
industries (The Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987, art. 43, 46). According 
to National Assembly Act 1988 (art. 25, 155), each MP should maintain proper 
dignity as an MP; should attend the plenary session and committee meetings; 
and should comply with legislation and regulations regarding the proceedings. 
MPs’ roles 
The work of an MP can be categorised into those of a representative of his/her 
constituency; those of a party politician; and those of a policy watchdog and 
entrepreneur. First of all, MPs have constituency work such as redress of 
grievances or securing a greater budget and more programmes for their 
constituency (Park, 1988, p.226; Yoon, 2010, pp.326-327). One of the most 
important motivations in MPs’ constituency work is re-election; constituents 
expect MPs to be active in their constituency work, and they are more likely to 
vote for MPs who were active in their constituency work (Park, 1988, p.236; Yoon, 
2002a, p.8; 2002b; 2010, pp.333, 341-343). Motivation, however, also comes 
from the sense of duty as a representative of the constituency (Yoon, 2000, 
p.165). On top of that, MPs have the role of being a party politician. MPs follow 
their party’s position for political or policy issues in the National Assembly. One 
of the most important factors in MPs’ decision making in the legislature is their 
party (Jung, 2009, p.163; Ka, 2009a, p.209; Park, 1998, p.218; Park, 1998, p.308). 
In addition, senior MPs want to assume party posts to increase their political 
influence and have lots of party work (Sohn, 2004a, p.218). Last, but not least, 
an MP has the role of being a participant in the policy process. They propose bills 
to fulfil their own policy preferences; scrutinise law bills and budget bills 
containing national policy; and oversee the executive through the inspection and 
investigation of state administration. According to Yoon (2004, p.186), there are 
MPs who prioritise their policy role and can be categorised into policy advocates 
in Searing (1994). 
Many studies in South Korea have pointed out that the roles of constituency 
worker and party politician are prioritised rather than the policy role (Jung, 2009, 
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p.186; Ka, 2009a, p.196; Lee, 2004, p.360; Lee, 2009, p.297; Lee, 2009a, p.258; 
Lim and Seo, 2013, pp.68-69; Sohn, 2004a, p.218). The hierarchy of MPs’ roles 
is affected by the historical contexts surrounding the legislature. As discussed in 
section 2.3, the dependence of local government on the central government due 
to the need for rapid economic development by the central government has made 
the MPs’ constituency work more important. Moreover, there was no local 
election and elected local government between 1961 and 1995, which makes 
MPs important representatives of local interests. MPs’ role as party politicians 
has been conceived as important because of the confrontational mode between 
the governing party and opposition party which originated from the era of the 
authoritarian military regime and strong party discipline due to the charismatic 
leadership of parties and the importance of party nomination based on electoral 
regionalism as discussed in section 2.3 and 2.4.  
Even in the policy role, oversight of the executive and sponsoring private 
members’ bills are more important to MPs than the scrutiny of legislation. 
Oversight of the executive through hearings draw greater media attention than 
committee meetings to scrutinise bills (Kim, 2006, p.146), which is more helpful 
for MPs’ advertising and credit claiming mentioned in Mayhew (1974, ch.1). MPs’ 
performance in sponsoring private members’ bills is an important indicator 
through which non-governmental organisations or parties evaluate MPs (Ka, 
2006, p.70; Kim, 2006, p.215). There is lots of work requiring resources (time and 
staff) besides the scrutiny of bills for individual MPs (Kim, 2006, p.210; Lee, 2006, 
p.9). 
 
2.3. Organisation of the Legislature 
  2.3.1. The number of chambers and MPs 
The Constituent Assembly was unicameral. The second constitution in 1952 
adopted a bicameral system, but the election of an upper chamber was not held 
until 1960. After the democratic movement (the April Revolution) in 1960, the fifth 
National Assembly convened in 1960 had two chambers in which MPs of the 
upper chamber were elected by a multiple-winner system (from two to eight in a 
constituency). However, this legislature was the only National Assembly adopting 
bicameralism. With the coup in 1961, the fifth National Assembly was dissolved, 
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and the sixth National Assembly returned to a unicameral legislature. Since the 
6th National Assembly, the legislature has maintained unicameralism. The 
number of MPs in each National Assembly is in table 2.7. 
Table 2.7. The numbers of MPs 
Assembly 
1st 
(1948-1950) 
2nd 
(1950-1954) 
3rd 
(1954-1958) 
4th 
(1958-1960) 
5th 
(1960-1961) 
MPs 198 210 203 233 
233 (lower) 
58 (upper) 
Assembly 
6th 
(1963-1967) 
7th 
(1967-1971) 
8th 
(1971-1972) 
9th 
(1973-1979) 
10th 
(1979-1980) 
MPs 175 175 204 219 231 
Assembly 
11th 
(1981-1985) 
12th 
(1985-1988) 
13th 
(1988-1992) 
14th 
(1992-1996) 
15th 
(1996-2000) 
MPs 276 276 299 299 299 
Assembly 
16th 
(2000-2004) 
17th 
(2004-2008) 
18th 
(2008-2012) 
19th 
(2012-2016) 
20th 
(2016-) 
MPs 273 299 299 300 300 
Sources: Park (2003, p.58) 
 
One of the most important reasons that the legislature adopted unicameralism 
after the coup was to construct a political system appropriate for promoting rapid 
economic development. The authoritarian regime after the coup in 1961 
emphasised efficiency of the developmental state, and unicameral legislature 
was preferred by them because of the needs for more a comfortable and rapid 
legislative process that supported policies of the executive (Cho, 2010, p.129; 
Park, 2003, p.59). The decrease in the number of MPs in the 6th assembly is also 
explained by that reason. The authoritarian regime thought that a smaller 
legislature would be more rational, considering the legislature’s participation in 
the policy process as an inefficiency or disintegration (Park, 2003, p.59). The 
decrease in the 16th National Assembly was due to the atmosphere of austerity 
after the financial crisis in 1997. 
  2.3.2. The Speaker, deputy speakers and committee chairs 
Election system, term and powers 
The Speaker and two deputy speakers are elected through a secret vote on the 
floor, obtaining the votes of a majority of MPs (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 
15). The term of the Speaker and deputy speakers is two years (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 9). The Speaker represents the National Assembly, 
regulates its proceedings, maintains order and supervises its affairs (National 
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Assembly Act 1988, art. 10), but the actual power of the Speaker is not strong. 
Conventionally, the order of business is set through negotiation among the floor 
leaders of parliamentary groups (usually parties). Deputy speakers have the 
power of acting for the Speaker (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 12). Beyond 
this, deputy speakers have no real power. 
The chair of a standing committee is elected by a secret vote on the floor and 
the elected should obtain the votes of a majority of MPs present under an 
attendance of a majority of all MPs (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 41). The 
term of chairs is also two years. The chair represents the committee, controls the 
proceedings, maintains order and supervises the affairs of the committee 
(National Assembly Act 1988 art. 49 (1)). The chair determines the order of 
business and the time and date of the opening of the committee meeting after 
consulting with ranking members who represent their own parliamentary groups 
in the committee (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 49 (2)). 
Chamber formation (Won gu seong) 
In reality, the posts of the Speaker, deputy speakers and committee chairs are 
distributed between parliamentary parties through negotiations between them. 
The negotiation process is called won gu seong in Korean which can be 
translated as chamber formation in English.  The process was established in the 
13th National Assembly (Ka, 2010a, p.134; Park, 2003, p.141; Yoo, 2006, p.68). 
The majority party (usually the governing party) had usually claimed all of the 
posts (except one deputy speaker) from the 6th to 12th Assembly (Ka, 2010a, 
p.134).  The governing party did not secure absolute majority in the legislature 
after the 13th general election, however, and they had to share the posts with 
opposition parties (Ka, 2010a, p.134). Chamber formation happens every two 
years because the term of the Speaker, deputy speakers and committee chairs 
is two years. The posts of committee chairs are distributed according to the 
proportion of each party’s seats (Ka, 2010a, p.134). The negotiation is focused 
on which specific committee chairs are distributed to which parties. 
The principal feature of the chamber formation is that the formation itself 
becomes a weapon of political strife. Opposition parties have tried to maximise 
their political interests from the chamber formation by linking the negotiation to 
other political agenda which is favourable to them (Yoo, 2006, p.96). Therefore, 
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the chamber formation has become an instrument of political transaction between 
parties and the start of an Assembly has usually been delayed (Park, 2004a, 
p.218). The delays are demonstrated in table 2.8. The delay is likely to be longer 
when the stakes of the political negotiation are bigger (Yoo, 2006, p.98). The 
pressure from public opinion is an important factor promoting coordination 
between parties in these situations (Yoo, 2006, pp.99-101).  
Table 2.8. Delays in chamber formations 
Assembly 13th 14th 15th 16th 
Delays (days) 
21 (1st half) 
0 (2nd half) 
125 (1st half) 
0 (2nd half) 
35 (1st half) 
79 (2nd half) 
17 (1st half) 
42 (2nd half) 
Assembly 17th 18th 19th  20th 
Delays (days) 
36 (1st half) 
21 (2nd half) 
88 (1st half) 
9 (2nd half) 
40 (1st half) 
25 (2nd half) 
14 (1st half) 
- 
Sources: The report of the proceedings of the National Assembly (various issues), Yoo (2006, 
pp.98-99) 
 
2.3.3. Committee 
Types of committee, appointment of committee members and powers of 
committee 
There are two types of committee in the National Assembly. One is standing 
committees, and the other is special committees. The distinction was already 
established in the Constituent Assembly (National Assembly Act 1948, art. 14, 
16). The plenary, however, had been the centre of the legislative process until 
the 5th Assembly and standing committees performed a complementary function 
in that a system of three readings on the floor was adopted in the scrutiny of 
legislation as in the British Parliament. It is from the 6th Assembly, convened after 
the military coup in which the three readings system was abolished, that the stage 
of standing committees becomes the centre of the legislative process. 
Standing committees are permanent. They deliberate on bills and scrutinise the 
work of government departments in their own jurisdiction. Each standing 
committee shadows one or more government departments. There are 16 
standing committees in the current 20th Assembly. The number of MPs in a 
standing committee ranges from 12 to 31. The MPs of a standing committee are 
appointed and replaced by the Speaker at the request of the floor leader of each 
negotiation group and in proportion to the number of MPs belonging to the 
negotiation group (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 48(1)). The Speaker cannot 
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be a Standing Committee member (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 39(2)). The 
term of the MPs in a standing committee is two years, and the term of a replaced 
MP in a standing committee is the remainder of the predecessor's term (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 40(3)). 
The first power of a standing committee is the power of the scrutiny of bills in its 
terms of reference (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 36). A standing committee 
scrutinises law bills before the examination of the Legislative and Judiciary 
Committee. It also pre-examines the budget bills and the accounts settlements of 
government departments in its terms of reference before the examination of the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts. The second power of a standing 
committee is the power of scrutiny of the work of government departments in its 
terms of reference. A standing committee holds the inspection of state 
administration every year and the National Assembly can have a standing 
committee investigate a specific issue (Act on the Inspection and Investigation of 
State Administration 1988, art. 2, 3). It also holds pre-appointment hearings on 
the ministerial posts of the executive (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 65-2(2)). 
Finally, it deliberates on petitions. However, the rate of petitions accepted is very 
low. Only 0.9% of petitions (2 of 227) were accepted in the 19th National Assembly 
(National Assembly, 2016a). 
A special committee is not permanent in principle, but there are two permanent 
special committees – the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts and the 
Special Committee on Ethics. The former examines budget bills, bills for fund 
operation and accounts settlements (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 45(1)). 
The term of the MPs in the committee is one year (National Assembly Act 1988, 
art. 45(3)). The ways of appointing MPs to the committee and the election of the 
chair are the same as those of a standing committee (National Assembly Act 
1988, art. 45(2), (4)). The latter special committee examines matters concerning 
the qualification and discipline of MPs (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 46(1)). 
The way of appointing MPs to the committee, the term of the committee members 
and the chair, and the way of electing the chair are the same as those of a 
standing committee (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 46(5)). 
Special committees are not permanent except those two committees. A special 
committee is established to examine matters related to the jurisdictions of several 
standing committees, or matters deemed necessary in particular (National 
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Assembly Act 1988, art. 44(1)).2 The terms of reference of a special committee 
are specified by the resolution that constitutes the special committee. When a 
special committee is established, the term of its activities should be fixed provided 
that the period can be extended by resolution at the plenary session, and the 
special committee exists until the expiration term of its activities (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 44(2), (3)). The chair of a special committee is elected 
by the vote of MPs in the special committee (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 
47(1)). The way of appointing MPs to a special committee is the same as that of 
a standing committee (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 48(1)). 
The expertise of committee members 
Many studies in South Korea have pointed out the low expertise of committees 
(Choi, 2010, p.96; Jun, 2010, p.229; Kim, 2004, pp.73-76; Kim, 2004, p.282; Kim, 
2006, pp.154-161; Park, 1996, p.338; Park, 1998, p.216). The main reasons 
enumerated in the studies are: the high turnover of MPs; the short term of MPs 
in committees; the high rate of circulation between committees by MPs; and 
election of committee chairs regardless of seniority principle. The turnover rates 
of MPs in general elections are high and the rates of senior MPs are low as 
demonstrated in table 2.2 and 2.3. Many MPs change committees every two 
years as demonstrated in table 2.9. The fact that it is rare for MPs to build 
expertise in a specific committee makes the application of the seniority principle 
to the election of committee chair difficult. 
Table 2.9. The rates of MPs changing committees between 1st half and 2nd half 
of an Assembly 
Assembly 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 
Rate (%) 51.6 42.3 51.4 47.9 48.8 
- Comparison of the last list in the 1st half with the first one in the 2nd half of committee membership 
Sources: calculated from the report of the proceedings of the National Assembly (various issues) 
 
The short term of committee chairs and membership, and frequent committee 
circulation are based on the notion that committee chairs and memberships are 
not for the division of labour and building expertise, but for the distribution of 
                                                          
2 Special committee on finance for local governments, special committee on countermeasures against 
school bullying and special committee on fairness of broadcasting are the examples of special committees 
in the 19th National Assembly. Special Committee on political reform are established conventionally 
before the general and local election to negotiate about electoral laws. 
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benefits and power (Seo, 2010, p.76). This notion had its root in the Constituent 
Assembly and 2nd Assembly (Seo, 2010, p.63). The condition that most MPs were 
freshmen emphasised egalitarianism among MPs and limited their term (Seo, 
2010, p.64). The term of committee chairs was one year until the 5th Assembly 
(1961) and that of committee members was also one year from 1953 to 1961. 
Even in recent assemblies, the condition remains because considerable numbers 
of MPs are freshmen or in their 2nd term as demonstrated in table 2.3. 
The reason that committee membership is conceived as a resource for the 
distribution of benefits and power is that MPs’ preferences for committees are 
similar. Although specific committees preferred by MPs have changed, the 
preference is likely to be concentrated on small numbers of committees according 
to previous studies in South Korea (Cho, 2010, p.115; Chung, 1995, p.61; Ka, 
2007, p.246; 2009a, p.212; Kim, 2006, pp.177-193; Lee, 2009, p.159; Park and 
Kim, 1997, p.463; Park, 1998, pp.296, 307). The concentration of preference 
remains in the 20th National Assembly as demonstrated in table 2.10. 
Table 2.10. Most preferred standing committees by MPs in the 20th National 
Assembly 
Committees MPs 
Rate in MPs 
responded 
(n=225) 
Rate in total MPs 
(N=300) 
Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport  
53 23.6% 17.7% 
Education, Culture, Sports and 
Tourism  
37 16.4% 12.3% 
Trade, Industry and Energy 24 10.7% 8.0% 
National Policy 19 8.4% 6.3% 
Agriculture, Food, Rural 
Affairs, Oceans and Fisheries  
17 7.6% 5.7% 
Source: Yonhap News Agency (2016c) 
  
Committee memberships preferred by MPs have been those which can redress 
grievances of constituents more easily and effectively; those which can secure 
budget or programmes in their constituency; those which are in charge of 
economic policy affecting private firms; or those which are related to the status of 
MPs in the legislature (for senior MPs) (Jung, 2014, p.77; Ka, 2009a, pp.198, 212; 
Kim, 2006, p.193; Park, 1998, p.300; Park, 2004, p.253). The way to resolve 
conflicts in committee assignment among MPs is committee circulation under the 
condition that MPs’ preferences for committees are similar and an egalitarian 
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atmosphere remains among MPs (Chung, 1995, p.62; Kim, 2006, p.211; Lee, 
2009, p.160; Park, 1996, p.335; Park, 1998, p.296). 
A couple of the important factors affecting MPs’ concentrated preference in 
committee assignment are the centralised relationship between the central 
government and local governments, and the dependency of local governments 
on the central government in South Korea. The historical contexts surrounding 
the concentration of power in the central government are the confrontation with 
North Korea and the need for rapid economic development by the central 
government (Chung et al., 2010, p.103). The central government has 
monopolised most resources in the country and the budget of local governments 
has depended on resource allocation by the central government. The financial 
independence rate of local governments is only 52.5 per cent in 2016 (Ministry of 
the Interior, 2016, p.235). Moreover, the authoritarian regime after the coup in 
1961 repealed local elections, so there was no elected local government between 
1961 and 1995. In light of these situations, the important roles of MPs have been 
securing budget and programmes in their own constituency and redress of 
grievances for constituents using the resources of central government (Park, 
1988, p.226). It has been very important for MPs to be selected as members of 
committees which are helpful for them to conduct those functions. 
  2.3.4. Party 
Parties as parliamentary groups 
The official political group in the National Assembly is a parliamentary group. 
Any political party having twenty or more members becomes a parliamentary 
group, but twenty or more National Assembly members who do not belong to 
other parliamentary groups can form a separate parliamentary group (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 33(1)). A parliamentary group is an important political 
unit in the National Assembly (Lee, 2009a, pp.260-265). The order of business 
on the floor is set through the negotiation between the floor leaders of 
parliamentary groups and the Speaker usually accepts the results of the 
negotiation (Lee, 2009a, p.260). MPs who do not belong to any parliamentary 
group are likely to be alienated from the operation of the legislature. Therefore, it 
is very important for a party to win twenty or more seats in the general election. 
The practice that the negotiation between parliamentary groups is important was 
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established in the 13th National Assembly due to the opposition parties’ intention 
to prevent the monopoly of the legislature by the governing party (Lee, 2009a, 
p.263). 
A parliamentary group tends to be composed of one party. There has been just 
one case in which two or more parties composed a parliamentary group since 
1988. Therefore, a party is a central actor in parliamentary politics. The 
contemporary major parties in South Korea have organisations such as a 
Supreme Council, Policy Research Institute, Central Secretariat and General 
Meeting of MPs. The parliamentary party organisation is the General Meeting of 
MPs. The party’s strategies in the legislature and positions on issues are decided 
or delivered to its MPs in the meeting. Usually, an Internal Affair Committee and 
Policy Committee are established as permanent organisations to support the 
meeting. The head of the parliamentary party organisation is the Floor Leader. 
Features of parties and party system 
Parties in South Korea have received lots of criticism. Firstly, parties depend on 
the political influence of party leaders (Park, 1998, p.208; Park, 2012, p.35). 
Parties have tended to be a strong leader’s personalised organisation or groups 
of factions dependant on prominent leaders (Ho, 2005, p.60; Jung, 2008a, p.112). 
The political fate of a party has been likely to be linked with that of its leader (Ho, 
2005, pp.58-59; Park, 1998, p.208). Secondly, the degree of party 
institutionalisation is low. Party organisations have tended to be electoral 
organisations (Ho, 2005, p.311; Jung, 2008a, p.222). Parties have been formed, 
split, unified or have disappeared according to electoral results, political plots of 
politicians or the interests of party leaders (Gil, 2011, p.301; Ho, 2005, p.58; Jung, 
2008a, pp.24, 91-92, 112; Park, 1998, p.208; Park, 2003, p.72). Thirdly, although 
the ideological spectrum between parties is being broadened currently (Ka, 
2010b; Ka, Yoo and Kim, 2009. p.304; Kang, 2005, p.82; 2009, p.129; 2010, 
pp.171-191; Kim, 2009), the spectrum is still narrow (Choi and Park, 2010, pp.58-
59; Kwak, 2009, p.132; Park, 1998, p.208; Park, 2012, p.36), especially 
compared with that in western democracies. Most of the political parties 
represented in the national legislature have been either conservative or centrist 
parties (Ho, 2005, p.304; Park, 1998, p.208). Finally, the party system has been 
based on the regional cleavage explained in the previous section since 
democratisation in 1988 (Gil, 2011, p.301; Jung, 2001, pp.205-208; 2002, p.8). 
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The historical trajectory of South Korea has affected the formation of those 
features. The separation and confrontation with North Korea had supressed 
progressive ideology. The progressive parties were already excluded in the 1st 
general election. The party system in which conservative parties were and still 
are important actors was formed in the 1950s (Choi and Park, 2010, pp.62-66). 
The most important national policy of the military government in 1961 was anti-
communism. The universal franchise awarded just after independence from 
Japan was not helpful for the formation of mass parties (Choi and Park, 2010, 
pp.73-74). The universal franchise without the experience of class struggle and 
wide ideological spectrum was not helpful for the formation of party identification 
according to class consciousness. The party system did not reflect the interests 
of social class (Choi and Park, 2010, p.74). The electorate was mobilised to 
support the authoritarian regimes (Choi and Park, 2010, p75). 
In the era of the authoritarian regimes, the main political cleavage was between 
the authoritarian regime and opposition parties requiring the resurrection of 
procedural democracy. Governing parties were quasi-state organisations in that 
era (Kang, 2009, p.127). They were formed by leaders of the authoritarian regime 
in a top-down manner (Ho, 2005, p.59). The President held the leadership of the 
governing party (Jung, 2008a, p.250). They were organisations for elections and 
the spreading of propaganda (Lee, 2001, p.156). Their role in the legislature was 
to support the executive’s policies (Kang, 2005, p.322). The roles of opposition 
parties were to criticise the regime’s monopoly of power and emphasise the 
principle of democracy (Choi and Park, 2010, p.131). Opposition parties were the 
organisations of movement for democratisation, and the leaders of this 
movement constructed charismatic leadership in their parties (Lee, 2001, p.156; 
Park, 2003, p.55). During the authoritarian era, opposition parties were 
maintained as groups following small numbers of leaders (Choi and Park, 2010, 
p.149) 
After democratisation in 1987, the cleavage changed into regional cleavage as 
explained in section 2.2. The cleavage surrounding the resurrection of procedural 
democracy disappeared, but the ideological spectrum between mainstream 
parties was narrow (Park, 2004, p.278). Prominent politicians (especially the two 
Kims) who had charismatic influence in their home region led major parties (Jung, 
2008a, p.91). Regionalism became a successful strategy in electoral competition 
36 
 
(Kang, 2005, p.322). To make matters worse, the merger of three major parties 
in 1990 through which the President of the day intended to secure an absolute 
majority in the legislature alienated the south-western area and exacerbated the 
regional cleavage (Kang, 2005, p.260; 2008, p.473). 3  Without substantive 
difference in ideology, presidents and governing parties had manoeuvred artificial 
political realignments through promoting defection of opposition MPs or merger 
of parties to secure the support of the legislature, and political groups had 
separated and united for their own interests in the general or presidential election 
(Kwak, 2009, pp.131-135). 
Two influences of these features of parties and the party system on 
parliamentary politics are worth mentioning here. First of all, parties in South 
Korea have a centralised and undemocratic structure (Gil, 2011, p.302; Ho, 2005, 
p.308; Jung, 2008a, p.240; Kim, 1999, p.753). The internal power structure of 
parties has been oligarchic (Jung, 2002, p.10). Their decision making system has 
been a closed feature (Park, 2003, pp.176-177). Party discipline is very strong 
and MPs are mobilised in parliamentary wars between parties (Kang, 2004, p.153; 
Lee, 2009a, p.269). The fact that the nomination from parties is critical in elections 
exacerbates the problem of strong party discipline (Eom, 2010, p.71; Jeon, 2010, 
p.206; Jung, 2009, p.186; Kang, 2004, p.154; Lim, 2004a, p.92). On top of that, 
the policy capacity of parties is weak (Jung, 2008a, p.112; Ho, 2005, p.312). The 
executive was a principal actor making public policy and governing parties 
supported them in the legislature in the authoritarian era (Kang, 2005, p.322). 
Opposition parties did not have to develop their own policies because 
parliamentary politics was not about policy competition, but the protest for 
democratisation (Kang, 2005, p.322). The narrow ideological spectrum between 
parties and electoral regionalism made the party platform unimportant in elections 
even after democratisation (Kang, 2005, p.322). 
  2.3.5. Legislative support system 
Personal staff 
An MP can employ seven personal staff (Act on Allowances, etc. for National 
Assembly Members 1981, art. 9). A personal staff member is appointed or 
                                                          
3 Three of the four major parties of the day were merged except PPD that was supported by south-western 
area. 
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dismissed by the Speaker according to the recommendation of the MP that 
he/she will support. However, the appointment by the Speaker is pro forma, and 
the recommendation of the MP is critical. MPs are practically the employers of 
their staff. Personal staff members have the status of civil servants, but they are 
not career civil servants. The number of personal staff members, classified 
according to grades, which can be employed by an MP is represented in Table 
2.11. In addition to this, an MP can employ two interns. There are many 
permutations in the way an MP uses personal staff. However, the typical case is 
that one chief advisor (Grade IV) works in the constituency of the MP and the 
other chief advisor works in the MP’s office in the National Assembly. Usually, 
two senior secretaries (Grade V) support the MP’s parliamentary activities 
(including the activities related to the MP’s party). Three secretaries (Grades VI, 
VII and IX) tend to support activities of the MP related to petitions of constituents, 
the MP’s schedule and administrative affairs of the office. Needless to say, there 
is no clear jurisdiction of an individual staff member. 
Table 2.11. The numbers of personal staff classified by Grades 
Grades IV V VI VII IX 
Staff number 2 2 1 1 1 
Source:  Act on Allowances, etc. for National Assembly Members 1981, attached table 4 
 
Staff of each parliamentary group 
A parliamentary group can employ its own staff working in the legislature for the 
group through the budget of the legislature. These staff members are called policy 
research members (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 34). The policy research 
members are appointed or dismissed by the Speaker according to the 
recommendation of the floor leaders of each negotiation group (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 34). As in the case of personal staff, however, the 
recommendation is critical and each parliamentary group is their practical 
employer. The total number of policy research members is 67. The number of 
policy research members classified according to grades is shown in Table 2.12. 
Table 2.12. The numbers of policy research members classified by Grades 
Grades I II or III IV 
Numbers 9 20 38 
Source:  calculated based on the National Assembly Regulations about the Appointment of the 
Policy Research Members of Parliamentary Groups 1992, art. 5 
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The number of policy research members which a parliamentary group can 
employ is allocated in proportion to the number of MPs who belong to the 
parliamentary group (National Assembly Regulations about the Appointment of 
the Policy Research Members of Parliamentary Groups 1992, art. 4). The policy 
research members support their own group’s parliamentary activities. They help 
the floor leader to plan the party’s parliamentary strategies; support the party’s 
general meeting of MPs; undertake hands-on affairs related to negotiations 
between parties; and play the role of the channel that links the floor leader and 
the party’s MPs in a standing committee and deliver the party’s position to the 
MPs. 
Legislative support agencies 
There are four agencies to support the activities of the legislature: National 
Assembly Secretariat (NAS), National Assembly Library (NAL), National 
Assembly Budget Office (NABO) and National Assembly Research Service 
(NARS). The committee staff belong to NAS and direct assistance of proceedings 
on the floor is conducted by the Proceedings Bureau in NAS. The functions of 
each agency and the number of staff in those agencies are summarised in table 
2.13. 
Table 2.13. The functions and staff number of legislative support agencies 
Agencies Functions Staff number 
NAS 
- To support the activities, such as legislation, examination of the 
budget and the settlement of accounts, etc., and to manage the 
administrative affairs of the National Assembly 
- Drafting and reviewing of the bills which MPs or committees 
request are conducted in Legislative Counselling Office in NAS. 
1,353 
NAL 
- To administer affairs concerning books and legislative materials 
of the National Assembly 
- Research function related to legislation is conducted in 
Parliamentary Information office and Law Library. 
304 
NABO 
- To research, analyse, and appraise matters concerning the 
settlement of budget and the management of funds and finances 
of the State 
138 
NARS 
- To provide the legislative information service; investigate and 
study the matters relating to legislation and policies; and provide 
the related information and data 
119 
Source: National Assembly Act 1988, art. 21, 22, 22-2, 22-3; National Assembly Regulations 
about the Organisation of the National Assembly Secretariat 2009; National Assembly 
Regulations about the Organisation of the National Assembly Library 2009; National Assembly 
Regulations about the Organisation of the National Assembly Budget Office 2010; and National 
Assembly Regulations about the Organisation of the National Assembly Research Service 2007 
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2.4. Operation of the Legislature 
  2.4.1. Legislative process 
Summary of the process 
The National Assembly of South Korea is a unicameral and committee-centred 
legislature. Standing committees are important in the legislative process. When 
a law bill is introduced, it is referred to the standing committee that has the 
jurisdiction over the bill (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 81). When a committee 
scrutinises a law bill, general debate and detailed scrutiny is conducted in the 
committee and subcommittee stage respectively (National Assembly Act 1988, 
art. 58). The subcommittee amends the provisions of the bill. After the 
subcommittee stage, the bill is referred to the standing committee again. There 
may be some amendments in this stage. When the committee has decided the 
substance of the bill, the bill is referred to the Legislative and Judiciary Committee, 
and the committee examines the structure and wording of the bill (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 86). After that, the bill is referred to the plenary and 
deliberated. Lastly, the bill is sent to the President. The President can veto the 
bill. If the President does not veto the bill, the bill is promulgated. Figure 2.1 is the 
flow chart that draws the legislative process of South Korea. 
Figure 2.1. The legislative process of South Korea 
  
Source: National Assembly (2016b) 
 
Introduction of bills 
When it comes to bill introduction, the biggest feature is that the introduction of 
private members’ bills is vitalised in South Korea. First of all, the requirements for 
the introduction are not strict. There are no rules such as ballot bills, presentation 
or ten-minute rule as in the British Parliament; the concurrence of ten MPs is 
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enough to propose a private members’ bill (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 
79(1)). Although the sponsor has to submit an estimation for expenses related to 
the bill written by NABO, the requirement is exempted when the sponsor submits 
a request for the estimation (National Assembly Act 1988, article 79-2(1)). On top 
of that, the media and NGO evaluate MPs according to their performance in bill 
introduction (Jeon, 2010, p.188). Lastly, the system in which the Legislative 
Counselling Office in NAS supports the drafting of bills is also helpful for the 
introduction of private members’ bills (Ka, 2006, p.69). Therefore, the number of 
private members bills is much more than that of government bills and is 
increasing. Table 2.14 presents the numbers of private members’ bills dealt with 
by the National Assembly from 1988 to 2016 (from 13th Assembly to 19th 
Assembly). 
Table 2.14. The numbers of private members’ bills dealt with by the National 
Assembly in South Korea (From 13th Assembly to 19th Assembly) 
Assembly 
13th 
(1988-
1992) 
14th 
(1992-
1996) 
15th 
(1996-
2000) 
16th 
(2000-
2004) 
17th 
(2004-
2008) 
18th 
(2008-
2012) 
19th 
(2012- 
2016) 
Introduced 
462 
(368) 
252 
(581) 
806 
(807) 
1,651 
(595) 
5,728 
(1,102) 
11,191 
(1,693) 
15,444 
(1,093) 
Passed 
244 
(355) 
99 
(561) 
349 
(737) 
770 
(551) 
2,239 
(880) 
3,866 
(1,288) 
5,346 
(803) 
Not 
Passed 
218 
(13) 
153 
(20) 
457 
(70) 
881 
(44) 
3,489 
(222) 
7,325 
(405) 
10,098 
(290) 
Figures in brackets are the numbers of government bills. 
Sources: National Assembly (2016c) 
 
Committee and subcommittee stage 
The committee and subcommittee stage is the centre of the legislative process. 
Before 1961 (the 5th Assembly), the legislative process was similar to that of 
Westminster in which the readings in the plenary are important, but the 
authoritarian regime, after the coup in 1961, that prioritised the efficiency of the 
policy process for the promotion of development policy changed the legislative 
process to secure the rapid passing of bills in the legislature (Park, 1996, p.333; 
Park, 2004a, p.37). They thought that the legislative process based on the 
scrutiny by committees or subcommittees which consist of small numbers of MPs 
is likely to secure comfortable passage for government bills (Cho, 2010, p.116; 
Oh, 2011, p.30). To sum up, the committee-centred legislative process originated 
not from the legislature’s needs for information and expertise, but from the 
intention of the executive to promote a rapid development policy. 
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The list of the bills to be deliberated in the committee or subcommittee meetings 
is decided in the negotiation between ranking members of parliamentary groups 
(Kim, 2004, p.287). When a standing committee’s deliberation on a law bill begins, 
the committee hears an explanation of its purpose from the sponsoring MPs or 
departments and the review report of the committee staff on the bill, and holds a 
general discussion about problems relating to the whole bill and the pros and 
cons including interpellation and answers with the sponsor (National Assembly 
Act 1988, art. 58(1)). The standing committee refers a bill to the standing 
subcommittee which has jurisdiction over the bill after the general debate 
(National Assembly Act 1988, art. 58(2), (3)). The committee should hold a public 
hearing or a hearing for a law bill for establishing new acts or whole amendment 
of acts, but the public hearing or the hearing can be omitted by the committee’s 
resolution (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 58(6)). A public hearing also can be 
held by the committee’s resolution or according to the request of not less than 
one third of the registered MPs of the committee (National Assembly Act 1988, 
art. 64(1)). However, whether a public hearing is held is usually decided through 
the chair’s consultation with the ranking members of each parliamentary group. 
When the deliberation on a law bill begins in the subcommittee, the chair of the 
subcommittee asks the committee staff director to report about the history of 
deliberation on the bill; the opinions of MPs and the committee staff director about 
the purpose of the bill; and the amendment opinions of MPs (if they are suggested 
in the general discussion before the subcommittee stage) and the committee staff 
director. Then the government department directly related to the bill reports its 
position. After the reports, MPs debate the bill. If necessary, representatives of 
NGOs, interest groups, prospective beneficiaries or victims are invited to attend 
and present their opinion. When the debate finishes, decisions about the bill are 
made. After a law bill passes the subcommittee stage, the standing committee 
decides on the bill after hearing the report of the subcommittee and arguments 
for and against the bill (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 58(1), (2)). 
The decisions of the committee and subcommittee are usually made 
unanimously except on controversial matters, and voting for bills is exceptional 
(Jeon, 2010, pp.194-195), although the official decision making system is based 
on an absolute majority system (The Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 1987, 
art. 49). When it comes to the scrutiny of politically controversial bills, however, 
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the negotiation between parliamentary party leaderships dominates the official 
legislative process and committee stage (Jeon, 2014, p.198; Park, 2003, pp.166-
167). MPs in the standing committee in charge of the bill are likely to follow the 
results of the negotiation. The bills introduced by committee chairs or MPs sitting 
in the committee in which the bill is scrutinised are more likely to pass (Jeon, 
2014, p.213; Park, 2009, pp.170-171). 
Examination of Legislative and Judiciary Committee 
A law bill which is resolved in the standing committee is referred to the 
Legislative and Judiciary Committee. The Legislative and Judiciary Committee 
has the power of examination of the structure and wording in the deliberation on 
all law bills (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 37(1), (2)). When the bill is tabled, 
the committee hears an explanation on its purpose from sponsoring MPs or 
departments and the review report of the committee staff on the bill. If there is no 
special problem or disagreement, the bill is revised according to the amendment 
opinions of the committee staff and passed. However, if the bill is controversial 
and there is a disagreement among MPs about the bill, the bill would be referred 
to the subcommittee in the Legislative and Judiciary Committee. The 
subcommittee examines the bill and sometimes changes its substance. After the 
subcommittee stage, the bill is deliberated in the meeting of the Legislative and 
Judiciary Committee. 
Although the examination by the Legislative and Judiciary Committee is limited 
to the aspects of structure and wording of a law bill, the committee sometimes 
changes the substance of a law bill (Jeon, 2010, p.198). The legislative process 
has even, often been delayed for a considerable time during the scrutiny of 
controversial bills by the committee (Jeon, 2010, p.198). The committee can be 
said to bear the function of an upper chamber (Seo, 2015, p.86). The committee’s 
examination of structure and wording was established in 1951, but the 
examination was complementary and minimal as only a pre-scrutiny before the 
readings in the plenary (Seo, 2015, pp.101-103). The examination was placed 
between the committee stage and the plenary in 1963 by the authoritarian regime 
in order to control the passage of law bills to the plenary (Seo, 2015, pp.103-107). 
The plenary and promulgation by the President 
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After the examination by the Legislative and Judiciary Committee, the bill is 
returned to the standing committee in charge of the bill.  The standing committee 
submits the deliberation report that records the process and result of the 
examination of the bill and other necessary matters to the Speaker (National 
Assembly Act 1988, art. 66(1)). The plenary hears the report on the examination 
and puts the bill to a vote through an interpellation and debate, but either or both 
the interpellation and debate may be omitted by resolution (National Assembly 
Act 1988, art. 93). Although the committee of the whole house can be held when 
there is a request from at least a quarter of the registered National Assembly 
members before or after the presentation of major bills – such as bills for 
government organizations, taxes or imposing burdens on the people – to the 
plenary (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 63-2(1)), the committee of the whole 
house was held only once. 
The deliberation on the floor tends to be ritual (Jeon, 2010, p.202). Most bills 
are resolved as the decision of the committee stage (Jeon, 2010, pp.192, 202; 
Kim, 2006, p.130; Park, 1998, p.222). This is because of the informal norms of 
deference and reciprocity that are similar to those in the U.S. Congress stated by 
Cox and McCubbins (2007, p.10) and Deering and Smith (1997, p.203) (Jeon, 
2006, p.54; Jeon and Park, 2012, p.61; Kim, 2006, p.130). Even in the cases of 
controversial bills, the rate of aye votes in the plenary session is usually high 
because MPs follow the results from the negotiation between parties held before 
the plenary (Jeon, 2006, p.54). There are votes according to the interests of 
constituency, however, in the cases of bills affecting constituency matters. 
A law bill decided by the National Assembly is transferred by the Speaker to the 
executive (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 98(1)). The President promulgates it 
within fifteen days after the date he/she receives it (The Constitution of the 
republic of Korea 1987, art. 53(1)).In the case of objection to the bill, the President 
can, within fifteen days, return it to the National Assembly with a written 
explanation of the objection, and request it to be reconsidered (The Constitution 
of the Republic of Korea 1987, art. 53(2)). If the National Assembly repasses the 
bill in the original form with the attendance of more than one half of the total 
members, and with a concurrent vote of two thirds or more of the members 
present, it shall become an act (The Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987, 
art. 53(4)). If the President does not promulgate the bill, or does not request the 
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National Assembly to reconsider it within fifteen days, it shall become an act (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987, art. 53(5)). The number of cases in 
which the President has vetoed a law bill decided by the National Assembly is 
small as demonstrated in table 2.15. It is because bills which are likely to be 
vetoed by the President cannot pass in the legislature rather than the executive 
respects the legislature. The number of presidential vetoes during the 
authoritarian regime (from 1963 to 1988) was only five. 
Table 2.15. The numbers of law bills vetoed by the President in South Korea 
Assembly 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Vetoed 
law bills 
14 25 3 3 8 1 
Assembly 7th 9th 13th 16th 17th 19th 
Vetoed 
law bills 
3 1 7 4 2 2 
Sources: The report of the proceedings of the National Assembly (various issues), National 
Assembly Secretariat (2012, pp.482-484) 
 
2.4.2. Parliamentary politics and public distrust of the legislature 
Features 
The first feature of the operation of the legislature and parliamentary politics in 
South Korea is the party oriented characteristic. The operation of the legislative 
process is based on the negotiation between parliamentary parties (Sohn and Ka, 
2008, pp.90-91). Even when the governing party occupies an absolute majority, 
it is difficult to adopt majoritarian decision making because unilateral action can 
bring about a boycott by opposition parties in the legislature (Sohn and Ka, 2008, 
p.91). The basic mode between the legislature and executive is party opposition 
mode in King (1976, pp.216-220) (Choi, 2004, p.187; Choi, 2010, p.266; Jung, 
2008a, p.241; 2008b, p.83; Kang, 2004, p.158; Lee, 2004, p.106; Lee, 2010, 
p.307; Park, 2001, p.84). Confrontation between the governing and opposition 
parties rather than between the executive and legislature is usual (Choi, 2004, 
p.187; Kang, 2004, p.158).  
MPs are subordinated to their parties and party discipline is very strong as 
explained in section 2.2 and 2.3. MPs are representatives of their own party and 
mobilised in the political strife between parties (Chong, 2004, p.113; Kim, 1999, 
p.753; Park, 2010, pp.259-260; Sohn, 2004b, p.239). The autonomy of MPs is 
limited (Jung, 2008a, p.241; Lim, 2003, p.135; Yoon, 2002a, p.27). Even in 
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committees, the role of committee leaders and MPs is focused on that of being 
delegates from their party (Ka, 2007, p.274; Kim, 2006, pp.220-225). Committees 
are dominated by parties and the battlefield between parties (Kim, 1999, p.755; 
Park and Kim, 1997, p.485). Committees are not corporate, but permeable in 
Fenno’s (1973, pp.137-138, 278-279) terminology (Park and Kim, 1997, p.485; 
Park, 1998, p.223). In the theories on committee composition in the U.S. 
congress, partisan theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993/2007) is appropriate for the 
explanation of that in the legislature of South Korea (Ka, 2007, pp.273-274; 2009b, 
p.92). 
The second feature is ‘strong political control and weak policy control’ (Park, 
2001, p.72) mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. The legislature has 
focused on political matters rather than policy matters and demonstrated a weak 
capacity in specific policies (Kang, 2004, p.164). Parliamentary politics has been 
concerned with, not national policy, but power struggle, and the legislature has 
been the arena of political strife (Chong, 2004, p.116; Lee, 2009b, pp.129-130; 
Lee, 2009, p.286; Park, 2004, p.65). The parliamentary activities which draw the 
attention of the media have been attacks on the executive – through questions, 
for example – or confrontation between parties rather than the scrutiny of bills 
(Sohn, 2004b, p.219). MPs’ behaviour such as public disclosure or accusations 
of corruption against other MPs or parties for political strife are similar to ‘politics 
by other means’ in Grinsberg and Shefter (1990) (Lim, 2004a, p.82) 
Even the reinforced official power of the legislature has been exploited in this 
political strife (Kang, 2004, p.165; Park, 2001, pp.90). Pre-appointment hearings 
are conceived by parties as means for the pursuit of their political interests 
(Chung, 2004, p.298). MPs in opposition parties criticise and blame nominees, 
and those in the governing party make efforts to defend and protect (Choi et al., 
2008). The scrutiny of budget bills has been linked with other agenda (Yim, 2004, 
p.342). The inspection of the state administration has been for political 
propaganda rather than for scrutiny of the executive’s policy (Lee, 2004, p.370; 
Lee, 2010, p.305). Questions focusing on public exposure have exacerbated 
confrontation between parties and crippled the operation of the legislature (Park, 
2004a, p.75). Other official powers to check the executive such as impeachment, 
approval of important appointments, recommendation of dismissal and the 
investigation of state administration have been made use of by opposition parties 
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as means of challenge to the governing party and executive (Jung, 2008a, p.254; 
Lee, 2004, pp.106-107). 
The last feature is a frequent malfunction of the legislature due to the fierce 
conflict between parties over matters such as chamber formation; the attendance 
of former presidents as witnesses in hearings; recommendations for removal of 
ministers by opposition parties; controversial appointment of Prime Minister by 
the President; the prosecution’s investigation of election campaign funding; and 
controversial bills. The number of cases of crippled operation of the National 
Assembly (the cases under which the plenary was not held for a considerable 
time due to the clash between parties) from 13th to 18th Assembly is demonstrated 
in table 2.16. 
Table 2.16. The numbers of cases of crippled operation of National Assembly 
Assembly 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th Total 
Crippled 
operation 
4 9 19 16 8 12 68 
Sources: National Assembly Secretariat (2012, pp.264-280) 
 
The delay in chamber formation and the confrontation between parties has 
brought about disagreement on the schedule of sessions or boycotts by 
opposition parties (Park, 2004, p.235). Stalemates have happened due to the 
polarised conflict between the governing and opposition party in negotiations 
where the political stakes are high (Park, 2004, p.248; Lee, 2009a, p.257). The 
governing party has sometimes attempted unilateral votes and opposition parties 
have blocked the process even using physical means in the legislative process 
of very controversial bills (Lee, 2008, p.24). If there was an attempt at unilateral 
decision making by the governing party, opposition parties boycotted the 
legislature and staged demonstrations outside the legislature (Kim, 2004, pp.29-
30). The competition between parties has tended to be polarised and has 
exacerbated social conflicts (Kang, 2005, p.82). The conflict management system 
in the legislature has demonstrated a low degree of institutionalisation (Kang, 
2009, p.25). 
Historical contexts of the features 
The historical contexts affecting the features of the legislature can be 
summarised as below. The legislature was the arena of the protest for 
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resurrection of procedural democracy rather than a policy making branch in the 
era of the authoritarian regime (Park, 1996, p.332). Opposition parties focused 
on political oversight of the executive rather than participation in the policy 
process (Kang, 2004, p.165). The main instruments of opposition parties were 
demonstrations outside the legislature and the threat of total resignation (Park, 
2004, p.249; Jung, 2008a, p.172). Governing parties without legitimacy thought 
that there should be no concession to the opposition for the maintenance of the 
regime, and opposition parties dared to accept extreme confrontation including 
physical clashes in the legislature (Kang, 2005, p.141). 
The confrontational mode adopted by parties has remained after 
democratisation in 1987. The democratisation was a compromise between the 
regime of the day and the opposition (Kang, 2008, p.473). The authoritarian force 
was not excluded from mainstream politics and won the presidential election in 
1987 based on the first-past-the-post system winning only 36.6 per cent of total 
votes. The legitimacy of the executive did not recover entirely. To make matters 
worse, the President, facing the legislature in which his party did not occupy an 
absolute majority, had attempted an artificial realignment of the party system 
through promoting defection of opposition MPs and merging parties to secure the 
support of the legislature (Kang, 2005, p.159; Kim, 2002, p.92; Lee, 2004, pp.102-
103). The most notorious example was the merger of three major parties in 1990 
mentioned in section 2.3. The artificial realignment exacerbated the fierce conflict 
and mutual distrust between the governing party and opposition party originating 
from the era of the authoritarian regime (Kang, 2005, p.160, 334; Kim, 2002, 
p.107). 
Public distrust of the legislature 
The public confidence in the legislature is very low. According to the World 
Values Survey (2015), the proportion of people who answer that they have a great 
deal or quite a lot of confidence for the legislature is only 3.2 and 22.3 per cent 
respectively. The proportion of people who do not have very much confidence or 
do not have confidence at all is 52.9 and 21.2 per cent respectively. This level of 
confidence is very low compared with that in other countries. The number of 
countries in which the proportion of people who do not have very much 
confidence or do not have confidence at all is higher than South Korea is only 
nine out of 57 countries. The level of confidence for the legislature is also lower 
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than those for other public institutions in South Korea except that for political 
parties as demonstrated in table 2.17. The level of public distrust is one cause for 
the high turnover of incumbent MPs as discussed in section 2.2. 
Table 2.17. The level of confidence for various public institutions in South Korea 
Confidence 
Institutions 
A great deal Quite a lot 
Not very 
much 
None at all No answer 
Parliament 3.2% 22.3% 52.9% 21.2% 0.5% 
Armed 
Forces 
19.8% 43.7% 28.3% 8.1% 0.2% 
Press 10.5% 50.5% 31.7% 7.1% 0.2% 
Police 8.1% 50.2% 34.7% 6.8% 0.2% 
Courts 10.9% 55.8% 25.9% 6.8% 0.7% 
Government 5.8% 43.7% 38.9% 11.4% 0.2% 
Political 
Parties 
2.4% 23.7% 53.3% 20.1% 0.5% 
Civil Service 5.0% 43.1% 40.8% 10.8% 0.2% 
Source: World Values Survey (2015) 
 
Considering the features of parliamentary politics discussed above, the public 
distrust of the legislature is not surprising. The distrust is due to politicians’ 
behaviour in the political process rather than the result of the policy process or 
the legislature’s performance in the process (Lim, 2004b, p.63; Lee, 2009b, 
p.123). The public think that the conflict in the legislature is a power struggle 
between elites (Lee, 2006, p.26). As Loewenberg (2011, pp.98-99) points out, the 
negotiation process to resolve political conflict is likely to be closed to the public, 
and the public are not willing to understand the inevitable controversial features 
of the legislative process dealing with political issues. In fact, the causes of public 
distrust are similar to those in the U.K or the U.S. – MPs’ expenses scandals 
(Rogers and Walters, 2015, pp.30-31); party politics on the floor and in public bill 
committees (Norton, 2013, p.277); and the legislature’s inertia, paralysis and 
polarised partisanship (Smiths, Roberts and Vander Wielen, 2015, ch.1). 
One of the differences between the public distrust in South Korea and that in the 
U.K. or U.S. is the fact that the public’s high expectation of the legislature under 
the authoritarian regimes was not fulfilled after democratisation and this has 
exacerbated the public distrust (Lim, 2007, pp.239-240). The level of distrust 
increased sharply during the one and a half decades after democratisation in 
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1987 according to the World Values Survey data as demonstrated in table 2.18. 
The negative opinion of the legislature’s check and control of the executive 
increased from 1985 to 2005 (Kim, 2009b, p.60).  
Table 2.18. The level of confidence in the legislature in South Korea 
Confidence 
Year 
A great deal Quite a lot 
Not very 
much 
None at all 
No answer / 
Do not Know 
1981-1984 24.3% 42.5% 24.7% 6.3% 2.2% 
1990-1994 7.4% 26.5% 42.8% 22.4% 1.0% 
1995-1998 3.3% 27.7% 51.6% 16.9% 0.5% 
1999-2004 1.3% 8.9% 47.2% 37.2% 5.3% 
2005-2009 1.4% 24.8% 50.5% 23.3% 0.1% 
2010-2014 3.2% 22.3% 52.9% 21.2% 0.5% 
Sources: World Values Survey (2015) 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
The National Assembly of South Korea is in a mixed state. The legislature’s 
power and status has been strengthened since democratisation in 1987, but the 
strong political control and weak policy control remain as important features of 
the legislature. MP’s legislative activities (especially the introduction of private 
members’ bills) are vitalised, but they are still mobilised in party politics and have 
many other roles, beyond the scrutiny of public policy, that occupy their time and 
resources. Committees are the centre of the legislative process, but the expertise 
of committees is low and weak from the influence of parties. Although recently 
parties are beginning to demonstrate ideological differences, the party system is 
still based on regional cleavage and the policy capacity of parties is weak. The 
operation of the legislature is based on the negotiation and compromise between 
parliamentary parties, but the degree of institutionalisation in conflict 
management between parties is low and negotiation on policy matters is linked 
with other political matters. The public distrust of the legislature brings about a 
high turnover of MPs in general elections which, in turn, has negative effects on 
the professionalization of MPs and the legislature’s expertise. The low expertise 
of the legislature itself then becomes one of the causes of the public distrust. 
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In Collier and Collier’s (1991) terms, three critical junctures can be found in the 
historical trajectory affecting the mixed state of the legislature. The first one is the 
separation from and confrontation with North Korea just after independence from 
Japan. The confrontation moulded a narrow ideological spectrum in mainstream 
politics. Progressive parties were already excluded from the legislature in the 
1950s. Universal franchise, given from the 1st general election without the 
experience of class struggle and wide ideological spectrum, was not helpful for 
the formation of party identification according to class consciousness and the 
formation of mass parties based on social class. The narrowness of ideological 
spectrum affected the regional party system after democratisation and the weak 
policy capacity of parties. 
The second juncture is the formation of the authoritarian regime oriented to 
economic development after the coup in 1961. The legislature became the arena 
of protest against the authoritarian regime and opposition parties became protest 
organisations arguing for the resurrection of procedural democracy. The policy 
capacity of parties was not their priority. The leaders of the protest constructed a 
charismatic status in parties, and parties became their strong leaders’ 
personalised organisations or groups of factions dependent on their prominent 
leaders. The regime’s emphasis on efficiency in the policy process excluded the 
legislature in the process. The internal organisation of the legislature and the 
legislative process was adapted to the system for the promotion of development 
policies. The upper chamber was abolished. The legislative process in which the 
committee stage is central was established due to the need, not for the expertise 
of the committee, but for a rapid and comfortable legislative process. The 
electoral regionalism was seeded by the regional discrimination in implementing 
development policies. The need for the promotion of development policy 
constructed a centralised administrative system and brought about the local 
governments’ dependence on the central government that made the MPs’ role as 
the representative of constituency important.  
The last one is the democratisation and critical elections in 1987 (the 13th 
presidential election) and 1988 (the 13th general election). The regional cleavage 
became important under the situation in which the ideological spectrum was 
narrow and the resurrection of procedural democracy was achieved. The leaders 
of mainstream parties represented their home regions and exploited regional 
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sentiments for their electoral gains. The leaders of pro-democracy forces had 
strong influences in their home regions. The authoritarian forces which survived 
in the compromised democratisation process also mobilised regionalism in their 
home region. The electoral regionalism exacerbated the oligarchic and 
undemocratic feature of parties and made the policy capacity of parties 
unnecessary. The result of the 13th general election in which the governing party 
did not secure the absolute majority in the legislature changed the operation of 
the legislature. The operation began to be based on the negotiation between 
parties. The posts of the Speaker, deputy speakers and committee chairs began 
to be distributed to according to the proportion of seats held by each party. 
So far, the features of the institutions of the legislature of South Korea 
surrounding the legislative process and actors in the process have been 
explained. In addition, the historical contexts of South Korea affecting those 
features have also been discussed. The next stage is to introduce the committee 
staff system in the legislature. The introduction is made along with a comparison 
with those in other legislatures – the British Parliament, the U.S. Congress, 
Australian Parliament and German Bundestag and Bundesrat – at a descriptive 
level to make it easier to understand the character of the committee staff system. 
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3. Committee Staff in the Legislatures of Various Countries 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the committee staff system of the South 
Korean legislature and compare it with those in the legislatures of various 
countries at a descriptive level. The legislatures selected for the comparison are 
the 1st and 2nd chambers of the U.K., the U.S., Australia and Germany. The 
reason for this selection is to include as many factors as possible which could 
affect the role of committees and their staff in the chamber. These factors include 
the government system (presidential system in the U.S. and parliamentary 
system in the U.K., Australia and Germany); the official power of committees in 
the legislative process (vital committee stage and strong committee power in the 
U.S. and Germany and relatively weak committee power in the U.K. and 
Australia); and the 2nd chambers’ relative power to the 1st chamber (relatively 
strong 2nd chamber in the U.S. and Australia and relatively weak 2nd chamber in 
the U.K. and Germany). This classification is demonstrated in table 3.1. Shaw 
(1979; 1998) gives the insight of the use of the first and second factor, and Russell 
(2000) gives the insight of the use of the third factor. 
Table 3.1. Classification of legislatures 
 
Strong committees 
in the legislative process 
Relatively Weak committees 
in the legislative process 
Relatively strong 
2nd chamber 
Relatively weak 
2nd chamber 
Relatively strong 
2nd chamber 
Relatively weak 
2nd chamber 
Parliamentary 
system 
- Germany Australia The U.K. 
Presidential 
system 
The U.S. - - - 
 
The next section introduces the committee staff system in the National 
Assembly of South Korea. The committee system, organisation of the committee 
staff, official role and function, legal status, personnel management system and 
norms are described. In addition, the review report of the committee staff that 
provides briefings on bills in committee meetings, a unique system which is not 
found in other countries, is explained. The section is followed by other sections 
describing the committee staff system in individual countries in the order of the 
U.K., the U.S., Australia and Germany. Each section comprises the description 
of the committee system, organisation of the committee staff, role and function, 
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and legal status and norms. Those in the 1st and 2nd chambers are explained 
separately in each section, but the role, legal status and norms of the committee 
staff in the U.S. Congress are introduced together. 
The final section of this chapter compares the committee staff systems at a 
descriptive level. The comparison demonstrates that the role of committee staff 
is basically affected by the role of committees in the legislatures which, in turn, is 
affected by the committees’ status in the legislative process. The comparison, 
however, posits the possibility that the existence of other staff and the partisan 
status can affect the roles of the committee staff. The data sources are official 
documents; academic articles (especially in the cases of the U.S.); internet 
homepages of the chambers; and correspondence with senior officials in charge 
of supporting the committees of the chambers (in the cases of the U.K. and 
Australia). 
 
3.2. The Committee Staff in the National Assembly of South Korea 
  3.2.1. Introduction 
The National Assembly Act 1988 (art. 42) requires each committee to be 
provided with committee staff directors and other necessary public officials. As 
explained in chapter 2, there are two types of committees in the legislature – 
standing committees and special committees. In the cases of standing 
committees and permanent special committees, each committee is supported 
with a committee staff team which is exclusively responsible to the committee. In 
the cases of non-permanent special committees, however, each committee is 
supported with a committee staff team being comprised of staff who have duties 
other than supporting the committee (usually staff members of another committee 
which deals with matters closest to the matter dealt with in the special committee). 
The number of total committee staff is 311. The National Assembly Act 1988 (art. 
43) also enables committees to engage experts (no more than three) who have 
experience and knowledge as assistants under the approval of the Speaker 
although the engagement of these assistants is very rare. 
  3.2.2. Organisation of the committee staff 
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Committee staff members are employees of the National Assembly Secretariat.  
The National Assembly Secretariat Act 1984 (art. 8) rules that each committee 
shall be staffed with committee staff directors (including a chief of staff), 
legislative counsels (if necessary), legislative researchers, and other necessary 
public officials. The chief of staff is the head of a committee staff team. Staff 
directors (including the chief of staff) are senior staff in charge of reviewing bills 
under their own jurisdiction and presenting their opinions on them. Legislative 
researchers (except one senior legislative researcher) conduct research and 
analysis. One senior legislative researcher, deputy legislative researchers and 
secretaries conduct administrative tasks. The detailed number of committee staff 
according to committees and positions are in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. The number of committee staff in South Korean National Assembly 
Position 
 
Committee 
Chief 
of 
Staff 
Staff 
Director 
Legislative 
Research 
Counsel 
Legislative 
Researcher 
Deputy 
Legislative 
Researcher 
Secretary Total 
House Steering 1 - 1 5 1 4 12 
Legislation and 
Judiciary 
1 3 - 15 3 6 28 
National Policy 1 2 - 10 2 4 19 
Strategy and 
Finance 1 1 - 11 2 4 19 
Future Planning, 
Science, 
Broadcasting and 
Communication 
1 1 1 8 2 4 17 
Education, Culture, 
Sports and Tourism 
1 2 1 11 2 4 21 
Foreign Affairs and 
Unification 
1 1 - 7 2 3 14 
National Defence 1 1 - 6 2 3 13 
Security and Public 
Administration 
1 1 - 12 2 4 20 
Agriculture, Food, 
Rural Affairs, 
Oceans and 
Fisheries  
1 2 - 9 2 4 18 
Trade, Industry, 
and Energy 
1 1 - 9 2 4 17 
Health and Welfare 1 1 - 11 2 4 19 
Environment and 
Labour 
1 1 - 9 2 3 16 
Land Infrastructure 
and Transport 
1 1 1 10 2 5 20 
Intelligence 1 - 1 2 1 3 8 
Gender Equality 
and Family 
1 - 1 3 1 3 9 
Special Committee 
on Budget and 
Accounts 
1 1 2 17 3 6 30 
Special Committee 
on Ethics 
1 - - 1 1 2 5 
Special Committee 1 1 - 1 1 2 6 
Total 19 20 8 157 35 72 311 
Source: Enforcement Rule on the Organisation of the National Assembly Secretariat 2009, 
attached table 
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The organisation of a typical committee staff team is as follows: There are two 
or three sub-teams in a committee staff team. The head of a sub-team is a 
committee staff director (including the chief of staff), and legislative researchers 
assist him/her. The tasks of research and analysis are divided and assigned to 
each sub-team according to the jurisdiction of the committee staff director of the 
sub-team. In addition to research work, the chief of staff is responsible for the 
committee’s proceedings and administrative tasks. He/she conducts these duties 
with a sub-team which is comprised of a senior legislative researcher, deputy 
legislative researchers and secretaries. 
   3.2.3. Official role and function 
The official function of committee staff can be summarised as follows: 
supporting committee proceedings; providing information about bills and policies 
in the committee’s terms of reference; managing the committee’s official 
documents (including drafting committee reports and committee bills); and 
conducting other administrative tasks. The official role of committee staff is 
described according to their position as follows: 
The chief of staff directs and supervises other committee staff members 
(National Assembly Secretariat Act 1988, art. 9(1)). When committee (or 
subcommittee) meetings are held, staff under his/her direction and supervision 
include security officers and stenographers (The Speaker’s Direction on the Duty 
of the Committee Staff 1994, art. 4(1)). He/she is in charge of maintaining order 
and advises the chair and MPs in the committee on procedural matters. At the 
start of the term of the committee, he/she advises the chair and ranking members 
about organising the committee (e.g. organising subcommittees).  
Staff directors (including chiefs of staff) review bills and petitions under their own 
jurisdictions and present opinions on them at committee meetings; conduct 
research and analysis on matters related to the inspection and investigation of 
state administrations; provide information at the request of the chair or MPs in the 
committee; and support committee proceedings (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 
42(4); National Assembly Secretariat Act 1984, art. 9(2)). One of the most 
important roles of a staff director is presenting the review reports of the committee 
staff on bills at committee meetings. A committee should hear the review report 
in examining any bill (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 58 (1)). As demonstrated 
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in chapter 2, in the subcommittee stage, a staff director supports the 
subcommittee proceedings and reports about the history of examination on the 
bill, their own opinions about the purpose of the bill, their own amendment 
opinions about the bill and those of MPs (if they are suggested in general 
discussion before the subcommittee stage).  The National Assembly Act 1988 
(art. 66) requires a committee to report in writing the process and result of an 
examination of a bill when the committee has completed the examination. Staff 
directors are in charge of drafting the committee’s deliberation reports (The 
Speaker’s Direction on the Duty of the Committee staff 1994, art. 7). In addition, 
they are in charge of drafting committee bills and the committee’s reports of the 
inspection and investigation of state administration. 
Legislative researchers are core personnel in a committee staff team who 
conduct hands-on work in research and analysis of bills and policies in the 
committee’s terms of reference. Under the direction and supervision of the chief 
of staff and committee staff directors, they collect materials; investigate and 
research matters relevant to the examination of bills; draft review reports on bills; 
draft committee bills and deliberation reports on bills; identify potential witnesses 
for committee hearings; produce information and materials relevant to the 
inspection and investigation of state administration; and draft the committee’s 
reports of the inspection and investigation of state administration. 
Under the direction and supervision of the chief of staff, one senior legislative 
researcher supports committee proceedings and performs an administrative 
function with the deputy legislative researchers and secretaries (The Speaker’s 
Direction on the Duty of the Committee staff 1994, art. 5). They prepare the 
committee and subcommittee meetings; support the chairs’ proceedings in the 
committee and subcommittee meetings; conduct paperwork including sending 
bills and the deliberation reports to the plenary; carry out other administrative 
tasks such as arranging the committee’s domestic and overseas visits. 
    3.2.4. The review report of the committee staff 
Since the Constituent Assembly, committees have had their staff review bills, 
report about them or answer to members’ inquiries, and since the 6th National 
Assembly (1963-1967), the reviews on bills should have been distributed to MPs 
in the committee in written forms (Kim, 2006, p.60). The procedure, however, was 
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not compulsory and there was no unified term to call the procedure. Since the 7th 
National Assembly (1967-1971), the document has been called the review report 
of the committee staff director, and presenting the report became a compulsory 
procedure in the examination of any bill by the amendment of the National 
Assembly Act in 1981. 
The substance and the function of the review report 
The review report on a bill introduces the substance of the bill; analyses the 
purpose of the bill; presents the pros and cons of the bill; informs of relevant 
stakeholders’ positions on the bill; and offers amendment opinions of the staff 
director on the clauses in the bill in a detailed manner. In analysing bills, the 
committee staff should maintain an objective and neutral point of view and any 
benefits or side effects which can be expected from the implementation of the bill 
should be reviewed in the report. The report should be written to be easily 
understood by MPs who are usually non-expert to the policy matters that are dealt 
with in the bill. Nowadays, the detailed amendment opinions are sometimes 
omitted from the report and presented at the subcommittee stage because of the 
time pressure and workload of the committee stage. 
The functions of the report are policy evaluation and provision of information for 
the MPs in the committee who are making decisions, and disclosure of 
information on the scrutiny of legislation. First of all, the committee staff evaluate 
the policies contained in bills through the review report (Kim, 2006, pp.34-35; 
Park, 1998, pp.32-34). The pros and cons of the purpose of policies and detailed 
measures of the policies are analysed in the report. MPs in the committee are 
informed of the evaluation of policies in the report, and the evaluation contains 
important information for the decision making process of MPs in the committee in 
the legislative process. This information is very valuable for MPs because the 
attention of MPs to a specific bill is a rare resource in the legislative process as 
demonstrated in chapter 8. On top of that, the report discloses information 
concerning the scrutiny of a bill (Kim, 2006, p.59). Information about a bill which 
cannot be found in the official minutes of committee or subcommittee meetings 
such as the positions of stakeholders on a bill and the detailed logic of them, 
technical pros and cons on detailed provisions of the bill and the detailed reasons 
for amendments of the bill is revealed in the report.  These reports can be 
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accessed through the homepage of the National Assembly of South Korea and 
can be accessed by the general public. 
The production process and the presentation of the report 
Usually, legislative researchers draft the report of the committee staff director. 
When a bill is referred to a committee, the legislative researcher in charge of the 
bill requests information about the bill from the relevant department in the 
executive and from potential stakeholders. If necessary, the staff member 
consults with civil servants of the departments, personal staff members of 
sponsoring MPs (in the cases of private members’ bills) and representatives of 
relevant interest groups. After collecting information, the legislative researcher 
conducts analysis and research on the bill for himself/herself and writes the first 
draft of the report. 
Then, the staff director (including the chief of staff) in charge of the bill revises 
the first draft. When the workload of the staff director is heavy, he/she gives the 
legislative researcher direction in the revision of the draft, the legislative 
researcher revises the draft, and the staff director finally checks the revision. If 
necessary, the staff director meets senior civil servants of the relevant 
departments, the sponsoring MPs and the relevant interest groups’ 
representatives. The final version of the report should be distributed to committee 
members at least 48 hours before the bill is presented before the committee, 
except under special circumstances (National Assembly act 1988, art. 58(8)). 
The report is read by the staff director at the committee meeting when the bill is 
presented to the committee. In the past, a full version of all individual reports on 
individual bills were read. Nowadays, however, the reports tend to be read in a 
summarised version and all at once due to the great number of bills presented at 
a committee meeting and the need to secure enough time for committee 
members to debate. 
The limit of the report 
Historically, the limit of the report of the committee staff director was linked with 
the appointment of the committee staff director (Kim, 2006, p.60). Until 1972, 
committee staff directors (then, usually one per committee) had been appointed 
politically by the recommendation of parties. Committee staff directors in this 
period were likely to reflect their parties’ interests in doing their job, and it was 
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difficult to expect that they would support the committee as a whole in an objective 
and impartial manner. The power of appointment of committee staff directors was 
transferred from committee chairs to the Speaker in 1972. Then, senior civil 
servants in the executive were seconded as committee staff directors of important 
committees (e.g. Legislation and Judiciary Committee, Finance Committee, 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts) until 2001. The review reports of 
these committee staff directors were difficult to be conceived as impartial because 
they tended to be favourable to the executive branch and governing party (Kim, 
2006, p.60). 
All committee staff directors (including chiefs of staff) have been appointed from 
the permanent employees of the National Assembly Secretariat since 2001. The 
norm of political impartiality has been emphasised to them and even the National 
Assembly Act 1988 (art. 42(2)) itself rules on the political neutrality of the 
committee staff. This norm brings positive effects on staff credibility, but also has 
negative effects on the function of committee staff. The report may be so 
mechanically neutral to a bill that it tends to identify all pros and cons of the bill 
but not to judge them, and the committee staff may avoid active analysis of 
politically controversial issues (Seo, 2011, pp.25-26). This tendency is more 
explicit on the review reports on private members’ bills. 
    3.2.5. Legal status, personnel management system and official norms 
As mentioned above, committee staff members in the South Korean legislature 
are employees of the National Assembly Secretariat and they have the legal 
status of career civil servants. Although they are civil servants, they are appointed 
by the Speaker or the Secretary General and independent from the executive 
branch and the President. They are employed through an open and competitive 
procedure (usually written examinations) and guaranteed their tenure unless they 
are punished by criminal laws or disciplinary actions (State Public Officials Act 
1963, art. 28, 68). The parliamentary privileges, however, are not applied to them. 
A generalist approach is applied to the personnel management of staff in the 
National Assembly Secretariat. A staff member transfers every two and half years 
on average. The transfer of position is done between committees; between a 
committee and a position in other divisions of the National Assembly Secretariat; 
or between a committee and National Assembly Budget Office or National 
Assembly Research Service. 
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As civil servants, committee staff members should abide by the norms that are 
ruled in the relevant laws. The Constitution of the republic of Korea 1987 (art. 
2(7)) states the rules of political impartiality of civil servants. The State Public 
Officials Act 1963 (ch.7) rules on the norms that any civil servant should abide by: 
the duty of fidelity; obedience; kindness and impartiality; religious neutrality; 
confidentiality; integrity; and prohibition of deserting from office, pecuniary 
business and concurrent office, political activities and collective activities. 
Moreover, the National Assembly Act 1988 (art. 42(2)) stipulates that committee 
staff who are civil servants should maintain political neutrality in performing their 
duties. 
    3.2.6. Problems in the committee staff system of the South Korean legislature 
Heavy workload compared with personnel capacity and the personnel 
management system that inhibits the nurturing expertise of staff have been 
identified as problems in the committee staff system of the South Korean 
legislature by researchers. First of all, the staff have a heavy burden of work on 
their shoulders (Park, 1998, p.90; Park and Yun, 2001, pp.185-186; Choi, 2008, 
pp.69-70; Lim and Seo, 2013, pp.68-69). The number of bills that were introduced 
in the first year of the 19th National Assembly (from 30 May 2012 to 29 May 2013) 
were 5,248 (including 12 budget bills and one settlement of account). In addition, 
any bills should be reviewed by the committee staff and presented to the 
committee within at least 45 days (in the case of a legislative bill for partial 
amendment of acts) or 50 days (in the case of a legislative bill for establishing 
new Acts, whole amendment or repeal of acts) from the date when the bill is 
referred to the committee (National Assembly Act 1988, art. 59, 59-2). The 
number of legislative researchers who conduct research and analysis on bills and 
policies and draft committee reports or committee bills, however, was 134, which 
means that a legislative researcher had to review 39 bills (including one budget 
bill and one settlement of account) in a year. Moreover, the number of committee 
staff directors (including chiefs of staff) who finalise the reports about bills; 
present them on committee meetings; and are in charge of drafting and 
management of documents of committees was only 39, which means that a 
committee staff director has to review 135 bills (also including one budget bill and 
one settlement of account) in a year. The chief of staff of each committee is also 
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in charge of committee proceedings and other administrative tasks in addition to 
these duties. 
On top of that, the fact that the committee staff are guaranteed the legal status 
of career civil servants has been criticised by some researchers. According to the 
interviews with personal staff members in Park (1998, p.62), personal staff 
members think that committee staff members tend to have the identity of civil 
servants more than that of parliamentary staff, and (there was a perception that) 
they tend to be favourable to the executive. Moreover, the generalist approach of 
the civil service system may inhibit the committee staff members nurturing the 
expertise necessary to conduct analysis of and research on a specific area (Kim, 
1992, pp.53-60; Park, 1998, pp.52-57; Park and Yun, 2001, p.177; Choi, 2008, 
pp.74-77). Thus, Park (2004b, pp.312-313) argues that the committee staff 
should be appointed politically as those in the U.S. Congress, and other 
researchers suggested the employment of specialists in a specific policy area by 
fixed-term contract (Lee, 2006, pp.52-53; Choi, 2008, pp.91-92). 
Political appointment of committee staff, however, can damage the neutrality 
and objectivity of conducting the committee staff member’s job, especially 
considering the fact that the policy capacity of political parties in South Korea is 
low (Kim, 2006, p.32). Moreover, the expertise of committee staff in the South 
Korean legislature may not be limited to the knowledge of a specific policy area 
because the job of committee staff includes drafting of law bills (requiring high 
skills of legislation), analysis of budget bills (requiring knowledge about financial 
administration of public organisations) and the management of policy networks 
about a policy issue as demonstrated in chapter 7. Permanent staff who have 
accumulated diverse experience as committee staff members in various policy 
areas may perform well in their job. Therefore, a generalist approach in the 
personnel management system may not be always harmful to the expertise of 
committee staff. 
 
3.3. The Committee staff in the British Parliament 
  3.3.1. The House of Commons 
  There are three types of committees – select committees, general committees, 
and grand committees – in the British House of Commons (The U.K. Parliament, 
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2016a).4 Select committees can be categorised into departmental, cross-cutting 
and internal committees (Rogers and Walters, 2015, pp.306-314). Departmental 
select committees scrutinise the work of government departments which range 
from their policies to internal administrations. Cross-cutting committees and 
internal committees deal with matters to which many departments are related and 
domestic matters of the House itself respectively. General committees examine 
bills. Grand committees debate regional matters relating to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (The U.K. Parliament, 2016a). 
Organisation 
Full-time committee staff members in the House of Commons are employed by 
the House of Commons Commission and belong to the House of Commons 
Service (House of Commons Service, 2013, ch.2). The House of Commons 
Service, for which just less than 1,800 staff work, has six departments – Chamber 
and Committee Services, Facilities, Finance, HR and Change, Information 
Services and Parliamentary Digital Service (Joint services with the House of 
Lords) (House of Commons Commission, 2015, p.50). With about 200 full-time 
equivalent staff, the Committee Directorate in the Department of Chamber and 
Committee Services conducts the function of secretariat, advice, research and 
administration for each of the House’s departmental select committees and most 
other select committees (Rogers and Walters, 2015, p.60; The U.K. Parliament, 
2016b). The typical staff organisation of a departmental select committee is 
comprised of five or six full-time staff – the clerk of the committee, the second 
clerk, two subject specialists and one or two administrative staff (House of 
Commons, 2015, p.10). There are also part-time staff members called specialist 
advisers who are paid on a daily rate (Rogers and Walters, 2015, p.319). Select 
committees are also supported by a media officer who typically assists four or 
five committees (House of Commons, 2015, p.11). 
In addition to these, the Committee Directorate also supports public bill 
committees (The U.K. Parliament, 2016b). Staff members in the Scrutiny Unit in 
the department provide both select and public bill committees with expertise on 
legislative and financial matters (The U.K. Parliament, 2016c). The Public 
                                                          
4 Joint committees consisting of MPs and Lords are excluded. The classification of committees in House of 
Lords in sub-section 3.3.2 also excludes Joint committees. 
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Accounts Committee that oversees government spending draws on the 
resources of the National Audit Office (Rogers and Walters, 2015, pp.248-249). 
Role and Function 
When it comes to departmental select committees, the most important function 
of the committee staff is to support inquiries. They provide a detailed brief 
including the background of the inquiry; important points from written evidence; 
areas that could be explored further; items necessary for the committee report; 
and provisional questions (Rogers and Walters, 2015, p.321). They follow the 
inquiry for other possible information or evidence and draft the committee report 
of the inquiry (Rogers and Walters, 2015, pp.323-324). The roles of staff 
members of a select committee are as follows: The clerk of the committee is the 
chief of the staff team and an important adviser of the chair of the committee 
about the committee’s activities, and the second clerk manages inquiries and 
supports subcommittees (Rogers and Walters, 2015. P.319). Committee 
specialists provide information and research services through planning the 
inquiry programme; identifying potential witnesses; drafting briefing materials, 
provisional questions and committee reports; responding to requests for 
information from committee members; analysing previously published material 
and consulting experts in the relevant fields (The job description of committee 
specialist, acquired from the correspondence with the Committee Directorate of 
the House in 2014).  The committee assistant plays administrative roles, such as 
making arrangements for committee meetings or visits; and printing and 
publication of evidence and committee reports (Rogers and Walters, 2015, p.319). 
For the staff members of public bill committees, the main role is to support the 
proceedings of the committee, and research on the merits of a bill is not their 
function although they prepare the brief for sessions taking oral evidence along 
with departmental select committee staff and the Scrutiny Unit (Rogers and 
Walters, 2015, p.196). When it comes to dealing with amendments to bills, bill 
teams of the executive also support the legislative process (Cabinet Office, 2015; 
Page, 2003, pp.666-670). There has been no academic research about the policy 
impact of committee staff in the British House of Commons. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say about how great their impact is although they are indispensable 
resources for committee activities. According to the correspondence with the 
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Committee Directorate of the House in 2014, the committee staff are regarded as 
‘integral to the positive impact of committees on government’. 
Legal status and norms 
As mentioned above, full-time committee staff in the British House of Commons 
are staff of the House of Commons Service. They are recruited, transferred and 
promoted on the basis of appropriateness for the job (House of Commons Service, 
2013, ch.8, s. 2(1)). They are not civil servants, but the complementing, grading 
and pay of staff in the House Departments are kept broadly in line with those in 
the Home Civil Service (House of Commons Administration Act 1978, s. 2). There 
are several types of staff appointment according to the duration of appointment – 
permanent, fixed-term, casual or temporary and zero hours (House of Commons 
Service, 2013, ch.3, s. 3). 
The House of Commons Service (2013, ch.1, s. 3) enumerates integrity, 
professionalism, teamwork, recognition and commitment as core values. Political 
impartiality that is included in integrity is re-emphasised as an important norm of 
staff members who advise MPs (House of Commons Service, 2013, ch.18, s. 
5(2)). Committee staff members who provide information, briefings or advice to 
MPs are required to keep political impartiality (House of Commons Service, 2013, 
ch.18, s. 5(3)). The House of Commons Service expresses the concern that the 
reputation of the whole staff organisation as well as the ability of staff members 
to conduct their function would be damaged if the norm of political impartiality is 
not kept (House of Commons Service, 2013, ch.18, s. 5(2)). In this regard, 
political impartiality is an important norm of committee staff members. 
  3.3.2. The House of Lords 
According to the correspondence with the Committee Office of House of Lords 
Administration (2014), there are two types of committees – domestic committees 
and scrutiny committees – in the British House of Lords. The former deals with 
the delivery of services to peers, the use of public funds and the internal working 
of the House (The U.K. Parliament, 2016d). Permanent committees, except the 
domestic committees, focus on a specialised area, such as Europe, science, 
economics, communications, the UK constitution and international relations, 
differently from departmental select committees in the House of Commons (The 
U.K. Parliament, 2016e). Domestic committees have very few direct staff, but 
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scrutiny committees are supported by the committee office for which about 60 
staff members work (Rogers and Walters, 2015, p.337; The correspondence with 
the Committee Office of House of Lords Administration, 2014).  
Organisation 
Committee staff in the House of Commons are employed by the Clerk of the 
Parliament and belong to the House of Lords Administration for which about 500 
staff members work (House of Lords, 2012, p.1; 2016, p.56). The Committee 
Office in the Administration provides the House of Lords select committees with 
procedural and legal advice and administrative support (The U.K. Parliament, 
2016f).  A typical staff organisation of a scrutiny committee is comprised of three 
staff – a clerk, a policy analyst, and a committee assistant. As those in the House 
of Commons, committees can also appoint specialist advisers on a daily rate 
basis for the purpose of specialist advice (Rogers and Walters, 2015, p.337; The 
correspondence with the Committee Office of House of Lords Administration, 
2014). Committees which oversee legislation are also supported by the 
Legislation Office. For instance, the Delegated Legislation Office supports the 
scrutiny work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and 
the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that review legislative work 
delegated to government ministers (The U.K. Parliament, 2016f). 
Role and Function 
The staff organisation of a scrutiny committee prepares inquiries and the 
meetings of the committee, provides committee members with briefings and 
information, supports the subcommittee’s scrutiny work, drafts committee reports 
and publishes committee activities.5 The clerk is the head of the staff team. 
He/she manages the resources of the committee; gives advice to the chair and 
members of the committee on organisation, procedure and content of the 
committee’s work; and oversees the committee assistant’s administrative work 
and the policy analyst’s research and information services. The policy analyst 
supports the clerk and committee with research and drafting. He/she prepares 
draft committee reports with the chair, the clerk, and specialist advisers. Special 
advisers, who are often leading academics in their field, also provide research 
                                                          
5  This introduction of staff members’ role and function is based on the correspondence with the 
Committee office of House of Lord Administration (2014). 
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and information services. The committee assistant carries out administrative 
services. He/she makes all arrangements for meetings smoothly and efficiently. 
Legal status and norms 
As mentioned above, full-time committee staff in the British House of Lords are 
staff of the House of Lords Administration. They are recruited and promoted by 
fair and open competition (House of Lords, 2012, p.5). No committee staff 
member is a political appointee or the appointee of individual members. Staff who 
perform functions on behalf of the House or a committee of the House can at 
times be protected by parliamentary privilege (The correspondence with the 
Committee office of House of Lord Administration, 2014). As in the House of 
Commons, there are several types of staff appointment according to the duration 
of appointment – permanent, fixed-term, casual or temporary and zero hours 
(House of Lords, 2012, p.8). 
The values of House of Lords Administration are: respect for the constitutional 
importance and dignity of Parliament; professional excellence; honesty, 
impartiality and integrity; openness and accountability; fairness and respect for 
all staff; obtaining value for money while recognising their corporate responsibility 
to wider society; and environmental sustainability (House of Lords, 2013, p.2). In 
those values, political impartiality is emphasised as one of the most important 
norms of staff of the House of Lords as it is for those of the House of Commons. 
The House of Lords (2012, p.136) expresses the concern similar to that of the 
House of Commons that the reputation of the Administration could be damaged 
when the political impartiality of its staff members is impaired. Briefings and 
advice by a staff member are expected to be free from the personal political 
opinions of the staff member by peers (House of Lords, 2012, p.136). 
 
3.4. Committee staff in the U.S. Congress 
  3.4.1. The Committee system 
House of Representatives 
There are two types of committees – standing committees and select 
committees – in the U.S. House of Representatives in addition to the joint 
committees and conference committees with the Senate (Rules of the House of 
Representatives 2015, r.I(11), X(10), (11); The U.S. House of Representatives, 
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2016a). Standing committees are established by rules of the house and have 
jurisdictions corresponding to the departments of the executive (Rules of the 
House of Representatives 2015, r.X(1)). Each standing committee has the 
responsibilities of legislation and oversight of programmes in its terms of 
reference, and gathering information through hearings (Smith, Roberts and 
Vander Wielen, 2015, pp.174; Rules of the House of Representatives 2015, 
r.X(2)). Select committees exist for a short time period and matters which may 
under several standing committees’ terms of reference or investigation (Smith, 
Roberts and Vander Wielen, 2015, pp.177-178). The Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, however, is established by the rules of the house and 
has a permanent status (Rules of the House of Representatives 2015, r.X(11)). 
These committees have their own budget to employ committee staff members 
(Rules of the House of Representatives 2015, r.X(6)). 
Senate 
There are also two types of committees – standing committees and select or 
special committees – in the U.S. Senate in addition to the joint committees and 
conference committees with the House of Representatives (Smith, Roberts and 
Vander Wielen, 2015, pp.174-178; Standing Rules of the Senate 2013, r.XXV; 
The U.S. Senate, 2016a). Standing committees are established by standing rules 
of the Senate and have jurisdictions corresponding to the departments of the 
executive as those in the House of Representatives (Standing Rules of the 
Senate 2013, r.XXV(1)). Each standing committee has the power to report on bills 
or other matters in its terms of reference (Standing Rules of the Senate 2013, 
r.XXV(1)). Select committees are principally for specific issues and exist 
temporarily as do those in the House of Representatives (Smith, Roberts and 
Vander Wielen, 2015, pp.177-178), but four select and special committees in the 
Senate – Indian Affairs, Ethics, Intelligence and Aging – have their legal bases in 
the standing rules (Standing Rules of the Senate 2013, r.XXV(2)-(3)). These 
committees have their own budget to employ committee staff members as  in the 
House of Representatives (Standing Rules of the Senate 2013, r.XXVI(9)). 
  3.4.2. Organisation 
House of Representatives 
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Table 3.3. The number of committee staff in the U.S. House of Representatives 
and Senate 
House of Representatives Senate 
Committee Staff number Committee Staff number 
Agriculture 45 Appropriation 109 
Appropriation 156 
Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry 
33 
Armed services 61 Armed Services 51 
Benghazi 33 
Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs 
40 
Budget 46 Budget 42 
Education and Workforce 70 
Commerce, Science and 
Transportation 
64 
Energy and Commerce 118 
Energy and Natural 
Resources 
42 
Financial Services 65 
Environment and Public 
Works 
38 
Foreign Affairs 72 Ethics 14 
Homeland Security 87 Finance 73 
House Administration 50 Foreign Relations 61 
Intelligence 29 
Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs 
89 
Judiciary 64 
Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions 
81 
Oversight and Government 
Reform 
88 Indian Affairs 21 
Natural Resources 65 Intelligence 40 
Rules 28 Judiciary 97 
Science, Space and 
Technology 
58 Rules and Administration 21 
Small Business 22 
Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship 
23 
Ethics 26 Special Committee on Aging 22 
Transportation and 
Infrastructure 
70 Veterans' Affairs 19 
Veterans' Affairs 33   
Ways and Means 71   
Joint Committee on Taxation 63   
Total 1,420 Total 980 
Source: The U.S. House of Representatives (2016b) and The U.S. Senate (2016b). The number 
of the committee staff is the number of staff members who are paid at the end of the periods that 
the reports cover. 
  
Staff members of a committee are employees of the committee itself. A 
committee appoints its staff members by majority vote, and one-third of the staff 
members are appointed by a majority vote of minority party members at the 
request of minority party members (Rules of the House of Representatives 2015, 
r.10(9)). Thus, the committee staff are comprised of majority party staff members 
(two-thirds) and minority party staff members (one-third). The Committee on 
Ethics and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, however, do not 
have this dual composition of staff (Rules of the House of Representatives 2015, 
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r.10(9)). Although the structures of (organisation for) committee staff  differ a little 
among committees, a typical committee staff organisation includes the posts of 
staff director, committee counsel, chief clerk, policy director, policy advisor, 
professional staff member, legislative assistant, staff assistant, communications 
director, press secretary and administrative director (Committee on Education 
and Workforce, 2016). The staff organisation of a committee usually consists of 
three parts which take charge of administrative, policy and communication tasks 
respectively. The average number of staff members per committee is large (61.7) 
although the number of committee staff members varies among committees as 
demonstrated in table 3.3. 
Senate 
Staff members of a committee are employees of the committee itself and the 
committee staff is comprised of majority party and minority party staff as in the 
House of Representatives. The composition of staff should reflect the share of 
seats between the majority and minority parties and at least one third of the 
committee budget for staff should be allocated to the minority (Standing Rules of 
the Senate 2013, r.XXVII(3)). The posts and structures of staff organisation are 
similar to those in the House of Representatives. The numbers of committee staff 
members according to committees are demonstrated in table 3.3. The average 
number per committee is 49 which is smaller than that of the House of 
Representatives. 
  3.4.3. Role and function 
The roles and functions of the committee staff in the U.S. Congress can be 
classified into four major categories: information and intelligence function; 
integration function; drafting legislation and reports; and innovation function 
(DeGregorio, 1995, pp.268-274; Fox and Hammond, 1977, p.97; Patterson, 1970, 
pp.26-28; Sidlow and Henschen, 1985, pp.486-493). Firstly, the basic role of the 
committee staff is collecting information and delivering it to committee members 
(Webber, 1987; Whiteman, 1995). The information includes policy information, 
political information and procedural information (DeGregorio, 1995, p.268; 
Whiteman, 1995, p.40). The chairs and staff directors prioritise staff members’ 
provision of policy information above their provision of political information as the 
role of committee staff (DeGregorio, 1995). The function of investigation through 
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which the committee staff prepare committee hearings and committee 
investigations is also included in the information and intelligence function 
(Patterson, 1970, p.26). 
Secondly, the committee staff provide linkage between committees; between 
chambers (the House and the Senate); and between the Congress and the 
executive (Patterson, 1970, pp.26-27; Sidlow and Henschen, 1985, pp.488-490). 
The linking function includes negotiation (Patterson, 1970, pp.26-27; DeGregorio, 
1995, pp.268-269). The task of explaining legislative activities to the chairs’ 
constituencies may be the role of committee staff although the task is not 
important (DeGregorio, 1995, pp.268-270). Thirdly, the paperwork produced by 
committee staff that drafts legislation and committee reports is also an important 
role of committee staff (Fox and Hammond, 1977, p.98; Patterson, 1970, p.28). 
Patterson (1970, p.28) lists this function as a source of staff impact because the 
legislation and reports have the effect of policy making. Finally, the committee 
staff have the role of making new policy initiatives (DeGregorio, 1995, pp.268-
269; Patterson, 1970, pp.27-28; Sidlow and Henschen, 1985, pp.490-493). 
Sidlow and Henschen (1985, pp.490-493) states that the attitude of committee 
leadership and the jurisdiction of the committee affect the degree of staff 
innovation. 
DeGregorio (1995) states that there is a hierarchy of importance in the roles of 
the committee staff. Staff directors perceive that providing policy information is 
the most important role and negotiation on minor issues, providing political 
information and policy innovation comes next, but negotiation on major issues 
and informing of constituency chair’s activities are not perceived to be as 
important as other roles (pp.268-269). Chairs think that policy innovation is 
expected most from the committee staff; that providing policy information and 
negotiation on minor issues comes next; and that providing political information, 
negotiation on major issues and informing of constituency chair’s activities follows 
(pp.269-270). In this regard, policy information provision and negotiation on minor 
issues may be important roles of the committee staff in the U.S. Congress. 
Much research has pointed out that the policy impact of the committee staff in 
the U.S. Congress is substantive through their role and function (e.g. DeGregorio, 
1995; Fox and Hammond, 1977; Malbin, 1980; Patterson, 1970; Sidlow and 
Henschen, 1985) or as information sources for congressmen/women (e.g. 
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Whiteman, 1995). There have been disputes over the nature of staff impact, 
however, especially over whether committee staff are controlled by 
congressmen/women. Malbin (1980) states that staff are unelected 
representatives and congressmen/women become just the manager of legislative 
organisation. However, subsequent studies state that there exists a difference in 
the degree of delegation from committee chairs to staff; that the working styles of 
the committee staff indicate the control of committee staff by 
congressmen/women; and that the staff impact has a derivative character coming 
from the impact of congressmen/women (DeGregorio, 1988; 1995; DeGregorio 
and Snider, 1995). In fact, many factors can affect the committee staff impact. 
The factors can be summarised into the style of committee leadership (the degree 
of delegation to and acceptance of the committee staff); the expertise and 
partisanship of a committee member; the features of the committee (jurisdiction, 
history and party composition); the structure of staff organisation (centralised or 
de-centralised); the nature of issue (the degree of controversy); the stage in which 
the policy process is located (deciding on general directions or making details) 
(for details, see chapter 4, subsection 4.2.2). 
  3.4.4. Legal status and norms 
The committee staff members in the U.S. Congress are the employees of the 
committee itself, but they are not permanent civil servants. The job rotation of 
committee staff members to legislative support agencies at Capitol Hill, agencies 
in the executive, or lobbying firms is a well-known phenomenon pointed out by 
many studies as discussed in the literature review in chapter 4. Moreover, the 
staff members are partisan staff. Two-thirds and one-third of staff members are 
allocated to the majority and minority parties respectively in the House of 
Representatives. The staff members are allocated according to the shares of 
seats of the majority and minority parties in the Senate. Thus, the committee staff 
usually have a dual composition consisting of majority party staff and minority 
party staff. These non-permanent and partisan features are characteristics which 
are different from the committee staff in the legislatures of other countries which 
are compared in this chapter. 
The Rules of the House of Representatives 2015 (r. XXIII, XXV) specify the 
norms which committee staff members should abide as follows: creditability 
(r.XXIII(1)); adherence to the rules (r.XXIII(2)); integrity (r.XXIII(3)); limitations on 
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outside earned income and acceptance of gifts (r.XXIII(4)-(5), r.XXV); and 
confidentiality (r.XXIII(13)). The Standing rules of the Senate 2013 (r.XXXVI, 
XXXVII, XXXVIII) also specify limitations on gifts and outside earned income and 
conflict of interest. In addition to those official norms, unofficial norms include low 
visibility (anonymity and limited advocacy); deference to congressmen/women; 
partisanship (except a few committees); specialisation; and diligence (Patterson, 
1970, pp.29-31; Romzek and Utter, 1997, pp.1265-1272). Moreover, 
accountability to committee or subcommittee chairs and ranking minority 
members is also important (Romzek, 2000). One interesting thing is that the 
partisan feature affects the staff norms in that partisanship and accountability to 
chairs and ranking minority members become important. 
 
3.5. The Committee staff in the Australian Parliament 
  3.5.1. House of Representatives 
Committees of the Australian House of Representatives can be classified into 
standing committees which exist during the term of a Parliament and deal with 
matters within their terms of reference and select committees which are created 
for dealing with specific matters and expire after reporting the matters. The former 
has two types of committee – general purpose standing committees that 
investigate or scrutinise matters (including legislation) in a specific subject area, 
and domestic or internal committees that deal with matters related to the powers, 
procedures or administration of the House. A bill may be referred to a standing or 
select committee after the first reading for an advisory report, but the committee 
cannot amend the bill by itself (Department of House of Representatives, 2010, 
p.4; Wright and Fowler, 2012, pp.359-361). In addition, the House, with the 
Senate, can appoint joint committees. These committees, except some of joint 
committees, are supported by the staff organisation in the Department of the 
House of Representatives.6 
Organisation 
Committee staff members of the Australian House of Representatives are 
employees of the Department of the House of Representatives. The Committee 
                                                          
6 The categorisation of committees in this section is a simplified and reorganised from Wright and Fowler 
(2012, ch.18) that identifies seven types of committees. 
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Office of the department has nine secretariats supporting 20 committees – nine 
House standing committees; 10 joint statutory, standing or select committees; 
and one domestic committee (Department of House of Representatives, 2015, 
p.28). There are 60 staff members in the office (Department of House of 
Representatives, 2015, p.119). Generally, a committee secretariat supports more 
than one committee and is composed of a committee secretary, two or more 
project/research officers and one or more support staff member (Wright and 
Fowler, 2012, p.664). Domestic or internal standing committees are usually 
supported not by a full-time secretariat in the committee office, but by staff in the 
Department having other tasks (Wright and Fowler, 2012, p.664). A committee 
can also employ specialist advisers who are appointed only for a particular inquiry 
or a specific task and paid on a part time basis (Wright and Fowler, 2012, p.664). 
Role and Function 
The functions of a secretariat which supports committee activities are providing 
advice on the procedure and practice of the committee; conducting administrative 
and clerical services; and providing research and analytical services related to 
the remit of the committee and particular inquiries (Wright and Fowler, 2012, 
pp.663-664). The committee secretary, as the head of a secretariat team, gives 
the committee as a whole appropriate advice; secures impartial opportunities for 
committee members to approach evidence and information which are supplied to 
or by the committee; manages committee resources to have the committee 
function effectively; and supervises staff in the secretariat team and secures their 
welfare (Wright and Fowler, 2012, p.666). The research officers’ role is about 
research and analysis. They supply research and analytical support to a 
committee inquiry; prepare briefings and reports to committee members; arrange 
committee meetings and public hearings; and draft committee reports and other 
documents (The duty statement of Parliamentary Service Level 4 in Committee 
Support, acquired from the correspondence with the Committee Office of the 
Department of the House of Representatives in 2014). 
The satisfaction of MPs in committees with the committee staff is very high 
(Department of the House of Representatives, 2015). As indicated by table 3.4, 
the proportion of members who answered that they were extremely satisfied, 
highly satisfied, or satisfied with support to committee activity is 100 per cent 
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although the number of respondents is small. Moreover, this high satisfaction has 
been maintained during the previous five years as demonstrated by table 3.5. 
Table 3.4. Members’ satisfaction levels with committee staff’s services, 2015 
survey (2014 in brackets) 
Service area 
Extremely 
Satisfied 
Highly 
Satisfied 
Satisfied 
Not 
Satisfied 
Procedural advice, research, analytical  
drafting and administrative support 
services  in relation to committee 
inquiries and  publication of the final 
report 
8 (10) 7 (6) 7 (2) 0 (1) 
Source: Department of the House of Representatives (2015, p.121) 
 
Table 3.5. Member’s satisfaction rates during recent five years 
Indicator 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
Member’s satisfaction rates 
(%)* 
100 95 100 95 100 
* Members’ satisfaction rates represent the proportion of members who stated they were 
‘satisfied’, ‘highly satisfied’ or ‘extremely satisfied’ with committee services 
Source: Department of the House of Representatives (2015, p.27) 
 
Legal Status and Norms 
Committee staff members in the Australian House of Representatives are 
employees of the Department of the House of Representatives. The 
Parliamentary Service Act 1999 and its subordinate legislations provide the legal 
framework that rules their employment, promotion and norms. They are recruited 
by a merit based selection process (Parliamentary Service Act 1999, s.10; 
Parliamentary Service Determination 2013, c.19). The type of employment is 
classified into ongoing (permanent employment) and non-ongoing (employment 
for a specific duration). Most committee staff are in ongoing employment, but 
there are a small number (currently seven in the Committee Office) of non-
ongoing staff. 
The Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (s.10) states the rules of employment, 
management, rights and obligations of the committee staff members. The act 
identifies five parliamentary service values – committed to service, ethical, 
respectful, accountable and impartial. In addition, committee staff members 
should follow the Parliamentary Service Code of Conduct ruled by the act. 
Important parts of the code are as follows: behaving honestly and with integrity; 
acting with care and diligence; treating everyone with respect and courtesy, and 
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without harassment; complying with applicable Australian law; complying with 
any lawful and reasonable direction; maintaining appropriate confidentiality; 
avoiding any conflict of interest; using the resources of the Commonwealth in a 
proper manner; and not providing false or misleading information in response to 
a request for information (Parliamentary Service Act 1999, s.13). 
Political impartiality is also emphasised as an important norm of the committee 
staff in Australia. Two of the responsibilities of the committee secretary identified 
in Wright and Fowler (2012, p.666) are ‘provide impartial, non-partisan advice 
and support services to the committee’ and ‘provide equal and timely access to 
evidence, correspondence and information provided to, or commissioned by, the 
committee to all committee members’. 
  3.5.2. Senate 
Committees of the Australian Senate can also be classified into standing 
committees and select committees. In addition, the chamber, with the House of 
Representatives, can appoint joint committees. These committees are 
categorised as follows: standing domestic committees; standing legislative 
scrutiny committees; legislative and general purpose standing committees; 
estimates committees; select committees; and joint committees (Evans and Laing, 
2012, pp.444-445). The functions of domestic committees are similar to those of 
domestic committees in the House of Representatives (Evans and Laing, 2012, 
pp.447-456). Legislative scrutiny committees scrutinise secondary legislation 
(Regulations and Ordinances Committee) and law bills (Scrutiny of Bills 
Committee) in legal aspects (Evans and Laing, 2012, pp.456-460). A pair of 
legislative and general purpose standing committees in a subject area are 
comprised of a reference committee and a legislation committee (Evans and 
Laing, 2012, p.461). The latter conducts inquiries about bills, estimates, annual 
reports and performance of agencies and the former deals with general matters 
in the subject area except those referred to legislation committee (Evans and 
Laing, 2012, pp.461). Bills may be referred to legislation committees by the 
Selection of Bills Committee (Evans and Laing, 2012, p.308). The legislation 
committee cannot amend the bill by itself, but it can recommend amendments to 
the Senate (Department of the Senate, 2013, p.6). These committees, except 
some joint committees, are supported by the staff organisation in the Department 
of the Senate. 
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Organisation 
Committee staff members of the Australian Senate are employees of 
Department of the Senate. The Committee Office of the department supported 
16 legislative and general purpose standing committees, eight select committees, 
and six joint committees during 2014-15 financial year, and 58 staff members (full 
time equivalent) worked in the office during the same period (Department of the 
Senate, 2015, pp.46, 120). A secretariat which supports a legislative and general 
purpose standing committee supports two committees (a legislation committee 
and a reference committee) and is comprised of a committee secretary and a 
number of research and clerical staff members (Evans and Laing, 2012, p.516). 
Other committees, except legislative and general purpose standing committees, 
are supported by secretariats which are comprised of staff conducting other 
duties in the Department of the Senate (Evans and Laing, 2012, p.516). A 
committee can employ consultants who will advise the committee on technical 
matters under the approval of the President of the Senate (Evans and Laing, 2012, 
p.517). When committees examine estimates of departments or agencies of the 
executive, they can invite the Auditor-General or other senior officers from the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) to provide their comments on the 
estimates (Evans and Laing, pp.472-473). 
Role and Function 
The functions of a committee secretariat are as follows: advising the committee 
in procedural aspects; providing the committee with administrative services; 
organising meetings and public hearings; conducting research and analysis on 
the evidence received by committees; drafting the chair’s reports; and helping 
witnesses and the general public to participate in committee inquiries 
(Department of the Senate, 2014, p.42). The committee secretary is the head of 
a committee secretariat. He/she is in charge of the drafting of committee reports; 
gives advice about committee proceedings to the chair and other committee 
members; manages the staff in the committee secretariat (including consultants); 
and gives information about the committee system to interested groups and the 
general public to help citizens participate in parliamentary processes (Job 
description of Committee Secretary acquired from the correspondence with the 
Committee Office of Department of the Senate in 2014). The research officer 
conducts research and analysis work, producing draft reports, briefing papers, 
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and background material; helps the committee secretary in organising committee 
inquiries, especially public hearings; manages individual inquiries; provides 
witnesses, officials and the general public with information about committee 
business (Job description of Principal Research Officer, acquired from the 
correspondence with the Committee Office of Department of the Senate in 2014). 
There is no evidence demonstrating the impact of the committee staff in the 
Australian Senate although the Annual Report of the Department of the Senate 
states that there are informal feedback channels demonstrating  satisfaction with 
the service of committee staff from senators (Department of the Senate, 2015, 
p.47). 
Legal Status and Norms 
Committee staff members in the Australian Senate are employees of the 
Department of the Senate. Their employment, promotion, and norms are ruled by 
the Parliamentary Service Act 1999 and its subordinate legislations as in the 
House of Representatives. Thus, their legal status and norms are almost the 
same as those of the committee staff in the House of Representatives. In 
particular, the response from the Committee Office of Department of the Senate 
to the questionnaire about the norms of committee staff emphasises impartiality 
as follows: 
For practical reasons, a committee secretary works to the chair as the 
representative of the committee, but the secretary is ultimately the servant of 
the committee as a whole, and is expected to serve all the members of a 
committee equally. 
 
3.6. The Committee staff in the German Parliament 
  3.6.1. Bundestag 
Committees of the German Bundestag can be classified into permanent 
committees which exist during the electoral term and deal with matters within their 
terms of reference and special committees which deal with specific questions 
(Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag 2014, r.54). Each permanent 
committee is usually set up to shadow each ministry of federal government after 
the formation of the government (Linn and Sobolewski, 2015, pp.30-31). A bill is 
generally referred to the committee which has the jurisdiction of the bill after the 
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first reading of the plenary and the committee reports to the plenary advising the 
decision on the bill (Linn and Sobolewski, 2015, p.37; Rules of Procedure of the 
German Bundestag 2014, r.66, 80). In addition to permanent committees, the 
German Bundestag can establish committees of inquiry for the purpose of 
investigation (Basic Law 1949, art. 44; Linn and Sobolewski, 2015, p.50). These 
committees are supported by staff members in the Administration of the German 
Bundestag. 
Organisation 
Most committees are supported by secretariats in Directorate PA (committee) in 
Directorate-General P (Parliament and Members). The directorate support 20 
permanent committees and three committees of inquiry (Administration of the 
German Bundestag, 2016). The Committee for the Scrutiny of Elections, 
Immunity and the Rules of Procedure and the Committee on the Affairs of the EU 
are supported by a secretariat in Directorate PD (parliamentary services) and that 
in Directorate PE (European affairs) in the same Directorate-General respectively. 
The Petitions Committee is supported by a secretariat in Directorate Pet (petitions 
and submissions) in Directorate-General W (research and external relations). A 
committee secretariat is generally composed of a committee secretary, clerical 
assistants and secretarial staff members (German Bundestag, 2016a).  
Role and Function 
The role of the secretariats of committees in the German Bundestag is focused 
on the procedural and administrative function. The secretariats recommend the 
committee chair about the meeting schedule and agenda; check the submission 
of the items of business (including relevant documents necessary for their 
examination) to committees; keep their eyes on committee meetings in the aspect 
of rules of procedure and schedule; keep the list of MPs who will speak; and take 
charge of hands-on work in writing committee reports and minutes (Linn and 
Sobolewski, 2015, p.147; German Bundestag, 2016a). In addition, they conduct 
the function of linkage between the committee and the ministry of federal 
government that the committee shadows, other relevant ministries, relevant 
pressure groups and organisations and parliament groups or parties (German 
Bundestag, 2016a; Linn and Sobolewski, 2015, p.147). The reason that the 
committee staff focus on the function of procedural and administrative tasks 
would be that the staff of parties funded by federal budget according to the 
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Political Parties Act 1994 provide the research and analysis service. The total 
number of staff members employed by parties was 821 in 2014 (German 
Bundestag, 2016b). 
Legal Status and Norms 
Committee staff members in the German Bundestag usually have the status of 
civil servants. As the German Bundestag is one of the constitutional bodies and 
federal authorities (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2014), the staff members in 
the administrative apparatus of the legislature have the status of civil servants. 
The Federal Civil Service Act 2009 (s. 6(2)) specifies the duties of federal civil 
servants. Important norms to federal civil servants are devotion and commitment 
to their profession (art. 61); obligation to official instruction and supervisors’ 
guidelines (art. 62); responsibility for securing the legality of the administration 
(art. 63); keeping secrecy or confidentiality (art. 67); and keeping integrity, being 
prohibited from accepting rewards, gifts and other benefits (art. 71). The political 
impartiality of the civil service is emphasised in the Act by occupying the status 
of a basic obligation, being stated that civil servants do not serve a party and 
prioritise the public interest (art. 60). 
3.6.2. Bundesrat 
The German Bundesrat can set up standing committees and additional 
committees to deal with specific business (Rules of Procedure of the Bundesrat 
1993, r.11). The unique feature of the composition of a committee in the German 
Bundesrat is that each Länder should be represented in every committee by a 
member of the Bundesrat, another representative member of its government 
(Rules of Procedure of the Bundesrat 1993, r.12). The President of the Bundesrat 
refers bills to appropriate committees (Rules of Procedure of the Bundesrat 1993, 
r.36). The committees deliberate on the bills and report to the plenary their 
recommendations (Rules of Procedure of the Bundesrat 1993, r.45). The 
committees are supported by staff members in the Bundesrat Secretariat. 
Most committees are supported by committee offices in Directorate-General A 
(committees) in the secretariat. The directorate-general support 15 committees 
(Bundesrat Secretariat, 2016). A committee office takes charge of the secretary 
services of two or three committees, generally. The Committee on Legal Affairs 
is supported by a bureau directed by the Deputy Secretary General. The 
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committee offices assist committee chairs in preparing and presiding over 
committee meetings. They also conduct paperwork of writing the minutes of the 
committee meetings and drafting committee recommendations to the plenary 
which contain the decision of the committee (Bundesrat, 2016). As in the 
Bundestag, their function is also focused on procedural and administrative roles. 
It seems that the members of committees in the Bundesrat can be supported by 
officials of Land government in the aspect of research and analysis. The 
committee staff are also federal civil servants and have the same norms as those 
in the Bundestag. 
 
3.7. Comparison and Conclusion 
Table 3.6 is the comparison of the committee staff described in this chapter 
focusing on their role and status. Basically, the role of the committee staff is 
influenced by the role of the committee that they support. In turn, the role of the 
committee is affected by the features of the legislative process and internal 
organisation of the legislature. Thus, staff of a committee that is located in the 
centre of the legislative process (South Korea and the U.S.) exert a substantive 
role in forming legislation. They provide information and analysis in the legislative 
process. Conversely, where the function of a committee focuses on investigation 
and inquiries rather than legislation (the U.K and Australia), the role of committee 
staff is concentrated on the investigation and inquiries. 
There are a couple of interesting points worth mentioning. First of all, the 
existence of other staff can affect the role of committee staff. In the German 
Bundestag and Bundesrat, the committee staff focus on supporting proceedings 
although committees in the chambers play important roles in the legislative 
process. Strong party staff organisations can support MPs in committees in the 
Bundestag and staff of Land governments can support committee members – 
basically representatives of Land governments – in the Bundesrat. In the U.K. 
House of Commons, staff in public bill committees also tend to focus on a 
procedural role. The role is basically affected by the legislation process in the 
House of Commons in that the basic substance of a bill is decided in the 2nd 
reading on the floor and public bill committees focus on amendments to details, 
but the existence of bill teams in the executive supporting the progress of bills  
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Table 3.6. Comparison of the committee staff 
Legislatures Role and function Status Other staff* 
South Korean 
National Assembly 
-Support proceedings  
-Research and analysis 
-Paperwork in the legislative 
process (Drafting bills and 
reports) 
Civil Servants 
(non-partisan) 
Personal staff  
(seven per MP) 
The U.K. 
House of Commons 
   
Departmental select 
committees 
-Support proceedings 
-Investigative (preparing 
briefings, identifying witnesses 
etc.) function 
-Research and analysis 
-Drafting reports 
Employees of 
the house 
(non-partisan) 
Personal staff 
(usually four per 
MP) 
Public bill 
committees 
-Support proceedings 
Bill teams in the 
executive 
The U.K. 
House of Lords 
-Support proceedings 
-Investigative (preparing 
briefings, identifying witnesses 
etc.) function 
-Research and analysis 
-Drafting reports 
Employees of 
the house 
(non-partisan) 
 
The U.S. 
House of 
Representatives 
-Support proceedings 
-Providing policy and political 
information required in the 
legislative process 
-Investigative function 
-Linking between committees, 
between chambers, and 
between the legislature and the 
executive (including negotiation) 
-Policy innovation 
Employees of 
the committee 
(partisan) 
Personal Staff 
(18 full-time staff 
per MP) 
The U.S Senate 
Employees of 
the committee 
(partisan) 
Personal Staff 
(about 39 per 
MP) 
Australian House of 
Representatives 
-Support proceedings 
-Investigative (preparing 
briefings, identifying witnesses 
etc.) function 
-Research and analysis 
-Drafting reports 
Employees of 
the house 
(non-partisan) 
Personal Staff 
(three or four 
per MP) 
Australian Senate 
Employees of 
the house 
(non-partisan) 
German Bundestag 
-Support proceedings 
Civil servants 
(non-partisan) 
Personal staff 
(about seven 
per MP) 
Staff in parties 
German Bundesrat 
Civil servants 
(non-partisan) 
Staff in Land 
governments 
* Sources: Act on Allowances, etc. for National Assembly Members 1981 (attached table 4), The 
Brookings Institution (2017, ch.5), Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (2016), 
Jones (2006, p.646), Linn and Soblewski (2015, p.141), The United States Code (title 2, s.5321), 
Wright and Fowler (2012, p.152), The numbers of personal staff per MP in the U.S. Senate and 
German Bundestag are calculated by dividing total number of personal staff by total number of 
MPs. 
 
also seems to affect the function of the committee staff. On top of that, partisan 
status can affect the role of committee staff. The committee staff in the U.S. 
Congress have partisan features and are directly accountable to chairs (majority 
party staff) or ranking members of the minority (minority party staff) and their 
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parties. Thus, their roles include partisan support for committee members of their 
own party and policy innovation differently from those of committee staff in other 
legislatures. 
So far, the contexts of this thesis – the legislature of South Korea and its 
committee staff system – have been introduced. The committee staff system has 
been compared with those in other legislatures at a descriptive level. The next 
stage is the review of previous literature on the legislative staff. 
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4. Previous Literature Review 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews previous literature about legislative staff. The coverage of 
this review is as follows. Firstly, the subject of literature reviewed in this chapter 
is not limited to committee staff. Studies about personal staff and legislative 
support agencies are also included. This is not only because they tend to be 
considered together in the literature about the legislative staff (especially in the 
U.S.) and it is difficult to separate them, but also because literature about 
personal staff and legislative support agencies has implications for the aspects 
of theory and methodology in the study of committee staff. Secondly, this review 
does not, principally, cover dissertations, articles in the media and unpublished 
manuscripts. Dissertations about the impact of the committee staff in South Korea, 
however, are included. This is because empirical study in South Korea about the 
subject is rare and these dissertations are a few important studies about the 
subject. Thirdly, literature about the legislative staff in the U.S., South Korea and 
Western European countries is reviewed, although the languages of these 
studies are limited to English and Korean.  
Research about legislative staff in the U.S. has evolved reflecting the changes 
in political science in the country (Hammond, 1996, p.543). Early studies are 
descriptive and focus on institutional characteristics of staff systems. Until the 
end of the 1970s, the descriptive and exploratory studies had occupied a 
considerable part of the research on legislative staff. Studies which test 
hypotheses about staff behaviour and impact based on empirical data started to 
appear in the 1960s, but became an important part of the sub-discipline from the 
1980s (Hammond, 1996, p.543-544). Contrary to the studies in the U.S., most of 
the staff research in other countries is descriptive, institutional and prescriptive. 
Although several studies in South Korea have tried to assess the impact of 
legislative staff empirically since the 1990s, there is a big disparity between the 
research in the U.S. and that in other countries. Theories, concepts and research 
hypotheses developed in the U.S. are rarely used in studies about the legislative 
staff in other countries and systematic comparison of the roles or impact of staff 
in different countries has not been conducted as Hammond (1984, p.306) pointed 
out three decades ago. 
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Assessed against the aims of this thesis – addressing the role and impact of the 
legislative committee staff and factors affecting them, the literature about the 
legislative staff in South Korea has not reached the stage of addressing the 
factors affecting staff impact and the nature of staff impact. When it comes to 
American literature, which comprises most of the literature, the network managing 
function of the legislative staff has not been focused on enough in comparison to 
the information and intelligence functions. In addition, human factors (chair’s 
character or leadership style and partisanship or expertise of staff members) or 
administrative factors (the structure of staff organisation, committee’s terms of 
reference, chair’s tenure and official power of staff) listed by American studies as 
factors affecting the impact of staff seem to have less relevance in the  South 
Korean legislature. 
The following section is about the literature in the U.S. Diverse subjects in the 
literature are identified and introduced, but studies about staff impact are focused 
on although other studies are also tapped. Individual studies are reviewed 
according to their subjects. Then, studies in other countries are reviewed. The 
review of literature about the legislative staff in South Korea is followed by that of 
literature about the legislative staff in Western Europe. 
 
4.2. Literature in the U.S. 
The literature in the U.S. includes studies of various subjects: description of 
individual staff members and staff organisation; the relationship between staff 
and legislative activities or performance; staff impact; staff members’ utilisation 
of policy information and analysis; factors affecting staff organisation and 
legislative professionalism; staff norms and accountability; and staff from minority 
groups. Early studies, which are descriptive and exploratory, provided information, 
important concepts and research hypotheses which became the bases of 
research in the following period. With the advent of the studies about staff impact, 
staff became an important variable which explains legislative activities and the 
power of the legislature in the policy process. Some research tried to identify 
variables which affect staff behaviour and impact, provided that staff are 
important actors in the policy process. The subjects of research on the legislative 
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staff diversified in the 1990s. Norms of staff and policy impact of staff from 
minority groups began to be studied. 
4.2.1. Descriptive and exploratory studies about individual staff members and 
staff organisation 
Although research about the legislative staff in the U.S. started in about 1940 
(Hammond, 1984, p.272), this review covers studies after the 1970s. One of the 
flows of the early studies pays attention to individual staff members. Firstly, 
comprehensive data about individual committee staff members and personal staff 
members in the U.S. Congress are gathered by Hammond (1975) and Fox and 
Hammond (1977). The data are about tenure, recruitment paths and other 
demographic characteristics (age, education, gender and legal residence). 
Henschen and Sidlow (1986) also present data about previous positions, ages, 
formal education and career aspiration of committee staff members in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. According to these studies, the position, the features 
of the committee for which a staff member works, the degree of formal education, 
career experience and personal aspiration are associated with each other. 
Secondly, orientations of individual staff members were studied. Price (1971, 
1972) classifies committee staff members according to their orientations. The 
basic line is drawn between professionals and entrepreneurs. Whereas staff 
members of the former category are reactive, politically neutral and focus on 
analysing policies and developing alternatives, those of the latter are active and 
committed to finding new legislative proposals and pushing them (Price, 1971, 
p.335). Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a, p.568) add a new type of staff member – 
politicos who prioritise the success of their bosses – to the two types. Romzek 
and Utter (1996, pp.433-434) identify four orientations of congressional staff: 
policy or issue orientation, partisan orientation, regional orientation (feeling ties 
to a specific region or state) and loyalty to an individual Congressman/woman. 
Thirdly, research which focuses on the career path and turnover patterns of staff 
members was conducted. Salisbury and Shepsle (1981b) trace staff recruitment 
paths and turnover patterns of personal and committee staff members. They 
suggest three factors affecting staff member turnover: the orientation of the staff 
member, the relationship between the congressman/woman and his/her staff, 
and the change in political environment. Anderson (1990) analyses staff turnover 
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in two state legislatures (Nebraska and Ohio). He concludes that the staff 
recruitment system and the individual orientations of staff affect staff decisions to 
leave. Romzek and Utter (1996, pp.435-437) explain the personal differences of 
short-term career staff and long-term career staff. The former consider their 
current jobs as ‘stepping stones’ (p.435); become sceptical and tired; or cannot 
balance their work and private life. The latter are interested in politics and power 
and want to be involved in policy making. 
The other flow explores staff organisation. Firstly, Fox and Hammond (1977, 
pp.69-70) categorise congressmen/women’s personal office organisation: 
hierarchical, coordinative and individualist. They listed seniority, region and 
previous background of a congressman/woman as factors affecting the operation 
of his/her personal office. They also report communication patterns and sources 
of information in the personal offices of congressmen/women (ch.7). Hammond 
(1978) describes changes in the staff system in the U.S. Congress. According to 
her findings, the number of staff in charge of legislative work has particularly 
increased although the number of staff has also increased generally; staff have 
become more expert; and the distribution of staff has become decentralised 
(p.188). 
In addition, Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) set a unique perspective – 
Congressional enterprise – which views the U.S. congress focusing on the staff 
organisation. They argue that the growth of the staff organisation results in the 
emergence of ‘Congressional enterprises’ in which each congressman/woman 
plays a role as the head of the enterprise (p.559). The direct personnel resources 
of which an enterprise is comprised are personal staff members and committee 
or subcommittee staff members who are appointed by the congressman/woman, 
but former staff members – so called, ‘alumni networks’ (p.561) – who are working 
elsewhere (e.g. legislative support agencies, interest groups or the executive 
branch) can also be included in the enterprise as indirect resources. 
Moreover, Whiteman’s (1987) essay about congressional staff related to health 
policy reports the concentric feature of the communication network in the 
legislature. A typical network about a policy issue has a core comprised of the 
committee staff and personal staff of the congressmen/women who are involved 
in the issue. The degree of understanding about an issue among those who are 
outside the core falls through the order of personal staff of congressmen/women 
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in the relevant subcommittees and personal staff of other members in the relevant 
full committees. Finally, Romzek and Utter (1996, pp.416-420) describe the 
working conditions of staff (crowded offices, long working hours, lower wages and 
no job security) and the work of the staff according to their position (leadership 
staff, staff in administrative offices, committee staff and personal staff). They 
demonstrate that there is a hierarchy in a member’s office (pp.420-421). Senior 
and trusted staff occupy the core of the hierarchy and junior and less trusted staff 
are located at the periphery.  
The studies mentioned above provide the basis for subsequent research. The 
classifications of staff orientation by Price (1971, 1972) and Salisbury and 
Shepsle (1981a) have provided a framework of studies about the policy impact 
of the legislative staff reviewed later. The Congressional enterprise approach 
suggested by Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) has provided an influential 
perspective in understanding legislative behaviour in the U.S. Congress and in 
studying congressional staff. Descriptive data about the staff members’ 
demographic characteristics, recruitment and career paths and turnover in 
Hammond (1975), Fox and Hammond (1977), Henschen and Sidlow (1986), and 
Anderson (1990) have become the basis for research hypotheses about factors 
affecting staff behaviour and policy impacts. Whiteman’s (1987) essay is 
important exploratory research for the studies about the communication network 
in the U.S. Congress. These studies, however, do not directly address questions 
about the role and impact of the legislative staff and factors affecting them. That 
job is conducted by research reviewed in the next subsection. 
4.2.2. Role and impact of the legislative staff 
Research about the role and impact of the legislative staff occupies an essential 
part of the American literature about legislative staff. Studies can be classified 
according to their focus: examining the relationship between staff and legislative 
activities and performance; analysing the role of staff; assessing staff as 
legislators’ information source; investigating the communication network in a 
legislature; examining the nature of staff impact (autonomous or controlled by 
legislators);  and analysing factors affecting the impact of staff. 
The relationship between staff and legislative activities and performance 
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Staff are considered as an important resource for the legislature to do its job 
effectively (Evans, 1991; Fox and Hammond, 1977; Hall, 1993; Romzek and Utter, 
1997; Starahan, 1990). Therefore, the relationship between the development of 
a staff system and the performance of the legislature, committees or individual 
legislators is an important subject. At first, Rosenthal’s studies (1973, 1974) about 
state legislatures in the U.S. do not report a strong association between the staff 
organisation and committee performance. The studies demonstrate that there is 
no significant correlation between the size of the staff organisation and committee 
effectiveness (Rosenthal, 1973) or committee performance in policy formulation 
(Rosenthal, 1974). Staff are reported to (only) be associated with committee 
performance (only) in policy control (Rosenthal, 1974). 
The following studies, however, demonstrate a positive relationship. Ornstein 
(1975) demonstrates a positive correlation among the number of bills co-
sponsored, the number of staff and the utilisation of staff for legislative purposes 
in the U.S. Congress although the focus of the study is on which factors affect 
staff utilisation by a congressman/woman. Hammond (1978) reports the 
consequences of changes to the staff system in the U.S. Congress. They are the 
increase of staff resources for members; the growing autonomy of subcommittees 
and individual members; more active legislative activities (e.g. more hearings and 
meetings); and the growing need for skills in managing staff organisation (pp.189-
191). 
Several studies emphasise the importance of staff especially for the activities of 
individual legislators. In Strahan’s (1990) book, the committee staff is one of 
factors that affect the activities of congressmen/women in the Ways and Means 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives although his focus is on 
explaining the reform of the committee and its consequences. The construction 
of partisan committee staff and the increase in the number of staff members gave 
legislators the advantage of accessing expertise and information, but 
strengthened the partisan atmosphere in the committee. Non-partisan staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation, who traditionally had impact on tax policy issues in 
the Ways and Means Committee, became weak in the policy process. The growth 
of committee staff organisation, along with the creation of the Congressional 
Budget Office, made more information available for congressmen/women, but 
they began to rely on their staff. 
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Similarly, access to the committee staff is an important resource for a senator 
to participate in committee activities in Evans (1991) although the focus of the 
study is on senators’ behaviour in the U.S. Senate committees. According to 
Evans, information is very important for legislative activity and staff are ‘the 
primary resources for processing information’ (p. 486). Access to the committee 
staff, however, is limited to the committee leadership (chairs of full committees 
and subcommittees and ranking minority-party leaders). The disparity is also 
between the majority and minority parties and makes a difference in members’ 
participations in a committee’s legislative activity. 
Likewise, Hall (1993) pays attention to the effect of staff on the participation of 
congressmen/women in committee work although the focus of his study is not on 
staff but on committee work. The study is based on interviews with staff and 
committee records. He argues that legislative resources are important for a 
member’s participation and committee leaders possess these resources. The 
Committee staff is one of the most important resources. Intensive staff utilization 
is a necessary condition for effective legislative involvement. In addition, staff is 
one of the independent variables which affect senators’ bill introduction in Schiller 
(1995). The staff variable is measured by the number of staff members in a 
senator’s personal office. She demonstrates that a greater number of staff 
members is associated with more bill introduction through a regression analysis. 
The result does not change whether or not the bill is referred to the committee for 
which the sponsor works. 
Using data about state legislatures, Grossback and Peterson (2004) analyse the 
effects of legislative staff organisation on policymaking. They demonstrate that 
total staff size affects the number of bills introduced, the number of bills enacted, 
and the number of vetoes of the Governor positively (p.43). The number of 
institutional staff members affects the number of bills introduced positively, but 
the number of personal staff members affects the number of bills introduced 
negatively (p.43). They conclude that the development of a legislative staff 
organisation facilitates the activity of the legislature and affects the relationship 
between the legislature and the executive (pp.46-47). 
Overall, the legislative staff have been considered as one of the important 
resources of the legislature. As reviewed, most studies state that they contribute 
to the legislative performance and that the relationship between staff and 
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legislative activities (both of the legislature and individual legislators) is positive. 
This argument raises another question of how great the impact of the legislative 
staff is. This question has been answered through three strands of research: 
analysing the role of staff; assessing staff as legislators’ information source; and 
investigating the communication network. The research is reviewed below. 
Analysing the role of staff 
Staff impact is exerted through the roles that the staff play. Therefore, analysis 
of these roles is important for studying staff impact. Firstly, Patterson (1970) 
conducts interviews with congressional committee staff members. He argues that 
the most important function of staff is to supply information and that staff play the 
role of a bridge between committees; between the Senate and the House; and 
between the legislative and the executive branch. Staff have impact through their 
work on information processing and legislation drafting. Secondly, Fox and 
Hammond (1977, pp.93-96) list five roles of personal staff members in the Senate: 
interactor (dealing with constituency work and interest groups), supporter 
(dealing with bills, speeches and remarks in the committee and on the floor), 
corresponder (dealing with requests for information and work relating to 
correspondence), advertiser (dealing with presswork) and investigator (dealing 
with legislative oversight). Finally, Sidlow and Henschen (1985) study the 
committee staff in the U.S. House of Representatives through a survey of staff 
members in eight committees of the House. They identify three functions of staff 
– information and intelligence; integration between the chambers and between 
the legislature and the executive; and policy innovation. In addition to these 
studies, Malbin (1980) and DeGregorio (1995) address the issue of the role of 
staff, but their works are more relevant to the nature of staff impact. Thus, those 
studies are reviewed later. 
Considering these studies – including Malbin (1980) and DeGregorio (1995), as 
already discussed in chapter 3, the roles of the U.S. congressional staff are 
summarised into: information and intelligence function; integration function; 
drafting legislation and reports; and innovation function. It is noteworthy that the 
information and intelligence function has been focused on more than the other 
functions, which is also found in the studies about legislative information reviewed 
later, while on the contrary, the integration function – a sort of network managing 
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function to which this thesis give its attention – has been relatively 
underestimated.  
Assessing staff as legislators’ information source 
Staff are considered as one of the information sources of legislators. Many 
studies examine staff impact by assessing the importance of staff as an 
information source or by identifying the position of staff in the network of 
information. Already about 40 years ago, Porter (1975) demonstrated that 
legislators in state legislatures regard staff as an important information source in 
the studies of the legislatures of Michigan and Virginia based on a survey of 
members of the legislatures. In particular, 60 percent of legislators in the Virginia 
House value personal staff as very useful, and 38 percent of them value 
committee staff as very useful (p.50). In addition, the legislators conceive the 
informational function (research and information gathering) as the most important 
function of personal staff (p.51).  
The importance of the legislative staff as legislators’ information source has 
been supported by studies about state legislatures in the U.S. since the above 
study. Bradley (1980) shows that the legislative staff play an important role as an 
information source of technical policy information in the state legislature through 
a survey of members in the legislature of Nevada. Webber (1987) analyses 
legislators’ usage of policy information through interviews with 60 legislators of 
the Indiana House of Representatives. The legislative staff is conceived as one 
of the important information sources although the focus of the research is on the 
test of a two-communities theory and legislators’ orientation hypotheses about 
legislators’ use of policy information. Among 19 information sources, the 
legislative service agency is ranked as the second (in usefulness) and the 
seventh (in frequency); the committee staff is ranked as the fourth (in usefulness) 
and the fifth (in frequency); and the caucus staff is ranked as the seventh (in 
usefulness) and the fourth (in frequency) (p.622). Gray and Lowery (2000) trace 
origins of policy ideas in the legislature of Minnesota through surveys of 
legislators and staff members about their information sources in different policy 
stages. Legislative staff is ranked as the fourth most important source for 
legislators among 17 sources (p.584). Staff members evaluate other staff 
members as the most important source followed by the executive branch, 
legislative study commissions and lobbyists (p.585). They conclude that 
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members depend on staff although the primary sources of a policy idea are their 
own experience and constituents, and that the policy stage variable has a small 
influence on the importance of information sources (pp.592-594). 
The importance of the legislative staff has been also propped up by fiscal studies. 
Hoffman (2006) assesses the influence of legislative fiscal analysts (staff in the 
legislative fiscal office) on the examination of the state budget and analyses 
factors affecting the influence through four cases of state legislatures. Interviews 
with legislative fiscal analysts, legislators and officials in the executives are 
conducted and complemented by the analysis of the documents produced 
through the budget process. 73 percent of interviewees answered that legislative 
fiscal analysts are very influential or influential (p.45). Legislative fiscal analysts 
are ranked as the fourth key budget actor by interviewees out of a total of nine 
actors (p.46). The comparison of legislative fiscal analysts’ recommendations 
with final budgets reinforces the findings from interviews. It is argued that 
‘legislative [fiscal] analysts are seen as essential information conduits for the 
legislature’ (p.46). Bourdeaux (2008) examines the information sources of 
legislators in state legislatures through literature review; surveys and interviews 
with legislators in the Georgia Appropriations Committee (both in the House and 
the Senate) and officials in the legislature and the executive branch of the state; 
and participatory observation. The focus of this study is on fiscal information, 
especially performance information. The literature review demonstrates that the 
legislative staff is an important information source and that information from the 
executive is perceived as unreliable by members of the legislatures although it 
can be accessed easily and timely (pp.550-554). The surveys and interviews 
about information sources in the budget process reinforce the findings by 
demonstrating that the legislative staff is ranked as the third most reliable 
information source in 11 sources by legislators and that they do not trust 
information from the executive or administrative agencies (pp.559-562). 
Needless to say, there are a couple of studies containing qualified results. In 
their research based on interviews with legislators in eight state legislatures, 
Wissel, O’Connor and Michael (1976) state that staff are major information 
sources in legislatures which are well-staffed, but external sources are important 
in legislatures which are poorly staffed (pp.253-256). In addition, they argue that 
the reform of the legislative staff is influenced by the current pattern of information 
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supply. The interview data demonstrate that the most frequent recommendations 
from members of state legislatures about staffing reform reflect the current 
pattern of information supply in the legislature that they belong to (pp.260-261). 
In addition, Mooney (1991) identifies information sources of legislators in state 
legislatures through interviews with 16 members of the Wisconsin State 
Assembly about their information sources on seventeen bills. The interviewees 
are asked to classify documents in their offices into used and not-used. He traces 
the sources of used documents. Fellow members are the most important sources 
(27.6%), and legislative staff is ranked as the fifth (8.0%) among eight information 
sources (pp.439-441). 
The legislative staff has been ranked highly as important, reliable, useful and 
influential information sources for legislators in these studies, except in Mooney 
(1991) that adopts classification of documents by respondents instead of asking 
about the importance of information sourced directly. From the results, the work 
identifying the position of the legislative staff in the information network 
surrounding the legislature was inspired by the research which investigated the 
communication network.  
Investigating the communication network 
  It is worthwhile to review the studies examining staff impact through 
investigating the communication network in the legislature separately although 
they also see staff organisation as an information source. Sabatier and Whiteman 
(1985) test the relevance of two models of information flow in legislatures (the 
two-stage model and the three-stage model) through interviews with legislators 
and staff members in the legislature of California, and find that committee staff 
are an important factor in information flow. Policy information is delivered from 
the executive branch and interest groups to non-specialist legislators via 
specialist legislators in the two-stage model, but the committee staff play the role 
of a bridge between specialist legislators and the executive branch and interest 
groups in the three stage model (pp.396-401). The interview data demonstrate 
that the committee staff play a key role in information flow in their areas of 
specialisation, but legislators depend on them less than expected in other areas 
(p.406). 
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The communication patterns in the U.S. Congress and the role of the legislative 
staff are investigated intensively in Whiteman’s (1995) book. He exploits the 
congressional enterprise perspective of Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) and issue 
network theory of Heclo (1978) as theoretical frameworks although the enterprise 
in the book excludes former staff members who are included in a member’s 
enterprise in Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a). He conducts 318 interviews with 
congressmen/women and staff members, a survey of them and participatory 
observation to analyse issue networks for two health issues (Medicare physician 
payment and vaccine injury compensation) and two transportation issues (airport 
landing slots and hazardous material transportation). In an enterprise, the 
member and his/her staff share the responsibility of staying attentive to an issue 
(following up the issue), although most of the work is to be done by staff (p.75). 
Staff of attentive enterprises rely most on the committee staff as an information 
source (ch.4).  In an enterprise which decides to be involved in an issue, 
information sources are more diversified than in an attentive enterprise: The 
committee staff are one of the most important information source, but interest 
groups and other personal staff are as important as the committee staff (ch.6). 
He concludes that the U.S. Congress secures the independence of information 
especially from the executive; that an enterprise tends to get information from 
more various sources when they decided to be involved in an issue, but the 
information base is both ‘narrower and deeper than anticipated’ (p.188); that ‘the 
distribution of information within issue networks appears to be quite asymmetrical’ 
(p.188) between involved enterprises and others (pp.186-188). 
Including these two studies, the research about the legislative staff focusing on 
their informative function has contributed to the understanding of the role and 
impact of the legislative staff. Considering that one of the aims of establishing the 
staff system is to secure the independence of the legislature in information from 
the executive or interest groups, the focus of those studies is natural and well-
targeted. In addition, the exploitation of a network perspective in the investigation 
of information networks surrounding the legislature is well matched to the study 
of the legislative process, considering the network character of the legislative 
arena composed of relevant policy actors. However, the focus on the information 
and intelligence function has overlooked the network managing function of the 
legislative staff – the integration function in the terms of Patterson (1970) or 
97 
 
Sidlow and Henschen (1985). On the other hand, the results from those studies 
emphasising strong staff impact which is derived from their roles or informational 
power provoked another important question: is the legislative staff controlled? 
The nature of staff impact   
If the impact of the legislative staff is not to be ignored, the nature of the impact 
can be questioned. The mechanism of accountability that links decision makers 
of public policy and the public could be at peril when staff members are not 
controlled by legislators. This problem is the key issue in Malbin’s (1980) book. 
He extensively investigates the effects of the development of staff organisation 
and the impact of the legislative staff through case studies and interviews with 
congressmen/women and staff members. He traces the role of staff through 
different stages in the legislative process and across different tasks of legislature 
(legislation, examination on the budget and oversight). He states that staff 
organisation has the benefits of using expertise and securing independence of 
information from the executive and interest groups but elected members delegate 
their work to staff and they become ‘insulated administrators in a bureaucratised 
organisation’ (p.5). A larger amount of information provided by the staff 
organisation gives members greater workloads, makes members’ concentration 
on legislative deliberation more difficult, and in turn facilitates delegation to staff 
(ch.10). For him, the biggest problems of congressional staff are that elected 
members cannot control their staff and that unelected representatives who have 
their own interests play a big role in the policy process, which is against the ideal 
of representative democracy. 
However, this perspective is opposed by subsequent research. DeGregorio 
(1988) investigates working styles of subcommittee staff members through 
interviews with 43 subcommittee staff directors in the U.S. Congress. Based on 
the classification scheme of Price (1971) and Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) 
(professionals, entrepreneurs and politicos), the staff directors are classified into 
six clusters through cluster analysis of the interview data. Scores for four attitudes 
of staff – partisanship, accessibility, objectivity, and deference – are used as 
criteria for the classification. One of the most important findings of this analysis is 
that there are no staff members who can be identified as Price’s (1971) 
prototypical entrepreneurs who are expected to show low deference to 
congressmen/women (p.467). Moreover, the score in the dimension of deference 
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is usually high and just one of the six groups classified in the study (12.8% of the 
interviewees) shows low deference (p.467). Nearly a quarter of the sample can 
be identified as politicos in Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) and nearly a sixth of 
the sample can be identified as technicians – professionals in Price (1971) and 
in Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) (pp.467-468). The biggest cluster (28.2% of the 
sample) cannot be identified as any type of staff suggested in Price (1971) or 
Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a) (p.468). Contrary to Malbin (1980), she concludes 
that the subcommittee staff are well controlled by their chairs (p.473). 
She also assesses the degree of delegation from subcommittee chairs to staff 
and investigates the factors which affect the delegation through interviews with 
staff directors in the U.S. Congress and subcommittee chairs in the House of 
Representatives (DeGregorio, 1995). Based on the difference in the goals of 
congressmen/women and staff members and principal agent theory, she 
hypothesizes that there would be a hierarchy in staff activities in which the more 
routine tasks are more likely to be delegated (p.264). According to the interview 
data, there is a hierarchy in staff tasks as expected. Staff members are expected 
to give information about a policy from technical aspects rather than from political 
aspects and the order of relative valuations among services is similar between 
staff and chairs (p.268). She concludes that staff autonomy is exaggerated 
(p.275). 
In addition, DeGregorio and Snider (1995) examine the nature of staff impact 
although their focus is on the whole network of issue leaders. They identify 
legislative leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives regarding six 
controversial issues – contra aid, farm credit reform, omnibus drug, nuclear 
testing limitations, omnibus trade and welfare reform – in the 100th congress 
(1987-88) and investigate factors affecting it through 97 interviews with people 
from the executive, interest groups, private firms and non-governmental 
organisations. Just over one-third (35.5%) of the leaders (139 / 391) named by 
respondents are staff, but less than 5% of total committee staff members and 
legislative assistants of individual members are named as leaders (p.499). Two-
fifths of named staff members are standing committee staff members and the 
proportion of subcommittee staff members and personal staff members is about 
a quarter respectively (p.503). Almost all (96.2%) of named staff members are 
cited along with their bosses, but the proportion of congressmen/women who are 
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named along with their staff members is only 33.1% (p.501). They state that staff 
impact has a derivative character based on this analysis (pp.507-508). 
To sum up, earlier research which warned of the uncontrolled nature of staff 
impact that is contradictory to the principle of representative democracy and its 
accountability was repudiated by subsequent research which emphasised that 
staff impact has a delegatory and derivative feature and that technical and routine 
work has a higher priority for staff members. However, it could be absurd to 
conclude that legislators always control the legislative staff or vice versa. Then, 
the research question about the factors affecting staff impact should be 
addressed. 
Factors affecting the impact of staff  
It would be reasonable to think that staff play both an autonomous role and are 
controlled by legislators, and there are several factors affecting the nature of staff 
impact. In fact, there are many studies about the factors affecting staff impact. 
Nearly half a century ago, Patterson (1970, pp.29-35) enumerated the norms of 
staff, committee leadership, the structure of staff organisation, partisanship and 
specialisation as those factors based on interviews with the committee staff 
members in the U.S. Congress. Some of the studies mentioned above are also 
interested in these factors. Sidlow and Henschen (1985, pp.490-493) state that 
staff influence in finding new issues and solutions for them relies on their bosses’ 
characters and the committee’s terms of reference. DeGregorio (1988, pp.469-
473) argues that the history and party composition of a subcommittee, the nature 
of issues and the chairs’ leadership styles are factors affecting staff attitudes 
(partisanship, accessibility, objectivity and deference) after qualitative analysis of 
the interviews with staff directors. Whiteman (1995, pp.124-125) contends that 
staff autonomy is affected by the structure of a congressman/woman’s office; that 
the importance of staff impact is usually correlated positively with the degree of 
involvement of the office in an issue; and that the autonomy of staff undergoes a 
change along with the progress of the legislative process – their autonomy is 
greatest in detailing the position of their congressman/woman on the issue. 
Hoffman (2006, pp.46-48) argues that the influence is bigger when the analysts 
have the power of proposing budget recommendations; when they have worked 
longer and have more expertise; and when they meet more with other actors in 
the budget process and are more visible. 
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In addition to those studies, Weissert and Weissert (2000) analyse the influence 
of committee staff (health policy committee staff and fiscal committee staff) on 
making health policy in five states through interviews with legislators, staff, 
lobbyists and officials in the executive branch. They create a model that analyses 
committee staff influence in which staff influence is affected by trust from the 
committee chair; the expertise of the staff, whether the staff member belongs to 
the majority party; and whether the staff member is a fiscal staff member 
(pp.1123-1129). Trust, in turn, is affected by the tenure of the chair and to whom 
the staff is accountable (the chair, the speaker, party caucus or non-partisan 
institution) in the model (pp.1124-1126). The results of their logit analysis based 
on the data from interviews demonstrate that turnover of chairs has a negative 
impact on trust and trust has a positive impact on staff influence (pp.1143-1144). 
According to the interview data, the committee staff have influences within in the 
limitations permitted by the chairs (p.1132) and the stage of policy making affects 
staff influence: The influence is smallest at the agenda setting stage, but 
information gathering is a primary role of staff. The amount of staff influence in 
shaping proposals is decided by the chairs’ trust of the staff and valuation of staff 
opinion (pp.1136-1139). 
Factors listed by these studies can be categorised into human factors (chair’s 
character or leadership style and partisanship or expertise of staff members), 
administrative factors (the structure of staff organisation, committee’s terms of 
reference, chair’s tenure and official power of staff) and issue factors (the nature 
of issues, MPs’ degree of involvement with the issue and issue’s progress in the 
legislative process). Overall, there is a tendency that human factors about the 
features of MPs and staff members or staff organisation’s structure are 
enumerated repeatedly as important factors affecting staff impact. This would be 
because of the fact that committee chairs have practical power in the appointment 
of staff members and the operation of his/her own staff organisation, which are 
exceptional compared with other legislatures. 
  4.2.3. Literature about staff members’ utilisation of policy information and 
analysis; factors affecting staff organisation; staff norms and accountability; 
staff from minority groups; and legislative professionalism 
As the information function of the legislative staff drew attention, interest about 
staff members’ utilisation of policy information and analysis grew. In addition, 
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factors affecting staff organisation and the norms and accountability of staff 
members were focused on as the legislative staff were conceived as important 
policy actors. Reflecting the importance of staff members, staff members from 
minority groups were studied from the perspective of representative bureaucracy. 
For the scholars studying state legislatures, the legislative staff was perceived as 
an important factor affecting the professionalization of the legislature. Those 
studies noted the diversification of studies about legislative staff, but this was 
tapped into briefly because the studies were not directly related to the role and 
impact of staff. 
Staff members’ utilisation of policy information and analysis 
Staff are providers of information and intelligence for the legislature. Thus, how 
staff members use the policy information and analysis supplied to them becomes 
an important subject. One of the questions regarding this subject is whether the 
information used by staff substantially affects the direction of policy or just 
buttresses policies preferred by legislators. Whiteman’s (1985) study about the 
committee staff members’ use of Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
projects demonstrates that information from OTA projects is more likely to be 
used for elaborative (refining or fine-tuning members’ current positions) and 
strategic (backing up members’ current positions) functions than for substantive 
(establishing or setting members’ positions on an issue) functions (pp.299-304). 
Weiss (1989, p.424) identifies four functions of analyses used by the committee 
staff members: supporting members’ current positions; warning of defects in a 
policy; guidance for devising a plan to implement or fine-tune current policies; 
and enlightenment for changing ways of thinking about issues. The order of the 
use of these analyses is: support – warning – guidance – enlightenment (pp.425-
427). The other subject is the limitation of heuristics used by staff in their 
information processing. Miler (2009) argues that personal staff members depend 
on more accessible information and that the heuristics which staff use make 
biases favourable to the groups which are more active in contacting the House 
members’ offices and give more financial contributions to them.  
Factors affecting staff organisation 
Which factors affect the staff system began to attract scholars’ attentions as staff 
are perceived as important actors in the legislative process and thought to affect 
the performance of a legislature. Firstly, Chadha, Permaloff and Robert (2001) 
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analyse the legislative fiscal office (LFO) organisation in state legislatures in the 
U.S. According to their regression analysis, state legislatures which have dual 
LFOs (one for each chamber) allow LFOs more power in the budgeting process. 
LFOs in those states also secure more staff per member in the state legislature 
(pp.205-206). Secondly, Grossback and Peterson’s (2004) study about state 
legislatures in the U.S. analyses factors which affect legislative staff development 
using data about state legislatures. The positive factors found are prior legislative 
professionalism scores in King (2000) and the regional average of staff size and 
access to staff (the average of the legislatures in adjacent states), but one 
negative factor is legislative turnover (p.40).  
Thirdly, Handy and Strahan’s (2004) study about the staff organisation in the 
House Appropriations Committee examines the relevance of Krehbiel’s 
informational theory and Aldrich and Rohde’s conditional party government 
theory in explaining the change of staff organisation. They demonstrate that the 
majority party leadership began to intervene in the committee’s work and areas 
where staff had had autonomy through their expertise after the Republican 
takeover in 1994 (pp.8-11) and that partisanship began to be considered as one 
of the criteria for new junior staff recruitment (p.14). The study concludes that 
conditional party government theory has more relevance than informational 
theory for this case (p.17). Finally, Leal and Hess (2004) analyse personal staffing 
patterns of newly elected congressmen/women in the U.S. House of 
Representatives focusing on factors affecting the members’ decisions to recruit 
experienced staff. The representative’s ethnicity, gender, margin in the election 
and party (ideology and majority) and the number of newly elected members 
together are the factors. 
Staff norms and accountability 
One of the mechanisms to operate representative democracy is the chain of 
accountability from the people to the executive via the legislature (Massey, 1993, 
pp.66-70). As it has been revealed, staff is an important component in the 
legislature. Therefore, the question of what the nature of staff accountability is 
and how to secure this accountability drew scholars’ attention. Parts of these 
questions are related to the norms of staff. Patterson (1970, pp.29-31) lists those 
norms: limited advocacy, deference to congressmen, anonymity, specialisation 
and limited partisanship. Romzek and Utter (1997) argue that the legislative staff 
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can be perceived as a professional group because they have expertise, qualified 
autonomy, commitment to their work and their own group norms and identify the 
norms of the legislative staff in the U.S. Congress. They classify the norms of 
staff into three categories – norms in the relation with congressmen/women and 
the legislature (e.g. loyalty and deference), roles of staff in Congress (e.g. 
partisanship, low visibility and confidentiality) and working styles (e.g. courtesy 
and flexibility) (pp.1265-1272).  
When it comes to accountability, Romzek (2000) addresses the issue through 
interviews with congressional staff members. First of all, she classifies the 
relationships of accountability using two dimensions – source of control (internal 
and external) and the degree of autonomy (low and high) and the four types of 
relationships derived from the classification are: hierarchical (internal control and 
low autonomy), professional (internal control and high autonomy), legal (external 
control and low autonomy) and political (external control and high autonomy) 
(pp.417-419). Overall, her findings are that various accountability relationships 
emerge between a member and their staff member; that, overall, political and 
professional types are the major relationships for congressional staff; and that 
junior staff members are likely to work under hierarchical or professional types 
(p.428). Furthermore, she argues that staff are accountable to various actors 
which include colleagues, special authorities and groups outside Congress 
although their priority is with their Congress member (pp.422-424). 
Staff members from minority groups 
Representative bureaucracy has been perceived as a mechanism to reflect the 
interests of minority groups although its effectiveness is a controversial subject 
among scholars (Meier and O’toole, 2006, pp.70-73). Some scholars have 
studied the representativeness of the legislative staff and whether staff members 
from minority groups reflect the interests of their groups in the legislative process. 
Firstly, Friedman and Nakamura (1991) investigate the extent to which women 
are represented in committees in the U.S. Senate. According to them, women are 
more represented than in the past, but professional staff positions are still 
occupied by male staff disproportionately (pp.412-413). In addition, committees 
which are policy oriented, have many liberal members and are in high conflict 
among relevant interest groups, employ disproportionately more female 
professional staff, but opportunities for promotion for female staff are few (pp.419-
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420). Secondly, Bell and Rosenthal (2003) analyse the influence of female 
legislative staff members in the U.S. Congress based on the study of two cases 
- the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act and the Violence against Women Act. 
The study demonstrates that three conditions – strong expectations and requests 
for representation from interest groups, sufficient resources (expertise, status and 
interest) of staff and room for staff to have an influence (staff autonomy and 
importance of the issue as a gender issue) – are necessary for female staff 
members to play the role of substantive representation in gender issues (pp.72-
77). Finally, Grose, Mangum and Martin (2007) investigate the recruitment of 
African-American staff in district offices by congressmen/women of the U.S. 
Congress. Their findings are that employment of African-American staff in district 
offices facilitates contacts between members and African-American constituents, 
and elicits substantive representation (pp.455-460) and that Democrats and 
African-American members tend to hire more African-American staff in their 
district office (pp.468-472). 
Legislative professionalism 
Legislative professionalism has been an important subject in literature about 
state legislatures in the U.S. Scholars have studied the relationship between 
legislative professionalism and the legislative leader’s power (Clucas, 2007); the 
influence of legislative professionalism on the relationship between the legislature 
and the executive in a state (Dilger, Krause and Moffett, 1995; Squire, 1997; 
Thompson, 1986; Woods and Baranowski, 2006); the relationship between socio-
economic factors in a state and legislative professionalism (Moncrief, 1988; 
Mooney, 1995); comparison of legislative professionalism across states and 
nations (Moncrief, 1994); the relationship between legislative professionalization 
and the diversity of legislators (Squire, 1992a); the relationship between 
members’ career orientations and legislative professionalization (Squire, 1992b); 
the relationship between legislative professionalization and public opinion about 
the legislature (Squire, 1993); and the change in legislative professionalism 
across time (King, 2000; Squire, 2007). In this literature, staff is included in the 
indicators of legislative professionalization as one of the legislature’s important 
resources. 
  4.2.4. Implications and Limitations of the Literature 
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Research about the legislative staff in the U.S. has developed into an industry 
in which many sub-industries are included. The industry has drawn on various 
theoretical perspectives from legislative research and other fields. The 
congressional enterprises perspective is derived directly from the research on 
legislative staff. Theories about legislative organisation – informational theory, 
party government theory and legislative professionalism – have contributed to the 
explanation about the development and change of staff organisation. Theories 
about accountability are exploited to investigate staff norms. Particularly in some 
of the research about the policy impact of staff, rational choice institutionalism 
(principal-agent theory) and the policy network perspective (issue network) have 
been applied. The interests and preferences (e.g. career orientation) of staff 
members has also been considered as a variable to explain staff behaviour. From 
this research, it can be inferred that staff impact can be analysed from the 
perspectives that focus on the relationships and interaction between staff and 
other policy actors in the policy network and that orientations of staff members 
affect the relationship and interaction (especially that with legislators). 
These theories, however, have limitations when applied directly to the study of 
the legislative staff, especially the committee staff, outside the American context. 
First of all, many legislatures in other developed countries do not adopt the 
partisan committee staff system of the U.S. Congress in which staff members are 
accountable to the chair or the ranking minority-party member of the committee. 
On top of that, relatively weak party discipline and a strong legislature in American 
politics allow an individual congressman/woman to be the major actor of the 
legislative process who can set policy agenda and legislate it for himself/herself. 
In other developed countries, however, it is difficult for an individual MP to have 
a similar status to that of a congressman/woman in the U.S. Therefore, theoretical 
approaches which see individual MPs and their staff as important units of 
legislative activity would be difficult to apply to other legislatures. For these 
reasons, as written in the introduction of this chapter, research on the legislative 
staff in the U.S. and that in other countries seem to be insulated from each other. 
The congressional enterprises perspective and party government theory (for 
legislative staff), for instance, are difficult to apply in the study of the committee 
staff in South Korea. Committee staff members in South Korea are career civil 
servants who are non-partisan. The chair or ranking members of the committee 
106 
 
do not have the power to appoint committee staff and committee staff are not 
accountable to them. The chair seems to be a customer of the legislative support 
service provided by the committee staff rather than the boss of the staff. 
Committee staff members are not replaced due to a change of the majority party 
in the legislature. In this regard, it is necessary not only to review the theories 
applied to the study of the legislative staff in the U.S. but also to reset the 
theoretical framework and perspectives that fit with the explanation of staff impact 
and behaviour in South Korea. 
The methods used in the research are also various. Quantitative statistical 
analysis, surveys, interviews, document analysis and case studies about the 
legislative process of specific bills or about specific committees are used. 
However, the major methods for data gathering are surveys and interviews. This 
may be due to the invisible characteristics of the legislative staff. In this regard, 
statistical observation to assess staff policy impact is rare although the method is 
used in research about the relationship between staff and legislative performance 
(e.g. staff size and the number of bills sponsored or enacted). In South Korea, 
however, it is possible to observe and assess the impact of the committee staff 
through document analysis because committee staff can present their opinion 
about bills in the committee stage and subcommittee stage. In the research about 
fiscal analysts of the U.S. state legislatures, Hoffman (2006) assessed the impact 
of legislative fiscal analysts who can propose recommendations about budget 
bills by comparing their recommendations and the final budget. A similar method 
can be applied to the research about the legislative committee staff in South 
Korea. 
When it comes to the role and impact of the legislative staff, first of all, the 
information and intelligence function has been emphasised more than other 
functions. Although the linking and negotiating function was identified in some 
research about the role of staff (DeGregorio, 1995; Patterson, 1970; Sidlow and 
Henschen, 1985), the focus of many studies about the role and impact of the 
legislative staff is on the information and intelligence function as reviewed above. 
Considering the network character of the legislative arena discussed in chapter 
5, the network managing function – consulting, negotiating and mediating 
function – of the legislative staff should be given more attention. On top of that, 
although American literature about the factors affecting the impact of staff gives 
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valuable insights, the focus on the human factors (chair’s character or leadership 
style and partisanship or expertise of staff members) or administrative factors (the 
structure of staff organisation, committee’s terms of reference, chair’s tenure and 
official power of staff) has less relevance on the study of the legislative committee 
staff in South Korea. This is because in the legislature of South Korea, as 
discussed above, the chair does not have any appointment power for committee 
staff or the practical power of operating the committee staff organisation. The 
chair’s tenure is usually less than two years; the committee staff organisation is 
relatively homogenous between committees; and committee staff members are 
career civil servants who have relatively homogenous orientations and expertise. 
Thus, this thesis gives its focus to issue factors – the nature of the issue – when 
it investigates the factors affecting the impact of the committee staff. 
 
4.3. Literature in Other Countries 
  4.3.1. Research on the legislative staff in South Korea 
In South Korea, studies on the legislative staff could be classified by the 
following three groups: those investigating the features and perceptions of staff 
members or staff organisation usually based on surveys or interviews; those 
examining staff impact directly; and those proposing prescriptions to develop the 
staff system. The focus of the research has been on support agencies and the 
committee staff, but personal staff has drawn scholars’ attentions since the mid-
2000s. This review covers research after the mid-1980s.  
The features and perceptions of staff members or staff organisation 
Empirical research about the legislative staff in South Korea is dated to Park 
(1986) which is based on surveys and interviews with committee staff members 
and MPs. Rich data about staff recruitment patterns, their career paths, and 
structure and functions of staff organisation were provided. The division of labour 
among staff is not explicit; political impartiality is an important norm; rational 
decision making is the principle that directs the legislative process from the staff 
members’ point of view; staff members’ information sources are limited; and MPs 
do not make use of committee staff members’ work. Secondly, Park and Yun 
(2001) address the political neutrality of the committee staff and the difficulty in 
doing their job based on interviews with senior committee staff members and a 
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survey of committee staff and personal staff members. About the political 
impartiality of the committee staff, personal staff members think that the 
committee staff are favourable to the governing party and committee chairs 
(pp.184-185). Committee staff members conceive the shortage of manpower and 
budget as the main difficulties (pp.185-186). To improve the quality of the 
committee staff service, committee staff members think that it is necessary to 
increase the number of committee staff members and to prepare career 
development plans for staff, but personal staff members think that it is necessary 
to appoint experts who are not career civil servants as the committee staff 
(pp.185-186). Finally, Yim et al. (2004) assess the relative importance of core 
competencies in providing legislative support services through a survey of staff 
members in the National Assembly Secretariat. The survey data demonstrate that 
skills for drafting law bills; abilities for policy and budget analysis; and abilities for 
support proceedings are the most important core competencies for staff in 
legislative support agencies (p.144). 
The above studies are about committee staff members and legislative support 
agencies. As an important early study about personal staff, Park (1995, p.201-
253) analyses the role of personal staff through a survey and interviews with 
personal staff members. He classifies the role of personal staff into three types – 
a representation role, decision-making role and system-maintenance role. He 
concludes that the policy expertise of personal staff members is low. In addition, 
Kim and Yoon (2007) analyse personal staff members’ perceptions about 
professional norms in the legislature of South Korea through a survey. The results 
of the survey demonstrate that the personal characteristics of the staff member 
(gender, the degree of formal education and position) are associated with the 
staff member’s perceptions about norms. Male staff members, staff members 
who have a high level of education and staff in high positions mark a higher score 
than female staff members, staff members who have a low level of education and 
staff in low positions in perception about staff norms (pp.145-148). 
There are attempts to find the problems of the personal staff system and 
remedies for them based on surveys. Firstly, Han (2009) conducts a survey of 
personal staff members about their policy impact; satisfaction with legislative 
support agencies; job satisfaction; and measures for a reinforcement of the 
support system for MPs. According to the survey data, personal staff members 
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think that policy work is more important than constituency work among their tasks 
and that the work they personally carry out is helpful and influential for MPs 
(pp.100-105). Personal staff members conceive support agencies as cooperative, 
but they are not satisfied with the services of the agencies (pp.106-108). Personal 
staff members think that their own expertise is not high and that the heavy burden 
of staff work and insufficient training opportunities inhibits nurturing their expertise 
(pp.109-112). Their job satisfaction appears to be low (pp.112-113). In their view, 
it is necessary to relocate personnel between support agencies and increase the 
number of personal staff members (pp.110-111). Secondly, Kim (2012) also 
conducts a survey of personal staff members. The survey data demonstrate that 
the degree of systematic division of labour among staff members is low; that 
personal staff members have a heavy burden of work; and that the personal staff 
themselves feel the need for more staff and more training (pp.126-127). Personal 
staff members perceive the lack of budget and personnel, difficulties in getting 
information, and their insufficient expertise as important problems in doing their 
work (p.127). The study argues that it is necessary to increase the number of 
personal staff members; to set specific job requirements for personal staff; to 
guarantee job security of personal staff; and to strengthen training programmes 
for personal staff (pp.130-133). 
These studies could be the bases of other studies about the legislative staff, 
especially prescriptive studies that seek improvement of the staff system. 
However, they do not address the question of staff function and impact directly, 
not only for personal staff members but for committee staff members. This work 
is conducted by studies introduced below. 
Staff impact 
Studies addressing the question of staff impact in South Korea are mainly about 
that of the committee staff, but the number of those studies at the level of articles 
in academic journals and Ph.D. theses is very small. One of these studies is Park 
and Yun (2001) mentioned above. According to the survey data in the study, staff 
members (both committee staff and personal staff) conceive support for the 
scrutiny of the executive, and provision of expertise and information as the most 
important roles of the committee staff (pp.180-181). Committee staff members 
themselves think that they have high expertise and strong policy impact, but 
personal staff members do not think so (pp.181-184). In the interviews, senior 
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committee staff members say that their long tenure is helpful for nurturing 
expertise and that the opinions of committee staff are well accepted in the 
legislative process of non-controversial bills (p.181). 
Additionally, Kim’s (2006) Ph.D. thesis analyses the policy impact of the 
committee staff in the legislative process of government bills. Firstly, he assesses 
the extent to which the amendment opinions of the committee staff are reflected 
in the scrutiny of four government bills (the Bill on the Protection, Use, etc. of 
Location Information, Information System Efficiency Bill, Space Development 
Promotion Bill, and  the Bill on the Performance Evaluation and Management of 
National Research and Development Projects, etc.) through document analysis. 
The results demonstrate that one third of provisions of those bills are amended 
according to the amendment opinions of the committee staff and that 80 percent 
of the staff’s opinions are accepted (pp.73-85). Then, he lists conditions of staff 
failure: the interests of a key MPs’ constituencies; the interests of industries; big 
and direct political impacts of a bill for MPs (e.g. electoral laws); and high social 
controversy (pp.108-116). Finally, he describes the role of committee staff 
members’ amendment opinions through the framework of Dunn’s policy 
argument model (1981) and contends that committee staff opinions provide 
information for the judgement about individual issues if the legislative process is 
seen as a process of argument (pp.125-163). 
Finally, Pai (2011) analyses the factors influencing committee staff and 
assesses the policy impact of the committee staff through a survey of committee 
staff members and document analysis. The regression analysis of the survey data 
demonstrates that opinions of relevant policy actors (parties, the President, 
parliamentary leaders, the relevant department of the executive and interest 
groups) influence committee staff in writing the review reports and that staff 
members’ expertise has no statistically significant influence on their work contrary 
to expectation (p.115-121). According to the survey, staff themselves perceive 
that the reports they present in committee meetings have an impact in the 
legislative process (p.121-122). The document analysis of real bills (law bills, 
budget bills and settlements of accounts) demonstrates that staff impact is 
significant and that their impact is most significant in the examination of law bills 
and least significant in that of budget bills (p.122-123). 
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Several dissertations at Master’s level compose part of the empirical research 
about the impact of the committee staff. Firstly, Park (1998) conducts a survey of 
MPs and committee staff, and interviews with committee staff and personal staff 
members. The data demonstrate that MPs think that the expertise of committee 
staff is low; that MPs’ satisfaction with the committee staff is low; that MPs want 
to increase the number of personal staff; and that MPs do not utilise the 
committee staff. Secondly, Jang (2004) assesses the impact of the committee 
staff in the legislative process by comparing opinions in the review reports of the 
committee staff with the substance of general discussion in the committee stage 
and the results of the scrutiny. The number of sample bills is 13. The analysis 
demonstrates that staff opinions are less quoted in the debate at the committee 
stage, but final bills which pass the committee stage reflect staff opinions 
significantly. She concludes that the committee staff’s impact is big in the detailed 
examination of bills. Thirdly, Choi (2008) assesses the impact and expertise of 
the committee staff based on interviews with committee staff and personal staff 
members. He argues that committee staff impact is big, but their expertise is low. 
Finally, Seo (2011) analyses the impact of the committee staff by conducting a 
regression analysis on the relationship between the number of amendment 
opinions of the committee staff on a bill and how much the bill is amended. The 
analysis demonstrates that the greater the number of amendment opinions of 
committee staff, the more the bill is amended. 
When it comes to personal staff, Jeong and Kim (2008) analyse the factors 
affecting their impact through a survey. They classify the independent variables 
into four groups: expertise (answered by staff themselves), job satisfaction 
(answered by staff themselves), variables which have halo effects for the impact 
of a staff member (tenure, seniority of the staff’s MP, grades and party) and social 
demographic variables (formal education, gender, and age) (pp.81-85). The 
regression analysis of the survey data demonstrates that greater expertise and 
job satisfaction is associated with greater impact. In addition, male staff members 
and staff members in a higher position tend to have more impact (pp.86-91). 
Overall, academic attention to the impact of the legislative staff is not enough. 
The number of studies beyond the level of Master’s degree is very small, and the 
research is concentrated on the committee staff. As discussed later, the literature 
has still not addressed the question of factors affecting the staff impact enough. 
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In addition, individual studies have their own limitations: depending on only 
survey or interview data about the perception of staff members without examining 
other data sources (e.g. real bills and their final versions) (Park, 1998; Park and 
Yun, 2001); not securing enough numbers of sample bills (Jang, 2004; Kim, 2006); 
having the feature of a literature review rather than independent research (Choi, 
2008); or being based on a crude regression model (Seo, 2011). There is no 
standardised and agreed procedure in the document analysis, comparing the 
amendment opinions of committee staff members with a bill’s final version to 
examine staff impact.  
Prescriptive studies 
As a quality staff organisation is perceived as helpful for the policy competency 
of a legislature, and the legislature of South Korea is perceived as weak in policy 
expertise, some studies present prescriptions about staff organisations. Firstly, 
Lim (2002) emphasises an approach admitting the context of South Koran politics. 
He argues that the political environment (the weak legislature and strong party 
discipline) and political incentives of MPs (devolving power to the executive 
branch and blaming the executive in the case of a failure in policy making) 
decrease the necessity and usefulness of legislative support agencies in South 
Korea (pp.255-259). Accepting these limitations, he identifies the development of 
MPs’ expertise; reinforcement of control for support agencies by MPs themselves; 
securing political impartiality by construction of a decentralised support system; 
and construction of flexible post-bureaucracy as the direction for vitalisation of 
legislative support agencies (pp.259-266). 
Secondly, Park (2004b) analyses legislative support demands through the 
framework of Easton’s systems theory (1965) and proposes the reorganisation of 
the current legislative support system of the day. He identifies five information 
demands in the legislative process – input stage, with-input stage, output stage, 
feedback, and management and maintenance of the institution – and suggests 
the establishment of support agencies for each information demand (pp.298-311). 
When it comes to the committee staff, he argues that the power of appointment 
should be given to committee chairs and ranking members of negotiation groups 
on the condition of setting strict job requirements (pp.311-314). Finally, he 
suggests setting explicit job requirements for personal staff to give each MP the 
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power of setting the number of their personal staff under a budget limit (pp.315-
316). 
Thirdly, Lim and Seo (2013) analyse problems of the current legislative support 
system and propose some changes. They argue that support agencies and staff 
organisation have a big burden of tasks compared with their personnel capacity; 
that there is repetitious work done by different support agencies; and that 
committee staff have insufficient policy expertise (pp.68-72, 161). They suggest 
increases in the number of committee staff members and staff members in the 
Legislative Counselling Office; reorganisation of support agencies; providing 
personal staff members with more training opportunities; the use of external 
experts; and minimising the duplication of work through cooperation and linkage 
among support agencies (ch.6). 
Some prescriptive studies attempt to adopt a comparative perspective. Firstly, 
Hahm, Kim and Cho (2004, p.398-409) compare the staff organisations (personal 
staff, committee staff and staff supporting parties) in the U.S. with those in South 
Korea in the aspects of political contexts, the personal features of individual staff 
members and the institutional features of staff organisations. Their suggestions 
from the comparison are the increase of the number of staff members and more 
efficient operation of staff organisations (more explicit division of labour, adoption 
of internship programmes and more flexible operation of personal staff) (pp.409-
414). Secondly, Lee and Hahm (2008) analyse the institutional development of 
the National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) comparing it with that of the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). They use the framework of 
institutionalisation based on Huntington (1968) and Ragsdale and Theis (1997). 
According to the study, the NABO shows a high degree of development in the 
aspects of adaptability and complexity, but the degree of autonomy and 
coherence are low because the head of the agency can only appoint a small 
proportion of staff independently and a considerable part of the staff are not 
guaranteed their tenure (pp.176-193). They suggest both transferring the power 
of staff appointment to the head of the agency and guarantee the job security of 
staff members of the agency (pp.194-195). 
These studies have some important prescriptive implications about the 
establishment of a quality staff system. Some of them, however, refer to the staff 
system of the U.S. Congress without consideration of the differences in 
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parliamentary politics and the role of the legislature between the two countries 
and of the fact that the partisan committee staff system of the U.S. Congress itself 
is exceptional (Hahm, Kim and Cho, 2004; Park, 2004b; Lee and Hahm, 2008). 
Those studies seem to ignore the differences in historical and political contexts. 
Implications and limitations 
Research on the legislative staff in South Korea is in a mixed state. Prescriptive 
research remains an important part because the establishment of a competent 
legislature is conceived as important. Empirical studies, however, have begun to 
emerge in the academic industry. In particular, those on the impact of the 
committee staff demonstrate several characteristics and limitations that give 
implications for the direction of future research. Firstly, most of the studies on the 
legislative staff in South Korea have not tapped the interactions of these staff with 
other policy actors and orientations of the legislative staff enough. Staff members 
are assumed to form their opinions on policy in a vacuum only through their own 
knowledge and expertise. Contacts with other policy actors in preparation for the 
scrutiny of bills have been ignored. Staff members’ orientations or motivations in 
their work is not addressed enough. Consideration of their orientations has been 
lacking, or the simple orientation as the provider of information and analysis has 
been assumed in the research so far. Research considering interactive features 
of the policy process and staff members’ orientations is necessary. 
 Secondly, the result of this neglect is that the factors affecting staff impact have 
not been studied enough. Although Jang (2004) and Kim (2006) state that the 
staff impact becomes weak in the legislative process of controversial bills, they 
do not answer the question why staff do not matter in the examination of those 
bills. This is because most of the studies about the impact of staff are based on 
the assumption that the information and analysis supplied by staff members are 
reflected naturally in the legislative process if they are technically rational or 
correct. As we see from the literature in the U.S., however, many other factors 
influence utilisation. It is worth remembering a recent study (Pai, 2011) 
demonstrating that the committee staff members themselves think of the opinions 
of relevant policy actors as more important than their own expertise in doing their 
job. Thus, analysing the factors affecting staff impact is necessary. 
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Thirdly, the nature of the impact of staff has not been addressed. It should be 
an important subject because the committee staff members in South Korea are 
career civil servants appointed by the institution and do not have accountability 
to MPs directly, and the existence of uncontrolled staff itself could be a concern 
for the democratic legitimacy of the legislative branch. In fact, from this concern, 
some prescriptive studies suggest the transfer of the power to appoint committee 
staff members to committee chairs in reference to the staff system in the U.S. 
Congress. However, political impartiality that could not be secured by the partisan 
staff system is also an important value in a staff system. Therefore, it is important 
to address the nature of the impact of non-partisan legislative staff. 
4.3.2. Research about the legislative staff in Western Europe 
In Western Europe, the role and function of the legislative staff are described in 
literature, but the impact of staff is not assessed directly and separately. Some of 
the studies in the U.K. adopt the framework of legislative professionalization, but 
those attempts are exceptional. Research in the U.K. and that in other countries 
are reviewed separately in this sub-section. 
Research in the U.K 
Overall, the number of studies about the legislative staff in the U.K. is small and 
MPs’ personal staff has not drawn academic attention. The research has usually 
been descriptive. In the small number of studies, the focus of research about 
parliamentary staff has been on those in support agencies. Rush’s studies occupy 
a considerable part of the research. Barker and Rush (1970) conduct a 
comprehensive survey about the information sources of MPs in the British House 
of Commons. They assign a chapter to account the role and function of 
information and research services of the House of Commons Library. Their 
findings are that MPs use the service of the library frequently but half of MPs are 
not satisfied with the Library’s Research Division and that there is a need for 
personal research staff providing partisan and political services (ch.6). Rush and 
Shaw (1974) and Rush (1983) provide comprehensive accounts of the legislative 
support system and MPs’ resources in the British House of Commons of the day. 
The structure and functions of support agencies (the Department of the Clerk of 
the House, the Department of the Sergeant at Arms and the House of Commons 
Library) and the personal staff system are described. One step further, Rush 
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includes parliamentary staff as an important factor in the professionalization of 
the British Parliament and its MPs (Rush, 2001; 2005). Rush (2001) states that 
the demand from MPs, who want to play a more active role and are burdened by 
more constituency work, for better legislative support services resulted in the 
growth of staff in the House of Commons (ch.5). 
As one of the articles of the series about the legislative staff in Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, Ryle (1981) describes the staff system in the British House of 
Commons of the day focusing on non-partisan staff. He explores the factors 
affecting the establishment of a non-partisan staff system and describes the 
development of the staff system and the structure of the staff system of the day. 
He concludes that various demands from MPs and improvisatory and 
uncoordinated reactions to them have made a decentralised staff system 
(pp.514-516). As a comprehensive introduction of the British Parliament, Rogers 
and Walters’ (2015) book includes the explanation of the staff system and 
mentions the role and function of staff where necessary. They emphasise the 
political neutrality of staff members in the House of Commons Service (p.56). The 
high-quality information services provided by the House of Commons Library are 
perceived as valuable (p.61). When it comes to the committee staff, the role of 
staff members in public bill committees are related to the conduct of the 
proceedings (p.196), whereas staff members in legislative committees and 
departmental select committees play a substantive role in the policy aspect. 
Literature in other countries 
Along with Ryle (1981) mentioned above, Campbell and Laporte (1981) 
describe the staff system in the legislature of France of the day. They emphasise 
the independence and autonomy of staff in the legislature from the executive 
branch based on the principle of the separation of powers and describe the 
development of the staff system in the legislature owing to the demands for 
specialised legislative work. They state that the major role of the French 
Parliamentary staff system has become to secure independence of information 
and expertise from the executive (pp.530-531). Also in the same series, Blischke 
(1981) describes the staff system in the German Bundestag of the day. The 
growth of the staff system in the legislature is due to the increase of policy 
demands and demands for staff from junior MPs (pp.535-537). He classifies staff 
into three categories: staff for the legislature as a whole, staff for parliamentary 
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groups (e.g. parties) and personal staff, and accounts their functions (pp.537-
551). The study concludes that the quality of the legislative support service has 
been improved with the establishment and reinforcement of the staff system and 
that individual MPs’ autonomy from the executive, interest groups or 
parliamentary parties has been enhanced (pp.555-556).  
The German Bundestag has published books about its functions and 
procedures. The legislative staff system and the organisation of support agencies 
are accounted for in the latest edition (Linn and Sobolewski, 2015, ch.3). The staff 
system is composed of three types of staff: personal staff, staff for parliamentary 
groups (parties) and staff in support agencies. The most important support 
agency is the Administration of the German Bundestag. Its tasks are 
housekeeping of the parliament; supporting proceedings of the plenary and 
committees; providing research services to MPs; managing information and 
documents from the legislature itself and outside; and managing external 
relationships with press, citizens and legislatures of other countries (pp.141-154). 
The committee staff belong to the agency. 
When it comes to the Italian Parliament, Picirilli and Zudas (2012) describe the 
legislative support services of non-partisan staff in support agencies and partisan 
staff for MPs. Support agencies provide information about legislation and policy, 
supply referencing services to MPs and organise research training for MPs’ 
autonomous information collecting (pp.675-678). They argue that the training of 
parliamentary officers is limited to law education and that there are duplications 
of work among support agencies (p.679). Partisan staff are classified into three 
types: staff for the political groups, personal staff for individual MPs and staff for 
MPs who have particular duties within Parliament (e.g. committee chairs) (p.680). 
They argue that staff for the political groups conduct an important function in that 
their work is essential for the co-ordination of the legislature and linking support 
agencies and MPs (p.681). 
The development of a staff system is one of the important changes in the 
Icelandic Althingi described by Arter (2000). He analyses changes in the 
legislative capacity through the framework of five ‘Ss’ (space, sessions, structural 
changes, staff and salaries) in Rosenthal (1998) based on official statistics, 
parliamentary documents and interviews with senior staff members and MPs. The 
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staff organisation was professionalized during the 1990s and a section which 
supports standing committees was created in the Althingi secretariat (pp.56-57). 
Implications 
There are a couple of implications from these studies which draw attention. 
Firstly, staff is conceived as an important resource which is indispensable to the 
strong capacity of a legislature. As literature of legislative professionalization in 
the U.S. implies, staff is one of the components in the institutionalisation of the 
legislature (Arter, 2000; Rush, 2001; 2005). Secondly, researchers have 
considered the informational function as one of the most important functions of 
staff from early studies. Rush’s studies (Barker and Rush, 1970; Rush, 2001) and 
Rogers and Walters (2015) emphasise the research function of the Library of the 
House of Commons in the British Parliament. Articles of the series in Legislative 
Studies Quarterly pay their attention to the information function of the legislative 
staff (Blischke, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 1981; Ryle, 1981). Picirilli and 
Zudas (2012) also highlight the informational function of the legislative staff in the 
Italian Parliament. Legislative staff outside the U.S. are also conceived as 
contributing to the capacity of the legislature through the information and 
intelligence function. 
 
 4.4. Conclusion 
The previous literature reviewed in this chapter proposes several directions of 
study about the role and impact of the committee staff in the legislative process. 
First of all, a committee staff member should be considered as a policy actor who 
interacts with other actors and has his/her own orientations in the policy process. 
As revealed in the literature about congressional staff in the U.S., staff are not 
isolated actors and their impact comes from the position that they occupy in the 
policy network in which they are included. In addition, the orientations of staff 
members affect their behaviour, for example, a staff member’s career orientation 
is an important factor in explaining their behaviour in Malbin (1980). 
On top of that, theories about the behaviour and impact of staff developed in the 
U.S. cannot be applied directly to the study of the committee staff in South Korea. 
As non-partisan career civil servants, their orientations are different from those of 
staff in the U.S. Congress. Moreover, in the South Korean legislature, the 
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capabilities and orientations of MPs which affect their degree of attention 
concerning individual policies and bills can also be different from those of 
American Congressmen/women, and this makes the interaction between MPs 
and staff different from that in the U.S. Congress. Therefore, these differences 
should be considered, and it is necessary to set the theoretical framework and 
perspectives that fit with the explanation of staff impact and behaviour in South 
Korea. 
Thirdly, some research needs are derived from the review. In particular, from 
the review of the literature about the legislative staff in South Korea, previous 
studies in South Korea have not reached the stage of analysing the factors 
affecting staff impact. The information and analysis supplied by staff members 
are assumed to be reflected naturally in the legislative process if they are 
technically rational or correct. Moreover, the nature of staff impact has not been 
studied although the subject is more important in South Korea than in the U.S. 
because committee staff members have no direct accountability to committee 
chairs or MPs. These two issues need to be addressed. 
Finally, when it comes to the function of the legislative staff, the information and 
intelligence function has usually been emphasised in the previous literature. 
There are also a small number of studies which address their network managing 
function, but this function has not drawn as much academic attention as the 
information and intelligence function. This thesis also focuses on the network 
managing function and tries to address why the function is important. For the 
factors affecting staff impact, this thesis gives its focus to the nature of issue 
under scrutiny although American literature considers human factors and 
administrative factors as important ones. This is because of the character of the 
non-partisan committee staff system of the South Korean legislature in which the 
committee chair does not have the power of appointment or power over the 
operation of committee staff, and committee staff members do not demonstrate 
big differences in their orientations and expertise. 
Taking these points into consideration, setting of the theoretical framework and 
perspectives for the analysis of the role and impact of the committee staff; 
deriving key concepts for the analysis; and discussing the methods required to 
collect and analyse empirical data are conducted in the next two chapters. 
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5. Theoretical Framework and Perspectives 
5.1. Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are to construct a theoretical framework; discuss 
perspectives used in the framework; and derive key concepts to examine the role 
and impact of the legislative committee staff and factors affecting them. If the role 
and impact of a policy actor are to be examined, the interactions and relationship 
between policy actors need to be analysed. The interactions and relationship are 
affected by the features of policy actors; the network where the policy actors 
interact with each other; and the macro institutional contexts in which the actors 
and networks are embedded (Marsh, 1998a, p.192-197; Marsh and Smith, 2000, 
p.4-10; Scharpf, 1997, ch.2). Moreover, the four elements – interaction, actor, 
network and macro-level institutions surrounding the actor and network – have 
reciprocal relationships with each other. 
Firstly, the features of actors exchange influences with the other three elements. 
Actors are direct agents in social interaction (Dowding, 1991, p.10). The result of 
a social interaction is that of the actors’ intentional choices (Marsh, 1998a, p.195; 
Scharpf, 1997, p.1). The actors have the ability of intentional action and choice in 
the interaction (Marsh, 1998a, p.195; Scharpf, 1997 pp.12, 52). The constraints 
and opportunities from networks and institutions are interpreted and re-
constructed by actors (Marsh, 1998a, p.194; Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.6-7, 9). 
They reshape structural features in carrying and enforcing them in social 
interactions (Goodin, 1996, p.17). Moreover, structural elements can be changed 
by intentional decisions made by actors (Marsh, 1998a, p.194). 
Secondly, the characteristics of a network are important. The features of a 
network affect the setting of issues and solutions; the way in which they are dealt 
with in the network; and the rules of the network (Marsh, 1998a, p.195; Marsh 
and Smith, 2000, p.6). Networks provide the locus in which the actors behave 
and actors are bearers of their positions in the network (Marsh, 1998a, p.194; 
Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.6-7). The relationships in a network can prescribe the 
role of actors in the network (Marsh, 1998a, p.195). They also provide constraints 
and opportunities for actors and mould the attitudes of actors (Marsh and Smith, 
2000, pp.5-6). In addition, the features of a network mediate the influences of the 
institutional contexts (Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.7-9). 
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Finally, macro-level institutions also matter. They exert influences on the change 
of networks (Marsh, 1998a, p.195; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, pp.257-258; 
Marsh and Smith, 2000, p.7-8; Smith, 1993 pp.93-97). Marsh and Rhodes (1992a, 
pp.257-258) enumerate economic factors, ideology of governing parties and 
change in information or knowledge as factors affecting network change. In 
addition, macro-level institutions affect the features of actors. Institutions define 
actors in a social interaction and provide them with the locus for the interactions 
(Marsh, 1998a, p.195; Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp.6-7; Pierson, 2004, p.169; 
Scharpf, 1997, p.40). They affect actors’ resources and capabilities (Marsh and 
Smith, 2000, pp.6-7; Scharpf, 1997, p.12). They also influence actors’ 
preferences and perceptions (Goodin, 1996, p.17; Pierson, 2004, p.169; Shaprf, 
1997, pp.12, 40). One more important point is that the shaping and origin of the 
macro-level institutions are to be analysed because they are not formed in a 
vacuum, regardless of historical contexts of a polity (Thelen, 1999, pp.382, 384). 
These reciprocal relationships between actor, network, institutions and social 
interaction among actors are depicted in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1. Reciprocal relationships between actor, network, macro-level 
institutions and interaction among actors 
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For the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to analyse the features of actors 
and networks relevant to the legislative process and macro institutional contexts 
surrounding the legislature and the mechanism through which the features of 
these affect the interaction between committee staff members and MPs in the 
legislative process. For this work, this thesis depends on the perspective of policy 
network theory and new institutionalism. The policy network perspective is helpful 
for the analysis of the features of a network in which a policy is made and for the 
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relationship between network and actor (especially capabilities of actors); and for 
the network and interactions among actors. New institutionalism is helpful for the 
analysis of features of actors (especially orientations of actors) and for the 
relationships between actor and interaction among actors, actor and macro-level 
institutions, and network and macro-level institutions. It (especially, historical 
institutionalism) is also helpful for the analysis of the origins and formation of 
macro-level institutions. 
The next section discusses the policy network perspective. At first, the use of 
the perspective is justified. Then, the literature is reviewed briefly, and the 
interdependence due to resource dependence and the need for network 
management are focused on as features of the network. Key concepts of the 
capabilities of MPs and the committee staff in the National Assembly of South 
Korea are derived from the perspective. The section is followed by the discussion 
of new-institutionalism. The strands of rational-choice, normative and historical 
institutionalism are explained briefly. Then, specific theories and perspectives – 
which originate from these strands – to analyse the orientations of MPs and 
committee staff members are reviewed and key concepts of the orientations are 
derived. The necessity for analysis of the historical contexts which surround 
macro-level institutions affecting two other elements (actor and network) is also 
discussed. 
 
5.2. Policy network perspective 
  5.2.1. Justification for the use of the policy network perspective 
It could be seen as odd that the policy network perspective is used in the 
analysis of the legislative process because the perspective has its origin in 
explaining the alienation of Parliament from the policy process in the British 
context. The sub-title of Richardson and Jordan’s (1979) seminal book about the 
policy community in the British policy process contains the phrase ‘post-
parliamentary democracy’. The policy community of Rhodes (1986a, p.23; 1986b, 
p.22; 1992, p.78) excludes Parliament. The ‘differentiated polity’ of Rhodes 
(1997a, p.7; 1997b, p.41) also emasculates Parliament. This attitude about 
Parliament of the policy network perspective is a point of criticism for Judge 
(1999a, pp.136-142) from the perspective of representation and legitimacy. 
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Although the perspective in the British tradition underestimates the policy impact 
of Parliament, the concept of the network itself is still useful as a tool for the 
analysis of the legislative process. If a policy network includes actors in the 
legislature and is conceived as a locus of the legislative process in which various 
policy actors formulate an interdependent web and interact, the concept is well 
applied to the analysis of the legislative process. In fact, the American concepts 
of policy networks as forms of interest intermediation – sub-system, sub-
government and iron triangles – originated to analyse the interaction between 
policy actors in the legislative process where the Congress is an important actor. 
Even in the British context, Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998, pp.62-64) argue that the 
role of Parliament should be considered in the policy process and policy network 
because it has a structural power and there could be cases under which 
parliamentary parties represent conflicting groups. Thus, the legislature is a 
policy actor playing a substantive role and should be included in policy networks 
especially in analysing the legislative process. 
Moreover, the reason that the legislative arena can be interpreted as a policy 
network is the interdependence among policy actors due to the resource-
dependent feature in the legislative process. It is impossible for a legislature to 
make a policy unilaterally in the reality of the contemporary policy process. This 
is because the complexity and specialty of policy problems of modern society 
require resources such as legitimacy, information about policy problems and 
compliance of stakeholders to the policy (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.41; Van 
Waarden, 1992, p.31) which are dispersed with policy actors. The dispersion of 
policy resources and interdependence between policy actors in the U.S. is well 
depicted as below: 
Each actor in an iron triangle needs the other two to reach its goal, and the 
style that develops is symbiotic. The pressure group needs the agency to 
deliver services to its members and to provide a friendly point of access to 
government. The agency needs the pressure group to mobilize political 
support for its programs among the affected clientele. Letters from constituent 
to influential representatives and senators must be mobilized to argue that the 
agency is doing a good job and could do an even better job if given more 
money or a certain policy change. The pressure group needs the 
congressional committee again as a point of access and as an internal 
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advocate in Congress. And the committee needs the pressure group to 
mobilize votes for its members and to explain to group members how and why 
they are doing a good job in Congress. The pressure group can also be a 
valuable source of policy ideas and research for busy politicians. Finally, the 
committee members need the agency as an instrument for producing services 
to their constituent and for developing new policy initiatives. The agency has 
the research and policy analytic capacity that Congress members often lack, 
so committees can profit from their association with the agencies. And the 
agency obviously needs the committee to legitimate its policy initiatives and 
provide it with funds (Peters, 2016, p.31). 
The use of the policy network perspective has several advantages for the 
analysis of the network level as a legislative arena. First of all, as an analytical 
tool, the concept of policy networks is helpful for the identification of major policy 
actors in the legislative process, which is a requisite for the examination of 
interactions among policy actors. On top of that, the perspective is helpful for the 
analysis of interdependence in the legislative process. The literature of policy 
networks is already notorious for the resource dependence in the policy process 
of modern democracy (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992, pp.165-167; Kenis and 
Schneider 1991, pp.34-36; Klijn, 1997, p.21; Marin and Mayntz, 1991a, p.18; 
Rhodes, 1986a, pp.16-22; 1997a, ch.1; 1999, ch.5; 2000, pp.60-63). The analysis 
of the resource dependence is very important because the impact of a social actor 
can be attributed to the resource that the actor has (Aldrich, 2008, pp.268-269; 
Dowding, 1995: p.14; Klijn, 1997, p.21; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Last, but not 
least, the feature of the legislative arena as the policy network comprised of 
interdependent actors pursuing collective action (Marin and Mayntz, 1991a, p.18; 
Carlsson, 2000; deLeon and Varda, 2009; Ostrom, 2010) indicates the need for 
network management (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997a; Klijn, 1996; Klijn, 
Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995). It could be derived that the legislative arena, as 
a policy network, needs network management and the existence of actors who 
conduct the management function. This insight is important in the analysis of the 
role of legislative committee staff because they can play the role of network 
manager. 
  5.2.2. A review of the policy network literature 
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The policy network perspective has its roots in the literature about inter-
organisation relations and interest intermediation (Adam and Kriesi, 2007, p.129). 
Overall, the latter relates to the identification of actors in networks and the former 
relates to the interdependence among them. There are several categorisations 
of the policy network literature (e.g. Adam and Kriesi, 2007; Bőrzel, 1998; Rhodes, 
2006; Thatcher, 1998). Following Bőrzel (1998) and Adam and Kriesi (2007, 
pp.130-136), this thesis classifies the literature into two categories – description 
and typologies of policy networks and policy networks as a form of governance. 
Description and Typologies of policy networks 
The notion that public policies are formed in disaggregated systems began 
emerging in the U.S. after the Second World War. The concept of a sub-system 
(Freeman, 1955) is a notorious metaphor for a group of actors comprised of 
individuals in the executive branch, congressional committees and interest 
groups. The concept develops into the concepts of sub-governments (Ripley and 
Franklin, 1980) and iron triangles (Peters, 1986, pp.21-23). The basic arguments 
of these concepts are that routine policies are usually decided in a system 
consisting of personnel of the executive branch, congressional committees and 
interest groups, and that the system is closed and excludes the public. This 
closed nature of sub-systems, however, is criticised by the concept of issue 
networks in Heclo (1978). He argues that the concept of sub-systems only 
focuses on stable and autonomous actors in the policy process and suggests the 
alternative concept of issue networks. An issue network is ‘a shared-knowledge 
group having to do with some aspect of public policy’ (Heclo, 1978; p.103). 
Members of an issue network are changing constantly and no single member can 
control the policies. 
In the U.K., Jordan and Richardson initiate the discussion on the policy network 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Jordan and Richardson, 1983; 1987). They 
suggest the concept of a policy community comprised of government 
departments and interest groups, and list consensus and consultation, clientelism 
and personnel network as the characteristics of the policy process in the U.K. 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979, ch.3). The boundaries between policy 
communities are more distinct than those between departments or between 
interest groups (Richardson and Jordan, 1979, p.43). The normal policy process 
in the U.K. has the features of ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ and ‘logic of 
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negotiation’ and does not draw public attention (Jordan and Richardson, 1983, 
p.604). 
The typology of the policy network is systemised in the works of Rhodes 
(Rhodes, 1981/1999; 1986a; 1986b; 1988). Initially, He suggests a power-
dependent model to analyse central-local government relations inspired by inter-
organisational theory (Rhodes, 1981/1999. Ch.5). Resource dependence and 
exchange are the key intergovernmental relationships in the model. Later, he 
contends that the model is for micro-level analysis and suggests a policy network 
approach for meso-level analysis (Rhodes, 1986a; 1986b; 1988). Following 
Benson’s (1982, p.148) definition of the policy sector, he defines policy networks 
as ‘a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource 
dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in 
the structure of resource dependencies’ (Rhodes, 1986a, p.22; 1986b, p.22; 1988, 
p.77). Then he classifies policy networks into five types – policy communities / 
territorial communities, professional networks, intergovernmental networks, 
producer networks and issue networks – along five key dimensions – 
constellation of interests, membership, vertical / horizontal interdependence and 
the distribution of resources (Rhodes, 1988, pp.78-81). 
Other classifications of policy networks followed (e.g. Atkinson and Coleman, 
1989; Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Van Waarden, 1992). Among them, one of the 
notable analyses of policy networks was conducted by Wilks and Wright (Wilks 
and Wright, 1987; Wright, 1988; Wilks, 1989). Although based on Rhodes’ model, 
they suggest new connotations concerning the policy community and policy 
network. They distinguish between policy area, policy sector, policy sub-sector 
and policy issue. They state that policy community corresponds to both policy 
sector and sub-sector and is a group of actors or potential actors, and that policy 
network corresponds to a specific policy issue and depicts the features of the 
interaction process among actors of one or more policy communities (Wilks and 
Wright, 1987, pp.299-300). They argue that their framework makes it possible to 
admit that members of a policy network are comprised of actors in different policy 
communities (Wilks and Wright, 1987, p.301). Rhodes and Marsh also modify 
Rhodes’ initial classification (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a; Rhodes and Marsh, 
1992a; 1992b). They criticise that the initial model confuses cohesiveness and 
dominant interests of networks and they suggest the dichotomy of policy 
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community and issue network along the dimension of integration (Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992a, p.249-251; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992a, p.21; 1992b, pp.183-184, 
186-188). 
In the U.S., other labels for policy networks emerged, emphasising cognitive 
factors in the policy process – idea, belief, knowledge and information. Haas 
(1992) emphasises expertise in international policy coordination and suggests 
the concept of an epistemic community. Epistemic communities are 
characterised by common knowledge and norms, and professionalised features 
with recognised expertise and competence (Haas, 1992, p.3). In addition, the 
advocacy coalition framework suggested by Sabatier and his colleagues 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998) also 
emphasises information and knowledge in the policy process. However, this 
framework draws its attention to the difference in the belief systems of actors. 
The framework contends that actors in a policy subsystem are divided into 
several numbers of advocacy coalitions according to shared norms and beliefs, 
and that policies are decided in the process of interactions among the coalitions 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.149; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998, pp.475-
482). 
Policy network as a form of governance 
As interdependence among policy actors is conceived as an inevitable feature 
of the policy process in modern democracy, the problem of how to deal with policy 
problems in the interdependent relationship becomes a subject to be addressed. 
A network is conceived as a mechanism to solve the problem. Kenis and 
Schneider (1991, pp.34-36) summarise the changes in the policy process of 
modern polity and contend that governments are in interdependent relationships 
with other policy actors. For them, the policy network is a tool of resource 
mobilisation in the policy process (p.41). Hanf and O’Toole (1992) also 
emphasise the interdependence feature of modern policy making (pp.166-167) 
and conceive of a network as a collective mechanism of policy actors pursuing 
common objectives (p.170). Rhodes also makes links between the policy network 
and governance (Rhodes, 1997a). He identifies six usages of the concept of 
governance and contends that understanding governance as self-organising 
networks is useful for understanding the British policy process (Rhodes, 1997a, 
ch.3). In addition, he suggests the ‘differentiated polity’ (p.7) that has network 
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characteristics as a model to substitute the Westminster model to understand the 
British governing structure (Rhodes, 1997a, ch.1). 
The mechanism of networks does not depend on hierarchical control by the 
centre. It may have the feature of collective action (Marin and Mayntz, 1991a, 
p.18; Carlsson, 2000; deLeon and Varda, 2009; Ostrom, 2010). Thus, it becomes 
important to explore new forms of management to achieve the joint interests of 
the members of the network. This is a subject of Dutch literature about policy 
network management (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997a; Klijn, 1996; Klijn, 
Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995). The gist of their argument is that the policy 
process in the policy network has game characteristics due to the 
interdependency among actors in the network, and the strategies of network 
management can facilitate cooperative interactions between actors. They 
contend that the strategies of network management can be divided into two levels 
– game management (the game level) and network structuring (the network level) 
(Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, p.46-53; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer 1995, 
pp.441-450).  
In addition to the literature, Rhodes (1997b, p.48-51) also contends that network 
management has game-like and indirect features, and that the strategies are 
based on mutual trust and rhetoric skills for argument, debate and persuasion, 
arguing that the issue of network governance is ‘managing networks in the 
conditions under which they work best’ (p.49). O’Toole (1997, p.48) suggests five 
practical agenda for administrators in the network environment: not to assume 
their authority; regular surveys of the network(s); to look for points for coordination; 
to further cooperation between actors; and to form a more favourable network. 
Painter, Isaac-Henry and Rouse (1997, p.238) recommend local governments to 
audit relevant organisations; to map relationships with those organisations; and 
to identify resources which are bases of local government influence and barriers 
to exerting the influence. 
  5.2.3. Interdependence and network management 
For the purpose of this thesis, two points of the policy networks perspective are 
identified: interdependence due to resource dependence and the need for 
network management. When it comes to the former, the concept is important 
because it affects the feature of interaction among actors in the legislative 
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process and the capabilities of the committee staff can be derived from the 
resource dependent relationship. When it comes to the latter, the features of the 
policy network as a mechanism of collective action require the function of network 
management and the committee staff are allowed the possibilities of being 
network manager. 
Interdependence 
The causes of interdependence between actors during the policy process are 
summarised into several phenomena in modern society. The first one is 
fragmentation. Modern society and government is characterised by functional 
differentiation and professionalization (Jordan and Richardson, 1983, pp.604-605; 
Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.34; Rhodes, 1986a, pp.37-40; 1986b, pp.18-20; 
1992, p.3). The differentiation is also happening between central and local 
authorities. These functional and territorial fragmentations dilute the capacity of 
the centre and disaggregate it into networks of actors with specialised capacity 
related to specific policy problems, which brings about the rise of organized actors 
and increases their participation in the policy process (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992, 
p.166; Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.34). Secondly, the interdependency and 
complexity of modern social and political affairs make it difficult for one or a few 
actors to cope with or solve policy problems (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992. p.165; 
Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.36). Information and expertise becomes important 
in dealing with those affairs. 
Thirdly, the role of the central government has changed. The function of central 
government is being ‘hollowed out’ upwards to international organisations, 
downwards to special-purpose bodies and outwards to agencies (Rhodes, 1997a, 
pp.17-19). The feature of the executive branch of central government is 
summarised in the term ‘core executive’ which conducts the function of 
coordinating and policing individual policy networks (Rhodes, 1997a, pp.13-15). 
Finally, the boundaries between public and private sectors are becoming blurred 
(Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.35). Rhodes (1997b, p.48) points to marketization 
as one of the causes of the phenomenon, stating that mechanisms of 
marketization such as contracting out or special agencies facilitate the formation 
of interdependent relationships. 
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The basic features of the interdependency are well summarized in the following 
propositions of the power dependence model in Rhodes (1981/1999; 1986a): 
1. Any organization is dependent upon other organizations for resources. 
2. In order to achieve their goals, the organizations have to exchange 
resources. 
3. Although decision making within the organization is constrained by other 
organizations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The 
appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences which relationships 
are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought. 
4. The dominant coalition employs strategies within the known rules of the 
game to regulate the process of exchange. 
5. Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the 
relative power potential of interacting organizations. This relative power 
potential is a product of the resources of each organization, of the rules of the 
game and of the process of exchange between organizations (Rhodes, 
1986a, p.17; 1999, pp.78-79, emphasis in original). 
The core mechanism of interdependence is resource dependence. Resources 
in the policy process include authority, money, political support, legitimacy, 
information and expertise, organisational resources and compliance in policy 
implementation (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.41; Rhodes, 1986a, p.18; Van 
Waarden, 1992, p.31). These resources are dispersed among policy actors and 
no one actor (including governments) monopolises all the resources necessary 
in the policy process (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.36; Van Waarden, 1992, 
p.31). To achieve their goals in the policy process, policy actors need to interact 
with each other to exchange or transact resources that they want (Klijn, 1997, 
p.22; Van Waarden, 1992, p.31). Governments also become dependent upon the 
cooperation of other actors which are not under their control and need to mobilise 
their policy resources (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, p.36).  
In these interactions, power is based on the possession of resources and the 
forms of resource transactions (Klijn, 1997, p.22; Smith, 1993, p.59). Smith (1993, 
p.72) succinctly states that ‘actors have power if they have resources that can be 
exchanged and so actor A is dependent on actor B for particular resources.’ In 
addition, the interactions create interdependent relationships between policy 
actors and institutionalise the network structure in which actors from different 
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decision levels and organisations formulate complex constellations involving 
dispersed resource distribution (Hanf and O’toole, 1992, p.166; Kenis and 
Schneider, 1991, p.27, 41; Klijn, 1997, p.22; Van Waarden, 1992, p.31). 
Due to this interdependence, the policy process in the policy network has 
different characteristics than that from traditional perspectives. Policy processes 
are complex interaction processes between different actors where there is no 
clear authority structure (Klijn, 1996, pp.104-106). The special status of public 
bodies is not emphasised (de Bruijn and Ringeling, 1997, pp.156-157). Thus, the 
policy process has the feature of collective action in which the necessity of 
consultation, negotiation, cooperation and coordination arises (Jordan and 
Richardson, 1983, pp.606-609; Marin and Mayntz, 1991a, p.18; Van Waarden, 
1992, p.31). Governments have to adopt the strategies of negotiation and 
cooperation because many policy issues are dealt with in arenas where there is 
no single actor having the power of unilateral action (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992, 
p.166; Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, pp.40-43). Policy problems and solutions 
are not imposed by governments, but formed during the policy process (Klijn, 
1996, p.106). Jordan and Richardson (1983, p.604) call this new administrative 
style ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ and ‘logic of negotiation’ as reviewed above. 
In the interdependent situation, interactions between actors have game-like 
features (Klijn, 1996, p.98; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, pp.440-441; Klijn 
and Teisman, 1997, pp.99-105; Marin and Mayntz, 1991a, p.18; Rhodes, 1986a, 
p.18; 1997a, p.53). The game is based on trust and rules agreed by actors 
(Rhodes, 1997a, p.53), but actors in the policy network have different resources, 
interests, perceptions and orientations (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992, p.166). They 
employ strategies which they think suffice their preferences and minimize their 
dependence on other players, making use of their own resources (Rhodes, 1986a, 
p.18). The results of interactions for an actor are affected not only by his/her own 
strategies, but by other actors’ strategies (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992, p.166; Klijn, 
1996, p.99). Thus, the process is unpredictable (Klijn, 1996, p.99; Klijn, 
Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.441). 
In such game-like situations, the perceptions of actors are important to the 
results of the game (Benson, 1982, p.148; Klijn and Teisman, 1997, p.102). This 
is because their perceptions affect the strategies which they choose; the results 
of the game which they expect from the strategies; and their own assessments 
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of the results (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.440; Klijn and Teisman, 
1997, p.102). One of the important points is that the perceptions of actors in the 
game are socially constructed (Benson, 1982, p.148; Klijn, 1996, p.99; Klijn and 
Teisman, 1997, p.102; Termeer and Koppenjan, 1997, p.83). Relevant to the 
game are the socially constructed perceptions of actors formed during the 
interaction process (Klijn, 1996, p.99; Klijn and Teisman, 1997, p.102). 
Network Management 
The interdependent feature of the policy network demands network 
management. This is because the game-like situation in the policy network brings 
about the collective action problem which demands that actors in the network 
cooperate (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, pp.41-42). In addition, the problem is 
exacerbated because it is likely that there is no official actor in the policy network 
in charge of network management (Klijn and Teisman, 1997, p.105). In these 
situations, the success of the policy network in achieving the joint interest of 
actors is correlated with the ability of inducing the actors to cooperate and, in turn, 
managing joint problem-solving activities (Hanf and O’Toole, 1992, pp.167, 172). 
Network management is a way of facilitating actors to cooperate in these 
situations. According to Kickert and Koppenjan (1997, p.44), network 
management is defined as ‘promoting the mutual adjustment of the behaviour of 
actors with diverse objectives and ambitions with regard to tackling problems 
within a given framework of inter-organizational relationships.’ The aims of 
network management are coordinating actors with different interests and 
orientations to a policy issue and enhancing the joint problem solving ability of a 
policy network (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997b, p.10; Kickert and Koppenjan, 
1997, p.45). Thus, facilitating negotiation and consultation between actors is one 
of the foci of network management (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, p.44).  
In this regard, the network management has different features from the 
traditional public management. According to Rhodes (1997b, p.48), managing 
networks ‘is game-like, employs an indirect style of management, needs 
strategies rooted in trust, and uses the art of rhetoric or argument, debate and 
persuasion’. It is related to adjusting conditions of the network to induce 
successful interaction (Klijn, 1996, p.106). It tries to find a new goal; to mediate 
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between actors; and, in turn, to facilitate interactions between them (Kickert, Klijn 
and Koppenjan, 1997c, p.167). 
There are many studies about specific tasks or activities of network 
management (e.g. Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997; Klijin, 1996; Klijn, Koppenjan 
and Termeer, 1995; Klijn and Teisman, 1997; O’Toole, 1997; Painter, Isaac-
Henry and Rouse, 1997). This thesis introduces the classification of Klijn, 
Koppenjan and Termeer (1995) because it systemises the strategies of network 
management according to the level of management (game and network) and 
components of a network (actors, resources, rules and perceptions) and is the 
base for a couple of other classifications (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997; Klijn and 
Teisman, 1997). Table 5.1 is the classification. 
Table 5.1. Classification of network management strategies 
Components 
 
Level of 
management 
Actors Resources Rules Perceptions 
Game 
management 
Selective 
activation 
Mobilizing 
resources 
Anticipating 
rules 
Compromising 
and joint 
imaging 
formation 
Network 
Structuring 
Changing 
relations 
between actors 
Changing the 
distribution of 
resources 
Changing the 
rules 
Changing 
norms, values 
and perceptions 
Source: adjusted from Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer (1995, p.442) 
 
  Game management is related to the interactions between actors in a given 
network (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, p.46; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, 
p.442; Klijn and Teisman, 1997, p.105). Selective activation means the act of 
including or excluding of actors in the interaction (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 
1995, p.444). Mobilizing resources refers to bringing in or selecting policy 
resources of actors (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.445). Recognising 
rules is important because transgression of rules in a network can damage the 
relations between actors (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.445). Managing 
perceptions including negotiations about actors’ goals, changing actors’ 
preferences and reframing policy issues can be necessary to achieve policy 
objectives (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.446). Network structuring is 
related to the improvement of the policy network itself (Kickert and Koppenjan, 
1997, p.46-47; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.442; Klijn and Teisman, 
1997, p.105). The strategies of network structuring are also categorised by the 
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components of the network (changing relations between actors; changing the 
distribution of resources; changing the rules; and changing norms, values and 
perceptions). 
Actors who conduct the function of network management play the roles of a 
network manager. Network managers play the roles of mediator, process 
manager and network builder (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997b, p.11; Klijn, 
1996, p.106). The role has the features of facilitation rather than those of central 
control (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.441). The abilities and skills 
required of a network manager include those of negotiation or mediation; a certain 
amount of expertise; impartiality and independence; and other actors’ 
acknowledgement of the network manager’s legitimacy (Kickert and Koppenjan, 
1997, p.58). 
Although public actors are likely to be suited to conduct the function of network 
management, the possibility of network managers who are not public actors is 
not excluded (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, p.60-61; Klijn, Koppenjan and 
Termeer, 1995, pp.441-442). Every actor active in the policy process can conduct 
the function of network management (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997c, p.168), 
and the function can be conducted by many actors at the same time (Klijn, 1996, 
p.105; Klijn and Teisman, 1997, p.105). The role can even be played by actors 
outside the policy network if they conduct the function of mediation (Klijn, 1996, 
p.105; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.441-442). Needless to say, the 
possibilities of playing the role of network manager become different for each 
actor according to the resources and capabilities of the actor (Klijn, 1996, p.105). 
Moreover, network managers have their own interests and goals in their 
management activities (Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.442). 
Because the necessity of network management is derived from the collective 
action problem that a policy network faces in pursuing the joint interests of actors, 
one of the criteria evaluating network management is whether it enhances 
cooperation between actors and achieves their joint interests (Kickert, Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 1997b, p.9; 1997c, p.175; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995, p.450; 
Klijn and Teisman, 1997, p.113-115). In addition to the substantive criteria, 
procedural criteria including openness of interaction and securing democratic 
legitimacy also are used (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997c, p.174). According 
to Kickert and Koppenjan (1997, pp.53-58), the extent to which network 
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management is successful depends on diverse factors: the number of actors; 
diversity within networks; the closed nature of networks; conflict of interest; costs 
of network management; political and social context; leadership and commitment 
power; and capabilities and skills of network managers. 
   5.2.4. Key concepts of the capabilities of MPs and the committee staff in the 
scrutiny of government law bills in the legislature of South Korea 
The legislative process in the South Korean National Assembly has the following 
feature of interdependence due to resource dependency. Important resources in 
the process include legitimacy, official authority, political skills, knowledge about 
the legislative process, technical knowledge about legislation, policy expertise, 
resources and tools to implement the bill, compliances when the bill is 
implemented and public opinion which supports the bill. These resources are 
dispersed among policy actors in the legislative process. MPs of the committee 
in charge of the bill under scrutiny have legitimacy, official authority, and political 
knowledge and skills to pass the bill. Committee staff members have knowledge 
about the legislative process, technical knowledge about legislation and a certain 
level of policy expertise. The executive, including relevant departments, has 
policy expertise and resources to implement the bill such as organisations, 
budget and incentives to secure compliance of policy target groups. Interest 
groups have knowledge about the field where the policy is implemented; powers 
to influence the political support for MPs and the executive; and tools to secure 
the compliance of stakeholders who are members of their group. Experts such as 
academics have policy expertise. Finally, journalists have the ability to affect 
public opinion on the bill. 
Therefore, the actors who can enter a policy network in the legislative process 
may include MPs, committee staff members, civil servants in the executive, 
interest groups, experts and journalists. Each actor can move in and out of a 
policy network according to the importance of resources which it has for the 
legislative process and their own interests in the scrutiny of the bill, and these 
factors are affected by attributes of the issue and policy related to the bill. 
However, MPs, committee staff members and civil servants in the sponsoring 
department are basic indispensable members of the policy network which 
scrutinises a government law bill. Each actor cannot monopolise all resources 
necessary in the legislative process, so the relationship between actors becomes 
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interdependent. Thus, the cooperation and coordination between actors become 
important. The importance is emphasised when it is considered that it is likely 
that there is no official who manages the legislative process and the network. 
Consultation, linking and brokering, mediation and negotiation should be 
conducted to achieve the joint interests of actors in the network during the 
legislative process. 
The capabilities of MPs and committee staff members in the network of the 
legislative process are derived from the resources they have. MPs of the 
committee have the official power of the scrutiny of bills from their legitimacy and 
official authority. Bills cannot be enacted without their decision in the legislative 
process, and their comments on bills under scrutiny are perceived more seriously 
than those of any other actor. Moreover, they can mobilise their political 
knowledge and skills to affect a bill’s fate, and the fact itself that an MP’s tactics 
can influence the legislative path of a bill can allow a favourable environment for 
the MP in the legislative game through the anticipated reactions of other actors. 
This capability can be constrained by other actors, however. MPs may not 
ignore the opinions of the sponsoring department because they have resources 
to implement the policy contained in the bill under scrutiny.  In addition, they may 
have administrative resources to affect the interests of MPs’ constituencies or 
constituents. Interest groups have the capacity to mobilise political support for 
MPs or their parties. Negative comments from actors who have policy expertise 
or who can affect public opinion – committee staff members, the sponsoring 
department, the media and academia – can damage the legitimacy of and support 
for the legislation of a bill. Even consent from other MPs may also be necessary 
due to their legitimacy and official authority. Therefore, unilateral actions made 
by an MP or a group of MPs may not be easy in the usual legislative process as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
Committee staff members have knowledge about the legislative process, 
technical knowledge about legislation and a certain level of policy expertise. The 
resources of committee staff members can allow them to occupy the position of 
information channel among actors in the legislative process. The sponsoring 
department and interest groups are in need of knowledge about the legislative 
process and technical knowledge about legislation that committee staff members 
have. They may exchange the knowledge with the policy expertise and 
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knowledge about the policy field where the policy is implemented. MPs are in 
need of advice about the policy aspect and technical support in the scrutiny of 
legislation from the committee staff members. This information exchange can 
locate the committee staff in the centre of the information channel surrounding 
the legislative process. The committee staff can have policy impact through the 
provision of information that can change the perceptions of other policy actors. 
As in the case of MPs, however, their capabilities can be restrained by other 
actors. First of all, the committee staff do not have legitimacy and official authority. 
They have to persuade MPs to amend a bill as they wish. In addition, other actors 
may not respect their opinions in the legislative process where conflict among 
actors is fierce. On top of that, the committee staff can be in a sort of competition 
with the sponsoring department or other actors in provision of policy expertise. If 
their information or analysis on a policy is different from that of the sponsoring 
department or other actors, they may have the risk that the validity of their 
information or analysis is checked. In this regard, the committee staff may have 
to secure cooperation from other policy actors in their support and preparation for 
the legislative process. 
One more important point to be mentioned is that the necessity of network 
management may allow the committee staff the possibility of being network 
manager. This is because of their neutrality, knowledge and expertise and status 
as employees of the legislature. Different from other major policy actors (MPs, 
the executive and interest groups), they are non-partisan and have no political 
stake in the enactment of a bill, which enables them to play the role of ‘honest 
broker’ (Scharpf, 1997, p.145). They occupy the position of information channel 
among policy actors due to their knowledge in legislation, the legislative process 
and policy matters, and are in favourable positions in the channel to provide links 
between actors. They are in charge of working-level legislation, which imposes 
on them the responsibility of managing the legislative process that other actors 
do not take.  
One caveat of the committee staff as network manager in the legislative process 
should be considered, however. The caveat is that the committee staff do not 
have official authority of arbitration. They are not elected representatives. This 
caveat suggests a couple of qualifications. The first is that their network managing 
can be limited to low level. It is likely to be only parts of those in the game 
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management of Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer (1995). They may not have the 
capabilities of changing network structure. The second is that the level of conflict 
among actors can affect their network managing function. If the situation has 
zero-sum characteristics or the stake in the legislative process is big, the conflict 
among actors would be fierce. In that situation, the committee staff may have no 
ability of conducting network management, or their network managing may have 
limited effect in the legislative process. 
 
5.3. New-institutionalism 
  5.3.1. The three branches of new-institutionalism: rational choice, normative 
and historical institutionalism 
New institutionalism pays its attention to the institution as an important 
independent variable in political interaction (Peters, 2012; Rothstein, 1996; 
Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Differently to old institutionalism, new institutionalism 
includes informal norms and traditions which affect political interaction in the 
institution and attempts to explain the relationship between the institution and 
political behaviour (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012, pp.19-20). In this thesis, 
rational choice, normative and historical institutionalism are introduced. 
Rational choice institutionalism 
From the perspective of rational choice institutionalism, the major actors in the 
political process are individuals and they behave to maximise their own utilities 
(Peters, 2012, p.51). To achieve their individual goals, the actors attempt to utilise 
institutions (Peters, 2012, p.55) and behave in a highly strategic manner (Hall 
and Talyor, 1996, pp.944-945). Institutions are perceived as rules and incentives 
setting parameters on actors’ behaviours (Peters, 2012, p.48). They are ‘humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990, p.3). They 
structure strategic social interaction; transform actors’ payoffs; enforce 
cooperation; and induce more desirable outcomes of social interaction (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, p.945; Peters, 2012, p.50; Rothstein, 1996, p.149; Weingast, 2002, 
pp.661, 670).  
In rational choice institutionalism, the preferences of each individual are the 
criteria for evaluating their own utilities. Thus, preferences become an important 
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motivation of an individual actor, and the social role an actor plays is attributed to 
the motivations of the actor (Dowding and King, 1995 pp.1, 15). From this 
perspective, however, preferences tend to be given and exogenous (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, p.944; Peters, 2012, p.180; Rothstein, 1996, pp.147-148). 
Individuals have a fixed set of preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.944), but the 
rational choice theory itself seems not to answer the question of how the 
preferences are formed or where they come from (Pierson, 2004, p.60; Rothstein, 
1996, p.148). 
Rational choice institutionalism has strength in explaining individual actors’ 
strategic interaction based on given capabilities and orientations (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, pp.945, 951; Scharpf, 1997, pp.5-6). Considering that the interaction 
among the policy network has the features of game-like interaction in which 
actors move strategically, this advantage is important. In addition, this 
perspective has strength in explaining actors’ self-interested orientations. 
Therefore, in this thesis, rational choice institutionalism is adopted to explain the 
self-interested orientations of the key actors (MPs and committee staff members) 
and how the capabilities and orientations of actors affect interactions among them. 
However, this perspective is based on a narrow assumption of human motivation. 
Thus, the institutional origins of actors’ orientations and how institutions affect 
their formation is explained by other perspectives. 
Normative institutionalism 
From the perspective of normative institutionalism, social actors behave 
according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March, 1996; March and Olsen, 1989; 
1996; 2006). An institution is ‘a relative stable collection of rules and practices … 
roles, identities and belongings, common purposes, and casual and normative 
beliefs’ (March and Olsen, 2006, p.691). The institutions specify the proper action 
for an actor in a specific circumstance (March and Olsen, 1989, p.23; 1996, pp. 
251-252; 2006, p.693), and social actors attempt to grasp the features of the 
circumstance and select proper actions in accordance with the circumstance 
(March, 1996 p.282; March and Olsen, 1989, p.23). The logic of appropriateness 
enforces an actor to oblige to a role in a given circumstance (March and Olsen, 
1989, p.160). 
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One qualification of the logic of appropriateness, however, is that institutions do 
not decide political behaviours although they affect the behaviours (March and 
Olsen, 1996, p.252; 2006, p.693). Components of an institution could be 
ambiguous and contradictory (March and Olsen, 1989, p.38; 2006 p.695). Actors 
may have difficulty in facing the ambiguities and contradiction (March and Olsen, 
1996, p.252; 2006, p.693). Even if they know about what to do, actors may not 
have capabilities to follow the direction (March and Olsen, 1996, p.252; 2006 
p.695). Actors interpret institutions and circumstances in selecting their actions 
(March and Olsen, 1996, p.252). 
In normative institutionalism, preferences are endogenous (March and Olsen, 
1996, p.250; Wildavsky, 1987, p.17). Political institutions form and constitute 
social actors’ identities (March and Olsen, 1996, p. 251; Scharpf, 1997, p.12). 
Social actors are perceived as collections of identities guiding proper behaviour 
in a certain circumstance (March, 1996, p.282). Institutions transform individuals 
into actors bearing social roles (March and Olsen, 2006, p.696; Scharpf, 1997, 
p.61). Actors’ preferences come from the social role that they play (Scharpf, 1997, 
p.61). Thus, social actors behave based on the preferences of socially 
constructed identities that fit with those of larger social units which they belong to 
(Scharpf, 1997, p.12). Therefore, the perspective has strength in explaining 
actors’ orientations which are not self-interested and how institutions affect their 
formation. Therefore, in this thesis, this perspective is adopted for explaining the 
key actors’ (MPs and committee staff members) orientations which are not self-
interested and how institutions affect the formation of those orientations. 
Historical Institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism emphasises the influence of decision making in the 
past. Institutions which include formal organisations and informal rules and 
procedures (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.2) have been built at different times in 
the past and laid in tiers (Orren and Skowronek, 1994 p.323; Rothstein, 1996 
p.152). They are conceived as the legacy of the past and the product of specific 
historical processes (Thelen, 1999, pp.382, 384). Institutions are formed and 
maintained through social contexts and cannot be explained without regard to the 
contexts (Thelen, 1999, p.384). In turn, institutions affect actors and other 
institutions (Orren and Skowronek, 1994, p.325). They give social actors 
prescriptions for their actions providing legitimacy (Skowranek, 1995, p.94). 
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Political institutions are made by other institutions (Orren and Skowronek, 1994, 
p.328). Thus, social and historical contexts affect political actors and politics 
(Pierson, 2004, p.169; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.3). Actors, their strategies 
and the power relations between them are put in their contexts focusing on the 
way the political situations are constructed (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, pp.12-
13). 
One of the most important mechanisms of historical institutionalism is path 
dependence (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.941-942; Levi, 1997; Peters, Pierre and 
King, 2005; Pierson, 2000; 2004; Thelen, 1999). The term refers to the situation 
under which the initial or critical decision making continuously affects the 
following trajectory of a polity because reversal of the trajectory is difficult (Levi, 
1997, p.31; Pierson, 2000, p.252). Pierson (2000; 2004) argues the relevance of 
path dependence in the study of politics by borrowing the logic of increasing 
returns and positive feedback from economics. From the perspective of historical 
institutionalism, it is also important to identify the moment that continuously 
affects the subsequent sequences in the perspective. Collier and Collier (1991) 
conceptualises these moments as ‘critical junctures’. Krasner (1984) terms the 
trajectory that features a big change followed by minor changes as ‘punctuated 
equilibria’. 
In historical institutionalism, preferences are endogenous. Preferences of social 
actors can be based on the institutions, in turn, embedded in a specific historical 
circumstance (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.2). Institutions shape the range 
and substance of preferences (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.4). One of the 
roles of institutions is creating preferences (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, 
p.14). As institutional arrangements are affected by historical processes and 
contexts from the perspective of historical institutionalism, historical processes 
also affect preferences (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.15). Specific social 
contexts can shape actors’ identities and preferences (Pierson, 2004, p.169). The 
institutional contexts form the goal that actors pursue (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 
pp.8-9). In this regard, preferences ‘may … be the product of circumstances and 
institutions’ (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.7). 
If institutional influence on the features of actors and, in turn, the interaction 
among them, is to be thoroughly analysed, the origins of formation of institutions 
are also needed to be traced. The historical institutionalism focusing on the 
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historical contexts surrounding institutions has strength in that tracing. Thus, in 
this thesis, this perspective is adopted in chapter 2 to investigate the origins and 
formation of macro-level institutions in which actors and network are embedded, 
and how historical contexts of South Korea affect the formation of them. 
  5.3.2. Research on MPs’ orientations and key concepts of the orientations of 
South Korean MPs 
One of the early comprehensive studies on the orientations, preferences or 
goals of members of the legislative branch is that of Fenno (1973) on the goals 
of U.S. congressmen/women. He enumerates re-election, influence within the 
House and good public policy as the three primary goals of congressmen/women 
(Fenno, 1973, p.1). Each committee in the House, however, provides different 
opportunities for achieving the goals (Fenno, 1973, p.1), and the behaviours of 
individual congressman/woman in congressional committees are to maximize 
his/her goals within the constraints (Fenno, 1973, Introduction). 
Among Fenno’s triads, the goal treated as the most important one is re-election. 
Mayhew (1974, p.5) asserts that congressmen/women are ‘single-minded 
seekers of re-election’. He lists three activities essential for re-election: 
advertising (attempts to form a positive image among constituents without having 
controversial substance), credit claiming (having relevant actors believe that 
he/she is responsible for making the government, or other units, do favourable 
things for them) and position taking (making statements on affairs which are likely 
to draw the attentions of political actors) (Mayhew, 1974, ch.1). Fiorina (1989, 
p.68) argues that public policy is a by-product of consideration of congressional 
elections. Congressmen/women tend to focus on affairs from which they can get 
credits favourable to their re-election – for instance, federal projects or individual 
favours – instead of broad national public policies (Fiorina, 1989, pp.68-69). This 
assumption of legislators’ orientations to re-election directs many studies on the 
U.S. Congress (e.g. Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002; Carson et al., 2010; 
Cox and McCubbins, 2007; Fiorina, 1982; Krehbiel, 1991; Lazarus, 2010; 
McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Weingast and 
Moran, 1983). 
This approach to MPs’ orientations is from the perspective of rational choice, 
but the research on those of MPs in the British Parliament is from a somewhat 
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different perspective. Searing (1994) examines the role of MPs of the British 
House of commons and identifies four major preference roles of backbenchers: 
policy advocate (checking the executive), parliament men (maintaining 
institutional structures), ministerial aspirants (making ministers) and constituency 
members (redressing grievances). His motivational approach to the roles is 
basically based on the rationality principle, but the preferences of politicians are 
not wholly exogenous because the roles politicians play are constructed around 
institutional situations guiding their proper actions (Searing, 1994, p.18). 
The endogenous characteristics of MPs’ preferences become more explicit in 
Rush’s work (Rush 2001; 2005; Rush and Giddings, 2011). Criticising Searing 
that the different roles of MPs can be played by the same MP and at the same 
time, Rush (2001) identifies three roles of MPs of the British House of Commons 
– a partisan role, a constituency role and a scrutiny role. He derived the change 
in the roles of MPs from the professionalization of MPs that is a change of 
institutional environment. More explicitly, Rush and Giddings (2011, pp.54-58) 
construct a model of parliamentary socialisation connected to normative 
institutionalism in which MPs’ knowledge, values and attitudes are affected by 
political institutions. Maintaining the typology of MPs’ roles in Rush (2001), they 
define legislative socialisation as ‘the process by which newly elected members 
of a legislature become acquainted with the institution’s rules and norms or 
behaviour.’ and identify three types of legislative socialisation – functional 
socialisation, attitudinal socialisation and behavioural socialisation (Rush and 
Giddings, 2011, pp.56-57). 
For the examination of South Korean MPs’ orientations, it seems that research 
on the orientations of British MPs is more relevant than that on the U.S. 
congressmen. First of all, research on the U.S. congressmen is based on a 
somewhat narrow assumption of human motivation. It hypothesises basically 
self-interested men. Constituency activities and policy activities, however, do not 
depend wholly on the calculation of electoral prospect (Rosenblatt, 2006, pp.13-
15; Norton, 2002a, pp.32-33; Yoon, 2000, p.165). On top of that, the research is 
based on the specific institutional contexts of the U.S. Congress. For example, 
relatively weak party discipline is a unique circumstance in the U.S., so American 
literature has given less consideration to party in explaining the orientations of 
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congressmen/women. But, party activity could be an important orientation for 
MPs of a legislature in which party-discipline is strong. 
In this thesis, MPs in the National Assembly of South Korea are seen as having 
three orientations: constituency worker, party politician, and policy watchdog and 
entrepreneur, which are basically based on Rush’s research on the roles of British 
MPs. Similar to the U.K., the major electoral system of the South Korean 
legislature is the first-past-the-post system and party discipline is strong in South 
Korea, which is similar to the British House of Commons. As explained in chapter 
2, the orientations as constituency worker and party politician have been 
strengthened by the dependence of local governments on the central government; 
the confrontation between parties accompanying fierce conflict; and the low re-
election rate of incumbent MPs.  Thus, the orientations are justified. One change 
is made in the scrutiny role. South Korean MPs can introduce their own private 
members’ bills more freely than British MPs as explained in chapter 2. Thus, the 
number of private members’ bills is large and the policy impact of the bills is 
substantive. South Korean MPs have some degree of leeway in making their own 
policies. Needless to say, they also scrutinise government bills and policy, and 
the administration of executive departments. Thus the orientation to the scrutiny 
role is changed into that of policy watchdog and entrepreneur. 
A couple of qualifications are to be added to the discussion about MPs’ 
orientations. One is that the application of Rush’s framework of MPs’ three roles 
does not exclude MPs’ self-interested orientations. The goal of re-election is 
achieved through playing the roles mentioned above. Advertising, credit-claiming 
and position taking in Mayhew (1974) happen in conducting those roles. The 
other is that the orientations have a hierarchical structure in which the scrutiny of 
legislation is given lower priority than other tasks as discussed in chapter 2. 
  5.3.3. Research on the orientations of civil servants and key concepts on the 
orientations of committee staff members in the South Korean National 
Assembly 
Research on the orientations of congressional committee staff in the U.S. is not 
relevant because committee staff members of the South Korean legislature are 
not partisan staff appointed by committee chairs, but non-partisan permanent 
employees of the legislature. Moreover, committee staff members have the legal 
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status of career civil servants in South Korea. Thus, it is necessary to refer to 
research on the orientations or motivations of civil servants. From the perspective 
of rational choice, civil servants are typically perceived as budget maximisers 
(Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971) or bureau shapers (Dunleavy, 1991). Those 
assumptions, however, have no relevance to the committee staff in the legislature 
because they do not have their own programme in need of a large budget; their 
status is not correlated with their budget; and they have no implementation 
responsibilities to delegate to other bureaus. 
Thus, from the perspective of rational choice, this thesis pays its attention to civil 
servants’ motivation for promotion and growth in the organisation. These 
motivations are mathematically formalised in the career-concern model 
(Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999a; 1999b; Dixit, 2002, pp.703-704; Holstrőm, 
1982). The gist of the model is that an agent exerts efforts, even without financial 
incentives, to demonstrate his/her abilities to the principal and labour market to 
achieve future rewards (Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999b, p.201: Dixit, 2002, 
p.703). Holstrőm (1982) states that an agent’s abilities are demonstrated over 
time and the wage in the next period is linked with performance in the current 
period. The feature of the implicit contract can be used to oversee an agent’s 
moral hazard (Holstrőm, 1982, p.177). Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a, 
p.183) argue that the career concerns are more relevant in the public sector 
where explicit financial incentives are limited and difficult to apply. 
According to the career concern model, a good performance enhances the 
reputation of an employee’s ability and job opportunities inside or outside his/her 
organisation (Dewartripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999b, p.201). An employee at the 
early stage of their career is likely to be more affected by career concern and 
make efforts to raise his/her own reputation in the organisation (Dixit, 2002, 
pp.703-704; Holstrőm, 1982, p.177). When it comes to those at the late stage of 
their career, although the implicit incentive in the form of career concern may be 
reduced, they can be incentivised by future employment opportunities outside the 
organisation (Dixit, 2002, p.704). The dynamic model sees the uncertainty due to 
information asymmetry in the principal-agent relationship, not as a problem, but 
as an incentive mechanism. 
The orientations of civil servants, however, are not accounted for wholly by 
career concerns. The organisational culture, norms and socialisation process 
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also affect the orientations from the perspective of normative institutionalism. 
From this perspective, public service motivation (PSM) theory explains the 
orientations of civil servants. PSM refers to altruistic motivation and motivation to 
serve the well-being of a community (Perry and Hondeghem, 2008a, p.6; 2008b, 
p.3; Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999, p.23). It includes altruism and prosocial 
motivation and has institutional grounded features (Perry and Hondeghem, 
2008a, pp.3-6). Dimensions of PSM suggested by research are: attraction to 
public policy making, commitment to the public interest and civic duty, 
compassion and self-sacrifice (Perry, 1996); policy-making, commitment and 
compassion (Coursey and Pandei, 2007); self-sacrifice, commitment to public 
interest and compassion (Coursey et al., 2008). 
According to PSM theory, people working for the public sector are likely to 
inculcate PSM and have a different motivational structure from those in the 
private sector (Brewer and Selden, 1998, p.418; Crewson, 1997; DiIulio, 1994; 
Houston, 2006; Perry and Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982). Moreover, high PSM is 
correlated with high performance. It is more important than wage in raising 
workers’ effort levels (Taylor and Taylor, 2011). People having high PSM are 
likely to demonstrate high performance, job commitment and job satisfaction 
(Brewer and Selden, 1998; Naff and Crum, 1999; Perry and Wise, 1990; Taylor, 
2007). They also show high levels of commitment to their organisations and tend 
to remain with their organisations (Naff and Crum, 1999; Perry and Wise, 1990; 
Taylor, 2007). 
The linkage between PSM and normative institutionalism can be found in the 
research on the origin of PSM. PSM is derived from institutions bearing values, 
norms, rules and external expectations (Perry and Vandenabeele, 2008, p.71; 
Vandenabeele, 2007, p.551). Institutions shape individuals’ identities by 
socialisation, social identification, culture and social learning (Perry and 
Vandenabeele, 2008, pp.60-62). Therefore, according to Perry and 
Vandenabeele (2008, p.73), ‘individuals are social creatures’. Thus, institutional 
contexts and individual identities are linked (Perry, 2000 p.481). Through this 
mechanism, the values and norms borne in public institutions are transmitted into 
individuals’ identities in public organisations (Moynihan and Pandey, 2007, p.41; 
Vandenabeele, 2007, p.551; 2008, p.145). Preferences and motivations are 
formed from the identities (Perry, 2000, pp.477-478; Perry and Vandenabeele, 
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2008), so preferences are endogenous. When it comes to public organisations, 
individuals in the public sector are likely to be public service motivated due to the 
public values borne in the institutions (Vandenabeele, 2011, p.90). Many 
empirical studies on PSM demonstrate the relationship between institutional 
factors and PSM (e.g. Camilleri, 2007; DiIulio, 1994; Kjeldsen and Jacobsen, 
2013; Moynihan and Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997; Vandenabeele, 2011). The 
above discussion is in line with the normative institutionalism of March and Olsen 
(1989; 1995; 1996; 2006). 
From the discussion so far, this thesis sees committee staff members in the 
South Korean legislature, permanent employees of the institution, as having 
orientations based on career concern and PSM. To be specific, they are seen as 
having orientations to promotion or career concern; participation in making public 
policy; commitment to public interest; and conformity to institutional norms. The 
first one is derived from the career concern model and justified by the permanent 
status of their employment. Junior staff members may have incentives to 
construct a good reputation about their abilities which is helpful for their career in 
the organisation. The motivation can be relevant even to senior staff members, 
as discussed in chapter 8, because their reputation among MPs and other policy 
actors can be important in their promotion and affect their employment by outside 
organisations after their retirement from the staff organisation.  
Orientations from the second to the fourth are basically derived from PSM 
literature and normative institutionalism. For the second one, as a staff member 
in an important policy institution, motivation to participate in the policy process is 
natural for a committee staff member in the South Korean legislature. When it 
comes to the third one, differently from those in the U.S. congress, they have no 
incentive in promoting specific partisan policies. Thus, they can have leeway to 
advise MPs from a politically neutral position and have a commitment to public 
polices which they think are desirous for the public interest. Finally, they are 
expected to follow institutional norms. In particular, the norms that are important 
to committee staff members in a legislature are anonymity, limited advocacy and 
deference to MPs (Patterson, 1970, pp.29-31). In addition, political neutrality and 
impartiality are required of them because they are non-partisan staff. 
  5.3.4. The necessity of analysis of historical contexts which surround 
institutions affecting actor and network 
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The macro-level institutions affecting both actors and networks are not shaped 
in a vacuum. As discussed above, their formation is under the influence of the 
historical legacy from the perspective of historical institutionalism. Thus, if the 
analysis of the features of actors and networks affecting interaction among policy 
actors are to be thorough, the processes through which the macro-level 
institutions are moulded and affected by historical contexts have to be analysed. 
This consideration for dynamic historical contexts is found in works making efforts 
to juxtapose rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism (e.g. 
Grief and Laitin, 2004; Katznelson and Weingast, 2005; Levi, 1997; Bates et al., 
1998). 
Among those attempts, analytic narratives (Levi 1997; Bates et al., 1998) are 
basically based on the premise of the rational choice perspective. This approach, 
however, also emphasises a deep understanding of institutions surrounding the 
research topic (Levi, 1997, p.31). The institutions are derived from the legacy of 
the past, so the temporal processes affecting institutions are important and 
particular events in the past could trigger the processes (Levi, 1997, p.28). Thus, 
the concept of path dependence is also important in Levi’s rational choice theory 
in historical analysis. She uses the metaphor of a tree to explain the concept: 
When climbing a tree consisting of many branches and sub-branches, a climber 
is likely to follow the branch that he/she starts (Levi, 1997, p.28). 
The importance of historical contexts in forming social actors’ preferences is 
emphasised in Katznelson and Weingast (2005). Preferences are induced by 
institutions that are embedded in historical contexts (Katznelson and Weingast, 
2005). Institutions are shaped from historical processes and perceived as 
historical products linking the times of upheavals and routines (Katznelson and 
Weingast, 2005, p.7, 15). In turn, social actors are embedded in the institutions 
that affect their identities (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.4). Institutions 
mould beliefs and values and affect social actors’ preferences (Katznelson and 
Weingast, 2005, p.14). Through this process, institutions mediate social actors 
and historical processes (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.7), and preference 
can be affected by historical contexts (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p.15). 
From the above discussion, the necessity of a historical approach to trace the 
origin of institutions affecting actors and networks is justified. The historical 
approach is in line with process tracing as an analytical tool (Collier, 2011). For 
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the purpose of this thesis, the historical contexts of South Korea surrounding 
parliamentary politics and bureaucracy are analysed in chapter 2. The contexts 
include the confrontation with North Korea; experiences of military authoritarian 
regime from 1960s to 1980s; construction of a political and administrative system 
appropriate for rapid economic development; the democratisation process from 
the late 1980s; and the advent and domination of regionalism in elections as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 
5.4. Summary and Conclusion 
From the above discussion, a theoretical framework based on the reciprocal 
relationships between actor, network, macro-level institutions and interactions 
between actors is constructed. It is also considered that institutions are affected 
by historical contexts. The policy network perspective and new institutionalism 
are useful perspectives for the analysis of the relationships among those 
elements in the framework. In particular, although the policy network perspective 
in the British context began emasculating Parliament as an important policy actor, 
this thesis tries to exploit the policy network perspective claiming that the 
legislative process in the legislature can be conceived as the locus of the policy 
network and that actors in the legislature can be important policy actors. 
To be specific, the policy network perspective is employed to analyse the 
mechanism through which the features of network affect capabilities of actors and 
interactions among them. Rational choice institutionalism is applied to analyse 
the orientations of actors and the mechanism through with the features of actors 
affect interactions among them. Normative institutionalism is adopted to analyse 
the influence of macro-level institutions on the orientations of actors. Historical 
institutionalism is exploited in analysis of the influence of historical contexts on 
macro-level institutions. The theoretical framework and perspectives are 
succinctly depicted in Figure 5.2 (the same figure as figure 1.1). 
Key concepts of the features of the policy network and key actors (MPs and 
committee staff members) in the South Korean legislative process and the 
historical contexts surrounding the process are derived in the application of the 
theoretical framework and perspectives. When it comes to the network, 
interdependence due to resource dependence and network management are 
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Figure 5.2. Theoretical framework and perspectives 
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derived as key concepts. The resource dependence defines actors’ capabilities. 
MPs have the official power of scrutiny and are allowed a favourable environment 
to reflect their own positions in the legislative process from legitimacy, official 
authority and political knowledge and skills to pass the bill. The committee staff 
have informational power from knowledge about the legislative process, technical 
knowledge about legislation and a certain level of policy expertise. They are also 
allowed the possibilities of conducting network management function at a low 
level due to the necessity of network management. 
For the orientations of MPs and committee staff members, the analysis sees 
that MPs have orientations as constituency worker, party politician, and policy 
watchdog and entrepreneur in which the scrutiny of legislation is given lower 
priority than other tasks. Committee staff members are seen as having the 
motivations of promotion or career concern, participation in making public policy, 
commitment to public interest and conformity to institutional norms (anonymity, 
limited advocacy, deference to MPs and political neutrality). When it comes to the 
historical contexts, as already discussed in chapter 2, key concepts include the 
confrontation with North Korea; experiences of military authoritarian regime from 
1960s to 1980s; construction of a political and administrative system appropriate 
for rapid economic development; the democratisation process since 1987; and 
the advent and domination of regionalism in elections. Those key concepts are 
summarised in Table 5.2. 
So far, the theoretical framework and key concepts to analyse the role, function 
and impact of the committee staff members in the South Korean legislature are 
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derived from the discussions in this chapter. The next necessary step is to set a 
research strategy to collect and analyse empirical data for the analysis. This work 
is to be done in the next chapter. 
Table 5.2. Key concepts in the thesis 
Features of network affecting actors and interactions among them in the 
legislative process 
Network 
- Interdependence due to resource dependence 
- The necessity of network management 
 
Resources and capabilities of key actors (derived from the features of network) 
MPs 
 
o Resources 
  - Legitimacy 
  - Official authority 
  - Political knowledge and skills 
o Capabilities 
  - The official power of scrutiny 
  - Being allowed a favourable environment to reflect their own 
positions 
Committee 
staff members 
o Resources 
  - Knowledge about the legislative process 
  - Technical knowledge about legislation 
  - A certain level of policy expertise 
o Capabilities 
- Informational power 
- Being allowed the possibilities of network managing 
 
Orientations of key actors affected by macro-level institutions (from the 
perspective of rational choice and normative institutionalism) 
MPs 
- Constituency worker 
- Party politician 
- Policy watchdog and entrepreneur 
Committee 
staff members 
- Promotion or career concern 
- Participation in making public policy 
- Commitment to the public interest 
- Conformity to institutional norms (anonymity, limited 
advocacy, deference to MPs and political neutrality) 
 
Historical contexts affecting the evolution of institutions surrounding the 
legislative process 
- Confrontation with North Korea 
- Experiences of military authoritarian regime from 1960s to 1980s 
- Construction of political and administrative system appropriate for rapid 
economic development 
- Democratisation process from late 1980s 
- The advent and domination of regionalism in elections 
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6. Methodology: the Collection and Analysis of Empirical Data 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain methods used to collect and analyse 
empirical data in this study. One fundamental difficulty of empirical investigation 
of the role and impact of the committee staff is that they are basically invisible 
actors in the legislative process. As we reviewed in chapter 4, the norms of the 
legislative staff require of them low visibility. They usually play their role behind 
the scenes. For example, lots of work has to be done in advance to table a bill at 
the committee and subcommittee meetings. These activities of committee staff 
members are not seen through observing the official legislative process. The way 
in which staff members work makes studying them difficult. In this regard, 
researchers studying the legislative staff have difficulties in gathering explicitly 
observable evidence. Thus, studying a small number of cases and surveying or 
interviewing staff members, MPs or other participants in the legislative process 
have been the main methods to analyse staff impact in their research. 
Fortunately, the problem of invisibility is alleviated, although not solved entirely, 
in the case of South Korean committee staff because they can present their 
opinions on bills in the form of the review report and the document for the 
subcommittee’s examination at the committee and subcommittee meetings 
respectively, and speak under the permission of the chair at the meetings as 
explained in chapters 2 and 3. Their amendment opinions on bills can be found 
in the documents. Thus, it is possible to get observable data about how many of 
their opinions are reflected in the legislative process.  When it comes to their 
impact, the comparison between their opinions and real amendments to bills is 
possible. Therefore, it is possible to employ one of the methods to analyse the 
impact of a policy actor in the legislative process – the amendment analysis 
discussed in Russell and Benton (2009). 
However, the amendment analysis is not perfect for the purpose of this thesis. 
First of all, the analysis cannot give answers about the role of the committee staff 
outside the official legislative process. As mentioned above, most of the 
committee staff’s work is done outside the official legislative process. No official 
document demonstrates the process by which they form their own opinions on 
bills and prepare the committee or subcommittee meetings. Analysing official 
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documents does not demonstrate how they work. On top of that, even for the 
evaluation of their impact, the method is imperfect. The behaviour of the 
committee staff could be affected by their perceptions or predictions of the actions 
of other actors (especially those of MPs) in the legislative process, as the ‘law of 
anticipated reactions’ (Beetham, 2013, p.45; Norton, 2013, p.6) explains. For 
example, the amendment opinions of the committee staff would be suggested 
after their expectations about the reactions of MPs, the sponsoring department 
or interest groups were formed. Those expectations are not analysed through 
official documents. 
Therefore, it is necessary to ask staff members themselves about their working 
process and their own perceptions in doing their job. An interview strategy 
enhances understanding of experiences which the researcher did not take part in 
(e.g. professionals’ working experiences); provides good descriptions about 
social and political processes; and enables researchers to investigate personal 
perceptions or orientations (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, pp.3-4). In this thesis, the 
interview method is useful for investigating working experiences of committee 
staff members which are deeply embedded in political contexts and affected by 
their orientations. The statements by committee staff members about their own 
working lives enable a deep examination of their role and impact, especially the 
mechanism that induces their participation in the legislative process. 
The analysis on the interview data and the amendment analysis mentioned 
above, however, are not likely to provide detailed and specific descriptions of 
individual legislative processes and the role and impact of committee staff 
members in the processes. Thus, a complementary legislative case study (the 
number of cases is four) is conducted in this thesis. Although case study research 
has weaknesses in generalizability and causal inference (King, Keohane and 
Verba, 1994, pp.210-211; Maggetti, Gilardi and Radaeli, 2013, p.67, p.130), it 
can provide detailed and specific description (Gerring, 2004, pp.347-348). In this 
thesis, the case study provides vivid observation of specific legislative processes 
which is difficult to obtain from the aggregate data from statistics about 
amendments or interviews with committee staff members. 
Therefore, the major research methods are interview, amendment analysis and 
legislative case study. The following sections discuss methodological issues in 
using these research methods and describe the processes of collecting and 
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analysing empirical data. The strengths and weaknesses of each research 
strategy are discussed. The descriptions of the research process are as detailed 
as possible to secure transparency (for the necessity of transparency, see 
Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003, p.84; Kvale, 1996, pp.255-256; Rubin and Rubin, 
2005, pp.76-77; Silverman, 2013, pp.352-355). The sections are in the order of 
interview, amendment analysis and legislative case study. 
 
6.2. Interview Research 
  6.2.1. Strengths and weaknesses of interview research 
There are several strengths of the interview research strategy. First of all, as 
stated in the introduction of this chapter, the interview strategy provides 
researchers with a way to investigate working lives (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.3). 
Thus, the interview enables researchers to see behind the scenes. In this thesis, 
interviews with committee staff members can capture their own working 
experiences. On top of that, the interview can inform policy actors’ thoughts, 
beliefs and attitudes directly (Tansey, 2007, p.766). In this thesis, interviews with 
committee staff members can investigate their attitudes and thoughts about 
supporting MPs and committees in the legislative process. This investigation can 
examine staff members’ orientations and assess the impact of anticipated 
reaction of staff members directly. Last but not least, the data obtained from the 
interviews can be used to check the validity of the results from other analyses 
(Tansey, 2007, p.766). Consistent findings from multiple data sources strengthen 
the results of analysis, or different results from various data sources keep the 
researcher from concluding incorrectly. In this thesis, the results from the 
interviews can be used to verify the results of quantitative amendment analysis 
about the impact of the committee staff. 
One limitation of interview research is that respondents may overestimate or 
underestimate their role (Berry, 2002, p.681; Tansey, 2007, p.767). In this 
research, if the questions about committee staff impact in the legislative process 
are asked of the committee staff members themselves, senior staff members are 
likely to minimise their role. It is because they might consider the current 
relationship with MPs and the norm of low visibility. Conversely, needless to say, 
there is also a possibility that committee staff members are more likely to inflate 
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their impact. In particular, junior staff members who start their job as a member 
of committee staff at an early age and have no experience of other work tend to 
regard their work as very important and overstate their role in the legislative 
process. For this reason, answers about their impact in the legislative process 
are compared with the results of amendment analysis. In addition, as stated later, 
senior staff members in the top job in the committee (chiefs of staff) are excluded 
from the sample respondents in the main interviews. Instead, former staff 
members replace them. Junior staff members who have worked for less than 
three years when the interviews are conducted are also excluded from the main 
interviews, but data from pilot interviews with them are exploited when the data 
are coherent with the data from the main interviews. 
  6.2.2. The time schedule of the interview research 
The time schedule of the interview research is as follows: Before conducting the 
main research interviews, pilot interviews were conducted with five committee 
staff members, who have worked for less than three years, from 4th to 7th August 
2015. The main research interviews were conducted from 17th August to 4th 
September 2015 after the improvement of the interview guide and provisional 
coding scheme through the reflection on the results of the pilot interviews. The 
data from the pilot interviews were to be excluded from the analysis at first, but 
the data including meaningful themes and coherent with them from the main 
interviews are included in the analysis. Table 6.1 is the summary of the time 
schedule. 
  6.2.3. Pilot interviews 
The pilot interviews of this research have been conducted with five committee 
staff members who have worked for less than three years. Three of them were 
selected by convenience sampling. One of the interviewees recommended two 
other interviewees (snowball sampling). Three of the interviews were conducted 
through Skype (a videophone application) and the other two interviews were 
conducted through the telephone. The interviews were semi-structured interviews. 
The subjects of the interviews were the role and the function of committee staff; 
the skills and knowledge required for committee staff; the norms and motivations 
of committee staff; factors affecting the role and function of committee staff; and 
the rewards and difficulties. The average time spent in an interview was 70.6  
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Table 6.1. Time schedule of the interview research 
- Pilot interviews 
4th-7th August 
-Sampling pilot interviewees (five interviewees) 
-Contacting pilot interviewees and getting the approval for 
the interview 
4th-7th August -Conducting pilot interviews (through Skype and telephone) 
10th-16th August -Transcribing the interviews 
17th, 18th 
August 
-1st coding 
21st, 22nd 
October 
-2nd coding 
24th October – 
1st November 
-3rd coding 
 (reviewing previous coding and organising the codes) 
  - Main research interviews 
8th, 9th August 
-Sampling main research interviewees (26 interviewees) 
-E-mailing the main research interviewees 
10th, 11th 
August 
-Sampling supplementary interviewees (6 interviewees) 
10th-16th August 
-Contacting interviewees and getting the approval for the 
interview 
17th-27th August -Conducting telephone interviews (21 interviewees) 
31st August –  
4th September 
-Conducting face-to-face interviews (12 interviewees) 
7th-26th 
September 
-Transcribing the interviews 
27th September  
- 7th October 
-1st coding 
8th-23rd October -2nd coding 
24th October – 
1st November 
-3rd coding 
 (reviewing previous coding and organising the codes) 
 
minutes. The longest interview took 107 minutes and the shortest one took 55 
minutes (for the detailed interview guide, see appendix 1.1). 
The researcher improved the interview guide from the results of the coding of 
the pilot interviews. There are three important improvements. First of all, the first 
question (about the role and function of staff) and the fifth question (about the 
factors affecting the role and function of staff during the scrutiny of government 
bills) are merged under one subject to make a natural conversation. On top of 
that, the revised first question focuses on the procedures in the committee and 
subcommittee stages during the legislative process because interviewees in the 
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pilot interviews did not think of other procedures, after bills have passed the 
committee stages, as important. Finally, the question about the actors or 
participants in the legislative process who affect committee staff is added 
because the interviewees think that policy actors affect committee staff members 
and that the roles of committee staff among policy actors (e.g. mediation between 
policy actors) are important. 
  6.2.4. Sampling of the main research interviewees 
The prospective interviewees are former senior committee staff members who 
retired after 2014 (N = 5) and the current committee staff members (except chiefs 
of staff and junior staff members who have worked for less than three years. N = 
141.). The sample framework for the current committee staff members is the 
directory of the National Assembly Secretariat (02/Mar/2015). When it comes to 
the current committee staff members, principally random sampling was 
conducted to secure diversity of samples and 26 interviewees were sampled. Two 
of them were on maternity leave, however. Moreover, five committees out of 17 
committees (Intelligence Committee was excluded because of security reasons) 
had no interviewee after the sampling. Thus, purposive sampling which selected 
one interviewee per each missing committee was conducted within the limits of 
keeping representativeness of gender, position and grade of all staff members. 
In addition, one of the interviewees who had been selected by random sampling 
rejected the interview. Thus, the most similar staff member to the interviewee (in 
the aspects of gender, position, grade and period of service) was sampled 
purposively (n = 6). In addition to the interviewees, all five former senior 
committee staff members were sampled. The researcher contacted sampled 
interviewees and acquired their approval for the research interview via telephone. 
From these 34 interviewees, 33 interviewees have been interviewed. A current 
staff member was not interviewed because of a business trip. Table 6.2 is the 
breakdown of the main research interviewees. 
  6.2.5. Conducting the main research interviews 
Initially, interviews had been planned to be conducted through Skype, but the 
interviewees were reluctant to use Skype because most of them do not know 
how to use the videophone application. Thus, interviews were conducted via 
telephone and face-to-face. 21 participants were interviewed via telephone. The 
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Table 6.2. Frequency distribution of the interviewees according to gender, 
position and grade (except the interviewees for the pilot interviews) 
Category n (in sample) % 
N 
(in population) 
% 
     
Gender     
Male 27 81.8 136 85 
Female 6 18.2 24 15 
     
Position     
Chief of Staff 5 15.2 19 11.9 
Staff Director 4 12.1 18 11.2 
Legislative 
Research 
Counsel 
0 0.0 7 4.4 
Legislative 
Researcher 
24 72.7 116 72.5 
     
Grade     
I 5 15.2 19 11.9 
II 4 12.1 18 11.2 
III 4 12.1 23 14.4 
IV 15 45.6 75 46.9 
V 5 15.2 25 15.6 
 
other 12 participants were interviewed face-to-face in their office rooms in South 
Korea. The interviews were semi-structured interviews. The initial questions for 
each major theme were the same for each interviewee. But, interviewees had 
freedom in answering the initial questions and probes, and follow-up questions 
were adopted according to the answers. The answers were usually similar, 
however. Thus, most interviews could follow the planned interview schedule 
roughly (for a detailed interview guide and typical substances of the main 
interview, see appendix 1.2 and 1.3). The subjects of the interviews included the 
role and function of committee staff; knowledge and abilities for committee staff 
members; norms and motivations of committee staff members; policy actors in 
the legislative process; and the rewards and difficulties in the committee staff 
members’ work. The average time spent in an interview was 59.2 minutes. The 
longest interview took 85 minutes and the shortest one took 23 minutes. 
  6.2.6. Transcribing and coding the interview data 
160 
 
In principle, the interview data were transcribed verbatim, but the routine words 
the interviewer used to indicate that he was listening to the interviewee (yes or 
um) were omitted. It took about four hours to transcribe a one hour interview. The 
pilot interview data were firstly coded through NVivo software. The need for more 
detailed coding was revealed after the initial coding. The coding of the main 
research interview data was conducted after the transcription of the interviews 
had been finished. One interview with a committee staff member of the Special 
committee on Ethics was excluded from the coding because the substance of the 
interview was irrelevant to the role of committee staff in the scrutiny of 
government bills. The main research interview data were firstly coded manually 
using the comment function of Microsoft Word. The coding was conducted in as 
much detail as possible and closely to in vivo coding in Charmaz (2014, p.190). 
A provisional coding structure was set through the first coding. The second coding 
of the pilot and main research interview data was conducted through NVivo 
software after the first coding. The coding produced 1,342 initial codes. Then, the 
created codes were reviewed and organised. Some initial codes were merged 
because they had the same meanings. The codes were organised hierarchically 
and some categorical codes were produced by the organisation. All codes were 
classified into 12 categories demonstrated in Table 6.3. The number of final 
codes is 1,427. 
Table 6.3 Categories in which the final codes are organised 
1. Role of the committee staff 
2. Policy impact of the committee staff 
3. MPs’ orientations 
4. Knowledge and abilities for committee staff members 
5. Norms of committee staff members 
6. Motivations and rewards of the committee staff’s work 
7. Policy actors in the legislative process (policy network) 
8. Factors affecting committee staff members conducting their work 
9. Difficulties in working as a committee staff member 
10. Government bills 
11. Senior committee staff members 
12. Realities in the legislative process in South Korea 
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6.3. Amendment analysis 
  6.3.1. Introduction of and issues in amendment analysis 
If we understand the impact of a policy actor in the legislative process as causal 
relationships in the counterfactual manner of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), 
the question about the impact can be paraphrased as the following: If it were not 
for the actor, how would the result of the examination on a bill change? Thus the 
impact of the actor would be the difference between the substance of a bill when 
the actor participates and those of a bill when the actor does not. If this difference 
were to be measured, a laboratory experiment manipulating the participation of 
the actor would be the best method in principle (Maggetti, Gilardi, and Radaeli, 
2013, pp.49-50). However, this type of experiment is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to conduct in a real research and has its own weaknesses. First of 
all, it is very difficult to have enough number of MPs come together for academic 
research in the midst of their own hectic political lives. Moreover, the subjects 
(MPs) in this experiment could respond to the experiment itself - the so called 
Hawthorne effect (Hoover and Donovan, 2011, p.72). For example, for the 
purpose of this thesis, if MPs think that a strong impact of committee staff in the 
legislative process is not favourable to themselves, they might reject the opinions 
of staff more in the experiment than in the real world. 
One alternative to overcome this difficulty is amendment analysis. The analysis 
is used to examine the significance, acceptance and origins of amendments to 
bills in the legislative process (Russell and Benton, 2009, pp.9-10). The basic 
logic is that a policy actor’s impact is big if amendments initiated by the actor are 
more important and more accepted than those of other actors in the legislative 
process. To take this a step further, inferential statistics are exploited to analyse 
factors affecting the actor’s impact. The analysis strategy is developed from the 
notion that a crude counting of amendments, ignorant of the degree of importance 
and acceptance and origins of them, may induce misunderstandings about a 
policy actor’s impact in the legislative process (Russell and Benton, 2009, pp.6-
7). 
There are many studies about the policy impact of a legislature based on 
delicate quantitative amendment analysis. When it comes to the British 
Parliament, descriptive statistics and regression analysis which consider the 
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significance, acceptance and origin of amendments in the legislative process 
have been exploited to show the policy impact of the legislature and the factors 
affecting it (Russell and Johns, 2007; Russell, Gover and Walter, 2016; Russell 
and Sciara, 2008; Thompson, 2013). Shephard and Cairney (2004, 2005) and 
Cairney (2006) use similar quantitative amendment analysis to analyse the 
impact of the Scottish Parliament. Several studies about the impact of the 
European Parliament and the factors affecting it also exploit similar methods 
(Häge and Kaeding, 2007; Kasack, 2004; Kreppel, 1999; 2002; Tsebelis and 
Kalandrakis, 1999; Tsebelis et al., 2001). 
In this thesis, descriptive statistics and cross tabulation analysis are used to 
demonstrate the impact of the committee staff in the legislative process and 
analyse the factors affecting their impact. The significance, initiators and 
acceptance of amendments to government law bills are classified in the 
descriptive statistics. The relationships among the significance, acceptance, 
initiators and other factors are analysed through the cross tabulation analysis. 
Two caveats of the analysis should be mentioned in advance. The first one is 
that bivariate analysis has the problem of spuriousness. The relationship between 
two variables can be due to other variables omitted in the analysis (Hoover and 
Donovan, 2011, pp.106-110; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, pp.176-182; 
Maggetti, Gilardi and Radaeli, 2013, p.45). This weakness is alleviated in two 
ways. First of all, each cross tabulation analysis attempts to control as many other 
variables as possible. On top of that, the results of the analysis are complemented 
by the interview data. The second caveat is the problem of anticipated reaction. 
As mentioned repeatedly, a committee staff member is likely to suggest 
amendment opinions which are likely to be accepted by other actors (especially 
by MPs). Thus, the analysis of interview data complements the interpretation of 
the results from amendment analysis in this thesis. 
    6.3.2. The aim and time schedule of the amendment analysis 
The aim of the amendment analysis in this research is to analyse the 
significance, acceptance and origins of amendment opinions to government bills 
submitted to the 18th National Assembly of South Korea. The initiator, type and 
degree of acceptance of amendment opinions to government law bills are 
classified in the analysis. The controversy of the bill under scrutiny and the type 
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of policy related to the bill under scrutiny are also classified in the analysis. Before 
conducting the main analysis, a pilot analysis was conducted from 18th November 
to 5th December 2015. There were some modifications in the selection and 
definition of variables and coding criteria after the pilot analysis. The main 
analysis was conducted from 15th December 2015 to 9th February 2016 reflecting 
the modifications. Table 6.4 is the time schedule of the analysis. 
Table 6.4. Time schedule of the amendment analysis 
Date Progress 
17th November -Sampling bills (361 bills from 1,693 bills) 
18th November 
- 5th December 
-Conducting pilot analysis 
-Analysing 40 bills and 110 amendment opinions to them 
8th-13th 
December 
-Modifying the selection and definition of variables 
-Modifying coding criteria 
15th December 
- 9th February 
-Conducting main analysis 
10th – 19th 
February 
-Checking the accuracy and consistency in coding 
 
  6.3.3. Sample bills 
The sampling in the analysis aimed to select 400 bills from 1,693 government 
bills submitted to the 18th National Assembly of South Korea (from 30th May 2008 
to 29th May 2012). The sampling method was random sampling with replacement, 
so there were some duplications in random number. Therefore, the real number 
of sample bills is 361. The breakdown of the sample bills according to the 
committee that scrutinised the bill and final results of the scrutiny is demonstrated 
in table 6.5. In the sample bills, however, there were some bills for making acts 
readable which do not change the substance of acts, but rewrite the acts in plain 
language (n = 76). Those bills were excluded in the analysis. If a bill has the 
character of both a normal bill which changes the substance of an act and a bill 
for making acts readable, only the part that changes the substance of an act and 
the amendments to it were analysed. The final number of bills and amendments 
analysed is 285 and 787 respectively. 
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Table 6.5. Frequency distribution of sample bills by the committees and final 
results 
Category 
n 
(in sample) 
% 
N 
(in population) 
% 
     
Committee     
House Steering 1 0.28 4 0.24 
Legislation and Judiciary 39 10.80 178 10.51 
National Policy 25 6.93 120 7.09 
Strategy and Finance 33 9.14 144 8.51 
Foreign Affairs, Trade 
and Unification 
6 1.66 26 1.54 
National Defence 10 2.77 54 3.19 
Public Administration and Security 37 10.25 195 11.52 
Education, Science 
and Technology 
18 4.99 107 6.32 
Culture, Sports, Tourism, 
Broadcasting and Communication 
17 4.71 70 4.13 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 21 5.82 109 6.44 
Knowledge Economy 51 14.13 183 10.81 
Health and Welfare 14 3.88 95 5.61 
Environment and Labour 35 9.70 142 8.39 
Land, Transportation 
and Marine Affairs 
47 13.02 238 14.06 
Intelligence 2 0.55 4 0.24 
Gender Equality and Family 4 1.11 20 1.00 
Special Committee 1 0.28 4 0.18 
Total 361 100.00 1,693 100.00 
X2(16) = 17.207, p = 0.628 
 
    
Pass 85 23.55 369 21.80 
Pass (amended) 79 21.88 321 18.96 
Included in a committee bill 115 31.86 598 35.32 
Rejected 1 0.28 2 0.12 
Killed 78 21.61 398 23.51 
Withdrawn 3 0.83 5 0.30 
Total 361 100.00 1,693 100.00 
X2(5) = 1.292, p = 0.064 
    
 
  6.3.4. Documents used in the analysis 
Documents used in the analysis include original bills, the review reports of the 
committee staff, the deliberation reports of the committee, the minutes of 
committee and subcommittee meetings, committee bills including the substance 
of sample bills, private members bills intending amendments to sample bills, and 
written amendments submitted to the plenary. Firstly, South Korean MPs usually 
suggest their amendment opinions to a law bill verbally during the scrutiny of the 
bill. Thus, the minutes of committee and subcommittee meetings and the plenary 
are used as the main data sources to identify MPs’ amendment opinions to bills. 
Secondly, committee staff members suggest their amendment opinions in the 
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review report and the document for the subcommittee’s examination of a law bill 
in a written form and present them verbally in the committee and subcommittee 
meetings, but the documents for the subcommittee’s examination are neither 
open to the public nor available to the researcher (the documents are not officially 
stored). Therefore, the minutes of committee and subcommittee meetings are 
used as the main sources to identify committee staff members’ amendment 
opinions, and review reports are used to check the accuracy of the identification. 
  Thirdly, the minutes of committee and subcommittee meetings demonstrate the 
process of the scrutiny of law bills and the deliberation report of a bill contains the 
final substance and clauses of the bill. Therefore, the deliberation reports of 
sample bills as well as the minutes are used to identify the result of the scrutiny. 
Fourthly, if a government bill is included in a committee bill and the government 
bill is amended to reflect the substance of a private members’ bill into the 
committee bill, the committee bill as the final form of the government bill and the 
private members’ bill intending amendments to the government bill are used as 
data sources to identify amendment opinions about the government bill. Finally, 
written amendments submitted to the plenary are also used, although the number 
of the written amendments is only four. 
    6.3.5. Identification of an opinion as an amendment opinion 
It is necessary to establish specific criteria in identifying an opinion in the 
legislative process as an amendment opinion because an amendment opinion, 
as a unit of observation in this research, is usually identified in the minutes of 
committee and subcommittee meetings and does not have the concrete form of 
written documents, except in the cases of private members’ bills intending 
amendments to government bills and written amendments submitted to the 
plenary. Firstly, it would be problematic if all negative opinions about a law bill are 
identified as amendment opinions. It is necessary to establish the criteria of 
required features for an opinion on a bill in order for it to be seen as an 
amendment opinion. Principally, opinions with the particular purpose of changing 
a bill, under consideration of the specific problems of the bill itself, are identified 
as amendment opinions. Simple concerns about operational problems or 
opinions which amend secondary legislations are not identified as amendment 
opinions. In addition, opinions suggesting an amendment which cannot amend a 
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bill (because the opinions are based on explicit misunderstanding of the bill) are 
not identified as amendment opinions. 
Secondly, criteria about how to treat several opinions relating to an identical 
issue are necessary. Principally, the first opinion related to the issue is identified 
as an amendment opinion and other opinions that change the substance of the 
amendment opinion are not identified as an amendment opinion, but conceived 
as revisions to the amendment opinion. There are some cases, however, in which 
subsequent opinions not just change the initial amendment opinion, but extend 
the range of the amendment opinion based on different reasons from those of the 
initial amendment opinions. Such opinions are identified as separate amendment 
opinions. Typical examples of these cases are those in which a policy actor 
suggests a change to a policy of a bill, but another actor suggests the deletion of 
the policy from the bill. 
 There are a couple of things to be mentioned additionally in the identification of 
amendment opinions. Firstly, only opinions which appear in the minutes of 
meetings are identified as amendment opinions except in the cases in which there 
are official written amendments (private members’ bills or written amendments 
on the floor). This is not only because opinions which do not appear in the minutes 
usually cannot be identified in data sources but because they are trivial and can 
be ignored. If they are significant, the laws would be made without the scrutiny of 
the committee or subcommittee and regardless of MPs’ will, which violates the 
rules of the legislative process. Secondly, the amendment opinions of the 
committee staff in the Legislation and Judiciary committee are not identified as 
amendment opinions principally because their amendment opinions are likely to 
be about spellings or punctuation of a law bill. The impact of committee staff 
would be overestimated if those opinions are identified as amendment opinions. 
Their opinions are identified as amendment opinions only when there are 
opinions about real changes in the substance of a bill and the opinions are 
deliberated in the subcommittee of the Legislation and Judiciary committee. 
  6.3.6. The initiator(s) of an amendment opinion 
Principally, the initiator(s) of an amendment is the first person or organisation 
that suggests the amendment opinion in the legislative process. The initiator is 
classified as staff, staff of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, MP 
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(government), MP (opposition), MPs (both government and opposition), the 
sponsoring department, relevant departments, negotiation between 
parliamentary party leaderships, interest groups and experts. The categories of 
initiator(s) can be collapsed into staff, MPs and others. Committee staff and 
Legislation and Judiciary Committee staff are collapsed into staff. MP 
(government), MP (opposition), MPs (both government and opposition) and 
negotiation between parliamentary party leaderships are collapsed into MPs. 
Other initiators are collapsed into others. 
    6.3.7. The type of an amendment opinion 
The coding criteria to classify the significance of an amendment opinion need to 
be as objective as possible although it is inevitable that there are some subjective 
features in assessing the significance. The classification scheme in this thesis is 
basically affected by British research that classify amendments into non-
substantive and substantive ones (Cairney, 2006; Russell and Johns, 2007; 
Russell, Gover and Walter, 2015; Shephard and Cairney, 2004; 2005) or 
according to the importance of related policy (Russell and Sciara, 2008; 
Thompson, 2013). It also attempts to exploit the structure of South Korean law 
bills that identifies the major substances of the bill in the preamble. 
Firstly, there are some amendment opinions which are not related to the bill itself 
although the number of such amendment opinions is very small (36 out of 787). 
Such amendment opinions are classified as irrelevant because they are irrelevant 
to the bill under scrutiny. Secondly, there are two types of amendments that do 
not bring about substantive changes in the policy of the bill. One of these types 
is that of amendment opinions which modify words without changes in the 
meaning of the clauses or bill. Such amendment opinions are classified as 
wording. The other type is that of amendment opinions to secure consistency 
between Acts and within an Act. Such amendment opinions are classified as 
structure. 
Finally, there are amendment opinions that bring about substantive changes in 
the policy of a bill. The major substances summarised in the preamble of the bill 
are used as a criteria in classifying the significance of those amendment opinions 
because the major substances include policies which officials of the executive 
branch (especially, those of the sponsoring government department) think of as 
168 
 
important (they write the preambles of government bills). If an amendment 
opinion is not related to the major substance, the amendment opinion is classified 
as minor. If an amendment opinion deletes a whole policy included in the major 
substance, the amendment opinion is classified as major (elimination). If an 
amendment opinion just modifies or changes the substance of a policy contained 
in the major substance, the amendment opinion is classified as major (change). 
Figure 6.1 is the flow chart depicting the decision-making in classifying the 
significance of an amendment opinion. 
It goes without saying that this coding scheme has limitations in measuring the 
significance of an amendment opinion. One of them is that the coding scheme 
seems not to consider the degree of change – the alteration dimension in Russell 
and Sciara (2008). However, the limitation is minimised because the amendment 
analysis in this thesis identifies amendment opinions according to the unit of 
paragraph in the minutes of proceedings and the scrutiny in committee and 
subcommittee meetings are structured according to the unit of clause (usually) or 
policy (in the case of major policy specified across many clauses). Thus, 
amendment opinions identified in this research do not show a big difference in 
alteration dimension except those that eliminate a whole policy which is contained 
across many clauses of a bill. Those opinions are usually classified as major 
(elimination). Considering the limitation, however, the categorical variable 
measuring the significance of amendment opinions is named as the type. 
The categories are collapsed into non-substantive (wording and structure), 
substantive (minor, major (change) and major (elimination)) and irrelevant in 
some statistical tests on the data. The re-categorisation is important because the 
classification considers the technical complexity in legislation which is expected 
to have a relation to MPs’ delegation to staff in the scrutiny of bills. The types of 
wording and structure are related to technical matters in legislation, but those of 
policy substance are related to matters about policy substance of bills. 
Amendments in wording and structure are likely to require more technical skills 
in legislation than substantive amendments because it requires technical 
knowledge in legislation. 
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Figure 6.1. Flow chart to classify the type of an amendment opinion 
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  6.3.8. The acceptance of an amendment opinion 
The acceptance of an amendment opinion is classified as accepted wholly, 
accepted (revised) and rejected. If there are changes in the amendment opinion, 
the acceptance of it is classified as accepted (revised). The acceptance is coded 
at each stage of the scrutiny – subcommittee, the second committee stage, 
Legislative and Judiciary Committee and the plenary (if necessary, including the 
subcommittee of Legislative and Judiciary Committee). If the bill under scrutiny 
is rejected, killed or withdrawn, the acceptance of amendment opinions related to 
the bill is coded as the bill is rejected, killed or withdrawn respectively. 
  6.3.9. The type of policy related to the bill under scrutiny 
Every bill and amendment opinions to them are classified according to the type 
of policy related to the bill under scrutiny because there can be difference in the 
impact of policy actors among policy types. The criterion is borrowed basically 
from the classification of policy type suggested by Lowi (1972, p. 300), and it is 
supplemented by the classification of a political system’s capabilities in Almond 
and Powell (1966, pp. 28-29). Thus, four types of policy are derived initially: 
distributive, regulative, constituent and extractive. But, there are bills related to 
basic laws unrelated to these policies (for example, civil laws or criminal laws) 
and bills to include international treaties into domestic laws. Bills which cannot be 
included in the six categories are classified as etc.  
  6.3.10. The controversy of the bill under scrutiny 
The degree of controversy in the legislative process is a tricky concept to 
measure. It is very difficult to decide the level of the controversy through a ratio 
scale objectively, and the concept basically needs relevant experts’ qualitative 
assessments which are outside the capacity of this research. Moreover, even the 
selection of a panel who would judge the level cannot be objective and their 
judgements are likely to be different from each other. One bypass of such barriers 
is to make use of proxy variables. In this thesis, two proxy variables are employed 
to measure the degree of controversy – the number of articles in main 
newspapers and the duration of debate in the legislature. 
If a bill is controversial, the bill is likely to draw the attentions of the media. 
Therefore the numbers of articles directly related to the bill in major newspapers 
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in South Korea are counted. The search for articles is conducted through the web 
database of the Korea Press Foundation (http://www.kinds.or.kr). If a bill is 
controversial, the duration of debate over the bill is likely to be long. Thus, the 
duration of the debate is measured. The major problem in counting this is that 
many bills are debated at the same time in committee or subcommittee meetings 
in South Korea and there is no official record of the duration of the debate time 
for each individual bill. Thus, the number of pages in the minutes that are directly 
related to the bill under scrutiny is counted. 
Although the number of articles in main newspapers and the duration of debate 
are used to measure the degree of controversy of a bill in this research, the two 
variables have their own limitations. A bill could be controversial even if the media 
do not give attention to it because the bill is related to special interests (specific 
constituencies or interest groups) which do not draw the attention of the media, 
but are important to MPs. When it comes to the duration of debate, official debate 
could be the tip of the iceberg and pro-forma because negotiation between 
political parties or MPs could be outside the official legislative process. Thus, the 
duration of the official debate could be short in the legislative process of 
controversial bills. In this regard, depending on only one of the two could be 
problematic in classifying controversial bills and uncontroversial bills.  
Therefore, bills are classified into those which are controversial and those which 
are not through cluster analysis (k-means) using the two variables together. Bills 
are classified into four groups through the cluster analysis as outlined in table 6.6. 
Bills in Group 1 (n = 15) draw moderate attention from the media but they are 
much debated in the legislature. Bills in Group 2 (n = 4) draw lots of attention from 
the media but they are debated moderately. Bills in Group 3 (n = 4) draw lots of 
attention from the media and they are much debated. Bills in Group 4 (n = 262) 
draw little attention from the media and they are little debated. Bills in Group 1, 2 
and 3 are classified into controversial bills and bills in Group 4 are classified into 
uncontroversial bills. Needless to say, the classification is not perfect. The 
classification avoids arbitrary judgment on the controversy of a bill, however, 
considering that It is very difficult, if not impossible, to make an objective judgment 
on whether a bill is controversial or not (for detailed criteria, examples, frequency 
distributions and descriptive statistics of variables of the classifications so far, see 
appendix 2). 
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Table 6.6. Cluster centres (through k-means cluster analysis)  
Cluster 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 
Media 13.73 81.50 59.75 1.85 
Debate 35.98 16.23 73.46 3.25 
Controversy 
(Number of bills) 
Controversial 
(n=23) 
Uncontroversial 
(n =262) 
 
 
6.4. Legislative Case Study 
  6.4.1. Strengths and weaknesses of case study 
  Above all, case studies can provide in-depth description and narratives (Gerring, 
2004, pp.347-348). In this thesis, the case study makes it possible to look closer 
at specific legislative processes. The role of the committee staff can be shown 
vividly. The process of negotiation between parties in the examination on a 
politically controversial bill can be traced. Such in-depth description and 
narratives may not be obtained from the aggregate data from statistics about 
amendments and interviews with committee staff members. The mechanism in 
which the committee staff play an important role in the legislative process of 
South Korea can be understood through this detailed description. 
As with other research methods, however, this method has also its own caveats. 
The first limitation is in generalisation to other cases which are not studied in the 
research (Gerring, 2004, p.347). Although a case (scrutiny of a government bill) 
shows the strong policy impact of committee staff in the legislative process, it 
does not guarantee that the impact of the committee staff is strong in other cases. 
According to Gerring (2004, p.347), arguments that provide a broad applicability 
are in greater need of cross-unit research designs. The second limitation is in 
causal inference and hypotheses testing. This limitation is called ‘many variables, 
small number of cases’ (Lijphart, 1971, p.686). Although some good comparative 
case studies which strive to imitate experimental studies have been conducted 
for causal inference, the ‘ceteris paribus’ assumption is difficult to achieve in the 
real world (Maggetti, Gilardi, and Radaeli, 2013, p.67). Eckstein (1992, pp.152-
163) argues that a crucial case study can provide a good opportunity to achieve 
causal relationship, but King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, pp.210-211) refute his 
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argument for three reasons – alternative explanations, measurement error and 
the possibility of chance factors. 
In this thesis, the legislative case study which compares a small number of 
individual legislative processes is employed to complement the weaknesses of 
interview research and amendment analysis – providing a closer look at the real 
legislative process and the mechanism through which staff members play their 
role and exert influence. In addition, the case study provides the cases of 
legislative processes supporting the results of the interview research and 
amendment analysis. In-depth examination of typical cases representing 
variance in the key variables affecting the role and impact of the committee staff 
demonstrates the validity of inference from the interview research and 
amendment analysis. 
  6.4.2. The logic of the case study and the selection of cases 
The case study is designed through the logic of the most similar systems design 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1982, ch.2). The logic states that if cases are selected 
which are as similar as possible except in the provisional independent variables, 
the differences among the cases can be attributed to the provisional independent 
variables (Maggetti, Gilardi and Radaeli, 2013, pp.56-57; Przeworski and Teune, 
1982, pp.32-34). The aim of this research design is to alleviate the problem of 
omitted variables (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p.168). 
In this thesis, four cases of legislative processes are selected according to the 
degree of the two key variables of this thesis (the political controversy and 
technical complexity of issues under scrutiny) – the bill for partial amendment of 
State Public Officials Act (1902217) (for re-categorisation of civil servants); the 
bill for partial amendment of State Public Officials Act (1901362) (for the 
introduction of affirmative action for North Korean refugees); the bill for whole 
amendment of Government Organisation Act (1903484) (for administrative 
reorganisation); and partial amendment of Public Official Election Act (for 
constituency demarcation). The variance of the two key variables in the four 
cases are summarised in table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7. The Four cases according to political controversy and technical 
complexity 
Technical 
Complexity 
Political 
Controversy 
High Low 
Low 
Re-categorisation of 
civil servants 
Affirmative action for North 
Korean refugees 
High 
Administrative 
reorganisation 
Constituency demarcation 
 
The selected cases have similar conditions of the scrutiny except the variance 
of the key variables. Firstly, the four bills are related to the same policy type – 
constituent policy in Lowi (1972). Secondly, the bills were examined in the same 
committee (Public Administration and Security Committee) except the last case 
(Special Committee on Political Reform). Even in the last case, however, the 
legislative process was supported by the same committee staff organisation 
because the staff organisation of the standing committee in charge of the first, 
second and third bill supported the special committee in charge of the last bill. 
Thirdly, the four cases were scrutinised in similar periods – the first: from October 
to November 2012; the second: from August to September 2012; the third: from 
January to March 2013; the fourth: from December 2011 to February 2012. 
Finally, the first, second and third bill were sponsored by the same department 
(Ministry of Public Administration and Security: MOPAS). The final case was in 
the charge of the National Election Committee, but MOPAS was also engaged in 
the scrutiny. 
One of the reasons for the selection of these cases is the experiences of the 
researcher himself in the scrutiny of the bills. The researcher participated directly 
in the scrutiny of the first, second and third bills as the committee staff member 
in charge of the bills, and the fourth case was examined in the committee for 
which the researcher worked as a committee staff member. This experience 
makes it easy to collect data and apply key results of the interview research and 
amendment analysis to the cases. 
  6.4.3. Sources of data 
Official documents (initial bills, final bills, minutes of meetings, the review reports 
of the committee staff), unpublished documents of committees and sponsoring 
departments, news articles in the media (the third and fourth cases) and 
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experiences of the researcher who participated in the legislative processes are 
used as the sources of data. First of all, it is essential to refer to official documents 
in the legislature to examine formal legislative processes. Initial bills contain the 
policy intended by the executive. Minutes of committee and subcommittee 
meetings and the review reports of the committee staff demonstrate a concrete 
legislative process and the amendment opinions of policy actors including how 
they are dealt with in the scrutiny. Final bills demonstrate the results of the 
interaction among policy actors in the legislative process. 
On top of that, unpublished documents of committees and sponsoring 
departments are exploited. They provide a channel to see behind the scenes. 
Sponsoring departments prepare legislation before the official legislative process 
and are consulted by the committee staff about bills. In addition, there can be 
negotiation between political parties or between MPs and the sponsoring 
department outside the formal legislative process. These processes cannot be 
observed through official documents. Unpublished documents are used to 
examine these processes. 
Finally, news articles in the media are used in the cases of the third and fourth 
bills. The bills were high-profile and drew attention from the media, so the process 
through which the bills are dealt with was reported to the public by the media. The 
news articles complement the other data sources in two ways. Firstly, prominent 
policy actors (e.g. the President, party leaderships outside the committee, etc.) 
may move publicly (e.g. making statements) to affect the legislative process 
outside the legislative arena. Those moves which may not be captured through 
official or unpublished documents are well reported by the media. Secondly, there 
may be negotiations between policy actors in which even committee staff 
members cannot take part due to secrecy. Some of the results of those 
negotiations may be leaked to the media, and news from the media can inform of 
the important information about those negotiations. 
 
6.5. Summary 
The methodology of this thesis is dealt with in this chapter. Three major research 
strategies are adopted to collect and analyse empirical data on the role and 
impact of committee staff in the South Korean legislature in the legislative process: 
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interview research - conducting interviews with former and current committee 
staff members; amendment analysis - analysing the significance, acceptance and 
initiator(s) of amendment opinions to government bills; and legislative case study 
- comparing specific cases of the scrutiny of bills in which there are variances of 
the two key variables of this thesis. The strengths and weaknesses of the three 
strategies are discussed, and the reasons why those methods are adopted are 
explained. The aims and uses of those strategies in this thesis are also explained 
and the processes of conducting each research strategy are described in as 
much detail as possible. 
The aims and uses of the research strategies are worthy of short reiteration. 
Interview research aims to examine the role of the committee staff and the 
mechanism that induces their participation in the legislative process considering 
the invisible features of staff. It is also used to analyse the factors affecting the 
impact and complement the results of amendment analysis on the impact of the 
committee staff that can be exaggerated due to the problem of anticipated 
reaction. Amendment analysis investigates the impact of the committee staff in 
the legislative process and factors affecting the impact along with the interview 
research. Legislative case study provides concrete examples of the legislative 
processes in which the results of the interview research and amendment analysis 
are verified. The next step is reporting the findings from the empirical analysis. 
The following three chapters are about the findings. The next chapter addresses 
the role of the committee staff. 
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7. The Role and Impact of the Committee Staff 
7.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role and impact of the committee staff 
in the legislature of South Korea in the scrutiny of government law bills through 
empirical data. The theoretical framework and perspectives and key concepts 
derived in chapter 5 are referred to in the analysis. To be specific, the policy 
network perspective is used in the identification of major policy actors and the 
interdependence between them in the scrutiny of legislation. Key concepts on the 
capabilities of the committee staff are used in the analysis of the role of the 
committee staff. The empirical data include interview data and amendment 
opinions in the scrutiny of government law bills. Through the analysis, the 
informational and network managing function of the committee staff and their 
impact based on those function is identified. Especially, the network managing 
function of the committee staff that has not been much focused on is vividly 
revealed through interview data and explained using the policy network 
perspective. 
Before the analysis of the role and impact of the committee staff, the next section 
investigates the features of the policy network surrounding the scrutiny of 
government law bills in the legislature of South Korea. Major policy actors are 
identified and their behaviours and impact in the legislative process are analysed. 
The location of the committee staff in the policy network is examined, and the 
interdependent feature of the network is explained. The section is followed by the 
analysis of the role of the committee staff. The analysis discusses the 
informational role as the basic role of the committee staff, and the consultation 
and mediation function originating from the interdependent feature of the policy 
network. In addition, the role of the committee staff in setting the items of the 
subcommittee meetings is identified. After the analysis of the role, the impact of 
the committee staff is assessed by their own perception and amendment analysis. 
The amendment analysis examines the share of committee staff members’ 
amendment opinions out of the total amendment opinions and accepted 
amendment opinions in the scrutiny of government law bills. The analysis also 
examines the success of the amendment opinions of the committee staff 
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compared with those of other policy actors’ amendment opinions while controlling 
for other factors. 
 
7.2. Policy Network Surrounding the Legislative Process in South Korea 
  7.2.1. Major policy actors and their behaviours in the policy network 
Congruent with the discussion in chapter 5, MPs and the executive branch were 
enumerated as the most important policy actors in the policy network surrounding 
the scrutiny of government law bills according to the interview data. Interest 
groups are also important policy actors, but they are not essential players. In 
addition, parties, MPs’ personal staff members, the media and experts were 
mentioned as policy actors by respondents. 
MPs 
MPs are the foremost major policy actor. They were mentioned as important 
policy actors affecting the legislative process and the work of the committee staff 
by 32 interviewees. They are the most important key players in the scrutiny of 
legislation as official decision makers and as consumers of the informative and 
analysis service of the committee staff. Whether amendment opinions are 
suggested by the committee staff or not, the ultimate decision is made by MPs. 
MPs’ opinions, suggested in the committee or subcommittee meetings, are 
considered significant by the committee staff as expressed in the following 
explanation: 
We make decisions in the process, such as in the proceedings of committee 
or subcommittee meetings. The important thing that we should consider is the 
MPs’ opinion, needless to say. In short, because MPs’ opinions suggested in 
the general debate on the bill or subcommittee meetings are likely to be 
reflected, anyway, we consider MPs’ opinions significant (Interviewee 011). 
However, MPs’ impact has its own limits. If an MP’s opinion is irrational or partial 
to specific interest groups, the opinion is not likely to be accepted in committee 
or subcommittee meetings. The limit of an MP’s impact is also due to the 
consensual feature of the legislative process explained in chapter 2 and 5. Even 
when those opinions are accepted in the committee stage, they can be blocked 
179 
 
in later stages of the legislative process (e.g. the scrutiny of the Legislation and 
Judiciary Committee). Two committee staff members stated: 
On the contrary, it (that MPs’ opinions are partial or emphasise the opinions of 
a specific side) is a weakness because other MPs do not agree. Moreover, the 
subcommittee meetings are operated based on unanimous agreement 
(Interviewee 014). 
When it comes to such cases (that an MP’s opinion contrary to that of the 
committee staff is accepted in the committee stage), more than 90 per cent of 
those cases are troubled in the Legislation and Judiciary Committee. There 
can be legal problems or lack of consultation with interest groups and 
procedural legitimacy, so they are blocked in the Legislation and Judiciary 
Committee or criticised by the media even when they are passed (Interviewee 
067). 
MPs of important and official posts (such as the Speaker, committee and 
subcommittee chairs or ranking members of the committee) have more impact in 
the legislative process than other MPs. According to the interview data, the 
committee staff have to take care of the legislative process of bills to which those 
MPs give their attention, and the requests to table those bills in subcommittee 
meetings from those MPs are not negligible. The official posts they occupy give 
them more policy resources. Officially, they are bosses of the committee staff in 
their work. Other policy actors (e.g. the executive branch or interest groups) need 
cooperation with them more than other MPs because they decide the operation 
of their committee. As that of other MPs, however, their impact has limitations. 
More than half of the interviewees who mentioned the impact of MPs in official 
posts pointed out that their impact is limited or moderate (the Speaker: 13/20; 
committee chairs: 16/27; subcommittee chairs: 11/20; ranking members of the 
committee: 11/21). Although bills in their attention can get priority in tabling in 
committee or subcommittee meetings and other policy actors take care to consult 
and mediate with them in the legislative process of those bills, it is difficult to pass 
those bills if the bills are not desirable. 
The executive branch 
In the scrutiny of government law bills, the executive branch cannot help 
participating in the legislative process as a major policy actor. The executive 
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branch was mentioned as a policy actor in the policy network by 33 interviewees. 
The sponsoring department is the initiator of government bills. Civil servants in 
the department are consulted before the official scrutiny of bills. The sponsoring 
department has policy expertise and information. Policy information is sometimes 
acquired from them in the legislative process especially in highly specialised 
matters. They are the agents of implementation of bills, so their opinions are 
regarded as important in the legislative process. They share policy principles with 
MPs in governing parties. They have also resources to support MPs’ 
constituencies. They explain government bills to MPs in the committee in charge 
and the Legislation and Judiciary Committee and the committee staff. They even 
mobilise public opinion through the media or public hearings. Their opinions are 
considered seriously in the legislative process, and they have an impact on the 
amendments to bills. It is difficult to reflect an amendment with which the 
executive branch does not agree. Two committee staff members stated: 
The most important player is the executive branch from the point of view of the 
committee staff. This is because it is necessary to consult the opinion of the 
executive branch when it comes to government bills … and the executive 
branch implement the bill through enacting secondary legislations (Interviewee 
011). 
Although we conduct the function of check and oversight over the executive 
branch, because the opinions of the executive branch that implements laws 
and programmes are important to apply the laws and programmes to realities, 
we consult those opinions and cooperate. Next, legislative researchers 
research for themselves, but request more specific and rich information from 
the executive branch and review because they have more specific and richer 
data and information (Interviewee 125). 
The President, as the head of the executive branch, is an important policy actor 
in the legislative process, especially in those of bills to which he/she gives 
attention. His/her impact is exerted through two policy actors: the sponsoring 
department and MPs of the governing party (including committee chairs and 
ranking members of the committee). They cannot but take care of bills that the 
President prioritises. Two committee staff members contended: 
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We were affected because the President gave her attention. The department 
said this bill is hers. Then, we were in trouble because the department pushed. 
… We were also affected through the ranking member of the governing party 
(Interviewee 028). 
When the chair is in the governing party, we are affected through the chair in 
that this bill is promoted by the BH (the initial of the President’s office of South 
Korea – Blue House) (Interviewee 082). 
The impact of the executive branch, however, is not unilateral. First of all, they 
need policy resources that they do not have from other policy actors. For example, 
technical skills in legislation was pointed out as one of the resources that the 
executive branch needs from the committee staff in the interviews. On top of that, 
decision making is usually suspended in the committee or subcommittee 
meetings when there is disagreement among policy actors. For example, MPs 
order more mediation when the committee staff disagree with the sponsoring 
department. Two committee staff members stated: 
We (the committee staff and the sponsoring department) exchange opinions. 
When it comes to law bills, the executive branch has much more knowledge 
and data in the policy aspect than us, but they are not good at the composition 
of the structure and wordings of law bills from my experience (Interviewee 052). 
When the department express different opinions from those of the committee 
staff [in the subcommittee meetings], MPs conclude to table the bill after 
mediation between the committee staff and the department (Interviewee 135). 
Interest groups 
Interest groups can also participate in the scrutiny of government law bills as 
important policy actors. They were mentioned as a policy actor in the policy 
network by 31 interviewees. They visit chairs and MPs of relevant committees 
and the Legislative and Judiciary Committee and the committee staff; provide 
information and their opinions: and attend public hearings. There are cases in 
which they exert their impact through contacting the Speaker or the Secretary 
General. The most important resource they possess is their ability to mobilise 
votes in elections. Their impact, however, is not unilateral as those of other policy 
actors. A bill is not likely to pass when there is a sharp confrontation between 
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relevant interest groups or when an interest group opposes the bill strongly. A 
senior staff member explained: 
The opinions of interest groups are also important because they express their 
opinions through MPs if we do not consult them enough – this does not mean 
that we accept their opinions. Anyway, it is very important for us to listen to the 
opinions of interest groups in a balanced way (Interviewee 011). 
Interest groups are not essential policy actors in the legislative process different 
to MPs or the executive branch. They tend to participate in the legislative process 
of controversial bills or due to the activities of opposing groups. Ceteris paribus, 
their participation is lower in the scrutiny of government bills than in that of private 
members’ bills because consultation with interest groups is conducted before the 
official submission of government bills to the legislature. A former staff member 
stated: 
If it is not so controversial, they do not visit us. But, if the issue becomes 
controversial and opposing groups’ activities are detected, they come and 
explain to the National Assembly vigorously. They visit MPs, and MPs advise 
them to explain to the committee staff. They visit us, too (Interviewee 194). 
Other policy actors 
Other policy actors in the policy network mentioned by the interviewees include 
parties (13 interviewees), MPs’ personal staff members (11 interviewees), the 
media (8 interviewees) and experts (5 interviewees). The policy principles of 
parties affect MPs due to the strong party discipline in South Korea. Parties exert 
their impact through their MPs. Bills to which parties give their attention are likely 
to get priorities in tabling in the committee and subcommittee meetings. MPs’ 
personal staff members participate in the legislative process when their MPs give 
attention to the bill. MPs sometimes get policy information provided by the 
committee staff through them and deliver their positions on bills to the committee 
staff through them. They are consumers of the service of the committee staff 
along with their MPs. The media are also non-negligible policy actors because 
they can affect and even mobilise public opinion. The direct participation of 
experts in the legislative process is exceptional, but they can participate through 
attending public hearings, sending letters to the committee in charge or being 
consulted by the committee staff. 
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  7.2.2. The location of the committee staff in the policy network: other policy 
actors’ bypassing the committee staff 
The committee staff who have the resources identified in chapter 5 – knowledge 
about the legislative process; technical knowledge about legislation; and a certain 
level of policy expertise – occupy the information channel among policy actors in 
the legislative process and have informational power by exchanging their 
resources with other policy actors as discussed in chapter 5. The interviews ask 
whether other policy actors bypass the committee staff, which would mean that 
there are cases where the committee staff do not know about information 
exchanged among other policy actors (especially between MPs and other policy 
actors) and then they face the information in the committee or subcommittee 
meetings. Of the 29 interviewees who answered the question, 24 interviewees 
answered that they experience other policy actors by-passing them, but five 
interviewees answered that they do not experience this. A committee staff 
member expressed: 
Ah, yes, sure. There are those cases, but I think it’s inevitable. Those cases 
happen because law or budget bills are living creatures and they do not go as 
I control. Living creatures can evolve or retrogress and I understand that 
(Interviewee 028). 
Most of the 24 interviewees (22), however, answered that those cases are 
exceptional. The low frequency of bypassing the committee staff is due to the fact 
that other policy actors have to maintain relationships with the committee staff in 
the long term. One bypassing action of a policy actor may damage the trust 
between the policy actor and the committee staff, and cooperation with the 
committee staff becomes difficult for the policy actor. Moreover, other policy 
actors using bypassing, intending to avoid reflection of committee staff opinions 
contrary to their own and to achieve their policy intention unilaterally, have limited 
effect because the deliberation on a bill, during which the committee staff point 
out problems, can be suspended in the scrutiny of government bills. A committee 
staff member stated that bypassing the committee staff is not a wise approach 
(Interviewee 037). Two interviewees explained: 
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It’s not usual. … Those cases happen, but they need our cooperation. They 
have to undergo the scrutiny of budget bills, settlement of accounts and law 
bills, but cooperation becomes difficult after one by-passing (Interviewee 097). 
If there is no agreement, the committee staff director tackles the bill in the 
subcommittee meetings. Even if an MP argues, when we say that there are 
such problems, rather than say that the bill should not pass, the argument of 
the committee staff is reasonable from the points of other MPs’ views. Then, it 
is difficult to proceed. After all, when the committee staff director is not 
persuaded and he/she says that there is a problem, 95 per cent of those bills 
are blocked (Interviewee 189). 
Despite the low frequency due to the adverse effect in the long term and limited 
effect, bypassing the committee staff by other policy actors, especially interest 
groups, can happen when they do not know the operation of the legislative 
process well. When it comes to the government departments, however, 
intentional bypassing happens although those cases are rare. The bypassing 
happens because civil servants at the working-level do not report the result of the 
consultation with the committee staff to their seniors and they lobby MPs directly, 
or because there are great policy interests of the executive branch or the 
governing party. Two committee staff members stated: 
In fact, there are cases in which interest groups do not know the legislative 
process or the role of the committee staff. I have experienced those cases. In 
those cases, such things (bypassing) happen because they do not know where 
to express their opinions or where to express their changed opinions 
(Interviewee 067).  
This was about the scrutiny of the bill dealing with fees for school-supporting 
associations. … MPs ordered the committee staff director to mediate and 
prepare amendments to the controversial bill. We prepared the amendments 
with the Department of Education and submitted them in the subcommittee 
meeting, but the department directly communicated with MPs of the governing 
party and said that there was no agreement about the amendments [in the 
meeting] … The department should not accept the amendments when we 
consulted if they did not want to accept, but they communicated with us as if 
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they had accepted the amendments even if they had no intention to accept 
them (Interviewee 094). 
7.2.3. Overview of the policy network and interdependent feature of the network 
Focusing on the major policy actors in the legislative process (actors which are 
mentioned by more than 10 interviewees), the policy network surrounding the 
scrutiny of government law bills in the legislature of South Korea can be depicted 
as figure 7.1. A qualification to the figure is that interest groups can communicate 
with parties in controversial bills. In addition, the media and experts can be 
important policy actors according to the feature of the bill under scrutiny although 
they are not included in the figure. 
Figure 7.1. Overview of the policy network surrounding the scrutiny of 
government law bills 
 
 
The players – MPs, the sponsoring department, interest groups and the 
committee staff – exchange influence and resources in the network. When it 
comes to the committee staff, they provide MPs, the sponsoring department and 
interest groups with the information about the legislative process and technical 
skills in legislation. In return, they take policy and political information (opinions 
of relevant interest groups) and data necessary in the scrutiny from the 
sponsoring department and interest groups and deliver them to MPs. They also 
take political information (positions of parties or individual MPs) and delegation, 
which is necessary in consultation with and mediation among other policy actors, 
from MPs. MPs, the sponsoring department and interest groups also exchange 
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information and knowledge each other, but the exchange is monitored by the 
committee staff. They even exchange resources unrelated to the scrutiny directly, 
such as the department’s favour to MPs’ constituencies or interest groups’ 
political support for MPs. A senior staff member succinctly explained:   
Instead, when it comes to the departments in the executive branch, I suppose, 
they can support MPs in the aspects, such as the management of constituency 
in implementing their programmes. So, such sort of exchange can happen. … 
When it comes to interest groups … they have votes, and they can affect 
several economic and social activities in MPs’ constituencies in certain cases. 
So, I also suppose … that such exchange, so called transaction, such things 
can happen in a lawful way (Interviewee 011). 
In this interdependent network, decision making becomes difficult when there is 
a disagreement among actors. If there is a disagreement in the subcommittee 
meeting, arguments among policy actors are reiterated and there is likely to be 
no decision. In those cases, the scrutiny is suspended and more consultation and 
mediation is conducted. Because the time for the subcommittee meetings is an 
important resource as discussed later and in chapter 8 (see table 8.1), 
consultation and mediation to induce agreement among relevant actors before 
the subcommittee stage become important to avoid a blockade or delay of the 
legislative process. Interviewees stated: 
If there is no consultation or mediation in advance, a unilateral decision is 
impossible even when there is an absolute majority … So, there is no way but 
forming agreement through consultation (Interviewee 186). 
The subcommittee orders us to mediate and prepare amendments, and the 
mediation is conducted and amendments are prepared before the next 
subcommittee meeting (Interviewee 094). 
The subcommittee meeting should be after consultation and mediation of 
some degree. If not, there are repetitions of arguments and there is no decision 
(Interviewee 008). 
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7.3. The role of the committee staff in the legislative process of South 
Korea 
  7.3.1. Providing information and guiding the scrutiny of bills 
  The basic role of the committee staff in the scrutiny of legislation is to provide 
necessary information. The role is based on their certain level of policy expertise 
and technical knowledge in legislation. This function is conducted by the 
production of two documents – the review report of the committee staff and the 
document for the subcommittee’s examination. Firstly, the review report should 
include comprehensive material necessary for the examination of a bill according 
to interviewees. The substances of review reports mentioned by interviewees are 
the purpose and the substance of the bill (including the problems of the current 
act); data or statistics related to the bill; the pros and cons of the bill (including 
the impact of the bill); the opinions and positions of relevant policy actors on the 
bill; issues that should be discussed in the scrutiny of the bill; matters to be 
considered in amending the bill and implementing the bill; and the opinions of the 
committee staff on the bill, if necessary. The review reports provide policy 
information for MPs of the committee by including these substances. A committee 
staff member pointed out the informative function of the review report: 
At first, the review report is sent to MPs 48 hours before the bill is tabled in the 
committee meeting. So, personal staff and MPs study the bill and identify 
issues related to the bill through the review report (Interviewee 101). 
Secondly, the document for the subcommittee’s examination should also 
include comprehensive materials to conduct the informative role. The substances 
of the documents are the summary of the review report and the general debate 
in the committee stage; the opinions of the committee staff (including amendment 
opinions); updated opinions of relevant policy actors; and data or statistics 
gathered after the committee stage. A committee staff member contended that 
the aim in writing the document is that MPs of the subcommittee do not need to 
refer to other documents during the scrutiny of the subcommittee: 
Even a novice can understand easily at a glance and can examine the bill. This 
is the objective in writing the document for the subcommittee’s examination. 
… There should be no need to refer to other documents. … For example, MPs 
should not need to refer to the Code to search related clauses of other acts. 
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The clauses should be included in the document for the subcommittee 
examination. The scrutiny of the subcommittee should be possible through this 
one document without any need to refer to other documents (Interviewee 008). 
Moreover, South Korean committee staff members think that they guide the 
scrutiny of bills when they support the scrutiny. According to a junior committee 
staff member, she feels that she guides the direction of scrutiny based on the bills 
that have been introduced (Interviewee 175). The guiding role is conducted 
through, not only the documents produced by them to provide policy information 
for MPs, but also their oral reports in subcommittee meetings. Firstly, according 
to interviewees, the review report of a bill guides the scrutiny of the bill by being 
the base of MPs’ judgement on the bill; guiding MPs to issues related with the bill; 
and being quoted by MPs in the general debate on the committee meeting or the 
subcommittee’s examination. Moreover, the review reports become the base of 
documents for the subcommittee’s examination. Considering the role of 
documents for the subcommittee’s examination discussed above and below, the 
review reports also guide the subcommittee’s examination of bills through the 
documents. Two committee staff members stated:  
The review report, especially those of a law bill, become the starting point of 
all discussion on the bill, so I think the report is very important. All the issues 
of the debate or discussion about the bill are derived from the report. So, the 
direction of the review report decides the direction of the legislative process. 
So, the report is important (Interviewee 032). 
I think that the most important role of the review report is that it becomes the 
base on which the document for the subcommittee’s examination is written 
afterwards. I don’t think that the review report itself leads to an amendment or 
revision of the bill directly. The committee staff can suggest a direction for the 
scrutiny when they write the document for the subcommittee’s examination. 
They suggest the base of the direction in the review report in advance and the 
direction is suggested in the document for the subcommittee’s examination. 
Then, the document leads the debate of MPs of the subcommittee. It seems 
that the influence of the review report is exerted through the process 
(Interviewee 088). 
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Secondly, the document for the subcommittee’s examination also conducts the 
guiding role in the subcommittee stage. Interviewees stated that the examination 
of the subcommittee is based on the document and the document forms the 
framework of debate between MPs. When asked about the impact of the 
document for the subcommittee’s examination, a committee staff member 
answered: 
I think the document plays a key role. The document plays a key role in 
deciding the direction of the examination of the subcommittee because MPs of 
the subcommittee refer to the document and move the discussion forward 
according to the document. This role could be more important than suggesting 
a specific amendment opinion in the subcommittee stage. The document plays 
an important role in forming the framework of the debate in the subcommittee 
stage (Interviewee 088). 
Two interviewees even argued that it is not desirable in the aspect of the 
transparency and predictability of the subcommittee stage that MPs raise other 
issues which are not included in the document for the subcommittee’s 
examination (Interviewee 067, Interviewee 183). They insisted that because the 
document is sent to MPs in advance, MPs or their staff need to give notice to the 
committee staff about the issue that they want to raise to allow for the review of 
that issue by the committee staff in advance, and for the high quality of the 
subcommittee’s examination. According to interviewees, the committee staff 
need to perceive all issues and policy information related to a bill in advance. The 
committee staff should monitor all information channels in the policy network to 
secure all policy information even when there are other policy actors’ bypassing 
the committee staff. This perspective of committee staff members is 
demonstrated well in the argument of a former committee staff member: 
MPs can raise unexpected issues in the general debate or the subcommittee 
stage due to other policy actors lobbying, but policy actors’ opinions are 
reflected finally through the document for the subcommittee’s examination 
written by the committee staff. So, I think that the committee staff should 
perceive those issues or opinions and include them in the document for the 
subcommittee’s examination and that the judgement on the issues should be 
made after the debate on them in the subcommittee stage (Interviewee 186). 
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Finally, the guiding role of the committee staff is also conducted by their oral 
reports in the subcommittee stage. The subcommittee meetings progress in the 
order of the oral reports of the committee staff director, reporting the opinion of 
the sponsoring department and debate between MPs as explained in chapter 2. 
The committee staff inform MPs of related issues, suggest amendment opinions 
and summarise the debate between MPs through the oral reports. A former 
committee staff member depicted the deliberation process in the subcommittee 
stage and the role of senior committee staff members in the deliberation: 
There are a lot of law bills. The examination is very efficient because MPs, well, 
are busy due to party work and constituency work. … MPs focus on core issues. 
On the remaining unimportant issues or clauses, MPs accept the amendment 
opinions of the committee staff. Even on core issues, I – the committee staff 
director – summarise the issues and previous debates on them and the Chair 
of the subcommittee asks what the executive branch’s opinion is. After the 
answer of the government department in charge, the Chair gives MPs 
opportunities to debate. The Chair may ask what the opinion of the committee 
staff is or what the desirable alternative is when MPs are not confident in 
making a judgement for themselves on an issue. Then, we summarise the 
debate and suggest amendment opinions on the issues. The scrutiny by the 
subcommittee progresses well in these ways (Interviewee 194). 
To sum up, the committee staff conduct an information providing function and 
play the role of guiding the scrutiny of bills through the review report and the 
document for the subcommittee’s examination and presenting oral reports. The 
interview data demonstrate that the committee staff secure policy information as 
much as possible in performing the information providing function. One 
interesting point is that the comprehensive securing of policy information by 
committee staff members and the comprehensive feature of documents produced 
by them are not just because the committee staff need them to support the 
scrutiny of bills but because the MPs need them for the efficient examination of 
bills. For example, in explaining what is needed for the efficiency of subcommittee 
meetings, a committee staff member pointed out: 
Individual MPs can have different opinions. If we don’t prepare for a 
comprehensive document, for example, important substances are not included 
in the document, it costs much time to discuss a bill and it is difficult to reach 
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a conclusion on the bill. Instead, it is necessary to write a basic document 
which enables MPs both to identify all necessary stuff for the scrutiny and to 
discuss conclusions (Interviewee 129). 
  7.3.2. Consultation and mediation function 
In addition to the informative role, the committee staff conduct a network 
managing function such as consultation and mediation in the scrutiny of 
government law bills. This is because of the interdependent nature of the policy 
network surrounding the legislative process and the staffs’ neutral position, 
knowledge and expertise as discussed in chapter 5. One important finding from 
the interview data is that the consultation with relevant policy actors (especially 
with the sponsoring department) and mediation between them are an important 
process in the committee staff members’ supporting of the scrutiny of bills. 
The core task of supporting the scrutiny is writing documents for the scrutiny of 
bills (e.g. the review report of the committee staff and the document for the 
subcommittee’s examination). When it comes to the review report, out of 30 
interviewees who answered explicitly about the process of writing review reports 
of law bills, 28 interviewees answered that they consult with relevant policy actors 
when they write the review reports of law bills (24 interviewees mentioned about 
the research on the bill). In explaining the writing process of the review reports, a 
committee staff member stated: 
The government department in charge has the power of implementation of a 
law bill when the bill is enacted, doesn’t it? So, I consult with the government 
department in charge. When it comes to interest groups, there could be a 
confrontation between their interests. … For example, the interest group for 
conglomerates and that for medium businesses have different views on the 
same bill because their interests are different. So, if there is an issue, I consult 
with the government department in charge and related interest groups directly, 
and introduce their opinions and the pros and cons of the bill in the review 
report of the bill (Interviewee 047). 
Out of the 28 interviewees, seven interviewees also answered that they mediate 
between policy actors when they suggest the committee staff’s own opinions 
(including amendment opinions) on the bill in review reports. The mediation could 
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be due to the expectation of other policy actors’ reactions to the amendment 
opinions. A committee staff member explained:   
If a committee staff member has amendment opinions about the substance of 
policies … there could be confrontation between stakeholders. The most 
important thing would be the mediation between them. If not, MPs representing 
various interest groups could refute the committee staff’s opinions, which could 
cause MPs to distrust the committee staff (Interviewee 088).  
This consultation and mediation are also important in preparing the 
subcommittee stage. Out of 23 interviewees who answered explicitly about the 
process of writing the documents for the subcommittee’s examination of law bills, 
22 interviewees mentioned consultation or mediation as one of the processes (No 
interviewees mentioned about the research on the bill). One interesting finding is 
that the mediation becomes more important in preparing the subcommittee stage 
than in writing review reports. Out of 22 interviewees, 14 interviewees mentioned 
mediation between policy actors. This is because the substantive and detailed 
scrutiny of law bills (including amendments) is conducted in the subcommittee 
stage and the committee staff need to prepare amendment opinions which 
require agreement among relevant policy actors. A committee staff member 
emphasised the importance of the mediation in preparing for the subcommittee 
stage: 
The fact that a law bill is tabled in the subcommittee stage and undergoes the 
scrutiny of subcommittee means that the bill could be enacted. So, 
stakeholders suggest their opinions more vigorously if a law bill is likely to be 
tabled in the subcommittee stage. Thus, processes such as the mediation 
between policy actors become more important in this stage and additional data 
or information are provided by policy actors. Then, the opinions of policy actors 
could be included in the documents for the subcommittee’s examination after 
the committee staff make a judgement on the desirability of the opinions 
(Interviewee 088). 
The mediation function of the committee staff is also performed during the 
subcommittee stage. If a law bill is not resolved in the first subcommittee meeting 
due to the difference between policy actors’ positions, MPs might ask the 
committee staff to prepare alternatives by the next subcommittee meeting. In 
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those cases, the committee staff mediate between policy actors in preparing the 
alternatives. This mediation function is important because a law bill is unlikely to 
pass when a policy actor disagrees in the legislative process of South Korea. A 
former staff member explained the mediation function between subcommittee 
meetings: 
When there is a difference in relevant policy actors’ positions on a law bill, MPs 
might ask the committee staff to suggest amendment opinions at the next 
subcommittee meeting. In these cases, the committee staff consult with and 
mediate between the government department in charge and stakeholders 
related to the bill more, and suggest amendment opinions in the next meeting 
(Interviewee 186). 
It is very important that the committee staff conduct the role of mediation 
between policy actors as well as that of consultation with them. The result 
corresponds to the arguments of governance literature. The interview data reveal 
that the committee staff of the South Korean legislature conduct the role of policy 
network manager discussed in Kickert, Klijin and Koppenjan (1997a) during the 
legislative process. Committee staff members are able to perform the function 
due to their neutral position and comprehensive securing of information in the 
policy network. Considering that the work of managing the legislative process 
may not be the responsibilities of any other actor in the network, the committee 
staff who are in charge of working level legislation and non-partisan employees 
of the legislature itself take the role of network manager – consultation, mediation 
and negotiation. A committee staff member explained the brokering function 
through an example: 
I explained the bill that makes CCTV instalment in kindergartens mandatory. 
There was no agreement when the bill was examined. The governing party 
argued that there should be provisions that legalise the instalment of network 
cameras7  as well as CCTV because network cameras had already been 
installed in 20% of all kindergartens. It would be also problematic that there is 
no provision on the instalment of network cameras. The opposition party 
argued that the instalment of network cameras should not be included in the 
                                                          
7 Network cameras enable parents to see the situation in the kindergarten in real-time through the 
Internet, but the real-time surveillance is impossible through CCTV. 
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bill. Mothers could complain in real-time. How can kindergartens deal with the 
appeals? So, I suggested an amendment opinion. Firstly, the instalment of 
CCTV becomes mandatory. … But, the instalment of CCTV is exempted when 
all parents agreed that the instalment is not necessary. … Secondly, the 
principle of the individual’s agreement when they are the subject of information 
gathering is the most important principle in the collection of personal 
information. According to the principle, network cameras can be installed only 
when all parents and teachers agree with the instalment. So, the installation of 
network cameras becomes possible. I suggested the amendment opinion and 
two parties accepted the opinion (Interviewee 014). 
However, there are limitations in the mediation function of committee staff. First 
of all, the committee staff cannot mediate between policy actors when there is a 
sharp confrontation between them. This is not only because committee staff do 
not have official authority for mediation but because the norm of neutrality 
prevents them from conducting active mediation. A committee staff member 
explained the point: 
If there is a sharp confrontation we can’t include amendment opinions in the 
document for the subcommittee’s examination. MPs should debate the matter 
in the subcommittee meeting. … There is no problem when the document 
includes the opinions of both sides, but there are cases in which we can’t 
suggest amendment opinions reflecting the position of one side. When there 
is a sharp confrontation, mediation in advance is impossible and we can’t 
include amendment opinions in the document for the subcommittee’s meeting 
(Interviewee 008). 
On top of that, the mediation by the committee staff could be seen as a close 
reflection of diverse opinions of policy actors or the suggestion of a sort of focal 
point on which the stakeholders can start negotiation rather than active arbitration 
or negotiation by the committee staff themselves. Six interviewees answered that 
they do not mediate between policy actors directly. In addition, two interviewees 
answered that there are cases in which policy actors start negotiation based on 
the committee staff’s opinion suggested in the review report. A senior committee 
staff member stated that he does not mediate between interest groups but listens 
to their opinions on the bill in preparing amendment opinions for the 
195 
 
subcommittee stage (Interviewee 013). When asked about the mediation 
between policy actors, a committee staff member answered: 
We consult with government departments in most cases and it is rare that we 
consult with or mediate between interest groups face to face. There could be 
some problems when we meet interest groups face to face, so we consult with 
interest groups indirectly based on their written opinions rather than meet them 
directly (Interviewee 082). 
  7.3.3. The role of the committee staff in setting the items of the subcommittee 
meetings 
One interesting point is that the committee staff could play a substantive role in 
setting the items of the subcommittee meetings. This is basically because they 
have knowledge about the legislative process. In addition, in the situation where 
time for the subcommittee meetings is scarce and efficient operation of the 
subcommittee meetings is important, their opinions on whether a bill can be 
tabled or not is important because they recognise the positions of relevant policy 
actors on the bill as network managers and are able to expect whether there could 
be agreement among them in the subcommittee meetings. 
The subcommittee stage is the most important procedure in the scrutiny of bills 
in South Korea as explained in chapter 2. Thus, the power of setting the items of 
the subcommittee meeting (agenda-setting) is a strong power in the legislative 
process. The interview data demonstrate that MPs, especially the ranking 
members of the committee, principally have the power of agenda-setting. 
According to the interview data, however, the committee staff play a substantive 
role in the agenda-setting in at least seven committees. For example, a law bill is 
unlikely to be tabled in subcommittee meetings when the committee staff suggest 
negative opinions on the bill in the review report. A committee staff member 
stated:  
If the substance is just a slogan, well, the bill is sponsored for the interest of a 
specific interest group or is unnecessary and we suggest a negative opinion 
on the bill, then the bill may not be tabled in subcommittee meetings. So, the 
bill is sifted out before the subcommittee stage when committee staff conclude 
that the bill is unnecessary (Interviewee 094). 
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  The mechanism under which the above case could happen proceeds as follows:  
MPs need efficient scrutiny as explained already. Thus, the committee staff give 
priority to the bills which are likely to pass in the subcommittee stage in the 
process of drafting the items of subcommittee meetings. If relevant policy actors 
do not reach agreement on a bill or the mediation between them is insufficient to 
pass the bill in the subcommittee stage, the bill is not given priority when the items 
of subcommittee meetings are drafted by the committee staff. For example, when 
it comes to the above case, a bill on which committee staff suggest negative 
opinions due to partiality of a specific interest group or other problems, is unlikely 
to be tabled in subcommittee meetings because the bill would not pass the 
subcommittee stage and could obstruct efficient scrutiny of bills from the 
committee staff member’s point of view. According to the interview data, a bill is 
unlikely to be tabled in subcommittee meetings if relevant policy actors do not 
reach agreement in at least three committees. 
  In another two committees, the committee staff members in charge of setting 
the items of the committee or subcommittee meetings stated that they consult 
with the committee staff member in charge of bills and that they give priority to 
the bills that are likely to pass due to sufficient mediation. The degree of the sifting 
is associated with the workload of the committee. A committee staff member 
stated that many law bills are sifted out when there is a heavy workload for the 
subcommittee (Interviewee 097). For example, in describing the sifting process, 
a committee staff member described: 
At first, we make a list. Needless to say, the criteria are different in each 
session, but we include the bills that have become mature and are likely to 
pass in this session into the list as a first step in general. Then, we include the 
bills to which each party gives priority and make the list. … [That a bill has 
become mature means that stakeholders are] consulted and mediated. … To 
some degree, disagreements between government departments have been 
mediated, interest groups have reached an agreement, or there have been 
public hearings (Interviewee 063). 
However, the impact of the committee staff in agenda-setting is limited by MPs. 
The ultimate power of agenda-setting belongs to MPs. According to the interview 
data, if a bill is given MPs’ attention and MPs (especially the ranking members of 
the committee) order committee staff to table the bill, the bill is tabled in 
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subcommittee meetings even if there is insufficient mediation and policy actors 
are likely to confront each other. The committee staff members of at least six of 
the above seven committees in which the interviewees stated the committee staff 
play a substantive role in the agenda-setting answered that law bills that are 
unlikely to pass are tabled in subcommittee meetings when MPs order them to 
table the bills. A committee staff member stated that if a bill is related to the policy 
principles of parties or the executive branch pushes the progress of a bill, the bill 
is more likely to be tabled (Interviewee 088). A committee staff member pointed 
to the limit of the role of staff in agenda-setting, answering the question about the 
possibility that a bill on which the committee staff suggest negative opinions in 
the review report is tabled in subcommittee meetings: 
The items of subcommittee meetings are set politically. The committee staff 
don’t decide the items. … We give priority to bills that are likely to pass when 
we draft the list of the items, so there is an association at some degree. 
Especially in my committee, however, the personal staff of ranking members 
are struggling for the initiative. So, … if there are a number of bills that the 
governing party requests to be tabled, it becomes necessary to table a similar 
number of bills that the opposition party requests to be tabled. They add bills 
continuously (Interviewee 097). 
Moreover, in at least two committees, the committee staff refrain from giving 
priority to some bills when they draft the items of subcommittee meetings. A 
senior staff member outside the above seven committees even stated that the 
activity of the subcommittee in his committee is so vigorous that, in agenda 
setting, there is no consideration of possibility that a bill passes. There is a low 
need for efficiency in this case. The following extract is his answer on the agenda-
setting in his committee. 
There are some bills treated in that way (If a bill is not resolved in the first 
meeting, there is mediation before the next meeting). On many other bills, even 
if the mediation failed, MPs hold the next meeting. The activity of the 
subcommittee is much vitalised in my committee (Interviewee 014). 
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7.4. The Impact of the Committee Staff in the Scrutiny of Government Bills 
The resources that the committee staff have – knowledge about the legislative 
process, technical knowledge about legislation and a certain level of policy 
expertise – enables the committee staff to conduct the roles identified in the 
above section – informative role, consulting and mediation function and limited 
role in setting the items of the subcommittee meetings. The committee staff would 
have substantive impact in the scrutiny of government bills through conducting 
those roles, which is demonstrated by the interview data and amendment 
analysis. 
  7.4.1. The perception of committee staff members themselves 
According to the interview data, committee staff members themselves perceive 
that their impact is strong and important, especially in the scrutiny of law bills. A 
senior staff member said that the role of the committee staff is important because 
many flaws in legislation are pointed out (Interviewee 011). According to one 
interviewee, MPs refrain from passing a bill over which the committee staff have 
negative opinions, but they are likely to give positive opinions to bills over which 
the committee staff have positive opinions (Interviewee 082). There are 
indications that a bill is not likely to be tabled if the review report of the bill is 
negative as explained above. A former committee staff member said that other 
policy actors such as civil servants in government departments know the 
importance of the committee staff (Interviewee 194). Another former committee 
staff member stated that 80 per cent of bills which are passed are concluded 
according to the reviewed opinions of the committee staff (Interviewee 189). 
The interviewees pointed out the importance of documents which they produce 
in the legislative process – the review report and the document for the 
subcommittee’s examination (31 interviewees mentioned these). As discussed 
above, those documents guide MPs to issues related to the bill and the 
examination of law bills. MPs are likely to depend on those documents produced 
by the committee staff in the scrutiny of legislation. The importance of the review 
report is mentioned by 26 interviewees. The report provides information on bills 
and other policy actors try to affect the substance of the reports. The report 
sometimes triggers negotiation among policy actors in different positions. 22 
interviewees pointed out the importance of the document for the subcommittee’s 
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examination. The document provides information about bills in the subcommittee 
stage, and other policy actors (especially government departments) want to affect 
the substance of the documents as they try to do in the review report. A committee 
staff member mentioned: 
When the review report states that the bill is not desirable, it seems that more 
than 90 or 99 per cent of those bills are not passed. When a bill is passed, the 
bill is amended according to the opinions in the review report. Although the 
review report has no legal authority, it seems that bills, in practice, are 
amended according to the review report, so I think that the role of the review 
report is very important (Interviewee 052). 
Amendment opinions of the committee staff in the documents make the 
documents important. The amendment opinions are mentioned as an important 
substance of the review report (10 interviewees) and of the document for the 
subcommittee’s examination (23 interviewees). According to the interview data, 
amendment opinions of the committee staff are accepted well in the scrutiny of 
law bills by MPs. 21 interviewees explicitly mentioned the high frequency of the 
acceptance of the committee staff members' amendment opinions. A committee 
staff member stated: 
In my opinion, I think that more than 60-70 per cent [of amendments reflected 
in bills] are affected by the documents for the subcommittee’s examination or 
the review reports. … about 60-70% [of amendments accepted] in standing 
committees, it’s my personal opinion (Interviewee 042). 
  7.4.2. Impact identified through amendment analysis 
The impact identified from the interview data is examined through amendment 
analysis because the committee staff members’ perception of their own impact 
may be underestimated or overestimated. Table 7.1 is the breakdown of 
amendment opinions which are suggested in the scrutiny of government bills 
according to the initiator(s) and type. Overall, staff members’ amendment 
opinions occupy nearly 60 per cent of total amendment opinions. They suggest 
amendment opinions more vigorously in the legislative process than any other 
policy actors. The proportions of staff members’ amendment opinions, however, 
are different according to the type of amendment opinions. The proportion of 
amendment opinions of staff is more than 80 per cent (86.5%) in non-substantive 
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amendment opinions (wordings and structure), but just less than half (49.1%) in 
substantive amendment opinions (minor, major (change), major elimination). 
Table 7.1. Type and initiator(s) of amendment opinions 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff MPs Others Total 
Wording 
55 9 4 68 
(80.9%) (13.2%) (5.9%) (100.0%) 
Structure 
93 6 4 103 
(90.3%) (5.8%) (3.9%) (100.0%) 
Minor 
86 78 5 169 
(50.9%) (46.2%) (3.0%) (100.0%) 
Major 
(change) 
176 154 16 346 
(50.9%) (44.5%) (4.6%) (100.0%) 
Major 
(elimination) 
23 40 2 65 
(35.4%) (61.5%) (3.1%) (100.0%) 
Irrelevant 
13 19 4 36 
(36.1%) (52.8%) (11.1%) (100.0%) 
Total 
446 306 35 787 
(56.7%) (38.9%) (4.4%) (100.0%) 
   
  Table 7.2 is the breakdown of amendment opinions according to the initiator(s) 
and acceptance of them. The acceptance means the final acceptance of the 
amendment opinions in the legislative process. Overall, the amendment opinions 
of staff are more successful than those of MPs or others. The association 
between initiator(s) and acceptance is significant according to the chi-square test 
on the data (X2(4) = 190.356 and p < 0.001, the cases in which the bill is killed or 
withdrawn are excluded from the test). The proportion of amendment opinions 
accepted without revisions is much higher for staff (64.8%) than for MPs (18.3%) 
or others (40.0%) and the proportion of those rejected is vice versa (13.9% for 
staff, 54.6% for MPs and 31.4% for others). 
Table 7.2. Initiator(s) and acceptance of amendment opinions 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Bill is killed 
Bill is 
withdrawn 
Total 
Staff 
289 72 62 22 1 446 
(64.8%) (16.1%) (13.9%) (4.9%) (0.2%) (100%) 
MPs 
56 73 167 10 0 306 
(18.3%) (23.9%) (54.6%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Others 
14 9 11 1 0 35 
(40.0%) (25.7%) (31.4%) (2.9%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Total 
359 154 240 33 1 787 
(45.6%) (19.6%) (30.5%) (4.2%) (0.1%) (100%) 
- X2(4) = 190.356 and p < 0.001. The cases in which the bill is killed or withdrawn are excluded from the test. 
 
To alleviate the problem of spuriousness, other factors – controversy of the bill 
under scrutiny, type of amendment opinions and policy type – are controlled. 
Table 7.3 presents the results of cross tabulation analyses about the relationship 
between the initiator(s) and acceptance of amendment opinions after the control. 
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The types of wording and structure are collapsed into non-substantive, and the 
types of minor, major (change) and major (elimination) are collapsed into 
substantive. The initiator(s) of amendment opinions are collapsed into staff and 
non-staff. Thus, the analyses in the table compare the acceptance of staff 
members’ amendment opinions with that of others’ than staff members’. Overall, 
the result that the amendment opinions of staff are more successful remains after 
the control. The association is significant at p = 0.05 level in seven categories to 
which 74.5 per cent of amendment opinions analysed (517 / 694) belong. Thus, 
even after the control of controversy of the bill under scrutiny, type of amendment 
opinions and policy type, the amendment opinions of the committee staff are 
more successful than those of other policy actors except in some categories to 
which about a quarter of amendment opinions analysed belong. 
Table 7.3. The results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship between 
initiator(s) and acceptance of amendment opinions after controlling for 
controversy, type and policy type 
Policy Type 
Type 
Controversy 
Non-substantive Substantive 
Distributive 
Controversial p = 1.000*, n = 7 p = 0.007*, n = 41 
Uncontroversial p = 0.002*, n = 54 X2(2) = 37.273, p < 0.001, n = 143 
Regulative 
Controversial p = 1.000*, n = 8 X2(2) = 0.860, p = 0.651, n = 57 
Uncontroversial p = 0.002*, n = 46 X2(2) = 62.836, p < 0.001, n = 174 
Constituent 
Controversial p = 1.000*, n = 11 p = 0.797*, n = 32 
Uncontroversial -**, n = 9 p = 0.011*, n = 28 
Extractive 
Controversial -**, n = 4 p = 1.000*, n = 14 
Uncontroversial -**, n = 3 p = 1.000*, n = 12 
Basic laws 
Controversial p = 0.167*, n = 6 p = 1.000*, n = 17 
Uncontroversial p = 0.295*, n = 13 p = 0.001*, n = 31 
Laws 
related to 
international 
treaties 
Controversial -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
Uncontroversial -**, n = 3 -**, n = 1 
Etc 
Controversial -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
Uncontroversial -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- The initiator(s) of amendment opinions are collapsed into staff and non-staff. The cases in which the bill is 
killed or withdrawn are excluded from the tests. The test is not conducted for irrelevant amendment 
opinions. For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see appendix 3.1. 
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Table 7.4 is the breakdown of accepted amendment opinions (those accepted 
wholly and those accepted with changes) according to the type and initiator(s) of 
them. Overall, staff members’ amendment opinions occupy just over 70 per cent 
of total accepted amendment opinions. The amendments to bills seem to reflect 
the amendment opinions of the committee staff well. The proportions of staff 
members’ amendment opinions in accepted opinions, however, are also different 
according to the type of amendment opinions although their amendment opinions 
are more than those of other policy actors except the types of major (elimination) 
and irrelevant. The proportion of amendment opinions of staff is more than 90 per 
cent (93.2%) in non-substantive amendments (wordings and structure), but just 
over 60 per cent (61.7%) in substantive amendments (minor, major (change), 
major (elimination)). 
Table 7.4. Type and initiator(s) of accepted amendment opinions 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff MPs Others Total 
Wording 
48 1 0 49 
(100%) (98.0%) (2.0%) (0.0%) 
Structure 
88 5 4 97 
(100%) (90.7%) (5.2%) (4.1%) 
Minor 
70 36 2 108 
(100%) (64.8%) (33.3%) (1.9%) 
Major 
(change) 
133 63 13 209 
(100%) (63.6%) (30.1%) (6.2%) 
Major 
(elimination) 
11 18 1 30 
(100%) (36.7%) (60.0%) (3.3%) 
Irrelevant 
11 6 3 20 
(100%) (55.0%) (30.0%) (15.0%) 
Total 
361 129 23 513 
(100%) (70.4%) (25.1%) (4.5%) 
 
 
7.5. Summary and Conclusion 
Firstly, this chapter analyses the feature of the policy network surrounding the 
scrutiny of government law bills in the legislature of South Korea. MPs, the 
executive branch and interest groups are identified as major policy actors 
although interest groups are not essential actors. The policy network has an 
interdependent feature because policy resources are dispersed among the actors, 
and unilateral decision making by an actor is difficult. The committee staff occupy 
the information channel in the policy network and other policy actors bypassing 
the committee staff is rare. 
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Then, this chapter investigates the role and impact of the committee staff in the 
scrutiny through interview data and amendment analysis, applying the theoretical 
framework and perspective (especially, the policy network perspective) and key 
concepts on the feature of policy network and the resources and capabilities of 
major policy actors (especially, MPs and the committee staff). The basic role of 
the committee staff in the network is to provide information about bills both in 
policy and legal aspects. This is because the committee staff have a certain level 
of policy expertise and technical skills in legislation and other actors in the 
network depend on them. In addition, they conduct parts of the network managing 
function discussed in governance literature – consultation and mediation. 
Although every actor can conduct these functions in principle, the committee staff 
members who have impartiality, the knowledge of the legislative process and a 
certain level of policy expertise are appropriate network managers. Lastly, they 
conduct a limited role in setting the items of the subcommittee meetings, based 
on their knowledge about the legislative process and expectation about the 
possibility that a bill can secure agreement among policy actors, as a network 
manager. Through conducting these roles, they have a substantive impact on the 
scrutiny of government law bills, which is demonstrated from their conception and 
amendment analysis. One important point of the discussion over the role of the 
committee staff in this chapter is that their network managing function is one of 
their important functions, which has not been treated as important as the 
information and intelligence function researched in previous literature. 
Although the role of the committee staff is analysed and their impact is assessed 
in this chapter, some important issues remain as yet untapped. They are the 
detailed mechanism through which the committee staff exert their impact; the 
factors affecting the role and impact; and the nature of the impact of the 
committee staff. The first issue is related to the reason that the committee staff 
have a substantive impact through conducting their roles. The second issue is 
the core of the investigation of the impact of the committee staff because the 
impact cannot be constant despite the change of other factors in the legislative 
process. The third issue is also very important because uncontrolled impact of 
the committee staff is against the principal of representative democracy. These 
issues are addressed in the next chapter. 
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8. Factors affecting the Role and Impact of the Committee Staff 
8.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the factors affecting the role and impact of 
the committee staff identified in the previous chapter. For the analysis, the 
detailed mechanism through which the committee staff exert their impact is to be 
investigated in advance. Through the investigation, the reason that the committee 
staff exert a substantive impact is to be analysed. Factors affecting staff members’ 
role and impact are examined through the examination of factors which affect the 
mechanism. After addressing these two issues, the nature of the impact of the 
committee staff is to be discussed based on the analyses. For this work, as in 
chapter 7, the theoretical framework and perspectives and key concepts derived 
in chapter 5 are referred to in the analysis. The empirical data include interview 
data and amendment opinions in the scrutiny of government law bills. 
This thesis gives its attention to the features of the issue under scrutiny (political 
controversy and technical complexity) as factors affecting the role and impact 
although the studies in the U.S. enumerate human factors (chair’s character or 
leadership style and partisanship or expertise of staff members), or administrative 
factors (the structure of staff organisation, committee’s terms of reference, chair’s 
tenure and official power of staff) as the factors. In South Korea, committee chairs 
are customers of staff rather than their bosses; they cannot organise the 
committee staff system as they want; their term is less than two years; and staff 
members are career civil servants rather than partisan staff. Thus, this thesis 
focuses on issue factors rather than human factors or administrative factors. 
The next section examines the detailed mechanism through which the 
committee staff exert their impact. Three sources of the impact of the committee 
staff – the motivation of the committee staff in conducting their roles; MPs’ 
delegation to the committee staff; and MPs’ trust of the committee staff and 
agreement with them – are focused on as the bases of the mechanism. The 
section is followed by the analysis of the factors affecting the impact of the 
committee staff. As common factors affecting the sources of the impact of the 
committee staff, the political controversy and the technical complexity (both in 
policy and legal aspects) are focused on. In addition, the personality and ability 
of staff members of the committee, and the workload and atmosphere of the 
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committee (especially the personality of the ranking members of the committee) 
are identified. Finally, the nature of staff impact is addressed. In the assessment 
of the nature, the findings from the interview data that the opinions of the 
committee staff suggested in the legislative process have a consultation and 
mediation feature and that committee staff members expect the reaction of other 
policy actors (especially, that of MPs) when they suggest amendment opinions 
are considered. 
 
8.2. The sources of the impact of the committee staff 
Basically, the impact of the committee staff is exerted when they conduct their 
informative and network managing role actively, and MPs delegate the scrutiny 
of bills to some degree and agree with the committee staff in the scrutiny at least 
implicitly. Therefore, it is necessary to know both why the committee staff conduct 
their roles actively and what leads to the delegation and agreement by MPs. In 
other words, it is necessary to investigate the motivation of staff members, the 
factors causing the MPs’ delegation to them and those that make MPs agree with 
them. In the investigation, the key concepts on the orientations, resources and 
capabilities of MPs and the committee staff discussed in chapter 5 are referred 
to. 
 8.2.1. The motivation of the committee staff in their role 
As the PSM theory reviewed in chapter 5 argues, the interview data 
demonstrated that the motivation most frequently referred to by committee staff 
members themselves is their policy efficacy; bills could be improved by their 
opinions. The number of interviewees who stated that policy efficacy is the 
motivation in their work is 36 interviewees. They think that they can participate in 
the legislative process; have an impact on the legislative process; contribute to 
making good public policies; and make contributions for the public interest. 
Especially in the scrutiny of government bills, they feel self-satisfaction when they 
can amend a government bill which has been worded only for the interests of the 
executive branch or their convenience and the staff are able to improve the bill. 
Moreover, they think that they have greater policy impact with neutrality and 
independence than the civil servants of the executive branch. A committee staff 
member answered: 
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Of course, I think that the motivation is to work for the public interest. I am not 
saying like this just for this interview. Really, really for the future and for as 
many people as possible, what is the right direction? Which policy is fair? It is 
to think for the future of my nation rather than from a short sighted perspective. 
The motivation is working for the public interest. It would be possible to achieve 
self-realisation in the process, but the basic motivation is that. … I think that 
most committee staff have the motivation of, for example, contribution to 
making a desirable finance policy or welfare policy. This is the most important 
motivation although other personal motivations would be different. The self-
esteem that we can feel by playing an important role in the policy process is 
an important motivation (Interviewee 067). 
This policy efficacy seems to be linked with the committee staff members’ sense 
of duty. Nearly a half of all interviewees (18) answered that they work due to a 
sense of duty believing that their work could affect the lives of people and the 
public interest. This sense of duty also includes the perception that it is their 
responsibility as a career civil servant to do the work given to them. The sense of 
duty is directly related to the norm-based dimension of Perry and Wise’s (1990, 
p.370) public service motivation. A senior staff member pointed out: 
The most basic point is that we are career civil servants. Doing given work is 
the basic duty of civil servants. That is a point. Then, the reason I work hard is 
that, as you said earlier, a considerable part of the scrutiny of bills, law bills or 
budget bills, is delegated to the committee staff and MPs depend on the 
committee staff. So, I cannot help feeling the responsibility. For example, if the 
committee staff miss a flaw in a bill, it is directly reflected in laws and affects 
the lives of people. So, as much as possible, most committee staff members 
cannot but have the sense of responsibility, and it seems that they work hard 
with such responsibility (Interviewee 011). 
However, it would not be reasonable that committee staff work only by the 
motivation of policy efficacy or a sense of duty. It is necessary to investigate 
whether there are incentives for committee staff members from their work. In 
answering the initial question about their motivation, five interviewees mentioned 
direct incentives such as promotion or bonuses in salary as committee staff 
members’ motivations and four interviewees (including two interviewees of the 
above five interviewees) mentioned the need for securing a good reputation 
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which affects their career as civil servants. Thus, follow-up questions about 
whether committee staff members’ performances or reputation affect their career 
and function as their motivation are asked. According to the interview data from 
the answers to the initial question about motivation or follow-up questions about 
incentives and reputation as motivation, 23 interviewees answered that gaining a 
good reputation is an important motivation for committee staff members. 15 
interviewees, including six of the above 23, however, stated that the influence of 
committee staff members’ reputations or performance on their career or 
incentives is not strong.8 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the answers of the six interviewees who 
showed an ambivalent attitude in detail in order to understand committee staff 
member’s motivation exactly. Firstly, a former staff member stated that he worked 
hard for promotion but reputation was not helpful for promotion to the top post 
with hindsight (Interviewee 194). Anyway, the reputation functioned as an 
important motivation for him. Secondly, three interviewees answered that 
receiving a salary bonus is not decided by performance, but the reputation is 
important especially in promotion. They acknowledged that performance and 
reputation affect career (Interviewee 008, Interviewee 070 and Interviewee 078). 
Thirdly, a junior staff member stated that his performance would not affect his 
promotion because he does not have seniority but reputation is important for him 
in a long-term (Interviewee 142). Thus, he admits the importance of reputation 
and performance. Finally, a staff member answered that there are more 
incentives for the personnel of other divisions in the National Assembly 
Secretariat rather than committee staff members although reputation is important 
(Interviewee 143). The answer is a tricky one, but could be interpreted as follows: 
The posts in the line organisation are popular for civil servants of the National 
Assembly and moving to those posts is very competitive. A committee staff 
member’s good reputation helps his/her movement to the popular posts when 
there is job circulation between the personnel in the line organisation and 
committee staff members. Therefore, reputation is also important. All these things 
considered, good reputation and good performance to gain the reputation can be 
important motivations for committee staff members, as the career concern model 
                                                          
8 Two interviewees declined to give answer. The follow-up questions are not asked in the pilot interviews 
and three of the pilot interviewees did not give an answer about this subject. 
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expected, although nine interviewees denied the association among the 
performance, reputation and the incentives in their career. A former committee 
staff member stated: 
Then, about the motivation for working hard, a committee staff member is 
evaluated through the review reports, and his/her self-esteem is raised by the 
evaluation. So, the review reports demonstrate the ability of the committee 
staff member and he/she could gain a good reputation. Their reputation could 
be considered in the decision on, for example, their promotion although not 
directly, but indirectly (Interviewee 193). 
  According to the interview data, the documents written by committee staff 
members (e.g. the review report or the document for the subcommittee’s 
examination) and committee staff members’ performances in subcommittee 
meetings (when it comes to senior staff members) become the bases on which 
other people (MPs, officials in the executive branch or other committee staff 
members) evaluate the committee staff members. A committee staff member’s 
reputation is formed through this evaluation and the reputation is shared. For 
senior staff members, this reputation is very important for their promotion to 
higher positions. For junior staff members, their reputation affects their job 
rotation, especially the movement to popular or important posts, and has an 
influence on their promotion in the long term. The motivation seems to be more 
important for senior staff members than junior staff members. Out of nine senior 
staff members, eight interviewees (88.9%) stated that gaining a good reputation 
is a motivation for committee staff members. Out of 24 junior staff members who 
answered about this subject, the number is 15 (62.5%).  
  Two interesting points should be highlighted. One is that having a reputation as 
a competent staff member affects not only the career as a civil servant but the 
career after retirement. Two interviewees (a former senior staff member and a 
current senior staff member) stated that the committee staff members who 
secured a good reputation as a competent staff member and a policy expert are 
likely to be recognised and work in the policy area even after their retirement. 
Their answers prop up the importance of a good reputation and the relevance of 
the career concern model discussed in chapter 5. The other point is that having 
an influence on government departments could be a motivation for committee 
staff members. According to three legislative researchers, if committee staff 
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members show a good performance in their work and their opinions are well 
accepted by MPs, they have more influence on government departments. The 
influence allows the committee staff members to work more conveniently, 
especially in the relationship with government departments, and to have more 
policy impact. Their answers prop up the importance of policy efficacy as a 
motivation for committee staff members. 
  8.2.2. MPs’ delegation to the committee staff 
Although the committee staff have the motivation to conduct their roles actively 
in the legislative process, they have no policy impact unless MPs delegate the 
scrutiny of bills to them to some degree. Considering the key concepts on the 
orientation of MPs discussed in chapter 5 – constituency worker, party politician, 
and policy watchdog and entrepreneur, MPs would have motivations to delegate. 
According to the interview data, three factors bring about MPs’ delegation of the 
scrutiny of bills to the committee staff. They are: MPs’ low expertise (already 
explained in chapter 2); MPs’ attention to tasks other than the scrutiny of bills 
(discussed in chapters 2 and 5); and MPs’ low attention to bills unrelated to their 
political interests. 
MPs’ low expertise 
As discussed in chapter 2, the institutions surrounding the legislature of South 
Korea are hostile environments for MPs raising their policy expertise according 
to the interview data. MPs usually move committee; the re-election rate of 
incumbent MPs is low; MPs have no time to raise their policy expertise due to 
many other tasks; and the number of personal staff in charge of the scrutiny of 
bills is small and their expertise in the scrutiny of law bills is low. The first and 
second factors are already discussed in chapter 2. A former staff member 
explained: 
Many MPs have high expertise in an individual policy area. But, they cannot 
stay in the committee in which they have expertise as they continue their 
political career, manage their constituencies and consider the next election. 
They move to committees that are irrelevant to their expertise in the long run 
(Interviewee 189). 
The third and fourth factors are related to MPs’ attention to other tasks which is 
discussed in chapters 2, 5 and later. They have many other tasks drawing their 
211 
 
attention, so they have no time to raise their policy expertise. Considering the fact 
that the number of personal staff members for each MP is nine (including two 
interns), MPs could use their personal staff although they themselves cannot 
raise their policy expertise. The personal staff members themselves, however, 
are in charge of the MPs’ various work. Therefore, the number of personal staff 
in charge of the scrutiny of bills is usually small and they have to conduct other 
tasks for their MPs simultaneously. 
MPs’ attention to tasks other than the scrutiny of bills 
MPs have much work other than the scrutiny of bills. As Rush (2001, Ch.7) 
pointed out about MPs of the British House of Commons, MPs of the South 
Korean Parliament are also taking the role of representative of their own 
constituency and party politician according to the interview data. Out of 20 
interviewees who commented about the variety of MPs’ tasks, all 20 interviewees 
mentioned constituency work and 13 interviewees mentioned party work. A 
committee staff member described: 
At first, I think that the most important work for MPs, especially for local 
constituency members, is the redress of their constituents’ grievances. That is 
the role of MPs. So, going to their constituency as much as possible and 
hearing constituents’ appeals and difficulties are the roles of MPs. These are 
not related to us. Other than that, MPs seem to do party work as I see. They 
work to decide the policy direction of the party, and such things, and they 
attend meetings such as the general assembly of MPs in their parties 
(Interviewee 052). 
One interesting thing about the MPs’ role of party politician is that some junior 
MPs take the role of attacking the other party in committee meetings. Especially 
junior MPs of the opposition party take the role of attacking the governing party 
and the executive branch. This is the legacy of the relationship between the 
government and the opposition in the era of military dictatorship explained in 
chapter 2. A committee staff member explained about an opposition MP taking 
this role. 
The broadcasting policy area is somewhat political. This MP played the role of 
a sniper, such as criticizing the broadcasting media or the executive branch. 
… So, from the opposition MPs’ point of view, they think the broadcasting 
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media are partial to the governing party or the President. They think that public 
broadcasting is partial to the governing party, so they are not satisfied. So, this 
MP attacked the broadcasting media when the public broadcaster had made 
a fault or when cable TV had become more favourable to the governing party. 
He played such a role. … Of course, he also attacked the governing party 
(Interviewee 125). 
In addition, five interviewees mentioned MPs’ own policy activities. Needless to 
say, sponsoring bills is one of the most important policy activities and there are a 
huge number of private members’ bills as demonstrated in chapter 2. According 
to the interview data, parties or NGOs evaluate an individual MP’s legislative 
activities by the number of bills that he/she has sponsored, so MPs sponsor bills 
for legislative performance as explained in chapter 2. In addition, when there is a 
high-profile issue, individual MPs sponsor similar bills related to the issue 
redundantly. There are also a growing number of hand-out bills because the 
government department can achieve their policy goal and the sponsoring MP can 
demonstrate a positive legislative performance. A committee staff member 
mentioned MPs’ attention to the current high-profile issues as the cause of the 
rising number of private members’ bills: 
Parties have recently considered MPs’ performance of legislative activities in 
their nomination for the next election. So, MPs are sponsoring many law bills 
to improve their legislative performance. Even when there are reports by the 
media about a serious issue, such as child sexual abuse or Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS), many MPs sponsor related bills. When there is 
a social issue, many MPs sponsor bills containing measures for the issue 
redundantly. So, the number of law bills is skyrocketing (Interviewee 047). 
Due to these diverse tasks of MPs, the time for the scrutiny of law bills becomes 
short. As demonstrated in chapter 2, the subcommittee stage is the core and 
substantive procedure in the legislative process in South Korea. The time for 
subcommittee meetings is usually very short, however, for the scrutiny of the 
huge number of bills. This shortage of time requires high efficiency in the 
subcommittee stage as demonstrated in chapter 7. While answering that there is 
not sufficient time to scrutinise law bills due to MPs’ diverse tasks, a committee 
staff member emphasised the low frequency of subcommittee meetings: 
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Next, the second reason is that MPs are too busy due to other work. So, for 
example, the period of a session is a month, but the time for committee 
activities is only two weeks considering the time for the plenary. MPs have to 
receive the report on the current issues through committee meetings and the 
committee has other schedules, so subcommittee meetings are held at most 
twice. There is a shortage of time and there is a limitation of the number of bills 
that can be tabled in subcommittee meetings (Interviewee 082). 
Table 8.1. The numbers of subcommittee meetings for the scrutiny of law bills 
and those of law bills according to standing committees 
Number 
Committees 
Subcommittee 
meetings (A) 
Law bills (B) B / A 
House Steering 19 357 18.79 
Legislation and Judiciary 46 1,300 28.26 
National Policy 66 1,187 17.98 
Strategy and Finance 102 1,660 16.27 
Future Planning, Science, Broadcasting 
and Communication 
32 776 24.25 
Education, Culture, Sports and Tourism 38 1,656 43.58 
Foreign Affairs and Unification 30 239 7.97 
National Defence 28 430 15.36 
Security and Public Administration 49 2,429 49.57 
Agriculture, Food, Rural Affairs, Oceans 
and Fisheries  
30 1,278 42.60 
Trade, Industry and Energy 45 1,030 22.89 
Health and Welfare 59 1,996 33.83 
Environment and Labour 42 1,223 29.12 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport 39 1,691 43.36 
Gender Equality and Family 16 376 23.50 
Total 641 17,628 27.50 
Sources: National Assembly (2016c); calculated from National Assembly (2016d) 
Intelligence committee is excluded because there is no available record of the committee. 
 
In fact, the number of the subcommittee meetings of 15 standing committees 
(except the Intelligence Committee) for the scrutiny of legislation was 641 during 
the four-year term of the 19th National Assembly from 2012 to 2016 according to 
the calculation of the data in National Assembly (2016d). The subcommittee 
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meetings for the scrutiny of legislation had been held only 0.89 times in a month 
in a standing committee. The total number of law bills referred to the 15 standing 
committees in the assembly was 17,628 and a subcommittee meeting dealt with 
27.5 law bills on average. Table 8.1 represents the number of subcommittee 
meetings for the scrutiny of law bills and that of law bills according to the 15 
standing committees. 
MPs’ uneven attention to law bills 
Even in the scrutiny of law bills, MPs give uneven attention to law bills according 
to the interview data. The bills that draw MPs’ attention are classified into three 
categories: bills that have great impact on the public or are high-profile; bills that 
draw the parties’ attention; and bills that are important for individual MPs. First of 
all, MPs give their attention to a high profile bill that has a big impact on the public 
(two interviewees mentioned this). This is not only because it is natural that MPs 
are interested in important bills as representatives of the people but because MPs 
can raise their profile through the debate over those bills, similar to credit claiming 
or position taking in Mayhew (1974). In answering the question about the bills 
that draw MPs’ attention, a committee staff member explained the point: 
[MPs are interested in] Law bills related to programmes that have a direct 
impact on their own constituency and draw the constituents’ attention or bills 
with a high profile in the media through which MPs can raise their own profile 
(Interviewee 082). 
The next bills that draw MPs’ attention are bills that draw the parties’ attention 
(21 interviewees mentioned this). The following bills are important for a political 
party and draw their attention: bills related to the ideology on which the party is 
based; bills related to the policy directions of the executive branch; bills related 
to the interests of the socio-economic class that the party aims to represent; bills 
related to interest groups that have political power; and bills related to the 
interests of a region which supports the party. In particular, MPs are taking the 
role of a party politician in committees when there is a sharp confrontation 
between parties over a law bill due to the difference in policy principle between 
the parties. For example, when a government bill which reflects the policy 
direction of the executive branch, which is contradictory to the policy principles of 
the opposition party, is referred to a committee, there could be a sharp 
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confrontation between MPs in the committee. Those bills are likely to be related 
to the interests of groups that support a party or that the party aims to represent, 
so they are related to the party’s political interests, such as gaining votes in 
elections. A committee staff member explained: 
Then, there are bills that the parties push due to their own party platform. The 
offices of MPs seriously review those important bills in advance. … For 
example, I told you about the Distribution Industry Development Act. In that 
case, on the one hand, the opposition party argues that there should be strict 
regulation and opposition MPs set the agenda. On the other hand, MPs in the 
governing party actively defend against those arguments because they may 
think that the regulation could hinder economic growth. … They don’t [set the 
party platform about all bills]. I think it (the setting) is related to the parties’ 
political stance. The governing party seems to intervene actively in the 
legislative process of the bills related to deregulation. The opposition party 
seems to focus on the protection of the lower or middle class [that they aim to 
represent] (Interviewee 103). 
Finally, there are bills that draw MPs’ attention because they are important for 
individual MPs (18 interviewees mentioned this). Firstly, there are bills related to 
an individual MP’s own constituency. Those bills are directly related to his/her re-
election. Secondly, there are bills related to interest groups which the MP has a 
relationship with, for example, the MP was a member of the interest group or the 
interest group supports the MP. Those interest groups could affect elections. 
Thirdly, there are bills related to the MP’s ideology or bills on which the MP has 
expertise. For example, an MP who was a member of a trade union is likely to be 
interested in law bills protecting the rights of workers. The second and third kinds 
of bills are closely related to the MP’s occupational background. Fourthly, there 
are bills that the MP has sponsored or bills that other policy actors (e.g. the 
executive branch or interest groups) have asked to pass. Bills in this category are 
linked to bills in the above three categories. An individual MP sponsors a law bill 
because it is related to his/her own constituency, interest groups that support the 
MP, their ideology or policy expertise. When asked about the features of bills in 
which individual MPs are interested, a former committee staff member answered: 
Generally, individual MPs are interested in law bills related to their own 
constituency, such as bills related to the programmes in the constituency, 
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which are much related to the next election. Then, there are cases in which 
individual MPs drive the legislative process of bills which correspond to the 
MP’s beliefs, principles or ideology. In addition, individual MPs are interested 
in the bills related to interest groups or government departments that they 
belonged to, or the policy area where they have worked (Interviewee 193).  
It is difficult for MPs to give attention to law bills except the bills mentioned above 
because there are too many bills as already demonstrated. 17,822 law bills have 
been introduced during the 19th National Assembly (from May 2012 to May 2016). 
There were 1,113.9 law bills per each standing committee. Five standing 
committees were in charge of more than 1,500 law bills and another five 
committees along with them were in charge of more than 1,000 law bills. 16 
interviewees answered that there are too many bills for MPs to review all law bills. 
It is an irony that MPs give low attention to the scrutiny of law bills because they 
themselves sponsor law bills very actively. 
  8.2.3. MPs’ trust in the committee staff and agreement with them 
Although MPs delegate the scrutiny of bills to the committee staff to some 
degree, they have the official and ultimate power of making legislation. Therefore, 
if there is no agreement and trust from MPs, the committee staff have no impact 
in the legislative process. According to the interview data, three factors lead to 
MPs’ trust and agreement. They are committee staff members’ devotion to 
reviewing bills; the mediated and consulted features of committee staff opinions; 
and the committee staff’s neutral position. Firstly, committee staff members can 
devote themselves to the scrutiny of bills unlike personal staff members of MPs 
(six interviewees mentioned this). Personal staff members of MPs have to 
conduct other tasks (e.g. constituency work, party work and the MP’s own policy 
activities) than the scrutiny of bills, but committee staff members can focus only 
on the scrutiny of bills. This devotion makes the documents produced by the 
committee staff so comprehensive that the scrutiny of bills becomes possible only 
through the documents as explained in chapter 7. Two interviewees explained: 
After all, the senior staff member who devotes himself to an issue reviews the 
bill comprehensively, so it can be said that he/she has high expertise on the 
issue (Interviewee 189). 
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Then, then, MPs perceive the same social phenomenon and suggest solutions 
to it. Several alternatives are submitted, but the offices of MPs seem not to 
make efforts to understand all the alternatives systematically and identify 
differences between them. It is natural that we are in charge of the task 
because they are submitted to us and we manage the alternatives. We review, 
compare and summarise them comprehensively (Interviewee 094). 
Secondly, the opinions of the committee staff are suggested after the process 
of consultation with diverse policy actors and mediation between them as already 
discussed. The opinions have the feature of mediated and consulted opinions 
(eight interviewees mentioned this). To some degree, the opinions are not 
committee staff members’ own opinions, but the opinions of the relevant policy 
actors themselves. Thus, the opinions are likely to suffice stakeholders in the 
policy network, so MPs are likely to agree with the opinions unless the opinions 
affect their own interests much or are contrary to their own beliefs, policy 
principles or ideologies. A senior staff member emphasised that amendment 
opinions in the documents for the subcommittee’s examination are not his own 
original opinions: 
The opinions are mediated opinions after consultation with government 
departments and interest groups rather than the committee staff director’s 
original opinions. So, the roles of the committee staff director are to mediate 
between stakeholders, resolve the confrontation between them and make 
consulted alternatives rather than to make new and original alternatives and 
suggest them. Thus, an amendment opinion is included in the document for 
the subcommittee’s examination after sponsoring departments and interest 
groups agree with it. So, the opinion is agreed by MPs without an objection 
(Interviewee 008). 
Finally, MPs’ trust in the committee staff is derived from the neutrality of the 
committee staff and documents written by them (four interviewees mentioned 
this). The neutrality of the committee staff includes the political neutrality between 
parties and being impartial and fair between relevant policy actors (e.g. interest 
groups). The neutrality of the committee staff enables the consultation and 
mediation mentioned above. Committee staff members themselves referred to 
neutrality as one of the norms of committee staff most frequently (28 interviewees 
mentioned neutrality). According to a former senior staff member, neutrality is the 
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essential reason that committee staff members have the legal status of career 
civil servants. 
I mentioned about neutrality earlier. It is unique that committee staff members 
review bills and make oral reports on the bill. The uniqueness is based on the 
trust that committee staff review bills from their impartial perspectives although 
there are differing opinions between MPs and parties. So, the trust will be 
damaged if the review is not balanced. In this regard, the neutrality is the raison 
d'être of committee staff members (Interviewee 186). 
MPs’ agreement and trust drawn from the comprehensive review of the 
committee staff; the features of their opinions as consulted and mediated 
alternatives; and their neutrality become important when an MP gives his/her 
attention to a bill and wants the bill to be enacted although the bill is not desirable. 
Although one or two individual MPs in the subcommittee are interested in the bill 
and want the bill to be enacted, other MPs follow the opinion of the committee 
staff at least implicitly unless the bill is reasonable and rational. Therefore, it is 
difficult for a bill to be enacted only because it draws the attention of an individual 
MP. A committee staff member explained: 
When an MP is interested in such bills, the MP could collide with the committee 
staff in subcommittee meetings. … The MP, well, the MP can insist, but such 
bills are likely to be unbalanced and favourable to a specific group. So, it’s the 
weakness of such bills. It is difficult to get other MPs’ agreement (Interviewee 
014). 
8.2.4. The mechanism in which the policy impact of committee staff is exerted 
The summary of the mechanism 
The mechanism in which the impact of the committee staff is exerted is depicted 
in Figure 8.1. First of all, committee staff members conduct their roles due to 
policy efficacy, a sense of duty and incentives in their career as civil servants or 
after their retirement. The reputation as a competent committee staff member 
affects the incentives. They also want to secure influence on government 
departments and the influence reinforces their policy efficacy and allows them to 
work with government departments conveniently. 
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Figure 8.1. Mechanism in which the policy impact of committee staff is exerted 
 
- Numbers in brackets: the numbers of interviewees who mentioned the theme, the width of arrows are differentiated according to the number 
- For a detailed version, see appendix 4.1.
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  On top of that, MPs delegate the scrutiny of bills to the committee staff to some 
degree. This is because of their low expertise, their attention to tasks other than 
the scrutiny of bills and their uneven attention to law bills. Firstly, MPs usually 
have low expertise on the scrutiny of bills. They have to move between 
committees. The re-election rate of incumbent MPs is low. They have a short time 
in which to raise their own policy expertise due to their other tasks. The number 
of personal staff to support them in the scrutiny of bills is small and the personal 
staff members also have to conduct other tasks. 
Secondly, MPs have to give their attention to tasks other than the examination 
of bills. They have the burden of constituency work and party work. In addition, 
they have to do their own policy activities. Sponsoring bills is one of the most 
important policy activities. One of the reasons they sponsor bills is that parties or 
NGOs evaluate an MP by the number of bills that the MP has sponsored. In 
addition, when there is a high-profile issue in the media, they sponsor bills related 
to the issue redundantly to raise their own profile. They also sponsor bills related 
to their own constituency or interest groups that support them. Needless to say, 
MPs also sponsor bills that achieve their own policy principles or bills related to 
policies on which they have expertise. 
Thirdly, MPs give uneven attention to law bills. There are too many bills due to 
the reasons above. Therefore, it is difficult for MPs to review all law bills and MPs 
need to concentrate their attention on important bills. Bills which have a great 
impact on the public or bills which are high-profile draw the attention of MPs. An 
MP’s participation in the debate over such bills raises the MP’s profile. Bills that 
are important for an MP’s party draw the MP’s attention. Those bills are bills 
related to the party’s own policy principles; the policy directions of the executive 
branch; the interests of the socio-economic class that the party aims to represent; 
interest groups that have political power; and the interests of a region which 
supports the party. There are also bills which are important from an individual 
MP’s point of view. Bills related to an individual MP’s own constituency, interest 
groups with which the MP has a relationship draw the MP’s attention. Bills on 
which the MP has expertise or bills related to the MP’s ideology also draw the 
MP’s attention. MPs are likely to delegate the scrutiny of bills to the committee 
staff except those bills that draw their attention. The uneven attention of MPs to 
law bills corresponds to the finding of Whiteman (1995) on the U.S. Congress 
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that the number of involved enterprises (the offices of congressmen/women) in 
the legislative process of a law bill is small and information is unevenly allocated 
in an issue network related to a law bill. 
Last, but not least, MPs’ trust and agreement allow the committee staff to have 
an impact in the legislative process. The trust and agreement are because of the 
devotion of the committee staff to reviewing bills; the mediated and consulted 
features of staff members’ opinions; and the neutral position of the committee 
staff. The committee staff can focus on the review of bills unlike MPs and their 
personal staff members. Their opinions are not their independent and original 
opinions, but consulted and mediated opinions. Therefore, the opinions are likely 
to secure agreement from relevant policy actors. The neutral position of the 
committee staff also enables committee staff to secure MPs’ trust and agreement. 
Due to the trust and agreement, even when an individual MP wants a law bill to 
be enacted, it is difficult for a bill, to which the committee staff are opposed, to 
pass unless the bill is rational and reasonable. 
The analysis of the mechanism through the theoretical framework and key 
concepts 
The theoretical framework and key concepts set out in chapter 5 is relevant to 
the analysis of the mechanism of the impact of the committee staff. First of all, 
the orientations of MPs and committee staff members analysed as below enable 
MPs’ delegation to the committee staff and participation of the committee staff in 
the legislative process. In the policy network of the scrutiny of government law 
bills, as discussed in chapter 5, MPs have the orientations of constituency worker, 
party politician, and policy watchdog and entrepreneur. These orientations not 
only have self-interested features but are also formed and affected by institutional 
and historical contexts. On the one hand, when it comes to the self-interested 
feature, constituency work and party work are directly related to nomination by 
their party and their re-election, and sponsoring bills as a policy entrepreneur is 
important for re-election through being evaluated as a good MP by their party or 
NGOs. On the other hand, these orientation structures are induced from the 
historical contexts of South Korean parliamentary politics explained in chapter 2. 
The importance of party work for MPs is due to the regionalism in elections since 
the democratisation in 1987 and the feature of parliamentary politics as political 
strife between parties which is the legacy from the era of military dictatorship. The 
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political strife in the legislature leads to people’s distrust in the legislature and has 
lowered the re-election rate of incumbent MPs. Thus, constituency work has 
become important. The concentration of national resource in the central 
government and the dependence of local governments on the central government 
has made constituency work more important; has had MPs preferring useful 
committees in securing budget and programmes for their constituency; and has 
lowered the merit of having policy expertise in the legislature. As Katznelson and 
Weingast (2005) argue, the orientations of agents are shaped in institutions which 
are historically constructed. In addition, in the historical contexts, there has been 
the logic of appropriateness that MPs behave as party politicians and 
constituency workers, especially in the authoritarian era when politics between 
parties were a sort of democratic movement and there was no adequate 
representation of local interests without elected local governments. 
Also discussed in chapter 5, committee staff members have orientations to 
promotion or career concern; participation in making public policy; and 
commitment to the public interest. The first one is a sort of self-interested 
orientation from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism, but the 
orientation is also affected by institutional settings. The legal status of the 
committee staff as career civil servants makes their reputation important in their 
career because they have to interact with other colleagues repetitively throughout   
their career. The second and third orientations are formed and affected by the 
institutions in which the committee staff are located. Committee staff members 
have policy efficacy and a related sense of duty as their motivation, which testify 
to the relevance of PSM theory related to normative institutionalism. As the 
normative institutionalism expected, they follow ‘appropriate actions’ identified by 
their role and function in the legislative process.  
The orientation structures of MPs and committee staff members are conducive 
to MPs delegation to the committee staff and committee staff members’ 
conducting their roles. On the one hand, the scrutiny of government law bills 
becomes similar to the production of public goods for MPs which has no exclusive 
benefit for them because any individual MP cannot claim exclusive credit from 
the scrutiny, and does not draw MPs’ attention. Moreover, the huge number of 
law bills and MP’s low expertise increase the costs in producing the public goods 
– the scrutiny of law bills. In addition, MPs have a considerable amount of other 
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work through which they can secure their own political interests (e.g. re-election) 
and through which they should conduct their appropriate roles formed by 
institutions. On the other hand, for the committee staff, participation in the scrutiny 
of government law bills becomes similar to the production of private goods which 
brings about exclusive payoffs for committee staff members and motivates them. 
First of all, active conducting of their functions helps them to secure a good 
reputation as a competent staff member. This reputation is useful for them to gain 
advantage in their career as civil servants or after their retirement. On top of that, 
it suffices their policy efficacy, commitment to the public interest and sense of 
duty. 
On top of that, the resources and capabilities of the committee staff enable them 
to get the approval and agreement of MPs in their participation in the legislative 
process. Firstly, committee staff members have knowledge about the legislative 
process, technical knowledge about legislation and a certain level of policy 
expertise as discussed in chapter 5. As discussed in chapter 7, they provide MPs, 
the sponsoring department and interest groups with the information about the 
legislative process and technical skills in legislation. In return, they take policy 
and political information (opinions of relevant interest groups) and data necessary 
in the scrutiny from the sponsoring department and interest groups and deliver 
them to MPs. They also take political information (positions of parties or individual 
MPs) and delegation, which is necessary in consultation with and mediation 
among other policy actors, from MPs. Through the resource exchange in the 
policy network, the committee staff occupy the information channel and have 
informational power. 
In addition, the feature of the legislative arena as a policy network requires the 
existence of a network manager. Major policy actors need other actors’ policy 
resources, and a unilateral decision by a policy actor is difficult in the policy 
network surrounding the legislative process. In this interdependent network, the 
committee staff have a neutral status, information and expertise which allow them 
the possibility of network managing as governance literature contends. As 
already discussed in chapter 5, differently from other major policy actors (MPs, 
the executive and interest groups), they are non-partisan and have no political 
stake in the enactment of a bill, which enables them to play the role of ‘honest 
broker’ (Scharpf, 1997, p.145). They occupy the information channel among 
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policy actors due to their knowledge in legislation, legislative process and policy 
matters, and are in favourable positions in the channel to provide linkages 
between actors. They are in charge of working level legislation, which imposes 
on them the responsibility of managing the legislative process that other actors 
do not take. 
The informational power of the committee staff enables them to review bills 
comprehensively and provide documents allowing efficient scrutiny in the 
legislative process. The network managing role of the committee staff produces 
their mediated and consulted amendment opinions. The comprehensive review 
and mediated and consulted opinions of the committee staff, along with their 
neutral position, induce the approval and agreement of MPs to and with them. 
 
8.3. Factors affecting the impact of the committee staff 
If there are variations in the factors depicted in Figure 8.1, the impact of the 
committee staff could change. The most important factor is MPs’ delegation to 
the committee staff due to the low attention MPs give to the scrutiny of law bills 
and their low expertise on the bills. As an aside point, the political controversy 
over a bill is likely to affect MPs’ attention. In addition, the technical complexity of 
bills affects the expertise of MPs and committee staff members over the bills. 
Therefore, political controversy and technical complexity are two important 
factors affecting the impact of the committee staff. This section examines these 
two factors’ influence on the impact of the committee staff through, firstly, the 
analysis on empirical data and then explores other factors’ influence through the 
interview data. 
8.3.1. Political controversy 
According to the interview data, 32 interviewees answered that their policy 
impact changes according to the political controversy of bills. Figure 8.2 is the 
mechanism in which committee staff exerted a weak policy impact in the 
legislative process of political controversial bills according to the interview data. 
First of all, MPs withdraw the delegation to the committee staff and actively 
intervene in the legislative process. It is because controversial bills are likely to 
make changes in the distribution of values over diverse social groups; affect the
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Figure 8.2. Weak impact of the committee staff over politically controversial matters 
 
- Numbers in bracket: the numbers of interviewees who mentioned the theme, the width of arrows are differentiated according to the number 
- For a detailed version, see appendix 4.2. 
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groups’ interests; and be related to the political interests of MPs or parties. MPs 
are likely to give their attention to those bills. Thus, politically controversial bills 
have similar features to bills drawing MPs attention discussed in the above 
section. Those bills include bills related to a MP’s own party’s policy principles, 
the interests of the socio-economic class or the region that the party aims to 
represent, politically strong interest groups or an MP’s own constituency. Bills of 
great impact on the public and high-profile bills also draw MPs’ attention and are 
likely to be controversial. The scrutiny of those bills becomes similar to the 
production of private goods which have exclusive benefits for them. MPs can 
secure their own political interest and conduct their appropriate roles such as 
being party politicians.   
  On top of that, committee staff members refrain from suggesting their opinions 
on those bills. Firstly, the self-restraint is due to the norm of political neutrality. 
Six interviewees mentioned political neutrality as the reason for refraining from 
suggesting their opinions in the legislative process of politically controversial bills. 
If a bill is politically controversial because the bill affects the interests of many 
people and there are confrontations between interest groups and parties due to 
the bill, MPs have to make political decisions on the bill as the people’s 
representatives and the parties may have to negotiate to make the decisions. 
Committee staff members have to keep political neutrality because they are just 
civil servants and have no democratic legitimacy. As Patterson (1970, pp.29-31) 
argues, the legislative norm constrains committee staff’s activities. This point 
reveals the relevance of the normative institutionalism. A committee staff member 
explained: 
Well, of course, we don’t suggest a specific amendment opinion over politically 
controversial matters because the process of political negotiation is necessary. 
We don’t advocate a specific opinion over such matters due to the status of 
the committee staff who should keep their neutrality (Interviewee 070). 
  Secondly, committee staff members refrain from suggesting their opinions in the 
legislative process of political controversial bills because of the fear of attack from 
MPs who give much attention to such bills. MPs are likely to reject and attack 
committee staff members when the opinions of the committee staff are contrary 
to their positions in the legislative process of these bills. Moreover, the attacks 
from MPs could lead to disadvantages over the committee staff member’s career 
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– the staff member is likely to be condemned that he/she is not neutral or impartial. 
If a committee staff member advocates an opinion in the legislative process of 
such bills, MPs are likely to attack the committee staff member that the staff 
member is not politically neutral. Eight interviewees confessed the difficulty in 
keeping a balance between parties in the legislative process of politically 
controversial bills, and two interviewees explicitly mentioned that they refrain from 
suggesting their opinions when MPs’ complaints are expected. Two committee 
staff members stated:  
Well, we are civil servants anyway. If we suggest amendment opinions 
strongly over politically controversial matters, a specific party is likely to 
attack us that we are not politically neutral (Interviewee 070). 
When it comes to difficulties in doing this job, as I’ve told you several times, 
well, writing an impartial review report about matters over which there is a 
confrontation in a neutral position is not easy in fact. It is rather easy to write 
a report reflecting the position of one side and back it up logically, but we 
have to deal with the opinions of both sides impartially. So, there are attacks 
from MPs of other opinions on the spot when the review report seems to be 
partial to one side even slightly. It’s the atmosphere, so we are very careful 
(Interviewee 008). 
  To sum up, for the committee staff, active intervention in the legislative process 
of politically controversial bills is contradictory to both their self-interests and 
appropriate action ruled by institutional norms. In this situation, committee staff 
members refrain from intervening in the scrutiny of controversial bills actively. 
Finally, as discussed in chapters 5 and 7, the difficulty of mediation by the 
committee staff in the legislative process of politically controversial bills leads 
them to refrain from doing so. The amendment opinions of the committee staff 
are likely to be the results of consultation with and mediation between relevant 
policy actors as already discussed. In the legislative process of politically 
controversial bills, however, the consultation and mediation become difficult 
because there is a sharp confrontation between policy actors. This confrontation 
is due to the feature of those bills as ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Easton 
1985, p. 143). There are confrontations between MPs, between parties and 
between interest groups because those bills affect the distribution of social values 
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between them. The committee staff have no official authority to arbitrate the 
confrontation. Therefore, it becomes difficult to suggest amendment opinions to 
appease all relevant policy actors. This limitation of the mediation by the 
committee staff induces MPs’ intervention in the scrutiny of those bills because 
they have political resources such as legitimacy, official authority and political 
knowledge and skills that are necessary for the arbitration between relevant 
political actors. 
Three additional interesting points are revealed according to the interview data. 
The first one is that the number of politically controversial bills of which MPs 
withdraw their delegation to committee staff is small compared to that of 
uncontroversial bills. 12 interviewees explicitly mentioned that the number of 
politically controversial bills is relatively small. Seven of the 12 interviewees 
answered that the percentage of bills which are so controversial that the impact 
of the committee staff becomes weak is from 10 to 20 per cent. The second point 
is that there are cases in which the committee staff have a strong impact even in 
the scrutiny of controversial bills. This is because mediation by the committee 
staff could be necessary over such bills, especially when there are needs for 
legislation of the bills. A junior legislative researcher mentioned that staff impact 
becomes stronger when there is a confrontation. Four legislative researchers 
stated that committee staff members’ mediation could become necessary in the 
scrutiny of a controversial bill when the bill has to be enacted. Two former senior 
staff members said that there are cases in which MPs request committee staff 
mediation. A committee staff member stated: 
By the way, one point is that there are cases in which the advice of the 
committee staff has a considerable impact on matters over which the 
governing party and the opposition party confront each other sharply. So, the 
committee staff mediate between parties when the bill should be enacted and 
someone should mediate. The committee staff intervene in many cases. In fact, 
they intervene unofficially. … The government department in charge and the 
committee staff make alternatives for mediation together when the ranking 
members of the committee and officials in the department meet. We bring the 
alternatives because the committee staff usually have better political sense 
than civil servants in government departments. However, the department 
make the alternatives following the directions of the committee staff. We 
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suggest the alternatives to MPs, and MPs accept them in most cases. … 
Those cases are up to 30 per cent [of controversial bills], aren’t they? 
(Interviewee 143) 
The last point is that there is a direct negotiation between the parliamentary 
leaderships of each party and even MPs of the committee in charge of the scrutiny 
have no impact when there is such a high controversy over a bill that the results 
of the scrutiny of the bill could affect the parties. The official legislative process 
(the scrutiny of the committee, subcommittee and the plenary) is not important. 
There is a negotiation between parties over the bill, and the committee and 
subcommittee officially in charge of the bill just resolve the bill according to the 
result of the negotiation. It is similar to ‘venue change’ discussed in Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993, p.34). This point is very important because the committee-
centered system for policy expertise in the scrutiny of bills could become nominal 
due to party politics. A committee staff member described: 
I saw such a case for the first time when there was a re-organisation of 
government departments. How can I call them? Such as parliamentary 
leadership. They are MPs in higher, higher positions, aren’t they? They 
decided all the matters. … Finally, we just made the committee bill according 
to their decisions after the decisions. We didn’t do anything really. … The 
features of those bills, there was no role for the committee staff, but there was 
no role for MPs of the committee, either. MPs of my committee didn’t play any 
role in examining the bill. They just resolved according to the direction of MPs 
in higher positions. Similarly, the special committee on the reform of public 
officials’ pensions was established, but MPs didn’t do anything. There was a 
separate negotiating body. They just resolved according to the decision from 
the negotiating body (Interviewee 097). 
Overall, the analysis on amendment opinions props up the interview data. Table 
8.2 demonstrates the breakdown of total amendment opinions according to the 
controversy of the bill under scrutiny and initiator(s) of amendment opinions. MPs 
and others suggest amendment opinions more vigorously in the legislative 
processes of controversial bills, and staff vice versa. The association between 
the controversy of the bill under scrutiny and the initiator(s) of amendment 
opinions is significant according to the chi-square test on the data (X2(2) = 32.113 
and p < 0.001). The proportion of amendment opinions of the committee staff is 
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low (41.3%), and those of MPs’ amendment opinions and others’ amendment 
opinions are high in the scrutiny of controversial bills (50.0% and 8.7% 
respectively). Amendment opinions of MPs (n = 103) outnumber those of staff (n 
= 85) in the scrutiny of controversial bills. 
Table 8.2. Controversy and initiator(s) of amendment opinions 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff MPs Others Total 
Controversial 
85 103 18 206 
(100%) (41.3%) (50.0%) (8.7%) 
Uncontroversial 
361 203 17 581 
(100%) (62.1%) (34.9%) (2.9%) 
Total 
446 306 35 787 
(100%) (56.7%) (38.9%) (4.4%) 
- X2(2) = 32.113 and p < 0.001 
 
Table 8.3. The results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship between 
controversy and initiator(s) after controlling for type and policy type 
Type 
Policy Type 
Non-substantive Substantive 
Distributive 
p = 1.000*, n = 62 
Odds ratio = 1.021 
X2(1) = 7.145, p = 0.008, n = 195 
Odds ratio = 0.377 
Regulative 
p = 0.531*, n = 59 
Odds ratio = 0.598 
X2(1) = 0.624, p = 0.430, n = 244 
Odds ratio = 0.787 
Constituent 
p = 1.000*, n = 20 
Odds ratio = 0.368 
X2(1) = 8.125, p = 0.004, n = 65 
Odds ratio = 0.228 
Extractive -**, n = 7 
p = 0.009*, n = 26 
Odds ratio = 0.055 
Basic laws 
p = 0.010*, n = 19 
Odds ratio = 0.036 
p = 0.095*, n = 48 
Odds ratio = 0.211 
Laws related to 
international 
treaties 
-**, n = 3 -**, n = 1 
Etc. -**, n = 1 -**, n = 1 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- The test is not conducted for irrelevant amendment opinions. 
- Odds ratio = the share of staff members’ amendment opinions in the scrutiny of controversial bills / that in 
the scrutiny of uncontroversial bills. 
- For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see Appendix 3.2. 
 
The negative association is investigated after controlling for other factors – type 
of amendment opinions and policy type. Table 8.3 represents the results of cross 
tabulation analyses on the relationship after the control. The data are collapsed 
in the same way as table 7.3 in chapter 7. The association is not significant in the 
categories of non-substantive amendment opinions except basic laws (n = 19, 
11.9 per cent of non-substantive amendment opinions analysed). Thus, the 
negative association is not confirmed in non-substantive amendment opinions. 
When it comes to substantive amendment opinions, however, the association is 
significant at p = 0.05 level in three categories to which 49.5 per cent of 
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substantive amendment opinions analysed (286 / 578) belong, and so at p = 0.10 
level in basic laws (n = 48, 8.3 per cent of substantive amendment opinions 
analysed). One exception is that p = 0.430 in substantive amendment opinions 
on bills related to regulative policy (n = 244, 42.2 per cent of substantive 
amendment opinions analysed). It means that the negative association between 
the controversy and staff members’ amendment opinions is not confirmed in the 
scrutiny of bills related to regulative policy, in contrast to other policies. 
Table 8.4. Initiator(s), controversy and acceptance of amendment opinions  
Initiator 
(s) 
Acceptance 
Controversy 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected 
Bill is 
killed 
Bill is 
withdrawn 
Total 
Staff 
Controversial 
41 18 25 1 0 85 
(48.2%) (21.2%) (29.4%) (1.2%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Uncontroversial 
248 54 37 21 1 361 
(68.7%) (15.0%) (10.2%) (5.8%) (0.3%) (100%) 
Sub-total 
289 72 62 22 1 446 
(64.8%) (16.1%) (13.9%) (4.9%) (0.2%) (100%) 
MPs 
Controversial 
26 28 48 1 0 103 
(25.2%) (27.2%) (46.6%) (1.0%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Uncontroversial 
30 45 119 9 0 203 
(14.8%) (22.2%) (58.6%) (4.4%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Sub-total 
56 73 167 10 0 306 
(18.3%) (23.9%) (54.6%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Others 
Controversial 
5 4 9 0 0 18 
(27.8%) (22.2%) (50.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Uncontroversial 
9 5 2 1 0 17 
(52.9%) (29.4%) (11.8%) (5.9%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Sub-total 
14 9 11 1 0 35 
(40.0%) (25.7%) (31.4%) (2.9%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Total 
359 154 240 33 1 787 
(45.6%) (19.6%) (30.5%) (4.2%) (0.1%) (100%) 
- X2(2) = 23.352, p < 0.001 for staff. 
- X2(2) = 6.460, p = 0.041 for MPs. 
- The cases in which the bill is killed or withdrawn are excluded from the tests. The test is not conducted 
for amendment opinions of others than staff and MPs. 
 
The analysis on the relationship between the controversy of the bill under 
scrutiny and acceptance of amendment opinions should be conducted to 
investigate the change of the impact according to the controversy. Table 8.4 
shows the initiator(s), the controversy of the bill under scrutiny and acceptance 
of amendment opinions. The amendment opinions of the committee staff are less 
successful in the scrutiny of controversial bills than in those of uncontroversial 
bills. The association is significant according to the chi-square test on the data 
(X2(2) = 23.352 and p < 0.001, the cases in which the bill is killed or withdrawn 
are excluded from the test). The proportion of amendment opinions accepted 
without revisions is lower (48.2%) and that of amendment opinions rejected is 
higher (29.4%) in the scrutiny of controversial bills than those in the scrutiny of 
uncontroversial bills (68.7% and 10.2% respectively). When it comes to MPs’ 
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amendment opinions, they are more successful in the scrutiny of controversial 
bills than in that of uncontroversial bills. The association is significant according 
to the chi-square test on the data (X2(2) = 6.460 and p = 0.041, the cases in which 
the bill is killed or withdraw are excluded from the test). 
Table 8.5. The results of cross tabulation analyses about the relationship between 
controversy and acceptance of staff members’ amendment opinions after 
controlling for type and policy type 
Type 
Policy Type 
Non-substantive Substantive 
Distributive p = 0.485*, n = 52 p = 0.529*, n = 89 
Regulative p = 0.587*, n = 53 p < 0.001*, n = 124 
Constituent p = 1.000*, n = 19 p = 0.070*, n = 30 
Extractive p = 0.429*, n = 7 p = 1.000*, n = 8 
Basic laws p = 1.000*, n = 12 p = 0.066*, n = 14 
Laws related to 
international 
treaties 
-**, n = 2 -**, n = 1 
Etc. -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- The cases in which the bill is killed or withdrawn are excluded from the tests. The test is not conducted for 
irrelevant amendment opinions. 
- For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see Appendix 3.3. 
 
The negative association between the controversy of the bill under scrutiny and 
the acceptance of staff members’ amendment opinions is investigated after 
controlling for other factors – type of amendment opinions and policy type. Table 
8.5 demonstrates the results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship. The 
data are collapsed in the same way as table 7.3 in chapter 7. The association is 
not significant and the negative association is not confirmed in the categories of 
non-substantive amendment opinions. When it comes to substantive amendment 
opinions, the results are different according to policy type. The association is 
significant at p = 0.05 level in regulative policy (n = 124, 46.8 per cent of 
substantive amendment opinions analysed). The association is significant at p = 
0.10 level in constituent policy (n = 30, 11.3 per cent of substantive amendment 
opinions analysed) and basic laws (n = 14, 5.3 per cent of substantive 
amendment opinions analysed). The associations in distributive policy (n = 89, 
33.6 per cent of substantive amendment opinions analysed) and extractive policy 
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(n = 8, 3.0 per cent of substantive amendment opinions analysed) do not 
demonstrate such significance. 
One interesting point is that the negative association is significant in substantive 
amendment opinions on bills related to regulative policy. It means that the 
amendment opinions are less likely to succeed in the scrutiny of controversial 
bills related to regulative policy where the negative association between the 
controversy and staff members’ amendment opinions is not confirmed. However, 
the association is not significant at such level in the scrutiny of bills related to 
other policy types in which the relationship between the controversy and initiator(s) 
shows strong significance. The analysis that fewer amendment opinions 
suggested by the committee staff in the scrutiny of controversial bills do not show 
a significant difference in acceptance rate from those in the scrutiny of 
uncontroversial bills hints that staff members would suggest amendment opinions 
under the expectation of MPs’ reaction to the opinions. 
Table 8.6. Controversy and initiator(s) of accepted amendment opinions 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff MPs Others Total 
Controversial 
(n of bills = 23) 
59 54 9 122 
(100%) (48.4%) (44.3%) (7.4%) 
Uncontroversial 
(n of bills = 262) 
302 75 14 391 
(100%) (77.2%) (19.2%) (3.6%) 
Total 
361 129 23 513 
(100%) (70.4%) (25.1%) (4.5%) 
* X2(2) = 37.269 and p < 0.001 
 
It is also necessary to analyse accepted amendment opinions according to the 
controversy of the bill under scrutiny. Table 8.6 represents the breakdown of 
accepted amendment opinions (as in chapter 7, those accepted wholly and those 
accepted with changes) according to the controversy of the bill under scrutiny 
and initiator(s) of amendment opinions. Overall, there are relatively fewer 
amendment opinions of staff in the scrutiny of controversial bills, the association 
between the controversy of the bill under scrutiny and the initiator(s) of 
amendment opinions is significant according to the chi-square test on the data in 
table 8.6 (X2(2) = 37.269 and p < 0.001). The proportion of staff members’ 
amendment opinions in the legislative processes of controversial bills is low 
(48.4%). The proportion of MPs’ amendment opinions in the scrutiny of 
controversial bills is much higher (44.3%) than that in the scrutiny of 
uncontroversial bills (19.2%). 
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Table 8.7. The results of cross tabulation analyses about the relationship between 
controversy and initiator(s) after controlling for type and policy type (accepted 
amendment opinions) 
Type 
Policy Type 
Non-substantive Substantive 
Distributive 
p = 0.515*, n = 54 
Odds ratio = 0.558 
X2(1) = 6.005, p = 0.014, n = 112 
Odds ratio = 0.317 
Regulative 
p = 0.258*, n = 51 
Odds ratio = 0.140 
X2(1) = 8.305, p = 0.004, n = 154 
Odds ratio = 0.325 
Constituent 
p = 1.000*, n = 19 
Odds ratio = 0.333 
X2(1) = 10.252, p = 0.001, n = 46 
Odds ratio = 0.125 
Extractive -**, n = 7 
p = 0.167*, n = 9 
Odds ratio = 0.182 
Basic laws 
p = 1.000*, n = 12 
Odds ratio = 0.429 
p = 0.008*, n = 25 
Odds ratio = 0.043 
Laws related to 
international 
treaties 
-**, n = 3 -**, n = 1 
Etc. -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- The test is not conducted for irrelevant amendment opinions. 
- Odds ration = the share of staff member’s amendment opinions in the scrutiny of controversial bills / that 
in the scrutiny of uncontroversial bills. 
- For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see Appendix 3.4. 
 
The negative association is investigated after controlling for other factors – type 
of amendment opinions and policy type. Table 8.7 demonstrates the results of 
cross tabulation analyses on the relationship. The data are collapsed in the same 
way as above. The association is not significant in the categories of non-
substantive amendment opinions. Thus, the negative association is not confirmed 
in non-substantive amendment opinions. When it comes to substantive 
amendment opinions, however, the association is significant at p = 0.05 level 
except in extractive policy (n = 9, 2.6 per cent of substantive amendment opinions 
analysed).  
To sum up, when it comes to substantive amendment opinions, it can be said 
that the impact of the committee staff becomes smaller in the scrutiny of 
controversial bills even after controlling for other factors. The controversy is 
negatively associated with staff members’ suggesting amendment opinions 
(except in the scrutiny of bills related to regulative policy) and the share of staff 
members’ in accepted amendment opinions. Although the negative association 
is not confirmed in the scrutiny of bills related to regulative policy, their opinions 
are less likely to succeed in the scrutiny of controversial bills. One important point 
is that, except in the scrutiny of bills related to regulative policy, the committee 
staff seem to suggest amendment opinions under the anticipation of whether the 
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opinions will be accepted or not because there is no significant difference in the 
acceptance of their amendment opinions between the scrutiny of controversial 
bills and uncontroversial bills, which is different from the suggestion of 
amendment opinions. For non-substantive amendment opinions, however, the 
negative association is not confirmed after the control. The association is not 
significant for the success of staff members’ amendment opinions and their share 
of total amendment opinions (except those in the scrutiny of bills related to basic 
laws) and accepted ones. 
   8.3.2. Technical complexity 
According to the interview data, 11 interviewees answered that their policy 
impact is affected by the technical complexity of the matters being scrutinised. 
The technical complexity includes the technicality of the policy that the bill deals 
with and the technicality of the bill in legal aspects. The technical complexity of a 
bill is related to the cost that it takes for MPs to intervene in the scrutiny of the bill. 
If a bill is technical and complex, the cost increases because MPs have to invest 
much time to review the bill and the opportunity cost of the investment for MPs 
having many other tasks increases. Therefore, MPs are likely to delegate 
technical matters in the scrutiny of the bill to committee staff. A committee staff 
member explained: 
The impact would be different according to bills. Well, there is little room for 
committee staff’s opinions to be accepted in the scrutiny of such bills that 
increase the corporation tax, but the opinions are much accepted in detailed 
modification or changes under the general policy direction. … in some detailed 
and technical matters, but those matters are not unimportant, definitely not, 
such as a change in the application scope of the Act. The room for the 
committee staff to intervene seems to be wider in those detailed and technical 
bills (Interviewee 088).  
The statistics in chapter 7 (table 7.1) that the committee staff suggest more 
amendment opinions in legal aspects, such as wording and structure of a law bill, 
than in policy aspects is explained by the technicality. The legal technicality of 
law bills requires much knowledge of laws and legislation, but MPs, except those 
from legal professions, are not likely to have such knowledge. Therefore, it is 
likely that MPs delegate the legal matters to the committee staff and the 
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committee staff suggest many amendment opinions and have them accepted. 
According to the interview data, nine interviewees stated that the committee staff 
have a greater impact on legal matters such as wording and structure. A junior 
legislative researcher explained: 
MPs trust committee staff in the aspects of wording and structure. … Well, I 
am saying that the impact of committee staff is strong over the technical 
matters in the legislative process, such as wording and structure (Interviewee 
162). 
When there is little difference between the expertise of MPs and that of 
committee staff or the committee staff have low expertise due to the high 
technicality of the policies being dealt with in a bill, the delegation by MPs to the 
committee staff could be withdrawn. In the first case, if there are some MPs who 
have high expertise on the bill being scrutinised, they do not depend on 
documents produced by the committee staff in the general debate or 
subcommittee stage. The second case is trickier. MPs withdraw the delegation to 
the committee staff, but they become dependent on the sponsoring department 
because they do not have the expertise necessary in the scrutiny of the bill. Then, 
the impact of the executive branch in the legislative process becomes greater. 
Asked about the policy impact of the committee staff in the legislative process, a 
committee staff member confessed: 
To be frank, when it comes to the role of the staff in my committee, we depend 
on the executive branch a lot because we have many specialised acts. We 
suggest opinions on legal matters or issues, but there is little room for the 
committee staff to intervene in policy matters due to the feature of bills. … We 
cannot suggest many opinions, to be frank, due to the specialty. … When the 
subcommittee deals with detailed matters, MPs discuss with the executive 
branch because it is difficult for us with low expertise to suggest opinions on 
such matters. …  There are committees in which we can work with common 
sense or knowledge that committee staff members already have, but my 
current committee has many bills that it is difficult to handle with general 
common sense. So, committee staff members feel a little bit of difficulty in 
decision making (Interviewee 143). 
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The amendment analysis in this thesis can be used to examine the relationship 
between the technicality in legal aspects and the impact of the committee staff. 
This is because the type of amendment opinion reflects the technicality in legal 
aspects. Suggesting amendment opinions on wording and structure requires 
technical knowledge in legislation. Table 7.1 in chapter 7 demonstrates that the 
share of amendment opinions of the committee staff is greater in non-substantive 
amendment opinions (wording and structure) than substantive amendment 
opinions (minor, major (change) and major (elimination)). The association 
between initiator(s) (staff and MPs) and type is significant according to the chi-
square test on the data in table 7.1 (X2(5) = 94.290 and p < 0.001, amendment 
opinions of others than staff and MPs are excluded from the tests). 
Table 8.8. The results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship between 
type and initiator(s) after controlling for controversy and policy type 
Controversy 
Policy Type 
Controversial Uncontroversial 
Distributive 
p = 0.011*, n = 48 
Odds ratio = 12.923 
X2(1) = 15.948, p < 0.001, n = 209 
Odds ratio = 4.769 
Regulative 
p = 0.060*, n = 65 
Odds ratio = 7.250 
X2(1) = 23.638, p < 0.001, n = 238 
Odds ratio = 9.583 
Constituent 
X2(1) = 11.450, p = 0.001, n = 45 
Odds ratio = 20.909 
p = 0.081*, n = 40 
Odds ratio = 9.279 
Extractive 
p = 0.002*, n = 18 
Odds ratio = 52.000 
p = 0.505*, n = 15 
Odds ratio = 2.143 
Basic laws 
p = 1.000*, n = 23 
Odds ratio = 1.500 
X2(1) = 7.736, p = 0.005, n = 44 
Odds ratio = 8.708 
Laws related to 
international 
treaties 
-**, n = 0 
p = 1.000*, n = 4 
Odds ratio = 0.556 
Etc. -**, n = 0 -**, n = 2 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- Irrelevant amendment opinions are excluded from the tests. 
- Odds ratio = the share of staff members’ amendment opinions in non-substantive amendment opinions / 
that in substantive amendment opinions 
- For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see Appendix 3.5. 
 
The association is investigated after controlling for other factors – the 
controversy of the bill under scrutiny and policy type. Table 8.8 represents the 
results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship. The data are collapsed in 
the same way as table 7.3 in chapter 7. The association is significant at p = 0.05 
level in the categories to which 80.4 per cent of amendment opinions analysed 
(602 / 749) belong, and so at p = 0.10 level in the categories to which 14.0 per 
cent of amendment opinions analysed (105 / 749) belong. Overall, staff members 
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are more likely to suggest non-substantive amendment opinions although the 
association is not confirmed in some categories. 
Table 8.9. Initiator(s), type and acceptance of amendment opinions  
Initiator(s) 
Acceptance 
Type 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected 
Bill is 
killed 
Bill is 
withdrawn 
Total 
Staff 
Non-
substantive 
115 21 9 2 1 148 
(77.7%) (14.2%) (6.1%) (1.4%) (0.7%) (100%) 
Substantive 
167 47 52 19 0 285 
(58.6%) (16.5%) (18.2%) (6.7%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Irrelevant 
7 4 1 1 0 13 
(53.8%) (30.8%) (7.7%) (7.7%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Sub-total 
289 72 62 22 1 446 
(64.8%) (16.1%) (13.9%) (4.9%) (0.2%) (100%) 
MPs 
Non-
substantive 
5 1 9 0 0 15 
(33.3%) (6.7%) (60.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Substantive 
49 68 145 10 0 272 
(18.0%) (25.0%) (53.3%) (3.7%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Irrelevant 
2 4 13 0 0 19 
(10.5%) (21.1%) (68.4%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Sub-total 
56 73 167 10 0 306 
(18.3%) (23.9%) (54.6%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Others 
Non-
substantive 
3 1 4 0 0 8 
(37.5%) (12.5%) (50.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Substantive 
8 8 6 1 0 23 
(34.8%) (34.8%) (26.1%) (4.3%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Irrelevant 
3 0 1 0 0 4 
(75.0%) (0.0%) (25.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (100%) 
Sub-total 
14 9 11 1 0 35 
(40.0%) (25.7%) (31.4%) (2.9%) (0.0%) (100%_ 
Total 
359 154 240 33 1 787 
(45.6%) (19.6%) (30.5%) (4.2%) (0.1%) (100%) 
- X2(2) = 15.568, p < 0.001 for staff 
  Value = 3.795, p = 0.147 (Fisher’s exact test) for MPs 
- Irrelevant amendment opinions and the cases in which the bill is killed or withdrawn are excluded from the 
tests. The test is not conducted for amendment opinions of others. 
 
The analysis on the relationship between the type and acceptance of 
amendment opinions should be conducted to investigate the change of impact 
according to the technical complexity. Table 8.9 demonstrates the initiator(s), 
type and acceptance of amendment opinions. The amendment opinions of the 
committee staff are more successful when it comes to non-substantive matters 
than to substantive matters. The association is significant according to the chi-
square test on the data (X2(2) = 15.568 and p < 0.001). The proportion of non-
substantive amendment opinions accepted without revisions is higher (77.7%) 
and that of amendment opinions rejected is lower (6.1%) compared to substantive 
amendment opinions (58.6% and 18.2% respectively). When it comes to MPs’ 
amendment opinions, the association is not significant (p = 0.147 (Fisher’s exact 
test), irrelevant amendment opinions and the cases in which the bill is killed or 
withdraw are excluded from the test). 
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Table 8.10. The results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship between 
type and acceptance of staff members’ amendment opinions after controlling for 
controversy and policy type 
Controversy 
Policy Type 
Controversial Uncontroversial 
Distributive p = 0.288*, n = 19 X2(2) = 5.439, p = 0.066, n = 122 
Regulative p = 0.227*, n = 35 p = 0.581*, n = 142 
Constituent p = 0.500*, n = 20 p = 0.412*, n = 29 
Extractive p = 0.200*, n = 5 p = 0.033*, n = 10 
Basic laws p = 0.333*, n = 3 p = 1.000*, n = 23 
Laws related to 
international 
treaties 
-**, n = 0 -**, n = 3 
Etc. -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- Irrelevant amendment opinions and the cases in which the bill is killed or withdrawn are excluded from the 
tests. 
- For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see Appendix 3.6. 
 
  The association between type and acceptance of staff members’ amendment 
opinions is investigated after controlling for other factors – the controversy of the 
bill under scrutiny and policy type. Table 8.10 represents the results of cross 
tabulation analyses on the relationship. The data are collapsed in the same way 
as table 7.3 in chapter 7. The association is significant at p = 0.05 level in 
amendment opinions on uncontroversial bills related to extractive policy (n = 10, 
2.5 per cent of amendment opinions analysed), and so at p = 0.10 level in 
amendment opinions on uncontroversial bills related to extractive policy (n = 122, 
29.9 per cent of amendment opinions analysed). The association is not significant 
in other categories. Overall, the association is not confirmed after controlling for 
other factors. Similar to the analysis on the relationship between the political 
controversy and the acceptance of staff members’ amendment opinions, the 
analysis hints at the existence of staff members’ anticipated reaction because 
there is no significant difference in the acceptance between substantive 
amendment opinions and non-substantive ones. 
It is also necessary to analyse accepted amendment opinions according to their 
type. Table 7.5 in chapter 7 demonstrates that staff members’ share of accepted 
amendment opinions is greater in non-substantive amendment opinions (wording 
and structure) than substantive amendment opinions (minor, major (change) and 
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major (elimination)). The association between initiator(s) (staff and MPs) and type 
is significant according to the chi-square test on the data in table 7.5 (X2(5) = 
62.357 and p < 0.001, amendment opinions of others than staff and MPs are 
excluded from the test). 
Table 8.11. The results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship between 
type and initiator(s) after controlling for controversy and policy type (accepted 
amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Policy Type 
Controversial Uncontroversial 
Distributive 
p = 0.086*, n = 30 
Odds ratio = 7.800 
X2(1) = 7.668, p = 0.006, n = 136 
Odds ratio = 4.437 
Regulative 
p = 0.093*, n = 41 
Odds ratio = 7.600 
X2(1) = 13.592, p < 0.001, n = 164 
Odds ratio = 17.706 
Constituent 
p = 0.006*, n = 31 
Odds ratio = 18.000 
p = 0.006*, n = 34 
Odds ratio = 5.098 
Extractive 
p = 0.008*, n = 9 
Odds ratio = 99.000 
p = 0.429*, n = 7 
Odds ratio = 7.000 
Basic laws 
p = 0.125*, n = 8 
Odds ratio = 45.000 
p = 0.110*, n = 29 
Odds ratio = 6.364 
Laws related to 
international 
treaties 
-**, n = 0 
p = 1.000*, n = 4 
Odds ratio = 0.556 
Etc. -**, n = 0 -**, n = 0 
* Fisher’s exact test 
** Cross tabulation analysis cannot be conducted. 
- Irrelevant amendment opinions are excluded from the tests. 
- Odds ratio = the share of staff members’ amendment opinions in non-substantive amendment opinions / 
that in substantive amendment opinions 
- For the detailed number of amendment opinions, see Appendix 3.7. 
 
The association is investigated after controlling for other factors – the 
controversy of the bill under scrutiny and policy type. Table 8.11 represents the 
results of cross tabulation analyses on the relationship. The data are collapsed in 
the same way as above. The association is significant at p = 0.05 level in five 
categories to which 75.9 per cent of amendment opinions analysed (374 / 493) 
belong and so at p = 0.10 level in two categories to which 14.4 per cent of 
amendment opinions analysed (71 / 493) belong. Overall, the share of staff 
members’ amendment opinions is likely to be greater in non-substantive matters 
than substantive matters although the association is not confirmed in some 
categories. 
To sum up, it can be said that the impact of the committee staff becomes greater 
in legally technical matters. Overall, the technicality in legal aspects seems to 
positively affect staff members’ suggestion of amendment opinions and the share 
of staff members in accepted amendment opinions although the association is 
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not confirmed in some categories. However, the positive relationship between the 
technicality in legal aspects and the success of staff members’ amendment 
opinions is not confirmed, which also implies the existence of an anticipated 
reaction by staff members similar to the analysis on the impact of political 
controversy.  
  8.3.3. Other factors affecting the impact of the committee staff 
The interview data revealed that factors other than the above two factors – 
political controversy and technical complexity – may affect the impact of the 
committee staff in the scrutiny of government law bills. They are the personality 
and ability of the committee staff members (seven interviewees) and the workload 
and atmosphere of the committee (three interviewees). The factors can be 
explained through the mechanism in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
  Firstly, it seems that the personality and ability of the committee staff member 
affects the impact of the committee staff. Above all, the personality of a committee 
staff member could affect the subjective risk of suggesting amendment opinions, 
the influence of the norm of political neutrality and the motivation for suggesting 
their opinions. If a senior committee staff member has a risk-averse personality, 
he/she is likely to refrain from suggesting amendment opinions. If the committee 
staff member is a sort of pure policy entrepreneur in Price (1971, p.324), he/she 
is less likely to be affected by the norm of political neutrality. If the committee staff 
member has a strong orientation to policy efficacy, he/she is likely to pursue the 
payoffs from suggesting his/her opinions and having them accepted. After that, 
the ability of a committee staff member could affect MPs’ trust and agreement. If 
the explanation given by the committee staff member about bills is not good, the 
document produced by him/her is not comprehensive and cannot guide the 
scrutiny of bills, or his/her policy expertise is low, MPs cannot trust him/her and 
may withdraw their delegation to the committee staff member. A committee staff 
member described: 
I want to apply the judicial activism and judicial restraint discussed in laws. If 
committee staff members have activism, there could be cases in which they 
suggest very meaningful ideas or productive alternatives and have them 
accepted by MPs. Conversely, if they show restraint, they just introduce the 
opinions of stakeholders such as the governing party, the opposition party, 
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NGOs, interest groups or the executive branch, just show the opinions and 
leave the matters with MPs. They can be passive. I understand in such a way 
… that (whether a committee staff member shows activism or restraint) 
depends on the atmosphere of the committee, such as MPs’ tacit approval, 
with the ability of the committee staff members (Interviewee 037). 
Secondly, the workload and atmosphere of a committee could affect the policy 
impact of committee staff of the committee. To begin with, if the workload of the 
committee is heavy, MPs’ attention to an individual bill is likely to be low. 
Therefore, the impact of the committee staff is likely to be strong in a committee 
with a heavy workload. Next to that, if the atmosphere of the committee is not 
favourable to committee staff members guiding the legislative process, it 
becomes difficult for the committee staff to exert their policy impact because MPs 
do not delegate to the committee staff. The atmosphere is affected by many 
factors mentioned so far, but a factor which is not mentioned above is the 
personality of the ranking members of the committee. A former senior staff 
member confessed that his impact became weak after a change of the ranking 
members of his committee: 
It is different according to the personality of ranking members in advance 
mediation. For example, all of the ranking members were cooperative before -
---, so the chief of staff played his role significantly. But, after ----, MP ---- 
became the ranking member of the ---- party. He has a unique personality. He 
wants to decide for himself over all matters. … So, there are cases in which 
the committee staff play an active role, but there are cases in which they 
cannot play the role according to the personality of the ranking members 
(Interviewee 194). 
 
  8.4. The nature of the impact of the committee staff 
Although the committee staff in the legislature of South Korea seems to exert a 
substantive impact in the scrutiny of government law bills, it can be said that the 
impact is not an autonomous one, which is not controlled by MPs. As discussed 
in chapter 5, they depend on MPs in the legislative process in the supply of 
legitimacy in official decision making. Some of their knowledge in policy aspects 
depends on the sponsoring departments and interest groups. Although the cases 
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are rare, the sponsoring department and interest groups can bypass the 
committee staff in the information channel as explained in chapter 7. They need 
relevant policy actors’ agreement because the disagreement among policy actors 
in the subcommittee meetings delays the scrutiny of a law bill and is detrimental 
to the efficiency of the scrutiny which is called for by MPs. For these reasons, the 
committee staff have to cooperate with other policy actors in the legislative 
process, especially with MPs, which causes the following features in the support 
of the committee staff for the scrutiny of government law bills. 
Firstly, the staff members work under an anticipated reaction. They have to 
expect other actors’ response to their amendment opinions in the preparation of 
them. The sponsoring department and interest groups can raise disagreements 
with the committee staff in the committee or subcommittee meetings although the 
case is rare as explained in chapter 7. The committee staff do not want such 
disagreement not only because their amendment opinions are not accepted by 
MPs but because they can be blamed by MPs for insufficient preparation for the 
scrutiny. Moreover, the committee staff have to consider MPs in their work. MPs 
may attack the committee staff in the committee or subcommittee meetings if the 
amendment opinions of the committee staff are contrary to their political interests 
or policy principles, especially in the scrutiny of controversial bills. The attack from 
MPs can be detrimental to the staff member’s reputation. For example, the 
reputation as impartial staff can be damaged when MPs accuse the committee 
staff that their opinions are not politically impartial. 
Secondly, as demonstrated in chapter 7 and section 8.2, the committee staff 
have to conduct consultations with and mediation between other policy actors 
and their opinions are not their own, but consulted and mediated ones. The 
writing process of the review report of the committee staff includes consultation 
with the sponsoring department and relevant policy actors. That of the document 
for the subcommittee’s examination also includes the consultation and, a step 
further, mediation between sponsoring departments and other relevant actors 
which become necessary for the preparation of amendment opinions. The 
amendment opinions of the committee staff prepared in this way and suggested 
in the subcommittee meetings are not ones that the committee staff have 
formulated based only on their knowledge of policy and legislation. The opinions 
come from the interaction among relevant policy actors. 
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Thirdly, the impact of the committee staff depends on the mechanism in which 
the motivation of the committee staff to conduct their roles; MPs’ delegation to 
them to some degree; and MPs’ trust and agreement with them are indispensable 
factors. These factors are affected by the features of bills, such as political 
controversy and technical complexity, and many other factors. When it comes to 
the technical complexity, it affects the motivation of the committee staff and MPs’ 
delegation to them positively and makes the policy resources of staff members 
more valuable. Thus MPs tend to delegate technically complex matters to the 
committee staff as demonstrated in the interview data. The amendment analysis 
reveals that the committee staff have more impact on legally technical matters. 
However, the political controversy affects the motivation of the committee staff 
and MPs’ delegation to them negatively as discussed in section 8.3.; it makes the 
mediation by the committee staff more difficult; and it makes the policy resources 
of MPs more valuable. As demonstrated in the interview data, committee staff 
members think that their impact becomes weaker in the scrutiny of controversial 
bills. The amendment analysis in section 8.3 reveals that the controversy and the 
impact of the committee staff have a negative association over substantive 
matters. The weak impact of the committee staff is revealed in table 8.12 
demonstrating that, when it comes to the scrutiny of controversial bills, the 
amendment opinions on substantive matters of MPs outnumber those of the 
committee staff both in total amendment opinions and accepted ones. 
Table 8.12. Initiator(s) of amendment opinions and accepted ones on substantive 
matters in the scrutiny of controversial bills 
Initiator(s) Staff MPs Others Total 
Total 
55 96 12 163 
(100%) (33.7%) (58.9%) (7.4%) 
Accepted  
32 50 8 90 
(100%) (35.6%) (55.6%) (8.9%) 
 
To sum up, the impact of the South Korean committee staff in the scrutiny of 
government law bills is not an autonomous one, which is not controlled by MPs. 
They depend on other policy actors in the scrutiny, and MPs’ cooperation with 
them is indispensable in their work. They work under the anticipation of MPs’ 
response to their opinions which will be suggested in the committee or 
subcommittee meetings. Their amendment opinions have consulted and 
mediated features. Their impact in the scrutiny depends on MPs’ delegation, trust 
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and agreement. The impact of the committee staff becomes weaker in the 
situation where it is difficult for them to get the delegation, trust and agreement. 
For example, the impact of the committee staff becomes weaker in the scrutiny 
of the controversial bills. 
 
8.5. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the detailed mechanism through which the committee 
staff exert their impact in the scrutiny of government law bills; the factors affecting 
the impact; and the nature of the impact. First of all, the three important factors in 
the mechanism of staff members’ impact – the motivation of committee staff 
members in their work; MPs’ delegation of the scrutiny of bills to the committee 
staff to some degree; and MPs’ trust and agreement – are identified through the 
interview data. In the mechanism, the interaction between MPs and the 
committee staff are analysed through the theoretical framework and key concepts 
set in chapter 5. The orientations of MPs and committee staff members that are 
identified in the interview data and analysed from the perspective of new 
institutionalism are conceived to induce MPs’ delegation to the committee staff 
and committee staff members’ active conducting of roles respectively. The 
resources and capabilities of the committee staff, especially their informational 
power and network managing status, enable them to get the approval and 
agreement of MPs.  
On top of that, when it comes to the factors affecting the role and impact of the 
committee staff, this thesis pays attention to the political controversy and 
technical complexity (both in legal and policy aspects) of the bill under scrutiny 
because the features can affect the features of the network; the values of 
resources which MPs and the committee staff have; and their orientations. 
Political controversy may increase the level of conflict among actors and make 
network management by committee staff members difficult. The political 
controversy may make the values of MPs’ resources more important and 
stimulate their motivations, and vice versa for the resources and motivations of 
committee staff members. The technical complexity may have opposite effects to 
the capabilities and orientations of MPs and committee staff members. Therefore, 
political controversy may make the role of the committee staff more passive and 
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decrease their impact in the legislative process, but technical complexity may 
make the role of the committee staff more active and increase their impact in the 
legislative process. 
Finally, the nature of the impact of the committee staff is addressed based on 
the feature of the work of the committee staff. The impact of the committee staff 
is not an autonomous one, which is uncontrolled by MPs. They work under the 
consideration of other policy actors’ responses to their amendment opinions, 
especially considering that of MPs. Their amendment opinions are consulted and 
mediated ones. The impact depends on the cooperation of other policy actors, 
especially delegation by MPs. Thus, their impact is affected by other factors, such 
as the political controversy and technical complexity. When it comes to 
substantive amendment opinions in the scrutiny of controversial bills, it is 
demonstrated that MPs’ amendment opinions outnumber those of the committee 
staff according to the amendment analysis. 
The analysis in this chapter tries to investigate the mechanism through which 
the committee staff exert their impact using the theoretical framework and key 
concepts set from the perspectives of policy network theory and new 
institutionalism. From the investigation, the analysis gives its attention to the 
nature of issue – political controversy and technical complexity – as the factors 
affecting staff impact independently from the previous literature about the factors 
in the U.S. This is because the committee staff system in the South Korean 
legislature, which is comprised of non-partisan staff members and career civil 
servants, is different from that in the U.S. which is comprised of partisan staff 
members appointed by the committee chair. In addition, this chapter tries to 
address the nature of the impact of the committee staff based on the analysis so 
far. 
So far, important issues in this thesis have been addressed. The next stage is 
to validate the findings more and provide concrete examples of specific individual 
legislative processes. The work is done through legislative case studies in the 
next chapter. 
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9. Legislative Case Study 
9.1. Introduction 
  The aim of this chapter is a detailed comparison of the role of the committee 
staff in the individual legislative process according to the degree of political 
controversy and technical complexity of a law bill. For this purpose, case studies 
are conducted. Four cases are selected according to the degree of two key 
variables (political controversy and technical complexity) – the bill for partial 
amendment of State Public Officials Act (1902217) (for re-categorisation of civil 
servants, low political controversy and high technical complexity), the bill for 
partial amendment of State Public Officials Act (1901362) (for the introduction of 
affirmative action for North Korean refugees, low political controversy and low 
technical complexity), the bill for whole amendment of Government Organisation 
Act (1903484) (for administrative reorganisation, high political controversy and 
high technical complexity) and the bill for partial amendment of Public Official 
Election Act (1814689) (for constituency demarcation, high political controversy 
and low technical complexity). 
Table 9.1. The Four cases according to political controversy and technical 
complexity 
Complexity 
Controversy 
High Low 
Low 
Re-categorisation of 
civil servants 
Affirmative action for North 
Korean refugees 
High 
Administrative 
reorganisation 
Constituency demarcation 
 
The case studies follow the logic of most similar systems design (Przeworski 
and Teune, 1982, ch.2) in order to avoid omitted variable bias as much as 
possible (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p.168). The four cases are in the area 
of constituent policy according to Lowi (1972). Except for the fourth case 
(constituency demarcation), the bills were in the jurisdiction of the same ministry 
of the executive (the Ministry of Public Administration and Security) and examined 
in the same standing committee (the Public Administration and Security 
Committee) of the 19th National Assembly. The fourth case was dealt with at the 
end of the 18th National Assembly in the Special Committee on Political Reform, 
but the committee staff of the special committee were those of the Public 
Administration and Security Committee. 
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Official documents (initial bills, final bills, minutes of meetings, reports of the 
committee staff director), unpublished documents of committees and relevant 
ministries, news articles in the media (in the third and fourth case), and 
experiences of the researcher who participated in the legislative processes are 
used as sources of data. The researcher participated directly in the first, second, 
and third cases as the legislative researcher in charge of the bills, and the fourth 
bill was examined in the special committee that the researcher worked for as a 
committee staff member. 
 
9.2. Re-categorisation of Civil Servants in 2012 
  9.2.1. Background 
The bill for partial amendment of State Public Officials Act (1902217) was to re-
categorise civil servants and to rearrange the clauses of the act and other 
relevant acts accordingly. Civil servants in South Korea were categorised into six 
groups when the bill was submitted. The six groups were: general service; special 
service (e.g. judges, public prosecutors, foreign service officials, police officers, 
fire officers, public educational officials, members of armed forces, etc.); technical 
service (public officials in charge of technical affairs, who are classified by 
function); political service (public officials who are elected; whose appointment 
requires the approval of the National Assembly; or who are in charge of affairs 
regarding sophisticated policy decision-making or of assisting such affairs); 
extraordinary civil service (public officials who are appointed based on separate 
qualification requirements to be in charge of specific affairs and who are 
designated as public officials in extraordinary service), and contractual service 
(public officials who are engaged in affairs requiring expert knowledge, technical 
skills or requiring flexibility, etc. in their  appointment, for a specific period under 
an employment contract with the State) (State Public Officials Act 1963, art. 28). 
The categorisation of civil servants was set in 1981.9 The categorisation had been 
criticised because it was too complex for an efficient personnel management of 
civil servants and it demoralised civil servants in technical service, extraordinary 
                                                          
9  The amendments in 1981 to the Act categorised civil servants into seven groups. Labour service, 
however, was abolished at 2011. With the exception of the amendment, the general principle of the civil 
servant categorisation scheme can be said to have been set in 1981. 
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service and contractual service due to the personnel management focusing on 
civil servants in general service (Lee and Jin, 2014). 
The major substance of the bill was that the six groups were to be reorganised 
into four groups. In particular, technical service and contractual service were to 
be merged into general service; civil servants in contractual service were to be 
incorporated into general service, but they were to be appointed for a limited 
period (fixed-term appointments); some civil servants in extraordinary service 
were to be incorporated into general service and appointed as professional career 
officials in a specific area. (The bill for partial amendment of State Public Officials 
Act (1902217), explanatory preamble) These changes can be summarised as 
figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1. Re-categorisation of civil servants 
  <Before>  <After> 
     
 
  General 
Service 
  General 
Service     
       
Career 
Service 
  Special 
Service 
  Special 
Service     
       
 
  Technical 
Service 
  
 
    
       
 
  Political 
Service 
  Political 
Service     
       
Non-career 
Service 
  Extraordinary 
Service 
  Extraordinary 
Service     
       
 
  Contractual 
Service 
  
 
    
Source: reconstructed from Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2012) 
 
The change of the civil servant categorisation scheme was attempted by the 
executive branch to secure a simple categorisation that enables efficient human 
resource management, and to raise morale of civil servants in technical service 
and contractual service through better treatment by including them into general 
service (The bill for partial amendment of State Public Officials Act (1902217), 
explanatory preamble). This bill was very complex in the technical aspect and the 
scrutiny of the bill needed expertise and knowledge about the personnel 
management system for civil servants. (The bill amended twenty four articles 
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which comprised 20 percent of the act and amended 40 other relevant laws.) The 
bill, however, was an uncontroversial bill, especially in the political aspect 
because there is no explicit cost to be borne by a specific group and the general 
public have no interest in the bill. 
  9.2.2. The legislative process 
The pre-legislative process 
  The executive branch decided to change the categorisation scheme in April 
2011. The Ministry of Public Administration and Security was in charge of the 
reform. The ministry set the Commission for the Change of the Civil Servant 
Categorisation Scheme that was comprised of eighteen members, which 
included experts in academia, representatives of civil service unions and senior 
civil servants in June 2011, and had a number of meetings to form the policy for 
the reform (Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2012). The 
Commission and the ministry had decided specific policies in July 2012. After 
public hearings and pre-announcement of legislation, the policies were translated 
into a law bill and submitted to the National Assembly on 17 October 2012 
(Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2012). 
The review of the bill by the committee staff 
  The review report of the committee staff on the bill agreed with the general 
direction of the change of the civil servant categorisation scheme reflected in the 
bill, but identified several problems in the bill. Firstly, the report pointed out that 
the introduction of professional career officials into the State Public Officials Act 
was not in accord with the structure of the act and hindered autonomous 
personnel management of the legislature and the judiciary. The report 
recommended that it would be better to introduce professional career officials, if 
necessary, through secondary legislation. Secondly, the report pointed out that it 
would be undesirable for the bill to rule professional career officials’ leave 
differently from that of general service because professional career officials were 
to be also categorised as civil servants in general service and the discrimination 
would demoralise them. Thirdly, the report recommended that the merger of 
contractual service into general service and introduction of fixed-term 
appointments should be scrutinised by MPs thoroughly because it could hinder 
consistent personnel management. The report also recommended that if the 
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merger and the introduction were inevitable, the executive should limit the fixed-
term appointments to a small number of positions and apply permanent 
appointments to many current civil servants, who were in the current contractual 
service but conducting permanent work, to enhance job security and equality 
among civil servants. Finally, the report pointed out that the bill had an 
unexpected side effect in that the power of appointment of some civil servants in 
the legislatures of local governments was transferred from secretary generals of 
the legislatures to mayors or governors, and recommended that other relevant 
acts or secondary legislation should be amended before the bill was enforced.10 
Committee stage before the examination of subcommittee 
  The bill was referred to the Public Administration and Security Committee on 18 
October 2012 and tabled at the meeting of the committee on 12 November 2012 
along with 105 other bills. The Minister for Public Administration and Security 
explained the bill’s purpose. The review report of the committee staff on the bill 
was read in a summarised way. In the general discussion about the bill, an MP 
asked the minister about the problem that the power of appointment of some civil 
servants in the legislatures of local governments was to be transferred from 
secretary generals of the legislature to mayors or governors. The general 
discussion resumed on 19 November 2012, but there were no questions or 
discussion about the bill. 
Subcommittee stage 
The bill was tabled at the meeting of the subcommittee for the examination of 
law bills on 20 November 2012 along with 52 other bills. The Chief of Staff in 
charge of the bill suggested five detailed amendment opinions at the meeting. 
Firstly, it would be better for professional career officials to be deleted from the 
bill. Secondly, it would also be better to delete the clause that ruled about the 
leave allocated to professional career officials from the bill. Thirdly, the clause 
that identified the provisions applied to civil servants of fixed-term appointments 
should be revised to exclude the provision about honourable retirement because 
honourable retirement assumes permanent appointments. Fourthly, he pointed 
out that the clause that ruled on the appointment of talent on recommendation 
                                                          
10 Strictly speaking, the last point was not about the bill, but about the bill for Local Public Officials Act 
containing the same re-categorisation scheme, but the point is included because the two bill were 
scrutinised together. 
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should be clarified to mean that the appointment would remain in the recruitment 
of civil servants of technical groups in general service despite of the elimination 
of the technical service category. Finally, he pointed out that some of clauses in 
the bill’s addenda that were to amend other laws should be deleted or revised 
because they amended clauses of other laws that cannot be amended by 
addenda according to the general theory of legislation in South Korea. 
The members of the subcommittee had questions about the following issues: 
the problem that the power of appointment of some civil servants in the 
legislatures of local governments was to be transferred from secretary generals 
of the legislature to mayors or governors; the merger of contractual service into 
general service and the introduction of fixed-time appointments; and the burden 
of examination that civil servants in technical service should take to transfer to 
general service. For the first issue, the second Deputy Minister for Public 
Administration and Security answered that they will prepare the legislation that 
amends the relevant laws before the enforcement of the bill to avoid the transfer 
of the appointment power. For the second issue, he answered that fixed-term 
appointments would be limited to a small number of positions and that application 
of permanent appointments to civil servants would be made in positions which 
are operated permanently as the Chief of Staff recommended. (for the third issue, 
the MP who raised the issue did not require answers). 
The deputy minister accepted the amendment opinions of the Chief of Staff. The 
members of the subcommittee did not suggest their own amendment opinions 
and also agreed with the amendment opinions of the Chief of Staff. The bill was 
amended according to the opinions of the Chief of Staff and resolved. The 
number of articles that were revised by the amendment opinions of the committee 
staff was ten (33 per cent of the articles in the bill). Moreover, 65 per cent (26 of 
40) of the paragraphs in the article that amended other laws were revised or 
deleted according to committee staff’s amendment opinions. 
The examinations of the standing committee, the Legislation and Judiciary 
Committee and the plenary  
The bill was tabled at the meeting of the Public Administration and Security 
Committee on 21 November 2012 along with the budget bill (of the Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security, the National Election Commission, the 
National Police Agency and the National Emergency Management Agency), the 
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bill for the operation plan of the public official pension fund and 24 other law bills. 
The bill was resolved to be amended as amended in the subcommittee for 
examination of legislative bills. Then, the bill was referred to the Legislation and 
Judiciary Committee and tabled at the meeting of the committee on 22 November 
2012 for the examination of structure and wording along with 20 other law bills. 
Only some clarifications of the words in the bill were conducted in the meeting. 
After the scrutiny of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, the bill was tabled 
at the plenary on the same day and resolved to be amended as amended in the 
Public Administration and Security Committee. There was no debate among MPs 
in the process. 
9.2.3. The role and impact of the committee staff in the legislative process 
The significance and the acceptance of the amendment opinions of the 
committee staff 
  As written above, the Chief of Staff who was in charge of the bill suggested five 
detailed amendment opinions. The first (deletion of professional career official) is 
an amendment to major policy substance. The second (about leave of 
professional career officials) is an amendment of minor policy substance. The 
third (revision of the clause about the provisions applied to civil servants of fixed-
term appointments) and the fifth (the revision of addenda which amend other laws) 
is an amendment in the aspect of legal structure. The fourth (revision of the 
clause about the appointment of talent on recommendation) is an amendment in 
wording. These amendment opinions are all accepted by the members of the 
subcommittee for the examination of law bills and reflected in the bill. The 
examinations of the standing committee, the Legislation and Judiciary Committee 
and the plenary also agreed with the amendments of the subcommittee. Thus, 
the amendment opinions of the Chief of Staff were all reflected in the final Act. All 
amendments to the bill came from committee staff, but the amendment opinions 
of the committee staff were formulated after the consultation with the sponsoring 
department and representatives of civil service unions. MPs did not suggest their 
own amendment opinions.  
Guiding the scrutiny process 
The issues that were discussed by MPs in the committee and subcommittee 
stages were as follows: the problem that the power of appointment of some civil 
servants in the legislatures of local governments was to be transferred from 
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secretary generals of the legislatures to mayors or governors; the merger of 
contractual service into general service and the introduction of fixed-time 
appointments; and the burden of examination that civil servants in technical 
service should take to transfer to general service. The first and the second issue 
were brought to the committee and subcommittee by the review report of the 
committee staff and the document for the subcommittee’s examination of the bill. 
The second Deputy Minister for Public Administration and Security agreed that 
the bill had some problems with the two issues and answered that future 
legislation (the first issue) and deliberate implementation of policies (the second 
issue) were necessary, as was the opinion of the Chief of Staff. Thus, committee 
staff could be said to have performed the function of guiding the scrutiny of the 
bill. 
The policy network and the impact of the committee staff 
The major policy actors in the policy network of re-categorisation of civil servants 
are MPs, sponsoring departments and civil service trade unions. Other policy 
actors who the committee staff consulted include the National Assembly 
Secretariat and the National Court Administration, which have officials who are 
ruled by the Act, and local governments. Civil service trade unions, as 
stakeholders of the re-categorisation, agreed with the bill because they were 
consulted and their opinions were reflected in the drafting process of the bill. Their 
attention was on the merger of technical services into general services. They 
lobbied MPs to pass the bill during the scrutiny of the bill in the legislature. 
However, the administrations of the legislature and court disagreed with the 
introduction of career professional officials in the Act and some provisions in the 
bill’s addenda amending acts about their organisations. It was because they 
thought that the introduction and provisions inhibited their autonomy in 
organisation and personnel management. In addition, local governments had a 
concern about the redistribution of appointment power of some civil servants in 
local legislatures. 
Parts of the amendment opinions of the committee staff were prepared based 
on the consultation with local governments and the administrations of the 
legislature and court. The amendment opinions repealing the introduction of 
career professional officials in the Act and some provisions in the addenda were 
the results of staff mediation between the sponsoring department and the 
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administrations of the legislature and court. The indication of problems about the 
redistribution of appointment power of some civil servants in local legislatures 
was also as a result of their mediation between the sponsoring department and 
local governments. MPs did not give their attention to the bill because of heavy 
work-loads of scrutiny of law and budget bills and the existence of other 
controversial bills tabled along with the bill. In the committee meeting before the 
subcommittee stage, the bill was tabled along with 105 other bills. MPs gave their 
attention to budget bills; bills about electoral laws – due to the 18th Presidential 
Election scheduled in December 2012; and those ruling about support for specific 
local governments. 
To make matters worse, there was a sharp confrontation in the committee 
between the governing and opposition party on the polling hours for the 
presidential election. Thus, the committee did not secure enough time for the 
scrutiny of law bills. The general debate over 117 law bills tabled at the two 
committee meetings on 12 and 19 November took just two hours and 42 minutes 
according to the minutes. The committee meeting on the 12th was disrupted, and 
that on the 19th tabled law bills along with budget bills and concentrated on budget 
bills. As already explained, there was just one question about the bill in the 
general debate. The lack of time in the subcommittee stage for detailed scrutiny 
was also severe. The number of bills tabled in the subcommittee meeting was 53. 
The time for the scrutiny of the bill containing such a big re-categorisation scheme 
was only 22 minutes, with three MPs questioning. MPs were interested in other 
controversial bills. For example, the scrutiny of bills ruling about support for 
specific local governments (Jeju, Cheongju and Sejong) took 4 hours 41 minutes 
altogether in the subcommittee meeting. Moreover, the policy contained in the bill 
was a technically complex matter for MPs to access. Thus, MPs who were 
interested in other controversial law bills implicitly delegated the scrutiny of the 
bill to the committee staff. MPs were party politicians and champions of local 
interests in the committee then. 
The scrutiny of the bill required efficiency. The role of the committee staff 
preparing mediated amendment opinions before the official legislative process 
was essential. If a policy actor had raised dissenting opinions about the bill in the 
process, the bill might have been blocked because MPs would refrain from 
making decisions before the disagreement of stakeholders was resolved and lots 
256 
 
of bills on which MPs wanted to deliberate were in the queue. MPs would 
postpone the scrutiny of the bill to a later subcommittee meeting until the 
disagreement was resolved. The committee staff had the motivation of 
conducting the role actively. Above all, it is because a successful performance in 
the support for the scrutiny of such a complex bill is helpful for building a good 
reputation as a competent staff member. The bill could pass with the amendment 
opinions of the committee staff because relevant policy actors were satisfied with 
the opinions. MPs agreed with the amendment opinions of the committee staff 
with which relevant policy actors had also agreed. 
  9.2.4. Summary and conclusion 
The bill for partial amendment of the State Public Officials Act (1902217) was a 
very technical and complex bill for MPs. Much expertise and knowledge was 
required to scrutinise the bill. The bill, however, was politically uncontroversial 
because the general public had no direct interest in the bill and there was no 
explicit group who should bear the cost of the policy. These characteristics of the 
bill affected the interaction between MPs and staff in the examination of the bill. 
The MPs who examined the bill did not suggest any amendment opinions of their 
own and accepted the amendment opinions of the committee staff. All 
amendments to the bill came from the committee staff, but the opinions were 
formed through consultation with the sponsoring department and representatives 
of civil service unions. Two of the three issues raised in the scrutiny of the bill 
were already raised in the review report of the committee staff and even the 
answers of the deputy minister of the sponsoring ministry followed the opinions 
of the committee staff. Thus, committee staff also performed a guiding function in 
the scrutiny of the bill. 
 
9.3. Affirmative Action for North Korean Refugees 
  9.3.1. Background 
The major purpose of the bill for partial amendment of the State Public Officials 
Act (1901362) was to introduce a special recruitment procedure through which 
North Korean refugees, who are settled in South Korea, are recruited as civil 
servants. In addition, the bill stated that the laws about crimes of civil servants 
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should be applied to candidates for appointments who have passed the 
recruitment examination and are in their probationary period before they are 
officially appointed as civil servants, and that the honourable retirement 
allowance should be paid back if the recipient of the allowance accepted a bribe 
or committed embezzlement when they were a civil servant. The major substance 
of the bill was relatively easy for MPs to access and not complex. The affirmative 
action in the personnel management of civil servants is a well-known policy issue 
for MPs and does not need high expertise. Five private members’ bills about 
affirmative action policy (nine per cent of total private members’ bills about the 
State Public Officials Act) were introduced during the 18th National Assembly and 
the first four months of the 19th National Assembly. The bill was also politically 
uncontroversial because the introduction of a special recruitment process for 
North Korean refugees made no explicit cost or burden and it is difficult for MPs 
to oppose a policy that helps minorities in South Korea. In addition, other 
substances of the bill are about internal personnel management and the general 
public had no interest in them. 
  9.3.2. The legislative process 
The pre-legislative process 
In fact, the special recruitment procedure for North Korean refugees in the 
recruitment of local government employees was introduced by the amendments 
to the Local Public Officials Act on 21 March 2012. The policy idea originated 
from a private member’s bill. The bill for partial amendment of the Local Public 
Officials Act (1809128), proposed by S. Kim MP and co-sponsored by other nine 
MPs in August 2010, introduced general affirmative action for North Korean 
refugees. (S. Kim MP also proposed the bill for partial amendment of the State 
Public Officials Act (1809127) with the same substance, but the bill was killed at 
the end of the 18th National Assembly.) In addition, the executive submitted the 
bill for the amendment of the Local Public Officials Act (1812626) in July 2011 
that introduced the special recruitment procedure for North Korean refugees. In 
fact, the policy in the government bill was a specified version of the policy in the 
private member’s bill. The two bills were merged into the committee bill for partial 
amendment of the Local Public Officials Act (1814707), and the committee bill 
was enacted in March 2012. Thus, the bill for partial amendment of the State 
Public Officials Act (1901362) was to introduce the special recruitment procedure 
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that had already been introduced in the recruitment of local government 
employees into the recruitment of civil servants in the central government. The 
bill was submitted on 28 August 2012. 
Committee stage before the examination of subcommittee 
  The bill was referred to the Public Administration and Security Committee on 
29 August 2012 and tabled at the meeting of the committee on 17 September 
2012 along with 162 other law bills and a petition. The review report of the 
committee staff on the bill agreed with the introduction of the special recruitment 
procedure for North Korean refugees and other policies in the bill. The report, 
however, pointed out that the probationary employment for candidates before 
official appointment should be ruled in the bill additionally to apply the laws about 
crimes of civil servants to the candidates (There had been no clause about the 
probationary employment for candidates before official appointment in the Act). 
No MP questioned the bill in the general discussion at the meeting. 
Subcommittee stage 
The bill was tabled at the meeting of the subcommittee for the examination of 
law bills on 18 September 2012 along with 40 other legislative bills. One MP 
required recent statistics about the payback of honourable retirement allowance. 
The Chief of Staff in charge of the bill suggested one detailed amendment opinion 
that was suggested in the review report of the committee staff on the bill. The 
MPs in the subcommittee and the sponsoring department accepted the 
amendment opinion. The bill was amended according to the opinion of the Chief 
of Staff and resolved. The number of articles that were revised by the amendment 
opinions of committee staff was one (25 per cent of the bill’s articles). 
The examinations by the standing committee, Legislation and Judiciary 
Committee, and the plenary  
The bill was tabled at the meeting of the Public Administration and Security 
Committee on 20 September 2012 along with 15 other law bills. The bill was 
resolved to be amended as it was amended in the subcommittee for examination 
of legislative bills. Then, the bill was referred to the Legislation and Judiciary 
Committee and tabled at the meeting of the committee on 26 September 2012 
for the examination of structure and wording along with 45 other law bills. The bill 
was not amended in the examination of the committee. After the examination of 
the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, the bill was tabled at the plenary on 27 
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September 2012 and resolved to be amended as amended in the Public 
Administration and Security Committee. There was no debate among MPs in the 
process. 
The uniqueness of the flow of the policy idea 
An interesting point about the legislative process of the bill is that the policy idea 
for the major substance of the bill originated, not from the sponsoring department, 
but from an MP who suggested the policy by proposing bills. The substance of 
the government bills that passed was a specified version of the private member’s 
bills. Thus, there was a unique flow of the policy idea that flowed from the 
legislature to the executive and came back to the legislature and was enacted as 
a clause of the relevant law. 
9.3.3. The role of the committee staff in the legislative process 
The significance and the acceptance of the amendment opinions of the 
committee staff 
As demonstrated above, the Chief of Staff in charge of the bill suggested only 
one detailed amendment opinion that the probationary employment for 
candidates before official appointment should be ruled in the bill additionally to 
apply the laws about crimes of civil servants. The amendment opinion was about 
legal structure because it was to secure legal consistency within the Act. The 
amendment opinion was accepted by the MPs of the subcommittee for the 
examination of legislative bills and reflected in the bill. The examination of the 
standing committee, the Legislation and Judiciary Committee and the plenary 
also agreed with the amendments of the subcommittee. Thus, the amendment 
opinion of the committee staff was reflected in the final Act. Needless to say, the 
amendment to the bill came from the committee staff after consultation with the 
sponsoring department. MPs did not suggest their own amendment opinions. 
Guiding the scrutiny process 
In the minutes, there is no explicit question and debate about the bill except a 
request for statistics because the bill had no issues to be discussed at the official 
meeting of the standing committee and subcommittee. Therefore, it is difficult to 
say that committee staff guided the debate in the committee and subcommittee 
stages. MPs, however, could be affected by the fact that the committee staff did 
not raise any problems in the aspect of policy substance (The one amendment 
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opinion raised by committee staff was about legal structure). Therefore, the 
committee staff might have contributed to the non-discussion about the bill as 
similar to the non-decision making in Bachrach and Baratz (1962). 
The policy network and the impact of the committee staff 
The major policy actors in the policy network of this introduction of a special 
recruitment procedure for North Korean refugees were just MPs and the 
sponsoring department. No interest group lobbied for or against the bill. The bill 
did not draw MPs’ attention. To some degree, the bill had routine and 
administrative features because a part of the aim of the bill was to secure a 
balance between the recruitment procedure of civil servants in the central 
government and local governments because the affirmative action was already 
adopted in the recruitment procedure for local government employees. 
In addition, the workload of the committee was heavy and there were other 
controversial bills. The number of bills tabled in the committee meeting along with 
this bill for the general debate was 162. The general debate over the 163 bills 
took just two hours. No MP questioned the affirmative action for North Korean 
refugees. Even in the subcommittee stage, the number of bills tabled along with 
this bill was 40. The focus of the subcommittee meeting was on bills related to 
electoral laws because the 18th presidential election was scheduled to be held in 
December. The scrutiny of those bills took one hour, and the meeting adjourned 
due to the controversy over the polling hours in elections. The subcommittee 
meeting was the battlefield between parties, and MPs were sort of soldiers in the 
battle. The scrutiny of the bill about the affirmative action for North Korean 
refugees took just four minutes. Just one MP requested related data in the 
subcommittee stage during the whole scrutiny of the bill in the legislature. For the 
committee staff, the issues in the bill did not require mediation between 
stakeholders because there was no disagreement. They suggested no 
substantive amendment opinion. With no controversy about the bill among the 
policy actors and public, MPs agreed with the bill because the bill was innocuous 
for their political interests. They implicitly delegated the scrutiny of the bill to the 
committee staff and approved the bill when the committee staff reported no 
problem.  
  9.3.4. Summary and conclusion 
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The bill for partial amendment of the State Public Officials Act (1901362) was a 
politically uncontroversial bill because the major policy of the bill made no explicit 
cost, and explicit opposition to a policy favourable to specific minorities was 
difficult. In addition, the bill was relatively easy and not complex because the 
policy issue did not need high expertise. The non-technical characteristic of the 
policy issue might influence the flow of the policy idea. The policy idea originated 
from an MP and flowed to the relevant department. The department specified the 
policy idea and submitted it to the legislature as a law bill. The legislature passed 
the bill and the policy was enacted. 
The fact that the policy issue was uncontroversial affected the interaction 
between MPs and committee staff. As demonstrated in the legislative process of 
the bill to reform the categorisation of civil servants, MPs did not suggest any 
amendment opinions of their own and accepted the amendment opinions of the 
committee staff. All amendments to the bill came from the committee staff after 
the consultation with the sponsoring department. Moreover, MPs did not even 
question or discuss the bill explicitly. It is possible to say that the opinion of the 
committee staff about the bill affected MPs and they did not raise any issues 
about the bill. Thus, the committee staff might have conducted the guiding 
function in a similar way to non-decision making. 
 
9.4. Administrative Reorganisation in 2013 
  9.4.1. Background 
The bill for whole amendment of the Government Organisation Act (1903484) 
was to reform the organisation of the executive branch before the inauguration of 
the 18th President of South Korea. It was to set the new organisation for the new 
executive branch. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987 
(art. 96), the establishment, organization and function of each executive ministry 
should be determined by acts. Therefore, to reform the organisation of the 
executive branch, amendments of relevant acts are necessary. Officially, the bill 
was a private member’s bill, but the substance of the bill was prepared by the 
Presidential Transition Committee and the Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security. A submission of a government law bill usually takes many procedures 
and much time (at least two or three months), and there is not much time between 
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the presidential election and the inauguration of the president (usually two months) 
in South Korea. Thus, the bill was formally introduced by the Floor Leader of the 
governing party. The bill could be called a hand-out bill. In addition to the bill, 37 
other bills related with the reorganisation were introduced together. 
Needless to say, the bill was very controversial in political aspects. As March 
and Olsen (1983, p.283) pointed out, administrative reorganisation is a ‘political 
struggle’ related to the interests of bureaucrats, interest groups and the 
legislature. Stakeholders related to administrative reorganisation try to affect the 
reorganisation. The reorganisation affects the career of civil servants in the 
departments. The reorganisation is also likely to give benefits to the related 
interest groups (Peters, 2010, p.162). According to Miles (1977), administrative 
reorganisation is considered to be an ‘expression of national priority’ (p.156). 
Thus, policy beneficiary groups, whose relevant departments are to be reduced, 
could think that the policies related to them can be given a low priority. Moreover, 
administrative reorganisation means that the current policy networks are to be 
changed and interest groups should bear the transaction cost to reconstruct a 
new policy network. Administrative reorganisation also affects the jurisdictions of 
standing committees in the legislature (Seidman, 1970, p.37). Especially in South 
Korea, committees themselves could be abolished or merged into other 
committees by following the reorganisation of standing committees (Standing 
committees in the National Assembly of South Korea were reorganised with the 
administrative reorganisation in 2013. Some of the standing committees were 
renamed and terms of references were changed). Even the opposition party can 
have interests in administrative reorganisation. The contraction of the 
departments related to policies which they think are important or which are related 
to socio-economic groups supporting the party can affect their political interest. 
In addition, the bill was very complex and technically difficult for MPs to scrutinise. 
It was necessary to have high expertise and knowledge about the structure of 
government organisation and the functions of each executive ministry at least 
roughly. Specifically, the bill was to wholly rewrite the Government Organisation 
Act and amend 712 other acts, so it was also necessary to have some knowledge 
about legal structure.                       
  9.4.2. The substance of the bill 
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The major reorganisation of the executive branch in the bill is summarised as 
follows: Firstly, a Deputy Prime Minister who has jurisdiction for the coordination 
of economic policies is to be established and the Minister for Strategy and 
Finance is to be the Deputy Prime Minister. Secondly, the function of the Korean 
Food and Drug Administration is expanded and the administration becomes the 
Ministry of Food and Drug Safety. The function of food and drug safety policy 
formulation is to be transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries is to be reduced to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs. Thirdly, the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning is to 
be newly established. This ministry has jurisdiction for the formulation, overall 
control and coordination of policies on science and technology; research, 
development and promotion of science and technology; training of science and 
technology personnel; planning of national informatisation, protection of 
information and information culture; fusion and promotion of broadcasting and 
communications; management of radio waves; the information and 
communications industry; nuclear safety; and the postal service, postal money 
orders and postal transfers. Relevant functions are to be transferred from other 
departments. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology is to be 
reduced to the Ministry of Education because the science and technology policy 
function is transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning.  
Fourthly, the trade negotiation function is to be transferred from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy before the reorganisation). Finally, the Ministry 
of Oceans and Fisheries is to be established. The ministry is to have the 
jurisdiction for maritime policies, fisheries, development of fishing villages, 
distribution of marine products, maritime transportation, harbours, marine 
environment, ocean surveys, development of marine resources, research and 
development of marine science and technology and adjudication in cases of 
maritime safety. The Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs is to be 
reduced to the Ministry of Land and Transport because the maritime policy 
function is transferred. 
  9.4.3. The legislative process 
The pre-legislative process 
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The Presidential Transition Committee was established on 6 January 2013, and 
the committee prepared the administrative reorganisation. The committee 
announced the reorganisation on 15 January 2013. Then, civil servants in the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security and other relevant departments 
drafted the law bills for the reorganisation. Aside from the bill for whole 
amendment of the Government Organisation Act (1903484), 37 bills were drafted 
for the amendments of individual acts. The bills were submitted to the National 
Assembly on 30 January 2013. In the following sections, the official legislative 
process is described focusing on the scrutiny of the bill for whole amendment of 
the Government Organisation Act (1903484), but the negotiation between the 
governing party and the opposition party is described including the negotiations 
about other relevant bills. 
The review of the bill by the committee staff 
  The review report of the committee staff on the bill did not suggest any explicit 
amendment opinions because of the bill’s high controversy. Instead it just 
surveyed the pros and cons of individual measures of the reorganisation 
discussed among experts and the media after the announcement of the 
reorganisation. The major issues reviewed in the report were the introduction of 
the Deputy Prime Minister; the extension of the Food and Drug Administration to 
the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety; the establishment of the Ministry of Science, 
ICT and Future Planning; the transfer of the trade negotiation function; and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. 
Firstly, about the Deputy Prime Minister, the report stated that coordination 
among the departments related to economy and industry policies would be 
enhanced, but the Deputy Prime Minister would be redundant given the existence 
of the Prime Minister. Secondly, about the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, the 
report stated that the consistency of food and drug safety policy would be 
enhanced, but drug safety policy would be better to be in the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare because the policy is closely related to health 
policy. Thirdly, about the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, the report 
stated that the establishment of the ministry would construct a strong policy 
delivery system that links science research and development with the industries 
of high technology, but science policy and policy about information and 
communication would be better to be split into other departments because of the 
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differences of the policies in temporal aspects (Science policy is conceived as a 
long-term policy, but information and communication policy is conceived as a 
short-term policy in South Korea). Fourthly, about the transfer of the function of 
trade negotiations, the report stated that the interests of manufacturing industries 
would be better reflected in trade negotiations with foreign countries by the 
transfer, but the interests of other industries (e.g. agriculture) could be neglected. 
In addition to these issues, the establishment of the Office of National Security, 
the renaming of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security to the Ministry 
of Security and Public Administration and the expansion of the function of the 
Small and Medium Business Administration were reviewed in the report. 
Committee stage before the negotiation between the governing party and the 
opposition party 
The bill was referred to the Public Administration and Security Committee on 30 
January 2013 and tabled at the meeting of the committee on 4 February 2013 
along with 110 other legislative bills. S. Kang MP (one of the bill’s co-sponsors 
and a member of the Presidential Transition Committee) explained the bill’s 
purpose. The review report of the committee staff on the bill was read in a 
summarised way. The general discussion about the bill, however, was not held 
immediately. The committee held a public hearing and general discussion about 
the bill on the next day. A panel of six experts attended, presented their opinions, 
and answered MPs’ questions in the public hearing. In the general discussion 
that was held after the public hearing, two members of the Presidential Transition 
Committee who had prepared the reorganisation and the Minister and the first 
Deputy Minister for Public Administration and Security attended and answered 
MPs’ questions. The major issues debated in the public hearings and the first 
general discussion were: the general direction of the reorganisation; the 
establishment of the Office of National Security; the elevation of the 
organisational status of the Presidential Security Service; the Deputy Prime 
Minister; the function of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning; the 
transfer of the trade negotiation function; the naming of the Ministry of Security 
and Public Administration; the naming of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs; the function of the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety; the naming of the 
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family; the function of the Ministry of Oceans 
and Fisheries; the Small and Medium Business Administration; and the need for 
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an anti-corruption organisation. The detailed issues of the debates in the 
meetings are summarised in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2. The issues in the public hearing and the first general discussion about 
the reorganisation on 5 February 2013 
 The General Direction of the Reorganisation 
 The need for the improvement of the reorganisation process 
 The frequency of administrative reorganisations (too frequent) 
 
 The Establishment of the Office of National Security 
 The risk of the redundancy of the office under the President 
 
 The Elevation of the Organisational Status of the Presidential Security 
Service (similar to a ministry) 
 The risk of power concentration to the agency  
 
 The Deputy Prime Minister 
 The risk of power concentration to the Deputy Prime Minister in 
economic policy areas 
 The risk of redundancy in policy coordination, given the existence of the 
Prime Minister 
 
 The Function of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning 
 The distribution of the industry-academia cooperation policy function 
between the ministry and other relevant ministries. 
 The distribution of the broadcasting policy function between the ministry 
and the Korean Communications Commission 
 The need for the separation of the science and technology policy 
function and the ICT policy function 
 The need for the separation of Nuclear Safety and Security Commission 
from the ministry 
 
 The Transfer of the Function of Trade Negotiations 
 
 The Ministry of Security and Public Administration 
 The unnecessary renaming of the ministry without a great change of the 
function of the ministry 
 
 The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
 The need for the maintenance of ‘food’ in the name of the ministry 
 
 The Ministry of Food and Drug Safety 
 The need for the explicit distribution of functions between the ministry 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in food policy areas 
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Table 9.2. The issues in the public hearing and the first general discussion about 
the reorganisation on 5 February 2013 (continued) 
 The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
 The need for including the word ‘youth’ in the name of the ministry 
 
 The function of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries 
 The need for further extension of the function of the ministry (e.g. 
management of marine and coastal national parks, policy about the 
shipbuilding industry) 
 
 Small and Medium Business Administration 
 The need for the reinforcement of the administration to a ministry 
 
 The need for the reinforcement of the anti-corruption organisation 
Source: summarised from the minutes of the 2nd meeting of Public Administration and Security 
Committee in the 313th Session (5 February 2013) 
 
Negotiations between the governing party and the opposition party 
Floor leaders of the governing party and the opposition party agreed with the 
establishment of a negotiating body for the reorganisation on 31 January 2013. 
The negotiating body was comprised of six MPs including the Chair of the Policy 
Committee and the Deputy Floor Leader of each party. The negotiating body held 
its first meeting on 4 February 2013 and members of the negotiating body 
discussed each party’s positions about the reorganisation. The negotiating body 
decided to include each party’s ranking members of the Legislation and Judiciary 
Committee and the Public Administration and Security Committee in the meeting. 
The negotiating body held two more meetings on 5 and 7 February 2013. Major 
amendment opinions raised by the opposition party in the meetings and the 
position of the governing party for the issues are summarised in Table 9.3. 
There had been no agreement about the reorganisation at the meetings of the 
negotiation body. The negotiation body could not function any more after 7 
February 2013. Instead, the negotiation continued between deputy floor leaders 
of the governing party and the opposition party. They met on 14 February 2013, 
but failed to reach an agreement about the reorganisation. The most important 
issue that they could not agree about was the distribution of the broadcasting 
policy function between the Korean Communications Commission and the 
Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (Lee, 2013). On 17 February 2013, 
floor leaders, deputy floor leaders and chairs of the policy committee of the two  
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Table 9.3. Debates in the negotiating body about the reorganisation 
Opposition Party Governing Party 
Establishment of anti-corruption 
organisation 
It should be discussed after the 
reorganisation. 
Elevation of organisational status of 
the Small and Medium Business 
Administration to a ministry 
 
Elevation of organisational status of 
the administration is not desirable. 
It would be possible to extend the 
function of the administration more. 
Maintaining the broadcasting 
promotion policy function in the 
Korean Communications Commission 
A major part of the policy function 
should be transferred to the Ministry of 
Science, ICT and Future Planning. 
The Ministry of Science, ICT and 
Future Planning should not direct and 
supervise the Nuclear Safety and 
Security Commission. 
It would be possible that the Prime 
Minister directs the commission. 
 
 
Establishment of the Ministry of Trade 
Negotiations 
 
 
As the initial bill, the function of trade 
negotiations should be transferred to 
the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy. 
Maintaining the industry - academia 
cooperation policy function in the 
Ministry of Education 
A major part of the policy function 
should be transferred to the Ministry of 
Science, ICT and Future Planning. 
Source: summarised from the report on the negotiation about administrative reorganisation 
(February 2013, an unpublished document of Public Administration and Security Committee) 
 
parties met again to negotiate about the reorganisation, but failed to reach an 
agreement. On 22 February 2013, chairs, floor leaders and deputy floor leaders 
of the two parties met, but also failed to reach an agreement. 
The opposition party argued that the transfer of the broadcasting promotion 
policy function from the commission to the ministry inhibited the neutrality and 
impartiality of the broadcasting media (Choi, 2013). Two of the commission’s five 
members are recommended by the opposition party, but the Minister for the 
ministry is appointed by the President. The opposition party might think that the 
Minister would direct the broadcasting media for the interests of the governing 
party. In particular, the opposition party opposed the transfer of the policy function 
about local service operators of cable TV (SO), Internet TV (IPTV), satellite 
broadcasting, and programme providers (Min and Lee, 2013; Yoo 2013).11 On 24 
February 2013, the governing party suggested that despite the transfer of the 
policy function, the commission could have the power of submission of law bills 
                                                          
11 Public broadcasting and the news reporting function of broadcasting remained under the jurisdiction of 
the Korean Communications Commission in the initial bill. 
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and secondary legislation under its jurisdiction as in other ministries and that the 
broadcasting advertisement policy function could remain in the commission, but 
the opposition party rejected the suggestion (Kim, 2013). 
On 25 February 2013, the 18th President of South Korea was inaugurated, but 
the necessary legislation for administrative reorganisation had not been done. On 
2 March 2013, the President invited chairs and floor leaders of the governing 
party and the opposition party to talk about the reorganisation, but the opposition 
party rejected the invitation. On 2 and 3 March 2013, deputy floor leaders 
negotiated focusing on the issue of the distribution of the broadcasting policy 
function, but failed to reach an agreement. On 4 March 2013, the President 
announced a statement and argued that the transfer of the broadcasting 
promotion policy function was necessary; that she had no intention to direct the 
broadcasting media for the interests of her own party; and that the opposition 
party should respond to her invitation to talk about the reorganisation (Segye-ilbo, 
2013a). Her statement, however, exacerbated the situation. The opposition party 
criticised the statement. The Chair of the opposition party held a press conference 
and argued that the reorganisation should be decided in the National Assembly 
according to the agreement between the governing party and the opposition party 
and that the President should respect the legislation power of the National 
Assembly (Kim, 2013). 
On 5 March 2013, the governing party suggested that the Korean 
Communications Commission could have the power of supervising the 
impartiality of the broadcasting media provided that the broadcasting promotion 
policy function was transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning, but the opposition party rejected the suggestion and suggested the 
enactment of a special Act which would reinforce the ICT policy function of the 
Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning provided that the broadcasting 
promotion policy function remains in the Korean Communication Commission 
(Choi, 2013). Deputy floor leaders of the two parties discussed their alternatives 
on 8 and 11 March 2013, but they failed to reach an agreement. On 12 March 
2013, the opposition party required the enactment of a special Act about the 
impartiality of the broadcasting media provided that the broadcasting promotion 
policy function would be transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning (Kim and Park, 2013). On 14 March 2013, deputy floor leaders of the 
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two parties discussed the alternative, but failed to reach an agreement. On 15 
March 2013, the President invited senior members of the governing party, and 
they talked about the reorganisation. She emphasised that the policy function 
about SO, IPTV, satellite broadcasting, and programme providers should be 
transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (Nahm, 2013). 
After the talk, deputy floor leaders of the governing party and the opposition party 
discussed the issue on the same and the next day focusing on the way to secure 
the impartiality of the broadcasting media provided that the broadcasting 
promotion policy function was transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT and 
Future Planning. 
Eventually, on 17 March 2013, the two parties reached an agreement about the 
reorganisation. The major substance of the agreement was as follows: Firstly, the 
policy function about SO, IPTV, satellite broadcasting and programme providers 
should be transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning under 
some conditions. The detailed substances about the distribution of the policy 
function between the ministry and the Korean Communications Commission is 
summarised in Table 9.4. Secondly, a special committee, which will deal with 
anti-corruption reforms, should be established in the National Assembly. Thirdly, 
the participation of the Administrator (the Head) of the Small and Medium 
Business Administration in the State Council (the cabinet meeting in South Korea) 
should be guaranteed (The administrators are not allowed to attend the council). 
Fourthly, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission should not be under the 
direction of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and the Prime 
Minister should supervise and direct the commission directly. Fifthly, the industry-
academia cooperation policy function should be distributed between the Ministry 
of Education and the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning as it had been 
distributed between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology before 2008. (The two ministries were merged in 2008.) Finally, ‘food’ 
should be added to the name of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. 
The Legislative process after the negotiation 
Standing committees to which bills about the reorganisation were referred held 
meetings on 18 March 2013. The Public Administration and Security Committee 
also held a general discussion. Individual MPs raised issues which were not 
included in the agreement. They are as follows: the elevation in organisational   
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Table 9.4. The distribution of the policy function between the Korean 
Communications Commission and the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future 
Planning 
 The Legal Status of the Korean Communications Commission 
 The power of secondary legislation and submitting legislative bills 
should remain in the commission. 
 
 Broadcast Communications Development Fund 
 The Minister of the ministry and the Chair of the commission should 
manage the fund together. 
 
 Internet TV (IPTV) 
 It should be under the jurisdiction of the ministry 
 IPTV operators themselves, however, should not have their own news 
channels. 
 
 Service Operator (SO) and satellite broadcasting 
 They should be under the jurisdiction of the ministry. There should be 
an agreement between the ministry and the commission, however, when 
the ministry gives permission to a SO or satellite broadcasting company, 
or if there is any legislation about the policy. 
 
 Programme Providers (PP) 
 The ministry has the jurisdiction over PPs who are not related with news 
programmes. 
 
 Frequency Management 
 The commission will manage the frequencies for broadcasting, and the 
ministry will manage the frequencies for telecommunication. 
 
 Further Legislation 
 A special committee for the impartiality of the broadcasting media will be 
established in the legislature. The committee will exist for six months. If 
there is a need for further legislation according to the report of the 
committee, the standing committee that has the jurisdiction over 
broadcasting policy will legislate related acts. 
 An act for the promotion of ICT will be enacted by June. 
Source: summarised from the agreement about administrative reorganisation between floor 
leaders of the governing party and opposition party (Lee, 2013) 
 
status of the Korea Post to an administration; the merger of child policy and youth 
policy; and the distribution of disaster management functions between the 
Ministry of Security and Public Administration and the National Emergency 
Management Agency. After the general discussion, the bill was referred to the 
subcommittee for the examination of law bills. On the same day, the 
subcommittee held a meeting for the examination of the bill. The Chief of Staff in 
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charge of the bill reported the substance of the agreement between the governing 
party and the opposition party and amendments according to the negotiation. 
MPs agreed with the agreement, but the bill was not resolved. This was because 
other bills about the distribution of the broadcasting promotion policy function that 
were referred to the Committee on Culture, Sports, Tourism, Broadcasting and 
Communications were not resolved due to  discrepancies among MPs’ opinions 
about detailed amendments according to the agreement. 
At the committee, MPs of the opposition party argued that the Ministry of 
Science, ICT and Future Planning should have the agreement of the Korean 
Communications Commission when it approves a change of permission to an SO 
(This issue was related to the range of agreement between the ministry and the 
commission about permission given to an SO) and that the Korean 
Communications Commission should have the power of giving permission to a 
public broadcasting company (This issue was related to the range of frequency 
management for broadcasting that was agreed to be under the jurisdiction of the 
Korean Communications Commission) (Lee and Hwang, 2013). MPs of the 
governing party opposed the arguments. Deputy floor leaders of the governing 
party and the opposition party had to re-negotiate to solve the discrepancies. 
After several meetings, the governing party agreed with the arguments of the 
opposition party on the night of 21 March 2013. After the negotiation, the 
committee staff drafted amendments with civil servants of the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security according to the agreement and produced 
documents explaining the agreement to MPs in the standing committee and 
subcommittee. 
On 22 March 2013, the subcommittee of Public Administration and Security 
Committee for examination of law bills held its meeting and resolved the bill 
according to the agreement. The subcommittee, however, attached an opinion 
that emphasised the importance of the youth policy function in the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family. Then, the bill was resolved at the meeting of Public 
Administration and Security Committee as it had been resolved at the 
subcommittee. In the examination of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, 
there were a few questions about the renaming of the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security to the Ministry of Security and Public Administration 
and other minor provisions, but there were no amendments. There was no debate 
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and only minor amendments to clarify clauses in addenda about the distribution 
of the broadcasting promotion policy function at the plenary. These official 
legislative processes were conducted in a day. 
  9.4.4. The role of the committee staff in the legislative process 
The committee staff in charge of the bill did not play a substantive role in the 
policy formation of the administrative reorganisation. Firstly, the review report of 
the committee staff could not state explicit amendment opinions because of the 
highly controversial and political characteristics of the bill. The report only 
surveyed the pros and cons of the reorganisation that had been already 
discussed among experts and in the media. Secondly, the guiding function of 
committee staff did not work well. MPs raised many issues which were not 
reviewed in the review report of the committee staff. They were as follows: the 
reinforcement of the Prime Minister’s power; the reinforcement of the anti-
corruption organisation; the distribution of the broadcasting promotion policy 
function between the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning and the 
Korean Communications Commission; the independence of the Nuclear Safety 
and Security Commission from the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning; 
the distribution of the function of disaster management between the Ministry of 
Security and Public Administration and the National Emergency Management 
Agency; the distribution of the food policy function between the Ministry of Food 
and Drug Safety and the Ministry of  Agriculture and Rural Affairs; the name of 
the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family; and the extension of the function of 
the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. Three of the six major issues in the 
negotiation between parties were not issues reviewed in the report (anti-
corruption organisation, the distribution of broadcasting promotion policy and the 
independence of the Nuclear Security and Safety Commission). Thirdly, the 
committee staff could not participate in the negotiation between parties. They 
could sit on the initial negotiation body. After the body failed to make an 
agreement, however, the negotiation was held between the deputy floor leaders 
of the governing party and the opposition party, and the committee staff could not 
attend the negotiation. 
The committee staff, however, conducted a technical function that translated 
and specified the agreement into the clauses of the bill. In particular, they played 
an important role in specifying the distribution of detailed policy functions among 
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administrative departments by revising the clauses in the addenda of the bill that 
amended other acts. It was because high expertise, which is difficult for elected 
MPs to have, is required in revising those detailed clauses. Of course, the major 
substance of the reorganisation was decided by the negotiation between the 
governing party and the opposition party, not by the committee staff, but the role 
of the committee staff was necessary to specify the results of the negotiation into 
the detailed distribution of policy functions (with civil servants in the executive 
branch) and translate it into legal provisions. The function of the committee staff 
was important due to the high technical complexity of the bill. Moreover, they 
amended the bill in the aspect of legal structure and wording (They revised six of 
the 43 articles except those in the addenda of the bill, seven of the eight articles 
in the addenda and 84 of the 712 paragraphs which amended other acts) within 
the limitation of not changing the substance of the reorganisation; and the work 
of the committee staff in the standing committee was very important in the 
legislative process of the bill because there was not enough time for examination 
by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee due to the urgency of the bill. 
  9.4.5. The policy network and the impact of the committee staff 
Basically, the policy network of the reorganisation was formed around the two 
political parties that negotiated with each other about the reorganisation. The 
relevant stakeholders including MPs, standing committees in the National 
Assembly, bureaucrats in the relevant ministries, interest groups, experts, and 
the media formed coalitions according to their own interests about the 
reorganisation and made efforts to influence the reorganisation. Firstly, some 
MPs tried to defend their own constituents’ interests against the reorganisation 
regardless of their parties. For instance, according to the minutes of the official 
scrutiny of the bill, MPs whose constituencies were in rural areas supported the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in the distribution of the food policy 
function between the ministry and the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, which 
they thought were in farmers’ interests, and an MP whose constituency was in 
the biggest seaport in South Korea continuously urged the extension of the 
function of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. 
Secondly, standing committees defended their own ministries against the 
reorganisation. The Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee discussed 
the transfer of the trade negotiation function along with a question about the 
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nuclear experiments of North Korea on 4 February 2013. The committee 
suggested its opinion that opposed the transfer by its resolution and sent it to the 
Public Administration and Security Committee. The Education, Science and 
Technology Committee discussed the reorganisation focusing on the function of 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning 
on 5 February 2013. The committee suggested its opinion by its resolution and 
sent it to the Public Administration and Security Committee. The opinion argued 
the extension of the function of the ministries. The Food, Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries Committee discussed the reorganisation focusing on the function 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on 4 February 2013. The committee 
suggested its opinion by its resolution and sent it to the Public Administration and 
Security Committee. The opinion argued that ‘food’ should be included in the 
name of the ministry and that the function of the ministry in food policy should be 
extended. The Knowledge Economy Committee discussed the reorganisation 
focusing on the function of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy on 5 
February 2013. The committee suggested its opinion by its resolution and sent it 
to the Public Administration and Security Committee. The opinion argued that the 
trade negotiation function should be transferred to the ministry and that the Korea 
Post should be reinforced as an administration. 
Thirdly, relevant bureaucrats and interest groups tried to direct the 
reorganisation for their own interests. For example, civil servants in the relevant 
ministries and administrations had met the committee staff in charge of the 
reorganisation and provided documents and data for their departments. The list 
of the departments are as follows: the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; the Ministry of Knowledge Economy; the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare; the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family; the 
Korea Food and Drug Administration; and the Korea Communications 
Commission. Even the first deputy minister (in charge of education) and the 
second deputy minister (in charge of science and technology) of the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology suggested different opinions about the 
distribution of the industry-academic cooperation policy function to the committee 
staff. Interest groups also participated in the legislative process. For instance, 
representatives of universities and secondary schools (related to the distribution 
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of the industry-academic cooperation policy function); farmers’ unions and food 
consumer groups (related to the distribution of the food policy function); interest 
groups related with ocean industries (related to the function of the Ministry of 
Oceans and Fisheries); the trade union of employees in Korea Post (related to 
the reinforcement of the Korea Post); and the Korea Federation of Small and 
Medium Entrepreneurs (related to the reinforcement of the Small and Medium 
Business Administration) all voiced their opinions about the reorganisation in the 
public hearing of the Public Administration and Security Committee as members 
of the audience. Representatives of food consumer groups, the famer’s union, 
the livestock industry, fisheries, and restaurants attended the public hearing of 
the Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee as a panel. 
Fourthly, experts in academia and the media were also actors in the policy 
network. Experts are mobilised to defend the positions of each party by attending 
the public hearings of the relevant standing committee as part of a panel. Three 
of the total six standing committees that examined the bills related to the 
reorganisation held public hearings. Six experts (four in public administration, one 
in trade negotiation, and one in media policy) attended the public hearing of the 
Public Administration and Security Committee, Four experts (all in media policy) 
attended that of the Committee on Culture, Sports, Tourism, Broadcasting and 
Communications. One expert in veterinary science attended that of the Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee. The media also played a role as 
policy actors. Most reports by the media about the negotiation of the 
reorganisation were not partial to a specific position. Some media, however, 
criticised a specific party. For example, two liberal newspapers carried five 
articles which only criticised the President and the governing party from 15 
February to 5 March 2013 (The Hankyoreh 2013; Kim, 2013; The Kyunghyang 
Shinmun, 2013a; 2013b; Seok, 2013). A conservative newspaper carried two 
editorials criticising the opposition party on 7 and 13 March 2013 (The Dong-A 
Ilbo, 2013; Hong, 2013). 
Finally, even the President herself became an actor in the policy network. Her 
actions can be classified into two categories: to request the opposition party to 
cooperate in the legislative process and to defend the initial substance of the 
reorganisation against criticisms and amendment opinions. She indirectly asked 
the opposition party to pass the bills related to the reorganisation at open forums 
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of the Presidential Transition Committee about the new government’s projects on 
15 and 18 February 2013 (Han, 2013; Lee and Gill, 2013); a meeting with her 
chief advisors of the Presidential Secretariat on 27 February 2013 (Kwak, 2013); 
and a breakfast prayer meeting with national leaders on 7 March 2013 (Shin, 
2013). She rang the Chair and the Floor Leader of the opposition party to request 
the cooperation on 15 February 2013 (Lee and Gill, 2013); directly asked the 
Chair at the anniversary of Independence Movement day on 1 March 2013 (Kim, 
Lee and Kim, 2013); and invited parliamentary leaders of the opposition party to 
discuss the reorganisation on 2 and 15 March 2013 although the opposition party 
rejected the invitations (SBS, 2013; Segye-ilbo, 2013b). She also argued for the 
desirability of the reorganisation. She stated that the reorganisation was 
reasonable at the meeting with proportional representatives of the governing 
party on 13 February 2013 (Lee, 2013); that the Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission should be under the direction of the Ministry of Science, ICT and 
Future Planning in the open forum of the Presidential Transition Committee about 
the new government’s projects in education and science policy on 14 February 
2013 (Kim, 2013); and that the establishment of the Ministry of Science, ICT, and 
Future Planning was necessary for the future at a visit to an ICT company on 12 
March 2013 (Kim, 2013). She also argued that she had no intention of directing 
the broadcasting media to her own political interests in the statement of 4 March, 
as explained above, and at the lunch meeting with seniors of the nation on 13 
March 2013 (Kim, 2013). As explained above, she said that the policy function 
about SO, IPTV, satellite broadcasting, and programme providers should be 
transferred to the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning at the meeting 
with parliamentary leaders of the governing party on 15 March 2013. 
Needless to say, MPs gave great attention to the scrutiny of the bill. A whole-
day session of public hearing was devoted to the bill in the Public Administration 
and Security Committee. The public hearing along with the general debate over 
the bill took 6 hours and 8 minutes, with 17 MPs questioning. Even after the 
negotiation between parties had decided the substance of the bill, MPs needed 
to demonstrate their attention to the bill and relevant policy actors for the purpose 
of credit claiming and position taking in Mayhew (1974, ch.1). Thus, the general 
debate over the bill in the committee on 18 March 2013 – after the negotiation 
between parties – took 50 minutes, with seven MPs questioning. The bill was very 
278 
 
important for MPs as party politicians promoting their own party’s policy and as 
representatives of their own constituencies. Due to the high controversy of the 
bill, however, the practical scrutiny of the bill was conducted through the 
negotiation between parties. After the negotiation, even MPs in the committee in 
charge of the bill could not change the results of the negotiation. 
The committee staff could not have a substantive impact in the policy network. 
Individual MPs who tried to secure the interests of their own constituents, civil 
servants of the relevant departments and representatives of the relevant interest 
groups contacted the committee staff and provided documents and data. The 
most important actors – the representatives of each party who negotiated, 
however, ignored the role of the relevant committee staff. As written above, the 
committee staff could not attend the negotiation and did not know the progress of 
the negotiation. They even knew the results of the negotiation only from the media 
and had to request the substances of the agreement from the Deputy Floor 
Leader of the governing party. Moreover, they had no motivation and resource to 
intervene in the negotiation over the highly controversial bill. Their major role was 
to report the agreement to MPs of the standing committee after the end of the 
negotiation. Although MPs, civil servants and the relevant interest groups 
provided them with documents and data, the documents and data were not 
important for the negotiation. However, they conducted their role actively in the 
translation and specification of the agreement between political parties. It was 
possible because of their expertise in legislation skills. 
  9.4.5. Summary and conclusion 
The bill for whole amendment of the Government Organisation Act (1903484) 
was a very controversial bill because of the political characteristics of 
administrative reorganisation that create benefits and costs to MPs, committees 
in the legislature, civil servants and relevant interest groups. In addition, the bill 
was very complex, so high expertise and much knowledge in public 
administration and law was necessary to examine the bill thoroughly. The 
negotiation between representatives of the governing party and the opposition 
party decided the major substance of the final bill. The official legislative process 
(subcommittee and committee stage, the examination of the Legislation and 
Judiciary Committee and the plenary) became just a formal process that 
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approved the agreement from the negotiation and gave legitimacy to the 
negotiation. 
The high controversy surrounding the reorganisation affected the interaction 
between MPs and committee staff. The committee staff could not play a 
substantive role in the policy formation of the administrative reorganisation. The 
review report of the committee staff could not suggest explicit amendment 
opinions because of the highly controversial and political characteristics of the bill 
and the guiding function of the committee staff did not work well in the general 
discussion and the public hearing. The committee staff could not even attend the 
negotiation and did not know the progress of the negotiation. After the end of the 
negotiation, however, they played an important role in specifying the agreement 
from the negotiation (with civil servants in the executive branch) and translating 
it into legal provisions due to the high technical complexity of the bill. 
 
9.5. Constituency Demarcation for the 19th General Election in 2012 
  9.5.1. Background 
MPs’ constituencies are to be set by an Act in South Korea (The Constitution of 
the Republic of Korea 1987, art. 41(3)). The official process of the demarcation 
of MPs’ constituencies was as follows in 2012: The Constituency Demarcation 
Committee, which should not include any MP as a member, should be 
established and members of the committee should be appointed by the Speaker 
of the National Assembly through consultation between the Speaker and floor 
leaders of each negotiating group (Public Official Election Act 2005, art. 24(1)-
(2)). The committee should prepare a draft constituency demarcation and submit 
a report about the demarcation six months before the next general election 
(Public Official Election Act 2005, art. 24(7)). The committee should consider the 
population, the administrative districts, geographical features and traffic (Public 
Official Election Act 2005, art. 25(1)). When the National Assembly amends the 
provisions governing MPs’ constituencies, it should pay regard to the draft 
constituency demarcation prepared by the Constituency Demarcation Committee 
(Public Official Election Act 2005, art. 25(10)). 
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By way of context, the Constitutional Court of Korea decided that the population 
of a constituency should be between 50% and 150% of the average population 
of constituencies on 25 October 2001 12 . Therefore, usually, the National 
Assembly should demarcate MPs’ constituencies for the next general election 
every four years because there are very likely to be constituencies which violate 
this principle decided by the court. The constituency demarcation is very 
controversial among MPs whose constituencies are likely to be merged or divided 
because it is directly related to their political interests. The constituency 
demarcation, however, is a relatively easy issue for MPs because they know well 
the principle of constituency demarcation and the outcome of the demarcation. 
Moreover, a revision of tables in the Public Official Election Act is enough and 
knowledge of legislation skills is not necessary for constituency demarcation. 
Strictly speaking, the process of constituency demarcation is not the same 
scrutiny process as that of a government law bill because there is no government 
bill for the demarcation and the relevant special committee in the National 
Assembly demarcates constituencies by a committee bill. The process is studied 
in this chapter, however, because the process is an extreme example in which 
political controversy is magnified and gives an insight on the impact of the degree 
of controversy and technical complexity of an issue on the interaction between 
MPs and the committee staff. 
  9.5.2. The legislative process 
The Constituency Demarcation Committee 
  The Constituency Demarcation Committee for the 19th general election held its 
first meeting on 6 September 2011. The committee heard reports on the 
constituency demarcation from the National Election Commission and the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security on 16 September 2011. They held 
a public hearing on 14 October 2011, and heard the political parties’ opinions on 
21 October 2011. The committee decided on the principle of the demarcation 
over meetings held on 28 October, 4 and 11 November 2011. The committee 
reviewed the opinions of local governments which sent their opinions on 18 
November 2011 and resolved the draft constituency demarcation. The committee 
                                                          
12 The principle was changed by the decision of the court that the population of a constituency should be 
between two thirds and one and a third of the average population of constituencies on 30 October 2014. 
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divided eight constituencies that were over 150% of the average population of 
constituencies into two constituencies respectively and abolished five 
constituencies under 50% of the average population of constituencies. The 
committee also changed the boundaries of four pairs of adjacent constituencies 
to meet the criterion of population. Therefore, the number of local constituency 
members was increased from 245 to 248. The committee, however, 
recommended that the number of proportional representatives should not be 
decreased. 
The review of the draft constituency demarcation by the committee staff 
The Chief of Staff of the Special Committee on Political Reform who was in 
charge of constituency demarcation reported the draft constituency demarcation 
of the Constituency Demarcation Committee, but did not present the review on 
the draft because the draft was not an official bill and the committee staff had no 
power to review the draft.13 In fact, the Committee Staff Director in charge of the 
Public Official Election Act presented the report about the bill for amendment of 
the Act only once (on 4 April 2011) during the period when the special committee 
existed (from March 2011 to February 2012) and bills which were referred to the 
special committee after April 2011 were directly referred to the subcommittee in 
charge of the Public Official Election Act without hearing the review report of the 
committee staff in the committee stage. 
Apart from the draft constituency demarcation, a legislative bill which reduced 
the number of local constituency members and increased that of proportional 
representatives was referred to the committee and the bill was reviewed by the 
committee staff director on 4 April 2011. The review report of the committee staff, 
however, just introduced the substance of the bill and surveyed the pros and cons 
of the single-member constituency system and multi-seat constituency system. 
There was no explicit opinion of the committee staff director. 
Committee stage before the examination of the subcommittee 
The draft constituency demarcation was tabled at the meeting of the Special 
Committee on Political Reform on 27 December 2011. The Chief of Staff reported 
the draft demarcation, but members of the Constituency Demarcation did not 
                                                          
13 In fact, the Chief of Staff and other committee staff were also staff members of the Constituency 
Demarcation Committee. 
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attend the meeting. The Secretary General of the National Election Commission 
attended and answered MPs’ questions. The major issues discussed were the 
balance between urban and rural areas; the balance between Seoul Metropolitan 
area and other regions; the increase of the total number of MPs; and the 
establishment of a constituency for Sejong City that was to be established on 1 
July 2012. An interesting point is that some of the MPs whose political interests 
were directly affected by constituency demarcation were the members of the 
special committee and attended the discussion. In the special committee, there 
were MPs whose constituencies were affected by the draft demarcation or likely 
to be affected by the final demarcation and who were planning to be candidates 
for those constituencies in the next general election. Ten MPs spoke about 
constituency demarcation in the meeting. Three of them were those whose 
constituencies were abolished by the draft demarcation. Two of them were those 
whose constituencies might be abolished because of small population. One MP 
was planning to be a candidate for a constituency that was divided by the draft 
demarcation. They tried to defend their constituencies in the discussion. 
Subcommittee stage 
The Subcommittee on the Public Official Election Act held five meetings from 10 
January to 27 February 2012. Constituency demarcation, however, was not 
discussed in the subcommittee. Only at the final meeting on 27 February 2012, 
the agreement about constituency demarcation between the governing party and 
the opposition party was reported and the subcommittee resolved a committee 
bill according to the agreement. 
Negotiations between the governing party and the opposition party 
Ranking members of the governing party and the opposition party in the 
committee negotiated about constituency demarcation. The draft constituency 
demarcation of the Constituency Demarcation Committee was ignored during the 
negotiation. The opposition party made their alternatives for constituency 
demarcation in late December 2011. The alternatives were dividing Paju, 
Giheung and Wonju into two constituencies each; establishing a new 
constituency for Sejong City; and abolishing three constituencies in Gyeongsang 
Province (Namhae-Hadong, Yeongcheon, and Sangju) and one constituency in 
Jeolla Privince (Damyang-Gokseong-Gurye) (Shin, 2011). 
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The governing party, however, did not have their own alternative until that time. 
The governing party only opposed the establishment of a constituency for Sejong 
City. There was no leadership to represent the party after their defeat in the by-
election for the mayor of Seoul City on 26 October 2011. The Chair of the 
governing party resigned on 9 December 2011. The new party leadership (the 
18th President Park) was inaugurated on 19 December 2011. The governing party 
replaced MPs (including the ranking members of the governing party) in the 
Special Committee on Political Reform who were stakeholders of the 
constituency demarcation on 31 December 2011. After two replacements, a new 
ranking member of the governing party was selected on 12 January 2012. Then, 
the governing party started to make their alternatives. 
A talk between ranking members of the two parties was held on 30 January 
2012. The governing party suggested an alternative that divided Paju and Wonju 
into two constituencies each, established a constituency for Sejong City and 
decreased the number of proportional representatives from 54 to 51, but the 
opposition party rejected the decrease of proportional representatives because 
the party’s coalition partner of the day did not want the decrease (Park, 2012; 
Seok, 2012). There had been no progress in the negotiation until 15 February 
2012. The governing party suggested a new alternative that abolished two 
constituencies in Kyeongsang and Jeolla Provinces respectively and increased 
the number of proportional representatives from 54 to 55 at the meeting between 
ranking members on 15 February 2012, but the opposition party suggested a new 
alternative that abolished two constituencies in Kyeongsang Province and one 
constituency in Jeolla Province at the meeting between floor leaders and ranking 
members on the next day (Seong and Seok, 2012; Nahm, 2012a). 
The two parties agreed with the establishment of a Sejong constituency and 
division of the Paju and Wonju constituencies at this time. The negotiation started 
to focus on how to decrease the number of constituencies by three seats. Floor 
leaders and ranking members of the two parties met on 20 February. The 
governing party suggested a new alternative that abolished one constituency in 
Kyeongsang and Jeolla Provinces respectively and decreased the number of 
proportional representatives from 54 to 53, but the opposition party adhered to 
their alternative that they had suggested on 16 February 2012 (Lee, 2012a). The 
number of constituencies which were to be abolished in Kyeongsang and Jeolla 
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Provinces was very important for the governing and the opposition parties 
because of electoral regionalism in the two regions explained in chapter 2. 
The Secretary General of the National Election Commission visited 
parliamentary leaders of the governing party, the opposition party and minor 
parties and suggested an alternative that increased the number of MPs from 299 
to 300 on 21 February 2012 (Kang, 2012). The suggestion became an alternative 
breaking the deadlock in the negotiation. Ranking members of the governing and 
opposition parties met on 23 February 2012, but there was no agreement. On 26 
February 2012, they reached an agreement which abolished one constituency in 
Kyeongsang and Jeolla Provinces respectively and increased the total number of 
MPs from 299 to 300. The major substances of the constituency demarcation is 
summarised in Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5. The Constituency demarcation for the 19th General Election 
 A constituency which was to be newly established 
 Sejong City 
 
 Constituencies which were to be divided into two constituencies 
respectively 
 Paju → Paju Gab and Paju Eul 
 Wonju → Wonju Gab and Wonju Eul 
 
 Constituencies which were to be abolished and merged into adjacent 
constituencies 
 Damyang-Gokseong-Gurye 
 Namhae-Hadong 
 
 Constituencies of which boundaries were to be changed 
 Suwon Gweonseon and Suwon Paldal 
 Yongin Cheoin, Yongin Giheung, and Yongin Suji 
 Yangpyeong-Gapyeong and Icheo-Yeoju → Yeoju-Yangpyeong-
Gapyeong and Iceon 
 Cheonan Gab and Cheonan Eul 
Source: summarised from the committee bill for partial amendment of Public Official Election Act 
(1814689) 
 
The legislative process after the negotiation 
The subcommittee on the Public Official Election Act held its meeting on 27 
February 2012. The Committee Staff Director in charge of the Public Official 
Election Act reported the agreement between the governing party and the 
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opposition party at the subcommittee meeting. An MP of a minor party objected 
to the agreement, but the subcommittee resolved according to the agreement. 
After the meeting, the Special Committee on Political Reform held its meeting on 
the same day. The ranking member of the governing party reported the 
constituency demarcation according to the agreement. The MP for Namhae-
Hadong constituency tried to enter the committee room and object to the abolition 
of his own constituency, but was stopped by security officers. Three MPs (two of 
them in minor parties) criticised the demarcation in that the imbalance between 
urban and rural areas was exacerbated. Another MP questioned the boundary of 
a constituency where she was planning to be a candidate in the next general 
election. After the discussion, the constituency demarcation was resolved 
according to the agreement between the governing party and the opposition party. 
In the examination of the Legislative and Judiciary Committee, one MP criticised 
the abolition of a rural constituency in Jeolla Province (he was a representative 
of the province in the Supreme Council of the opposition party), and two MPs 
criticised that the Yongin Giheung constituency was not divided despite the big 
population of the constituency (One MP was an incumbent MP for the 
constituency, and the other MP was planning to be a candidate for the 
constituency). The committee, however, only changed the name of some 
constituencies. At the plenary, one MP criticised the abolition of Namhae-Hadong 
constituency (he was the MP for the adjacent constituency that Namhae-Hadong 
was to be merged into) and another MP criticised that one more constituency 
should be added to Cheonan City (There were two constituencies in the city, and 
he was an MP for one of them). The constituency demarcation, however, passed 
the plenary. One interesting point is that the rate of aye votes to the demarcation 
was only 53 per cent (92 of 174 MPs in attendance) despite the agreement 
between the governing party and the opposition party. 
  9.5.3. The role of the committee staff in the legislative process 
The committee staff in charge of the constituency demarcation did not play a 
substantive role in the legislative process. Firstly, the committee staff director in 
charge of the demarcation could not suggest any opinions about the demarcation. 
The committee staff did not have the power to review the draft demarcation 
because it was not an official bill. Secondly, the committee staff could not conduct 
any guiding function. The issues debated at the official meeting of the relevant 
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special committee were set by MPs who tried to defend their own political interest. 
In the special committee in December 2012, six MPs (five in the governing party) 
were those whose constituencies were divided or abolished by the draft 
constituency demarcation, one MP was planning to be a candidate in a 
constituency which was divided by the draft demarcation, and constituencies of 
other two MPs were at risk of abolition due to their small population. Needless to 
say, the agenda and issues in the negotiation between the governing party and 
the opposition party were set by the two parties. Thirdly, the committee staff did 
not play a substantive role in the negotiation between the governing and 
opposition party. They could not attend the negotiation. Ranking members of the 
two parties did not request any information from the committee staff during the 
negotiation. Finally, after the negotiation, the committee staff drafted 
amendments according to the agreement between the governing party and the 
opposition party and produced documents explaining the agreement to MPs in 
the special committee and subcommittee. Differently to that of the legislative 
process of administrative reorganisation, however, the function was close to pure 
translation. There was no space for the committee staff to specify the agreement 
because the agreement about constituency demarcation was already very 
specific. This was because constituency demarcation was relatively easy for MPs 
to access and so controversial that the committee staff could not make decisions 
even on the details. Moreover, committee staff members’ examination of the legal 
structure and wording was not necessary because a revision of a table in the 
Public Official Election Act was simply enough for the constituency demarcation. 
  9.5.4. The policy network and the impact of the committee staff 
Basically, the policy network of the constituency demarcation was formed 
around the two political parties that negotiated with each other about the 
constituency demarcation. Individual MPs, local residents and local governments 
of the relevant constituencies, and the National Election Committee attended the 
network and made efforts to reflect their own interests on the constituency 
demarcation. Firstly, the governing and opposition parties were at the centre of 
the policy network. They were the major agents of the negotiation about the 
demarcation. They had made their own alternatives during the negotiation and 
coordinated the interests of their MPs. 
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Secondly, individual MPs whose political interests were related to the 
demarcation tried to influence the demarcation. Some MPs decided to be 
members of the special committee in charge of the demarcation. As explained 
above, a considerable proportion of the relevant special committee members 
were directly related to the constituency demarcation although most of them were 
replaced during the legislative process of the demarcation. One MP whose 
constituency was abolished tried to object to the agreement and made a 
statement criticising the constituency demarcation (The other MP whose 
constituency was abolished was planning to change his constituency). In the 
official legislative process (at the special committee, the Legislation and Judiciary 
Committee, and the plenary), many MPs participated in discussions and tried to 
defend their political interests. It is not only because the demarcation was critical 
for their re-election but because remaining or securing the status of an 
independent constituency was important for the individual constituencies 
themselves. Thus, MPs behaved not only as seekers of their own interests, but 
as representatives of their own constituencies. 
Thirdly, local residents and local governments tried to reflect their interests in 
the legislative process in the constituency demarcation. Representatives of local 
residents groups of Sejong city and the legislature of Yeongi County (that were 
to be included in the Sejong City constituency) announced statements in late 
November 2011 criticising the Constituency Demarcation Committee that had not 
established a constituency for Sejong City (Jee, 2011; Yoon, 2011). 
Representatives of local residents groups of Wonju City staged one-man 
demonstrations in front of the National Assembly in mid-December 2011 (Lee, 
2011). The legislature of Wonju City required the division of the constituency for 
the city on 30 January 2012 (Jang, 2012). A preliminary candidate for Icheon-
Yeoju constituency sued the National Assembly for the delay of constituency 
demarcation at the Constitutional Court of Korea on 19 January 2012 (Kim, 2012). 
Residents of Damyang-Gokseong-Gurye constituency gathered signatures 
during the demarcation process (Bae, 2012). Those of Namhae-Hadong 
announced a statement arguing that rural constituencies should not be abolished 
in January 2012, and staged demonstrations at the National Assembly on 17 
February 2012 (Bae, 2012; Nahm, 2012b). The local government of Yongin City 
submitted a suggestion that Giheung constituency should be divided into two 
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constituencies to the Special Committee on Political Reform on 26 January 2012 
(Jang, 2012). Representatives of local residents groups of Gijang staged a 
demonstration in front of the National Assembly on 30 January 2012 (Koo and 
Kang, 2012); charged the Ranking Member of the governing party through the 
Prosecutors’ Office (Lee, 2012b); and sued the National Assembly for the delay 
of constituency demarcation (Lee, 2012). The Mayor of Suwon City held a press 
conference and argued that Gweonseon – a district in the city - should be divided 
into two constituencies on 6 February 2012 (Kang, 2012). Representatives of 
local residents groups in Suwon submitted a statement arguing that Gweonseon 
should be divided to MPs for the City in early February (Kim, 2012). 
Finally, even the National Election Commission played a substantive role in the 
policy network. The Secretary General of the commission visited parliamentary 
leaders of parties and suggested an alternative that increased the number of MPs 
from 299 to 300. The suggestion made a space for the negotiation, and the 
agreement between the governing and opposition parties increased the number 
of MPs as he suggested. Experts and the media, however, did not support any 
party and did not present opinions of their own on the detailed demarcation 
though they criticised the demarcation on the grounds that the number of MPs 
increased and the interests of major parties were the most important issues to be 
considered in the demarcation. Although the members of the Constituency 
Demarcation Committee were experts from academia and the media and former 
senior civil servants related to constituency demarcation (out of the total eleven 
members, three were lawyers, three were from the media, three were from 
academia, and two were former senior civil servants), only one member urged 
once through the media for the draft constituency demarcation to be followed 
during the negotiation. 
  The committee staff did not have a substantive impact in the policy network. 
Differently from the case of the administrative reorganisation, stakeholders in the 
policy network did not provide them with information. The most important actors, 
ranking members of each party who negotiated about the demarcation, ignored 
the role of the relevant committee staff. The committee staff could not attend the 
negotiation and did not know the progress of the negotiation. The committee staff 
were just notified by the ranking member of the governing party after the 
negotiation finished. 
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  9.5.5. Summary and conclusion 
The constituency demarcation for the 19th general election in 2012 was very 
politically controversial because it affected MPs’ political interests directly. The 
demarcation, however, was relatively easy for MPs to access because they knew 
well the legal principles of constituency demarcation and the logic to defend their 
own constituencies (partly due to its direct effect on their political interests). The 
negotiation between representatives of the two major parties decided the 
substance of the final demarcation. The official legislative process (subcommittee 
and committee stage, the examination of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee 
and the plenary) became just a formal process which approved the results of the 
negotiation and gave legitimacy to the negotiation. At the plenary, however, many 
MPs showed their dissatisfaction about the constituency demarcation by voting 
against the demarcation (39 MPs) or abstention (43 MPs) 
The high controversy surrounding constituency demarcation affected the 
interaction between MPs and staff. The committee staff could not play a 
substantive role in the legislative process. All amendments were from the 
negotiation between political parties. The committee staff just drafted 
amendments according to the agreement. There was no space for the committee 
staff to specify the agreement contrary to the case of administrative 
reorganisation. They could not present the review report of the committee staff 
and did not conduct the guiding function. The issues in the legislative process 
were set by the relevant MPs and major parties. The committee staff could not 
attend the negotiation and did not know the progress of the negotiation. They just 
reported the agreement to MPs of the special committee after the negotiation 
finished. 
 
9.6. Summary and Conclusion 
The role of the committee staff in the legislative process of individual bills is 
summarised as follows: They played substantive roles in amending the bills and 
guiding the scrutiny along with mediation between relevant policy actors during 
the legislative process of re-categorisation of civil servants and the introduction 
of affirmative action for North Korean refugees. The bills were not controversial. 
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An interesting point is that the policy idea originated from an MP in the latter case. 
It could be said to be due to the low complexity of the agenda in the latter case. 
The committee staff, however, could not have an important impact in the 
legislative process of administrative reorganisation and constituency demarcation. 
The bills were very controversial especially in political aspects. In fact, the 
legislative process of the bills showed a different form from the official legislative 
process. Representatives of the governing party and the opposition party 
negotiated and the bills were amended according to the results of the negotiations. 
The committee staff could not attend the negotiations. Their role was limited to 
the translation of the agreements of the two parties into amendments of the bills 
and reporting the agreements to the MPs of the committee in charge of the bills. 
There was a difference, however, in the translation role of the committee staff 
between the two cases. The committee staff had space to specify the detailed 
amendments within the limits of the general principles of the agreement in the 
case of administrative reorganisation, and conducted the function of examination 
for legal structure and wording due to the technical complexity of the bill that 
made their expertise in legislation valuable, but there was no such space in the 
case of constituency demarcation. 
Through the case studies, the influences of the political controversy and 
technical controversy on the role and impact of the committee staff are identified 
as through the interview research and amendment analysis. The committee staff 
did not have an important impact in the legislative process of controversial bills, 
and vice versa. The committee staff, however, have their roles in technically 
complex matters even in the scrutiny of controversial bills. The committee staff 
can specify the amendments originating from the negotiation among parties in 
the legislative process of technically complex bills. 
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10. Conclusion 
So far, the role and impact of the committee staff of the legislature of South 
Korea in the scrutiny of government law bills and the factors affecting them have 
been investigated. In this chapter, the findings are reviewed; the contributions, 
implications and limitations of this thesis are discussed; and future research that 
can be followed is suggested. 
The first section summarises the findings of this thesis. The theoretical 
framework and key concepts of this thesis are also recalled in the section. The 
section discussing the contributions and implications of this thesis follows. The 
contributions of the thesis are: to give as much attention to the network managing 
function of the committee staff in legislatures as to the information and 
intelligence function; to address the issues of the factors affecting the role and 
impact of the committee staff and the nature of staff impact in the context of the 
legislature of South Korea; and to provide a base for comparative research on 
the committee staff by introducing the committee staff system in the legislature. 
Finally, the limitations of this thesis are discussed, and the direction of future 
research is suggested. The peculiarity of the legislature of South Korea and 
potential difficulty in application of the findings of this thesis to other legislatures 
can be pointed out as the major limitation of this thesis. In addition, this thesis 
does not examine the role and impact of the committee staff from the policy actors’ 
points of view, other than those of committee staff members, and comprehensive 
investigation of factors affecting the committee staff’s role and impact was not 
conducted due to the focus on the nature of the issue under scrutiny. Studies 
about the legislative staff in many other countries and research comparing them 
would be necessary for the development of the research on the committee staff 
in the legislatures. 
 
  10.1. Summary of Findings 
The research questions of this thesis are as follows: What are the roles and 
impact of the committee staff of the South Korean National Assembly in the 
legislative process of government law bills? and which factors affect them 
(chapter 1) ? Firstly, the contexts of the research – the South Korean National 
Assembly and its committee staff system – are introduced (chapter 2 and chapter 
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3). The committee staff system is compared with those of other legislatures – the 
U.K., the U.S., Australia and Germany (chapter 3). Secondly, the need for the 
theoretical framework and perspectives which consider the interaction among 
policy actors in the legislative process, and the features (capabilities and 
orientations) of the actors in answering the questions is identified through the 
previous literature review. The need for giving attention to the network managing 
function as a role of the committee staff and the issue factors as factors affecting 
staff impact are also identified through the review (chapter 4). 
Thirdly, the theoretical framework based on the perspectives of policy network 
and new institutionalism (rational choice, normative and historical institutionalism) 
is set up, and key concepts on the features (capabilities and orientations) of the 
policy network and major policy actors (MPs and the committee staff) and 
historical contexts surrounding the legislature of South Korea are derived from 
the framework (chapter 5). Fourthly, the empirical data for the investigation are 
collected and analysed through interview research with former and current staff 
members; amendment analysis examining the initiator(s), significance and 
acceptance of amendment opinions in the scrutiny of government law bills; and  
legislative case studies comparing individual legislative processes in which the 
issues under scrutiny demonstrate variance in the degree of the two key factors 
of this thesis – the political controversy and technical complexity of the issue 
(chapter 6). 
Then, the role and the impact of the committee staff are analysed applying the 
theoretical framework and key concepts (chapter 7). First of all, the scrutiny of 
government law bills in the legislature of South Korea is analysed through the 
application of the policy network perspective. Except the committee staff, three 
major policy actors are identified: MPs, the executive branch and interest groups. 
They have interdependent relationships with each other exchanging resources. 
The committee staff occupy the information channel among them. Unilateral 
action of a policy actor is difficult in the policy network. On top of that, the role of 
the committee staff is examined. The three roles identified are as follows: an 
informative role and guiding the scrutiny, consultation and mediation (network 
managing function), and a limited role in agenda setting for subcommittee 
meetings. The resources of the committee staff – knowledge about the legislative 
process, technical skills in legislation, and a certain level of policy expertise – and 
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their neutral position in the legislative process allow them to conduct those roles. 
Through conducting the roles, the committee staff have a substantive impact in 
the scrutiny of government law bills, which is demonstrated from their conception 
and amendment analysis (chapter 7). The sources of their impact are as follows: 
the motivation of the committee staff in their role, MPs’ delegation to the 
committee staff, and MPs’ trust of the committee staff and agreement with them 
(chapter 8). 
The structure of the orientations of MPs and committee staff members enables 
MPs’ delegation and invigorates staff members’ motivation. MPs’ attention is 
drawn to activities other than the scrutiny of government bills. Their roles as a 
constituency worker and party politician disperse their attention and time. Even 
in playing the role of policy watchdog and entrepreneur, MPs do not focus on the 
scrutiny of government law bills because they have their own private members’ 
bills that they want to be enacted as well as there being high-profile policy affairs 
to which MPs have to pay attention. For MPs, the scrutiny of government bills is 
a sort of production of public goods from which MPs cannot claim exclusive 
rewards, but have to take the cost of time and attention. Thus, they delegate 
detailed scrutiny to the committee staff. For committee staff members, the 
scrutiny of government bills is the production of private goods from which they 
take exclusive rewards. Their orientation to promotion and career concerns gives 
them the motivation to demonstrate their ability as competent staff and makes 
them intervene in the scrutiny. The orientations to participation in the policy 
process and commitment to the public interest also facilitate their engagement 
with the scrutiny of government bills. One important point is that the orientations 
of MPs and committee staff members are affected by institutional factors. The 
orientations of MPs are formed from the historical contexts of South Korea, and 
those of staff members are affected by their legal status and institutional norms. 
When it comes to MPs’ trust of the committee staff and agreement with them, 
three factors are important. Firstly, the committee staff can focus on the scrutiny 
of bills, which enables the comprehensiveness of their scrutiny Secondly, the 
opinions of the committee staff have the features of consulted and mediated ones. 
Finally, the neutrality of the committee staff becomes the basis of MPs’ trust. 
Therefore, this trust and agreement can be due to the resources and capabilities 
of the committee staff – informational power from knowledge about legislation, a 
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certain level of policy expertise and the status as network manager during the 
scrutiny. 
For the factors affecting the role and impact of the committee staff, this thesis 
gives its attention to the features of the issue under scrutiny – the political 
controversy and technical complexity (both in legal and policy aspects). This is 
because they affect the sources of the impact of the committee staff by changing 
the features of the network and the value of the capabilities and the degree of 
orientations of policy actors (chapter 8). Firstly, political controversy increases the 
degree of conflict in the policy network and makes network management by the 
committee staff, who have no official authority, more difficult. In the situation of 
fierce conflict among actors, the committee staff have a lower ability for 
conducting network management or their network management has a limited 
effect in the legislative process. The political controversy also changes the values 
of resources in the scrutiny and motivations of MPs and committee staff members. 
MPs’ resources – legitimacy, official authority and political knowledge and skills 
– become more important. The network management by the committee staff 
becomes difficult because they have no legitimacy or official authority. MPs have 
a higher level of motivation due to the political stake of their parties in the scrutiny 
and the opportunity to raise their profile. The political controversy may stimulate 
their sense of duty as representatives of the people and as a policy watchdog. 
Committee staff members have a lower level of motivation because active 
engagement with politically controversial and high-profile issues can collide with 
the norms of political neutrality and anonymity, and damage their reputation as 
neutral staff. Therefore, political controversy makes the role of the committee staff 
more passive and decreases their impact in the legislative process. 
Secondly, technical complexity of the bill (both in legislation and policy aspects) 
under scrutiny also changes the value of resources and motivations of MPs and 
committee staff members. The resources of staff members – technical knowledge 
about legislation and a certain level of policy expertise – become more important. 
Especially, complexity in legislation makes the committee staff more important 
because technical knowledge about legislation is the resource that they 
monopolise in the network. MPs have a lower level of motivation due to the bigger 
costs of time and attention taken in the scrutiny of technically complex issues. 
Committee staff members have higher levels of motivation because they can 
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demonstrate their competency in technically complex issues and gain a good 
reputation. Therefore, technical complexity makes the role of the committee staff 
more active and increases their impact in the legislative process. 
Based on the analysis on the features of the impact of the committee staff, this 
thesis does not see the nature of the committee staff as autonomous which is not 
controlled by MPs (chapter 8). Committee staff members work under the 
anticipated reaction. Their opinions have the feature of consulted and meditated 
ones rather than that of their own. The impact of the staff depends on MPs’ 
delegation, trust and agreement. The legislative case studies provide specific 
examples of individual legislative processes which reveal the specific roles of the 
committee staff (chapter 9). The committee staff did not exert a substantive role 
and impact in the legislative process of the scrutiny of controversial bills, and vice 
versa. However, they conducted the role of specifying the policy even in the 
controversial legislative process when the technical complexity of the issue was 
high. 
 
  10.2. Contributions and Implications of the thesis 
The first contribution of this thesis is that it gives an equivalent focus on the 
network managing function (consultation with and mediation between relevant 
policy actors) of the committee staff in legislatures to that on the information and 
intelligence functions. Previous literature about the legislative staff has mentioned 
the function, but the studies have given their attention to it less than to the 
information and intelligence function. Exploiting the policy network perspective 
that has emasculated Parliament as an important policy actor in the British 
context, this thesis sheds a light on the importance of the function because the 
legislative process in modern legislatures has the feature of a policy network in 
which relevant policy actors are in relationships of interdependence; collective 
action is required to solve a policy problem in the interdependence; and there is 
a need for network management to facilitate the collective action. 
The second contribution of this thesis is that it examines the factors affecting the 
role and impact of the committee staff in the legislatures and the nature of staff 
impact empirically that have rarely been addressed outside the U.S. When it 
comes to the factors affecting the role and impact of the committee staff, there 
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has often been the implicit assumption that the policy competence of staff would 
be reflected in the policy process if they are technically correct or rational in the 
studies outside the U.S. However, this thesis discards the assumption and 
investigates the factors systematically applying the theoretical framework which 
bases itself on the theoretical perspectives (policy network perspective and new 
institutionalism) emphasising the interaction and interdependence among policy 
actors, and the capabilities and orientations of them. 
One important point is that this thesis gives its attention to issue factors (political 
controversy and technical complexity) although American literature has also 
listed human factors (chair’s character or leadership style and partisanship or 
expertise of staff members) and administrative factors (the structure of staff 
organisation, committee’s terms of reference, chair’s tenure and official power of 
staff). This is not only because the committee chair in the National Assembly of 
South Korea does not have the power of appointment of committee staff 
members or organising the committee staff system and has a short term (less 
than two years) but because committee staff members are non-partisan staff and 
career civil servants, and demonstrate relatively homogenous orientations and 
abilities. 
For the nature of staff impact, this thesis asserts that the impact is not an 
autonomous one which is uncontrolled by MPs. In fact, the nature of staff impact 
is very important because the existence of uncontrolled legislative staff who exert 
a significant impact in the legislative process is against the principle of 
representative democracy as Malbin (1980) succinctly called the legislative staff 
‘unelected representatives’. This concern could become more important outside 
the U.S. because the committee staff of many legislatures are employed, not by 
the chairs or ranking members of the committee, but by the legislature itself, and 
do not have direct accountability to the chairs or ranking members. This thesis 
demonstrates that the non-partisan committee staff who are not appointed by 
MPs also work under consideration of MPs and are not autonomous outside the 
control of MPs. They behave under the anticipated reactions of other relevant 
policy actors (especially those of MPs), and their amendment opinions are not 
their own but mediated and consulted ones. 
The third contribution of this thesis is that the research can be a base for 
comparative research on the legislative staff through introducing a legislative 
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committee staff system. The committee staff system in the National Assembly of 
South Korea can be a reference point in the comparison of the staff systems in 
diverse countries because it adopts a non-partisan staff system as many 
countries in Western Europe, and staff members have a substantive impact in the 
legislative process. Moreover, the benefit of the committee staff in the aspect of 
information provision through the review report of the committee staff and the 
document for the subcommittee’s examination can be referred to in the 
institutionalisation of the legislatures in countries which attempt to construct a 
robust legislature. 
The findings of this thesis have a couple of implications. The first one is the 
importance of a quality staff system for the institutionalisation of a legislature as 
other previous research has demonstrated. The informative role of staff members 
is necessary for the legislature’s independence of information from the executive 
branch or interest groups. In addition, MPs have many other roles beyond the 
scrutiny of bills, and may pay lower attention to the scrutiny. The existence of a 
trusted staff system is necessary for the quality scrutiny of bills at the behest of 
MPs under their delegation in those situations. The necessity is more important 
in the scrutiny of technical and routine issues than in controversial issues. This is 
because the legislature has many functions other than the policy function as 
pointed out by Packenham (1970) and Norton (2013). 
The second and more important implication is that the abilities and skills 
required in network management can be important for the work of the committee 
staff in the legislature because the roles of the committee staff include network 
management – consultation with and mediation between relevant policy actors – 
as this thesis reveals. In addition to the recognition of stakeholders and their 
idiosyncrasies; the recognition of stakeholders’ shared perception and the rules 
of the game; and the impartiality among relevant policy actors suggested by 
Kickert and Koppenjan (1997, p.58), as the interview data of this thesis suggest, 
the abilities and skills may include the ability to find joint interests of relevant 
policy actors which they do not recognise themselves; to suggest a focal point 
which can be a base alternative for stake holders to negotiate; and to keep a 
balance between political parties confronting each other. Committee staff 
members of the legislature might have to be equipped not only with policy 
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expertise, but with network managing skills in the interdependent network of the 
legislative process. 
 
10.3. Limitations of the Thesis in the Aspects of Methodology to Address 
the Research Questions 
The limitations of this thesis can be categorised into those in the aspects of 
methodology to address the research questions and those due to the peculiarity 
of the context (South Korean National Assembly). The former is discussed in this 
section briefly, and the latter and the direction for future research are discussed 
in the next section with a comparison of the features of the legislative process 
and committee staff system in South Korea with those in the U.K. and U.S. 
When it comes to the research question about the role and impact of the 
committee staff, this thesis does not address the role and impact from the points 
of view of policy actors’ other than those of committee staff members’. The reason 
that this thesis focuses on the interviews with committee staff members 
themselves is that interviewing staff members is an efficient research strategy to 
investigate their role that other policy actors may know less about, and 
amendment analysis can verify and complement the results of the interviews 
about staff impact that could be exaggerated or underestimated. However, 
interviews with other policy actors – for example: MPs, their personal staff 
members, civil servants in the executive branch or representatives of interest 
groups – would be able to provide different aspects and perspectives from those 
of committee staff members themselves. 
For the research question about the factors affecting the role and impact of the 
committee staff, the focus on issue factors (political controversy and technical 
complexity) in this thesis inhibits comprehensive investigation of other factors to 
some degree. For example, the interview data demonstrate that human factors 
(the personality and ability of committee staff members and the personality of the 
ranking members of the committee) and administrative factors (the workload of 
the committee) can also be important factors, but thorough examination, as that 
carried out on issue factors, are not conducted on those factors. 
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Moreover, the amendment analysis used to investigate the influence of issue 
factors has its own limitations. It is basically at the level of descriptive statistics 
and may have the problem of omitted variables. There may be many other factors 
affecting a scrutiny of law bills and acceptance of an amendment – for example, 
the atmosphere and culture of the committee and subcommittee, the personal 
character of MPs in the committee and subcommittee and the attitude of the 
sponsoring department – than those considered in the amendment analysis – 
initiator, type of amendment opinions, policy type related to the bill under scrutiny 
and controversy of the bill. The amendment analysis cannot consider those 
factors and control for them because those factors are difficult to measure in a 
form which can be used in statistical analysis; consideration of those factors 
requires a much greater number of samples than those in the amendment 
analysis, which is already up to 800; and requires much more time to analyse 
them. The problem of spuriousness remains although the amendment analysis is 
complemented by the results of the interview research and legislative case study. 
 
10.4. Limitations of the Thesis due to the Peculiarities of the Context and 
Suggestions for Future Studies 
The major limitation of this thesis is the peculiarity of the context – the National 
Assembly of South Korea. This thesis does not address the issue of whether the 
findings from the legislature of South Korea can be applied to those of other 
countries although the findings can be a base for comparative research about the 
legislative staff. The comparison of the features of the legislative process and 
committee staff system in South Korea with those in the U.K. and U.S. props up 
the argument that there should be a consideration of the differences in the context 
in judging the leverage of this research. 
In fact, the legislative process in South Korea shares some common features 
with those in the U.K or U.S. First of all, in the legislative process, South Korean 
MPs and congressmen/women in the U.S. Congress make use of similar decision 
making procedures in which the controversy of the issue is an important factor. 
As explained in chapters 2, 7 and 8, South Korean MPs tend to follow the 
agreement formed between relevant policy actors in uncontroversial issues, and 
follow the positions of their own parties, constituents or interest groups according 
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to the feature of the issue. South Korean MPs cannot give their full attention to 
the scrutiny of bills within the limitation of their own resources (e.g. expertise, 
personal staff), and exploit a simplified decision making process during the 
scrutiny except in the cases where their own policy preferences or political 
interests are compromised over a threshold. Kingdon (1989, ch.10) demonstrates 
well the similar use of a simplified decision making model in the U.S. Congress – 
the consensus mode of decision in which the controversy of the issue is an 
important factor. This feature shared by the legislatures of South Korea and the 
U.S. can strengthen the leverage of the implication of this thesis that political 
controversy is an important factor affecting the impact of the committee staff.  
On top of that, the need for expertise in detailed scrutiny of law bills and 
legislation which is unlikely to be acquired by MPs is a common feature that the 
legislative process in South Korea shares with those in the U.K. and U.S. As 
explained in chapters 3 and 4, drafting legislation is an important function of the 
committee staff in the U.S. Congress. In the British Parliament, some committees 
about legislation – the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Regulatory Reform 
Committee and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments – have staff 
members specialised in legal matters who analyse legislation (Rogers and 
Walters, 2015, pp.310-311). The following extract from prominent practitioners in 
the British Parliament is worth notice although it could be controversial. 
Perhaps we should be thinking more radically about the scrutiny of legislation. 
How well are parliamentarians equipped for analysis, as opposed to advocacy? 
Should they concentrate on principles and aims rather than the detailed 
provisions? Might an independent commission on the quality of legislation be 
better equipped to deal with details and report to Parliament on how well a bill 
implemented the political aims that had been approved? (Rogers and Walters, 
p.374) 
This feature shared by the legislatures of South Korea, the U.K. and the U.S. can 
strengthen the leverage of the implication of this thesis that technical complexity 
is an important factor affecting the impact of the committee staff. 
Last but not least, as in the U.S. Congress, the enactment of a bill usually needs 
bipartisan agreement of MPs more than the minimal majority in the legislative 
process of South Korea. The legislative process of South Korea requires the 
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agreement of relevant policy actors to pass a law bill as discussed in chapter 7. 
As Krehbiel (1998, pp.84-85) reported well, the number of MPs who agreed with 
a bill usually exceeded that in the majority party when the bill was passed in the 
U.S. Congress, which means that a bipartisan coalition is also required in the 
enactment of a bill. The mediation and negotiation between policy actors must be 
also required in the formation of such coalition. This feature shared by the 
legislatures of South Korea and the U.S. can strengthen the leverage of the 
implication of this thesis that the network managing function is one of the 
important roles of the committee staff. 
There are several differences between South Korea and the U.K and U.S., 
however. First of all, MPs of the committees in the South Korean National 
Assembly do not have as much expertise as those in the U.S. Congress although 
the committee and subcommittee stages are the centre of the legislative process. 
Committee rotation is common among MPs because of the homogenous 
preferences of MPs and egalitarian culture among them. The committee chairs 
are not decided based on the rule of seniority in the committee, which is important 
in the U.S. Congress, because of the committee rotation of MPs and the small 
number of senior MPs. The establishment of the committee-centred legislative 
process in 1963 was not for the securing of expertise, but for the easy passage 
of government bills. The committee becomes the battlefield between parties or 
does not have any real power during the scrutiny of controversial bills. Of theories 
about the committee organisation, informational theory (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 
1990; Krehbiel, 1990; 1991) has low relevance to committees in the legislature of 
South Korea. Distributional theory (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Weingast and 
Marshall, 1988) would explain the composition of the committees, but the 
consequence of committee composition from the distributional purposes of MPs 
is MPs’ committee rotation which is different from the U.S. Congress. In the U.S., 
promotions in the hierarchies of committees and parties are used to incentivise 
participation in the legislative activities of congressional committees according to 
Wawro (2000). There is no such incentive mechanism for MPs to participate in 
the scrutiny of bills in the National Assembly of South Korea. 
On top of that, the scrutiny of bills has less incentive for MPs in South Korean 
than in the U.K. In the U.K., sponsoring a private members’ bill is very difficult 
and it is rare that a private members’ bill passes. Thus, an MP who wants to 
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participate in the policy process may select to suggest amendments during the 
scrutiny of government bills. For example, the number of non-government 
amendments to 12 bills in the case study of Russell, Gover and Wollter (2015) is 
3,374, which means that the average number of non-government amendments 
to a bill is about 280. However, the number of amendment opinions of MPs of the 
South Korean National Assembly per bill in this thesis is only 1.0. In fact, South 
Korean MPs can introduce a private members’ bill easily, and private members’ 
bills are more likely to pass in South Korea (5,346 / 15,444 from 2012 to 2016) 
than in the U.K. (5 / 118 in session 2015-2016). Thus, MPs in South Korea are 
more likely to introduce their own private members bill than to participate in the 
scrutiny of government bills in order to participate in the policy process.  
Thirdly, consensus between relevant policy actors is much more important in 
the legislative process in South Korea. In the U.K., divisions usually occur when 
there are disagreements between the government and opposition during the 
scrutiny of bills. The decision making process is usually majoritarian. According 
to Rogers and Walters (2015, p.363), ‘the executive is always going to get its way 
eventually, provided that it has a majority in the House of Commons and can 
persuade its backbenchers to support it issue by issue’ (emphasis in original). 
Although there are also bipartisan coalitions bigger than the number of minimal 
majority to enact a bill in the U.S. Congress, the basic aim of the coalition 
formation is to override a presidential veto or to stop a filibuster (Krehbiel, 1998). 
In South Korea, MPs wait for the consensus formation among relevant actors 
during the scrutiny of uncontroversial bills, and consensus between all 
parliamentary groups is essential during the scrutiny of politically controversial 
bills. 
Finally, the small number of MPs in a subcommittee, which is very important in 
the legislative process, and the process of the oral report of the committee staff 
in the committee and subcommittee stages are unique factors in the legislative 
process of South Korea and favourable to committee staff members. The 
subcommittee stage is crucial in the scrutiny of a bill as explained in chapter 2, 
so the committee staff can exert a substantial impact in the scrutiny if they can 
persuade, suffice or mediate between just small numbers of MPs in a 
subcommittee. Thus, the small number of MPs in a subcommittee demonstrated 
in table 10.1 is a favourable factor for the impact of the committee staff. Moreover, 
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the unique process of staff briefing about the merits of bills at the committee 
meetings and the oral reports of staff about bills at the subcommittee meetings 
can affect the opinions of MPs on bills and perform the role of guiding the scrutiny. 
Although the staff of departmental select committees and public bill committees 
also provide briefings in the British House of Commons, as explained in chapter 
3, the briefings are not about the merits of a bill, but about inquires or taking oral 
evidence. 
Table 10.1. The frequency distribution of the number of MPs in a subcommittee 
for the examination of law bills (March 2017) 
The number of 
MPs 
4 6 7 8 10 14 Total 
The number of 
subcommittees 
1 4 1 3 13 1 23 
Source: summarised from the websites of committees 
 
Although some common features that the South Korean National Assembly 
shares with other legislatures increase the leverage of the implication of this 
thesis, there are also unique features that require qualification in applying the 
implication to other legislatures. A direction for future studies about the legislative 
staff can be suggested from this comparison: the need for comparative research 
about the staff system of the legislatures in different countries with a consistent 
framework. Although there are many studies describing the staff system in 
individual legislatures, studies which compare staff systems in the legislatures of 
diverse countries are still rare. Institutional factors which are different according 
to the contexts in different countries and affect the role of the legislative staff have 
not been studied due to the lack of comparative studies. For example, the 
institutional causes (including historical contexts) of the strong impact of 
congressional staff in the U.S. compared with the legislative staff in other 
countries have not been investigated. The difference of the role of the legislative 
staff in different countries can be examined through comparative research. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis tries to compare the committee staff systems of different 
countries, but the comparison is at a descriptive level and does not consider the 
historical contexts affecting the institutional factors in individual countries. 
 
  10.5. Concluding Remarks 
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  As stated at the start of this thesis, a robust legislature is a necessary ingredient 
of a healthy representative democracy. The existence of a quality staff system 
contributes to the robustness of a legislature. However, the informative role and 
policy expertise may not be the only consideration in the construction of the 
quality staff system. The legislative staff work in a much politicised environment 
in which the interests and preferences of policy actors collide with each other and 
the staff may have to possess network managing abilities to work within the 
interdependent policy network of the legislative process. This research hopes to 
be a stepping stone in the conversion of viewpoints on the legislative staff. 
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Appendices 
1. Interview Research 
  1.1. The interview guide of the pilot interviews 
 Explain the role and function of committee staff during the scrutiny of 
government bills, using typical examples. 
 The interviewer attempted to elicit an answer about the impact of staff 
naturally in asking the question and asked follow-up questions about the 
impact of staff in the cases in which the attempt failed. 
 What skills and knowledge are required for legislative committee staff 
members in the scrutiny of government bills? If possible, use examples. 
 What about the norms of committee staff? Which is more important in those 
norms? If possible, use examples in explaining them. 
 When possible, the interviewer asked separately about the cases of the 
scrutiny of government bills 
 What are the important interests of committee staff? In other words, what 
do you think is important for you as a committee staff member or a career 
civil servant? If possible, use examples in explaining them. 
 Which factors affect the role and function of staff during the scrutiny of 
government bills? If possible, use examples in explaining them. 
 The interviewer attempted to elicit an answer about the factors affecting 
the impact of staff naturally in asking the question and asked follow-up 
questions in the cases in which the attempt failed. 
 What do you like most and least about your job? If possible, use examples 
in explaining them. 
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  1.2. The interview guide of main research interview 
 
Question 1 
Explain the role and function of committee staff in the legislative process. 
If possible, use examples or your own experience. 
- This subject is directly linked with the research question: the role and impact 
of legislative committee staff and the factors affecting them. 
- Check the detail of the process in which the role and function of legislative 
committee staff are conducted. 
- After initial answers, check additional or special features in the scrutiny of 
government bills. 
- Usually, there would be an explanation about the impact of staff in the answer. 
If not, ask ‘what is the policy impact of the role and function? And how great is 
it?’ 
- Check the detail of the process in which staff opinion affects the legislative 
process. 
- In the explanation about the impact of staff, the variance in staff impact 
according to the situation of the legislative process would be identified. Then, 
ask ‘what is the difference between the situation in which staff impact is strong 
and that in which staff impact is weak?’ 
- If no variance in the answer is identified, ask ‘Is there any variance in staff 
impact?’ Then, you can identify the variance in staff impact and move on to the 
above question. 
- In explaining the difference between a situation in which staff impact is strong 
and that in which staff impact is weak, MPs’ influence during the legislative 
process would be identified. Then, ask ‘why do MPs intervene in those cases?’ 
In addition, ask ‘why don’t MPs intervene in other cases?’ Answers for the 
question would address the interest of MPs. 
- Check additional or special features in the scrutiny of government bills in 
follow-up questions. 
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Question 2: 
What skills or knowledge are required for legislative committee staff in 
doing their job? If possible, use examples or your own experience. 
- In answering this question, the role and function of committee staff could be 
explained in a detailed manner and understood more fully. 
- For the above purpose, check the reason why the skills or knowledge the 
interviewee suggests are required. 
- If necessary, ask about skills or knowledge for senior committee staff 
(especially to senior staff themselves). 
- After the answer, request the interviewee to order the skills or knowledge 
according to importance unless the interviewee suggests just one skill or 
knowledge area. It would be helpful to understand which role or function is 
important. 
- After the initial answer, check additional or special features in the scrutiny of 
government bills. 
 
Question 3: 
What are the norms of committee staff in doing their job? If possible, use 
examples or your own experience. 
- The purpose of this question is to examine the relevance of normative 
institutionalism that expects the norms of committee staff (in particular, political 
neutrality) to affect their work. 
- For the above purpose, check the reason why the norms which the interviewee 
suggests are required. 
- After the initial answer, request the interviewee to order the norms according 
to importance unless the interviewee suggests just one norm. By doing this, it 
would be possible to assess the effect of individual norms on committee staff. 
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Question 4: 
What are the motivations of committee staff in doing their job? If possible, 
use examples. 
- The purpose of this question is to examine the relevance of rational choice 
institutionalism that expects the interests of committee staff to affect their work. 
- Be sure not to use ‘your motivation’. In that case, most interviewees would give 
mundane answers (e.g. for desirous policies). Use ‘staff’s motivation’, or the 
third personal pronoun. Even if you do that, you might not secure interesting 
answers. 
- Check if there is any disadvantage in their career when a staff member does 
not work hard. 
- Check the process in which the motivations suggested by interviewees affect 
committee staff. 
- After the answer, request the interviewee to order the motivations according 
to importance unless the interviewee suggests just one motivation. By doing 
this, it would be possible to understand which interest is important for 
committee staff. 
 
Question 5: 
Who and what affects committee staff in the legislative process? If possible, 
use examples or your own experience. 
- The purpose of this question is to examine the influence of policy actors from 
the perspective of policy network. 
- For any policy actor, check the process by which they affect committee staff or 
the legislative process. This enables you to understand the dynamics of policy 
network in the legislative process. 
- After the initial answer, request the interviewee to order the actors according 
to importance. By doing this, it would be possible to understand which actors 
are important in the legislative process. 
- After the answer, check additional or special features in the scrutiny of 
government bills. 
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Question 6: 
What do you like most and least about your job? If possible, use examples 
or your own experience. 
- The answers about the favourite features of the job would supplement 
explanations about staff role, function, impact and motivations. 
- The answers about the difficulties in doing the job of committee staff would 
supplement explanations about staff norms and the influences of other policy 
actors. 
- After the answer, check additional or special features in the scrutiny of 
government bills. 
 
Points of Attention during Interviews 
- Always check the reason why interviewees give their answer. The interviewees 
think that the researcher (a current legislative staff member) already knows the 
answers and why, so they are likely to omit detailed explanation. To record 
their own voice, assume that the researcher is an outsider and secure detailed 
explanations as much as possible. 
- Request examples or the interviewee’s own experience. This gives narratives 
to the explanation of interviewees. 
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  1.3. Summary of the typical substances of main research interviews 
 Subject 1: Explain the role and function of committee staff in the 
legislative process. If possible, use examples or your own experience. 
 Typically, the interviewees mentioned the function of information 
provision, especially preparing the report of the committee staff director 
and the document for the examination of sub-committee. 
 Then, the researcher asked about the writing process, the substance 
and the role of the documents that the committee staff prepare. Usual 
answers for the question about the role were to guide the examination 
of bills, and provide information and opinions of relevant policy actors on 
the bills. Most of the interviewees mentioned that the policy impact of 
the documents is strong in general cases and MPs usually depend on 
the documents during the legislative process. 
 Then, the researcher asked why the policy impact of the documents is 
strong. The typical answer was that MPs have no time to focus on the 
examination of bills and they focus only on bills which they are interested 
in. 
 Even in the cases where an individual MP is interested in a specific bill 
and supports a specific interest group, the policy impact of the 
documents that the committee staff prepare could be strong. It is 
because the documents provide all the information about the 
implications of the bills and the positions of all relevant policy actors and 
if the opinion of the MP who is interested in the bill is not rational, other 
MPs follow the opinion of the committee staff implicitly. 
 Then the researcher asked about the cases in which the policy impact 
of the committee staff is weak. The typical answer was that the policy 
impact of the documents could be weak in the cases where the bill is 
politically controversial between political parties or related with the 
political interests of them. The committee staff could not even suggest 
their opinion about the bill. 
 Finally, the researcher asked if there are additional or special features 
in the scrutiny of government bills. Most of the participants answered 
that there is no difference. 
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 Subject 2: What skills or knowledge are required for legislative 
committee staff in doing their job? If possible, use examples or your 
own experience. 
 Typically, the interviewees mentioned knowledge about the policy field 
that they are in charge of, the skills of legislation and the ability to write 
up documents and reports which are concise, clear and easy to 
understand. 
 For the senior staff, the interviewees suggested that they should have 
good political sensibility, good judgement to catch implications of bills 
and the ability of mediation between relevant policy actors. 
 Especially for the scrutiny of government bills, they suggested that the 
committee staff should have extensive information gathering skills and 
should not believe wholly or depend on the officials of the executive 
branch. 
 
 Subject 3: What are the norms of committee staff in doing their job? If 
possible, use examples or your own experience. 
 Typically, the interviewees mentioned political neutrality and integrity. 
They usually think that political neutrality is more important. 
 
 Subject 4: What are the motivations or incentives of committee staff 
in doing their job? If possible, use examples. 
 Typically, the interviewees mentioned a sense of duty and efficacy that 
they contribute to the improvement of policy. The researcher thought 
that this answer was mundane. 
 Thus, after several interviews, the researcher started to check if there is 
an advantage to the career of civil servants when they work diligently 
and show good performance. A considerable number of participants 
said that their reputation is important in their career although there is no 
explicit and direct reflection of their performance on promotion or salary 
bonuses. 
 
 Subject 5: Who and what affect committee staff in the legislative 
process? If possible, use examples or your own experience. 
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 Typically, the interviewees mentioned MPs, officials in the executive 
branch and interest groups in the aspect of policy actors. They think that 
officials in the executive branch are more important than interest groups, 
but the impact could be different according to the case.  
 The researcher checked if they are affected when the Speaker, the 
committee chair, ranking members or the sub-committee chair is 
interested in a specific bill. Most of them admitted that they are affected, 
but they said the influence has limits and an irrational bill cannot pass 
although an individual MP in an important position is interested in it and 
supports the bill. 
 
 Subject 6: What do you like most and least about your job? If possible, 
use examples or your own experience. 
 Typically, the interviewees mentioned that the best is that they can 
contribute to the improvement of policy, but it is very difficult to maintain 
the balance between political groups and there is a heavy burden with 
the job.  
 For the scrutiny of government bills, they answered that they feel a great 
efficacy when they improve a government bill which was drafted in the 
interests of the executive branch.  
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2. The Detailed Criteria, Examples, Frequency Distributions and 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Amendment Analysis 
2.1. The initiator(s) of amendment opinions 
  2.1.1. Detailed criteria in problematic cases 
Firstly, there are cases in which an MP initially suggests an amendment opinion 
according to the records, but the opinion appears in the review report of the 
committee staff. The initiator of those cases is coded as staff because the MP 
quotes the committee staff’s opinion. 
Secondly, there are cases in which an MP submits his/her amendment opinion 
in the form of written documents which are not recorded and the committee staff 
member omits the name of the MP when he delivers the opinion in the 
subcommittee stage. The initiator of those cases is coded as MP (unknown) 
because it is impossible to identify the party that he/ she belongs to. 
 
2.1.2. Frequency distribution 
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2.2. The type of amendment opinions 
  2.2.1. Examples of amendment opinions according to the types of: irrelevant, 
wording and detailed criteria in selecting amendment opinions in the type of 
structure 
Type Example and Criteria 
Irrelevant 
- To change the word ‘chlorides’ to ‘salt’ (to make the act easier for the public) 
in the scrutiny of the bill for partial amendment of Chlorides Management Act 
and the change is not related to the bill itself. 
Wording 
- To change the words ‘a mayor, a governor of a county and the head of a 
district’ to ‘the head of a local government that has the power of permission’. 
Structure 
- To resolve explicit conflict with other laws or international treaties 
- To change the enforcement date of the bill to prepare secondary legislation 
- To modify the clauses revising other acts 
- To restructure clauses of the bill without changes in the meaning of the bill 
 
  2.2.2. Frequency distribution 
 
2.3. Frequency distribution of the acceptance of amendment opinions 
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2.4. Classification of bills according to policy type 
    2.4.1. Detailed criteria and examples of bills 
Policy type Bills 
Distributive 
- Bills related to acts providing services or goods, or 
giving benefits or rights (ex. The Act on Special 
Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses) 
Regulative 
- Bills related to acts restricting the behaviour of the 
public or specific groups (ex. Railroad Safety Act) 
Constituent 
- Bills related to acts about administrative operation 
and management of government organisation or 
political matters such as elections or referenda (ex. 
Local Public Officials Act, Residents Voting Act) 
Extractive 
- Bills related to acts exploiting resources from the 
public (ex. Income Tax Act, Military Service act) 
Basic Laws 
- Bills related to acts about basic civil laws, criminal 
laws or judicial procedures (ex. Civil Act, Commercial 
Act, the Act on Special Cases concerning the 
Punishment of sexual Crimes, and Administrative 
Litigation Act) 
Laws related to 
International treaties 
- Bills related to acts which include international treaties 
into domestic laws (ex. The Act on Special Cases of 
the Customs Act for the Implementation of  Free Trade 
Agreements) 
Etc. 
- Bills which are not included in the above categories 
(ex. United Defence Act) 
 
    2.4.2. Frequency distribution  
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  2.5. The number of news articles related to the bill under scrutiny 
  2.5.1. The detailed method of searching news articles in the media 
The name of the Act related to the bill is used as the search word. The search 
is over the period from six months before the submission of the bill to six months 
after the final resolution of the bill in the National Assembly. If a bill is killed, the 
end date of the period is the end date of the 18th National Assembly. However, 
many articles searched for in this way are likely to be unrelated to the bill. Thus, 
every article is examined as to whether it is related to the bill. 
 
    2.5.2. Frequency distribution 
 
 
    2.6.3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable n min max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
News articles 285 0 105 4.4 12.7 
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  2.6. The duration of debate (pages of minutes) over the bill under scrutiny 
  2.6.1. The detailed way of measuring the duration of debate 
At first, the number of rows in the records that directly relate to a bill are counted 
at each stage of the legislative process of the bill and the sum of the numbers is 
divided by 90 (90 rows is one page of the records). When there is no real debate 
between MPs except for the explanation of the bill by the committee staff member 
and the presentation of the sponsoring department’s position, the duration is 
coded as zero. 
 
    2.6.2. Frequency distribution 
 
     
    2.6.3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable n min max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Pages of 
records 
285 0 100.9 6.1 12.5 
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3. The Results of Amendment Analysis 
  3.1. Initiator(s) and acceptance of amendment opinions (the detailed 
number of amendment opinions related to table 7.3) 
- Distributive policy (non-substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
4 2 0 6 
66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
5 2 0 7 
71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
37 6 3 46 
80.4% 13.0% 6.5% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
2 2 4 8 
25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
39 8 7 54 
72.2% 14.8% 13.0% 100.0% 
Total 
44 10 7 61 
72.1% 16.4% 11.5% 100.0% 
 
- Distributive policy (substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
9 1 3 13 
69.2% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
5 8 15 28 
17.9% 28.6% 53.6% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
14 9 18 41 
34.1% 22.0% 43.9% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
46 17 13 76 
60.5% 22.4% 17.1% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
10 16 41 67 
14.9% 23.9% 61.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
56 33 54 143 
39.2% 23.1% 37.8% 100.0% 
Total 
70 42 72 184 
38.0% 22.8% 39.1% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy (non-substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
5 1 1 7 
71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
6 1 1 8 
75.0% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
37 6 3 46 
80.4% 13.0% 6.5% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 0 3 4 
25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
38 6 6 50 
76.0% 12.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
Total 
44 7 7 58 
75.9% 12.1% 12.1% 100.0% 
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- Regulative policy (substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
9 6 13 28 
32.1% 21.4% 46.4% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
11 8 10 29 
37.9% 27.6% 34.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
20 14 23 57 
35.1% 24.6% 40.4% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
76 9 11 96 
79.2% 9.4% 11.5% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
15 20 43 78 
19.2% 25.6% 55.1% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
91 29 54 174 
52.3% 16.7% 31.0% 100.0% 
Total 
111 43 77 231 
48.1% 18.6% 33.3% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy (non-substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
7 2 1 10 
70.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
8 2 1 11 
72.7% 18.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
7 2 0 9 
77.8% 22.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
0 0 0 0 
- - - - 
Sub-total 
7 2 0 9 
77.8% 22.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
15 4 1 20 
75.0% 20.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy (substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
4 3 3 10 
40.0% 30.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
6 8 8 22 
27.3% 36.4% 36.4% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
10 11 11 32 
31.3% 34.4% 34.4% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
11 9 0 20 
55.0% 45.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 4 3 8 
12.5% 50.0% 37.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
12 13 3 28 
42.9% 46.4% 10.7% 100.0% 
Total 
22 24 14 60 
36.7% 40.0% 23.3% 100.0% 
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- Extractive policy (substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 4 8 13 
7.7% 30.8% 61.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
1 4 9 14 
7.1% 28.6% 64.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
1 1 5 7 
14.3% 14.3% 71.4% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 1 3 5 
20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
2 2 8 12 
16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total 
3 6 17 26 
11.5% 23.1% 65.4% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws (non-substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
0 0 5 5 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
1 0 5 6 
16.7% 0.0% 83.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
10 0 1 11 
90.9% 0.0% 9.1% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
1 0 1 2 
50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
11 0 2 13 
84.6% 0.0% 15.4% 100.0% 
Total 
12 0 7 19 
63.2% 0.0% 36.8% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws (substantive amendment opinions) 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Initiator(s) 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Staff 
0 0 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
4 3 8 15 
26.7% 20.0% 53.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
4 3 10 17 
23.5% 17.6% 58.8% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Staff 
10 1 1 12 
83.3% 8.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
Non-staff 
3 4 12 19 
15.8% 21.1% 63.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
13 5 13 31 
41.9% 16.1% 41.9% 100.0% 
Total 
17 8 23 48 
35.4% 16.7% 47.9% 100.0% 
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  3.2. Controversy and initiator(s) of amendment opinions (the detailed 
number of amendment opinions related to table 8.3) 
- Distributive policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
47 8 55 
85.5% 14.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
53 9 62 
85.5% 14.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
13 28 41 
31.7% 68.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
85 69 154 
55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
98 97 195 
50.3% 49.7% 100.0% 
Total 
151 106 257 
58.8% 41.2% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
7 1 8 
87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
47 4 51 
92.2% 7.8% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
54 5 59 
91.5% 8.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
28 29 57 
49.1% 50.9% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
103 84 187 
55.1% 44.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
131 113 244 
53.7% 46.3% 100.0% 
Total 
185 118 313 
59.1% 40.9% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
10 1 11 
90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
9 0 9 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
19 1 20 
95.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
11 23 34 
32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
21 10 31 
67.7% 32.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
32 33 65 
49.2% 50.8% 100.0% 
Total 
51 34 85 
60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
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- Extractive policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
4  0 4 
100.0%  0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
3  0 3 
100.0%  0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
7  0 7 
100.0%  0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
1 13 14 
7.1% 92.9% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
7 5 12 
58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
8 18 26 
30.8% 69.2% 100.0% 
Total 
15 18 33 
45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
1 5 6 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
11 2 13 
84.6% 15.4% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
12 7 19 
63.2% 36.8% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
2 15 17 
11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
12 19 31 
38.7% 61.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
14 34 48 
29.2% 70.8% 100.0% 
Total 
26 41 67 
38.8% 61.2% 100.0% 
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  3.3. Controversy and acceptance of staff members’ amendment opinions 
(the detailed number of amendment opinions related to table 8.5) 
- Distributive policy  
Type 
Acceptance 
Controversy 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
4 2 0 6 
66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
37 6 3 46 
80.4% 13.0% 6.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
41 8 3 52 
78.8% 15.4% 5.8% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
9 1 3 13 
69.2% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
46 17 13 76 
60.5% 22.4% 17.1% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
55 18 16 89 
61.8% 20.2% 18.0% 100.0% 
Total 
96 26 19 141 
68.1% 18.4% 13.5% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy  
Type 
Acceptance 
Controversy 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
5 1 1 7 
71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
37 6 3 46 
80.4% 13.0% 6.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
42 7 4 53 
79.2% 13.2% 7.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
9 6 13 28 
32.1% 21.4% 46.4% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
76 9 11 96 
79.2% 9.4% 11.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
85 15 24 124 
68.5% 12.1% 19.4% 100.0% 
Total 
127 22 28 177 
71.8% 12.4% 15.8% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy  
Type 
Acceptance 
Controversy 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
7 2 1 10 
70.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
7 2 0 9 
77.8% 22.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
14 4 1 19 
73.7% 21.1% 5.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
4 3 3 10 
40.0% 30.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
11 9 0 20 
55.0% 45.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
15 12 3 30 
50.0% 40.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Total 
29 16 4 49 
59.2% 32.7% 8.2% 100.0% 
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- Extractive policy  
Type 
Acceptance 
Controversy 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
2 2 0 4 
50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
3 0 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
5 2 0 7 
71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
1 1 5 7 
14.3% 14.3% 71.4% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
1 1 6 8 
12.5% 12.5% 75.0% 100.0% 
Total 
6 3 6 15 
40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws 
Type 
Acceptance 
Controversy 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
10 0 1 11 
90.9% 0.0% 9.1% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
11 0 1 12 
91.7% 0.0% 8.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
0 0 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
10 1 1 12 
83.3% 8.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
10 1 3 14 
71.4% 7.1% 21.4% 100.0% 
Total 
21 1 4 26 
80.8% 3.8% 15.4% 100.0% 
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3.4. Controversy and initiator(s) of accepted amendment opinions (the 
detailed number of amendment opinions related to table 8.7) 
- Distributive policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
43 4 47 
91.5% 8.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
49 5 54 
90.7% 9.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
10 13 23 
43.5% 56.5% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
63 26 89 
70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
73 39 112 
65.2% 34.8% 100.0% 
Total 
122 44 166 
73.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
43 1 44 
97.7% 2.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
49 2 51 
96.1% 3.9% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
15 19 34 
44.1% 55.9% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
85 35 120 
70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
100 54 154 
64.9% 35.1% 100.0% 
Total 
149 56 205 
72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
9 1 10 
90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
9 0 9 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
18 1 19 
94.7% 5.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
7 14 21 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
20 5 25 
80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
27 19 46 
58.7% 41.3% 100.0% 
Total 
45 20 65 
69.2% 30.8% 100.0% 
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- Extractive policy 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
4 0 4 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
3 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
7 0 7 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
0 5 5 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
2 2 4 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
2 7 9 
22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 
Total 
9 7 16 
56.3% 43.7% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws 
Type 
Initiator(s) 
Controversy 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Non-substantive 
Controversial 
1 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
10 1 11 
90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
11 1 12 
91.7% 8.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
Controversial 
0 7 7 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
11 7 18 
61.1% 38.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
11 14 25 
44.0% 56.0% 100.0% 
Total 
22 15 37 
59.5% 40.5% 100.0% 
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  3.5. Type and initiator(s) of amendment opinions (the detailed number of 
amendment opinions related to table 8.8) 
- Distributive policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
13 28 41 
31.7% 68.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
19 29 48 
39.6% 60.4% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
47 8 55 
85.5% 14.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
85 69 154 
55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
132 77 209 
63.2% 36.8% 100.0% 
Total 
151 106 257 
58.8% 41.2% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
7 1 8 
87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
28 29 57 
49.1% 50.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
35 30 65 
53.8% 46.2% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
47 4 51 
92.2% 7.8% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
103 84 187 
55.1% 44.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
150 88 238 
63.0% 37.0% 100.0% 
Total 
185 118 303 
61.1% 38.9% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
10 1 11 
90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
Substantive 
11 23 34 
32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
21 24 45 
46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
9 0 9 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
21 10 31 
67.7% 32.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
30 10 40 
75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Total 
51 34 85 
60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
 
328 
 
- Extractive policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
4 0 4 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
1 13 14 
7.1% 92.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
5 13 18 
27.8% 72.2% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
3 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
7 5 12 
58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
10 5 15 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Total 
15 18 33 
45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
1 5 6 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
2 15 17 
11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
3 20 23 
13.0% 87.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
11 2 13 
84.6% 15.4% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
12 19 31 
38.7% 61.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
23 21 44 
52.3% 47.7% 100.0% 
Total 
26 41 67 
38.8% 61.2% 100.0% 
 
- Laws related to international treaties 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
0 0 0 
- - - 
Substantive 
0 0 0 
- - - 
Sub-total 
0 0 0 
- - - 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
2 1 3 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
1 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
3 1 4 
75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Total 
3 1 4 
75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
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  3.6. Type and acceptance of staff members’ amendment opinions (the 
detailed number of amendment opinions related to table 8.10) 
- Distributive policy  
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Type 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Non-
substantive 
4 2 0 6 
66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
9 1 3 13 
69.2% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
13 3 3 19 
68.4% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-
substantive 
37 6 3 46 
80.4% 13.0% 6.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
46 17 13 76 
60.5% 22.4% 17.1% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
83 23 16 122 
68.0% 18.9% 13.1% 100.0% 
Total 
96 26 19 141 
68.1% 18.4% 13.5% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy  
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Type 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Non-
substantive 
5 1 1 7 
71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
9 6 13 28 
32.1% 21.4% 46.4% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
14 7 14 35 
40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-
substantive 
37 6 3 46 
80.4% 13.0% 6.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
76 9 11 96 
79.2% 9.4% 11.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
113 15 14 142 
79.6% 10.6% 9.9% 100.0% 
Total 
127 22 28 177 
71.8% 12.4% 15.8% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy  
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Type 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Non-
substantive 
7 2 1 10 
70.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
4 3 3 10 
40.0% 30.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
11 5 4 20 
55.0% 25.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-
substantive 
7 2  0 9 
77.8% 22.2%  0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
11 9  0 20 
55.0% 45.0%  0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
18 11  0 29 
62.1% 37.9%  0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
29 16 4 49 
59.2% 32.7% 8.2% 100.0% 
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- Extractive policy  
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Type 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Non-
substantive 
2 2 0 4 
50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
2 2 1 5 
40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-
substantive 
3 0 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
1 1 5 7 
14.3% 14.3% 71.4% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
4 1 5 10 
40.0% 10.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total 
6 3 6 15 
40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws 
Controversy 
Acceptance 
Type 
Accepted 
wholly 
Accepted 
(revised) 
Rejected Total 
Controversial 
Non-
substantive 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
0 0 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
1 0 2 3 
33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-
substantive 
10 0 1 11 
90.9% 0.0% 9.1% 100.0% 
Substantive 
10 1 1 12 
83.3% 8.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
20 1 2 23 
87.0% 4.3% 8.7% 100.0% 
Total 
21 1 4 26 
80.8% 3.8% 15.4% 100.0% 
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3.7. Type and initiator(s) of accepted amendment opinions (the detailed 
number of amendment opinions related to table 8.11) 
- Distributive policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
10 13 23 
43.5% 56.5% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
16 14 30 
53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
43 4 47 
91.5% 8.5% 100.0% 
Substantive 
63 26 89 
70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
106 30 136 
77.9% 22.1% 100.0% 
Total 
122 44 166 
73.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
 
- Regulative policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
15 19 34 
44.1% 55.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
21 20 41 
51.2% 48.8% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
43 1 44 
97.7% 2.3% 100.0% 
Substantive 
85 35 120 
70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
128 36 164 
78.0% 22.0% 100.0% 
Total 
149 56 205 
72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
 
- Constituent policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
9 1 10 
90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
7 14 21 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
16 15 31 
51.6% 48.4% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
9 0 9 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
20 5 25 
80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
29 5 34 
85.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
Total 
45 20 65 
69.2% 30.8% 100.0% 
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- Extractive policy 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
4 0 4 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
0 5 5 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
4 5 9 
44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
3 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
2 2 4 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
5 2 7 
71.4% 28.6% 100.0% 
Total 
9 7 16 
56.3% 43.7% 100.0% 
 
- Basic laws 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
1 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Substantive 
0 7 7 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
1 7 8 
12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
10 1 11 
90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
Substantive 
11 7 18 
61.1% 38.9% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
21 8 29 
72.4% 27.6% 100.0% 
Total 
22 15 37 
59.5% 40.5% 100.0% 
 
- Laws related to international treaties 
Controversy 
Initiator(s) 
Type 
Staff Non-staff Total 
Controversial 
Non-substantive 
0 0 0 
- - - 
Substantive 
0 0 0 
- - - 
Sub-total 
0 0 0 
- - - 
Uncontroversial 
Non-substantive 
2 1 3 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Uncontroversial 
1 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sub-total 
3 1 4 
75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Total 
3 1 4 
75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
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4. Causal Networks about the Impact of the Committee Staff 
4.1. Mechanism in which the policy impact of the committee staff is exerted (the detailed version of figure 8.1) 
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4.2. Weak impact of the committee staff over politically controversial matters (the detailed version of figure 8.2) 
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